[221]*221POPOVICH, Judge:
In this case of first impression for our Commonwealth, we hold, inter alia, that an adjudicated incompetent may prosecute a civil action in divorce through a guardian or guardian ad litem.
Having reviewed the records and the parties’ briefs, we agree with appellant that appellee, Frank T. Syno, an adjudicated incompetent, may prosecute his civil action for divorce only by means of a guardian or guardian ad litem, and, thus, his divorce decree which was obtained without the assistance of an appointed guardian is void. Nevertheless, we are convinced that, under certain conditions, an incompetent should be permitted to file a divorce action in this Commonwealth through a guardian or guardian ad litem. Accordingly, we vacate the divorce decree and remand for appointment of a guardian ad litem and for determination of whether Mr. Syno is capable of making sound personal decisions, whether he possesses a reasonable understanding of the nature of the action for divorce and whether he desires this divorce action to be brought. Pa.R.C.P. 2056(d) (court may vacate judgment and enter an order in the nature of a procendendo).
The record reveals the following facts: On November 24, 1984, Mr. Syno filed a complaint seeking a divorce under Section 201(d) of the Divorce Code alleging that the parties had lived separate and apart for more than three years. Mrs. Syno filed an answer and new matter denying that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Mrs. Syno asserted that her husband had been adjudicated an incompetent five months prior to instituting the divorce action with the result that he was incapable of bringing such an action. Mr. Syno, in reply, asserted that he was competent and capable of bringing the divorce action. A master’s hearing followed in which Mr. Syno was allowed to testify despite Mrs. Syno’s continuing objection to his competency. Following the denial of her petitions to stay the proceedings pending the appointment of a guardian ad litem as well as to [222]*222compel Mr. Syno to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, Mrs. Syno ultimately filed a § 201(d) counter-affidavit admitting that the parties had lived separate and apart, from November 25, 1984.1 Following a second master’s hearing on October 27, 1987. Mr. Syno filed a petition for bifurcation. The trial court declined to order bifurcation until the filing of the master’s report and recommendation. On March 17, 1988, the master recommended granting the decree. Mrs. Syno’s ensuing appeal to this Court from the denial of her exceptions was quashed as interlocutory at Syno v. Syno, 389 Pa.Super. 505, 567 A.2d 717 (1989). On February 28, 1990, the trial court issued a decree in divorce, retaining jurisdiction of the ancillary claims. The present appeal followed.
Herein, appellant, Marie Syno, raises the following questions on appeal: 1) Whether appellee, Frank Syno, is an incompetent as defined by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure such that he may not prosecute any civil action in this Commonwealth except through a guardian or guardian ad litem; 2) Whether an incompetent may prosecute a divorce action in this Commonwealth through a guardian or guardian ad litem; 3) Whether the lower court erred in ordering bifurcation of the divorce and equitable distribution proceedings; 4) Whether the testimony of an adjudicated incompetent is admissible, competent evidence; and 5) Whether the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a mental examination of appellee.
Before addressing the issues raised by appellant, we must review the facts surrounding Mr. Syno’s prior incompetency adjudication. On June 29, 1984, First Eastern Bank of Pittston was appointed the guardian of Mr. Syno’s estate, upon stipulation of counsel; the trial court specifically noted in its order that “[t]he Court has not ruled on the issue, and there has been no request for a ruling, on [223]*223whether or not Frank Syno should have a guardian appointed for his person.”2 Order, dated 6/29/84. Mr. Syno’s psychiatric evaluation concluded that he suffers from an Amnestac Syndrome (DSM-III 294.00),3 a syndrome making him likely to become the victim of designing persons.
The record indicates Mr. Syno’s prior incompetency determination was limited, establishing Mr. Syno’s incompetency only with respect to management of his estate. There was not a determination of whether Mr. Syno should have a guardian appointed for his person. However, in permitting Mr. Syno to proceed without a guardian ad litem, the lower court created a kind of dichotomy among adjudicated incompetents which does not exist by law. Nowhere in the case law of the Commonwealth nor in our statutes is there authority for two distinct types of incompetents: those who are unable to manage their finances and those unable to manage their personal lives. See Pa.R.C.P. 2051; 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 102 and 5501. Rather, an incompetent is a person who meets either criterion. Once one has been determined to be incompetent, one is incompetent for all purposes until, by court order, the status of incompetency is lifted. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5517; Pa.R.C.P. 2051 (an incompetent is a person “who has been adjudicated incompe[224]*224tent”).4
Presently, it is undisputed that at the time this action was instituted, Mr. Syno had been declared incompetent. Pa.R.C.P. 2051 is quite specific, defining an incompetent as a person “(a) who has been adjudicated incompetent ...” Thus, Mr. Syno, absent an intervening determination of competency, is an incompetent for the purposes of this action. Pa.R.C.P. 2051, 2056(e) (“A finding of incompetency shall be based either on evidence presented to the court in which the action is pending, or on an adjudication of incompetency entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly, Mr. Syno cannot maintain a divorce action, or any civil suit for that matter, in his own name, but rather must be represented by a guardian or guardian ad litem. Pa.R.C.P. 2053, 2056(a). Once the lower court was alerted to the fact that Mr. Syno was an incompetent, the court, before proceeding, should have either required his current guardian, First Eastern Bank of Pittston, to assume its duties or appointed a guardian ad litem for the divorce action. Pa.R.C.P. 2056.5 Since Mr. Syno was not represented by a guardian in the divorce proceedings, the divorce decree is void.
Although Mrs. Syno is correct that it was error to permit Mr. Syno to pursue this divorce action in his own name, we reject her assertion that an incompetent should not be permitted to institute a divorce action in Pennsylvania. In fact, the rules of civil procedure governing actions for divorce or annulment anticipate that an incompetent can be a plaintiff in an divorce action. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.12 states: “... the plaintiff shall set forth in the complaint as to the [225]*225cause of action of divorce or for annulment (1) the names of the plaintiff and defendant and, if either party is a minor or incompetent, a statement to that effect and the name and address of such party’s guardian, if any ...” (emphasis added).
As previously stated, the question of whether a guardian ad litem may file a divorce action in this Commonwealth on behalf of his incompetent ward is a question of first impression for Pennsylvania appellate courts.
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[221]*221POPOVICH, Judge:
In this case of first impression for our Commonwealth, we hold, inter alia, that an adjudicated incompetent may prosecute a civil action in divorce through a guardian or guardian ad litem.
Having reviewed the records and the parties’ briefs, we agree with appellant that appellee, Frank T. Syno, an adjudicated incompetent, may prosecute his civil action for divorce only by means of a guardian or guardian ad litem, and, thus, his divorce decree which was obtained without the assistance of an appointed guardian is void. Nevertheless, we are convinced that, under certain conditions, an incompetent should be permitted to file a divorce action in this Commonwealth through a guardian or guardian ad litem. Accordingly, we vacate the divorce decree and remand for appointment of a guardian ad litem and for determination of whether Mr. Syno is capable of making sound personal decisions, whether he possesses a reasonable understanding of the nature of the action for divorce and whether he desires this divorce action to be brought. Pa.R.C.P. 2056(d) (court may vacate judgment and enter an order in the nature of a procendendo).
The record reveals the following facts: On November 24, 1984, Mr. Syno filed a complaint seeking a divorce under Section 201(d) of the Divorce Code alleging that the parties had lived separate and apart for more than three years. Mrs. Syno filed an answer and new matter denying that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Mrs. Syno asserted that her husband had been adjudicated an incompetent five months prior to instituting the divorce action with the result that he was incapable of bringing such an action. Mr. Syno, in reply, asserted that he was competent and capable of bringing the divorce action. A master’s hearing followed in which Mr. Syno was allowed to testify despite Mrs. Syno’s continuing objection to his competency. Following the denial of her petitions to stay the proceedings pending the appointment of a guardian ad litem as well as to [222]*222compel Mr. Syno to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, Mrs. Syno ultimately filed a § 201(d) counter-affidavit admitting that the parties had lived separate and apart, from November 25, 1984.1 Following a second master’s hearing on October 27, 1987. Mr. Syno filed a petition for bifurcation. The trial court declined to order bifurcation until the filing of the master’s report and recommendation. On March 17, 1988, the master recommended granting the decree. Mrs. Syno’s ensuing appeal to this Court from the denial of her exceptions was quashed as interlocutory at Syno v. Syno, 389 Pa.Super. 505, 567 A.2d 717 (1989). On February 28, 1990, the trial court issued a decree in divorce, retaining jurisdiction of the ancillary claims. The present appeal followed.
Herein, appellant, Marie Syno, raises the following questions on appeal: 1) Whether appellee, Frank Syno, is an incompetent as defined by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure such that he may not prosecute any civil action in this Commonwealth except through a guardian or guardian ad litem; 2) Whether an incompetent may prosecute a divorce action in this Commonwealth through a guardian or guardian ad litem; 3) Whether the lower court erred in ordering bifurcation of the divorce and equitable distribution proceedings; 4) Whether the testimony of an adjudicated incompetent is admissible, competent evidence; and 5) Whether the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a mental examination of appellee.
Before addressing the issues raised by appellant, we must review the facts surrounding Mr. Syno’s prior incompetency adjudication. On June 29, 1984, First Eastern Bank of Pittston was appointed the guardian of Mr. Syno’s estate, upon stipulation of counsel; the trial court specifically noted in its order that “[t]he Court has not ruled on the issue, and there has been no request for a ruling, on [223]*223whether or not Frank Syno should have a guardian appointed for his person.”2 Order, dated 6/29/84. Mr. Syno’s psychiatric evaluation concluded that he suffers from an Amnestac Syndrome (DSM-III 294.00),3 a syndrome making him likely to become the victim of designing persons.
The record indicates Mr. Syno’s prior incompetency determination was limited, establishing Mr. Syno’s incompetency only with respect to management of his estate. There was not a determination of whether Mr. Syno should have a guardian appointed for his person. However, in permitting Mr. Syno to proceed without a guardian ad litem, the lower court created a kind of dichotomy among adjudicated incompetents which does not exist by law. Nowhere in the case law of the Commonwealth nor in our statutes is there authority for two distinct types of incompetents: those who are unable to manage their finances and those unable to manage their personal lives. See Pa.R.C.P. 2051; 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 102 and 5501. Rather, an incompetent is a person who meets either criterion. Once one has been determined to be incompetent, one is incompetent for all purposes until, by court order, the status of incompetency is lifted. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5517; Pa.R.C.P. 2051 (an incompetent is a person “who has been adjudicated incompe[224]*224tent”).4
Presently, it is undisputed that at the time this action was instituted, Mr. Syno had been declared incompetent. Pa.R.C.P. 2051 is quite specific, defining an incompetent as a person “(a) who has been adjudicated incompetent ...” Thus, Mr. Syno, absent an intervening determination of competency, is an incompetent for the purposes of this action. Pa.R.C.P. 2051, 2056(e) (“A finding of incompetency shall be based either on evidence presented to the court in which the action is pending, or on an adjudication of incompetency entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly, Mr. Syno cannot maintain a divorce action, or any civil suit for that matter, in his own name, but rather must be represented by a guardian or guardian ad litem. Pa.R.C.P. 2053, 2056(a). Once the lower court was alerted to the fact that Mr. Syno was an incompetent, the court, before proceeding, should have either required his current guardian, First Eastern Bank of Pittston, to assume its duties or appointed a guardian ad litem for the divorce action. Pa.R.C.P. 2056.5 Since Mr. Syno was not represented by a guardian in the divorce proceedings, the divorce decree is void.
Although Mrs. Syno is correct that it was error to permit Mr. Syno to pursue this divorce action in his own name, we reject her assertion that an incompetent should not be permitted to institute a divorce action in Pennsylvania. In fact, the rules of civil procedure governing actions for divorce or annulment anticipate that an incompetent can be a plaintiff in an divorce action. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.12 states: “... the plaintiff shall set forth in the complaint as to the [225]*225cause of action of divorce or for annulment (1) the names of the plaintiff and defendant and, if either party is a minor or incompetent, a statement to that effect and the name and address of such party’s guardian, if any ...” (emphasis added).
As previously stated, the question of whether a guardian ad litem may file a divorce action in this Commonwealth on behalf of his incompetent ward is a question of first impression for Pennsylvania appellate courts. However, commencement of an action for divorce by an incompetent through a guardian was approved by the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County in the case of Carver Estate, 5 D. & C.3d 743 (1977).
Research reveals that many states adhere to the view that, absent statutory authority, a guardian cannot maintain an action for dissolution of an incompetent’s marriage. 6 ALR3d 681, Power of Incompetent Spouse’s Guardian, Committee, or Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacating of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage, or to Make a Compromise or Settlement in such Suit, § 3[a]. See also, In re Marriage of Drews, 115 Ill.2d 201, 104 Ill.Dec. 782, 503 N.E.2d 339 (1986), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1001, 107 S.Ct. 3222, 97 L.Ed.2d 729 (1987); Phillips v. Phillips, 203 Ga. 106, 45 S.E.2d 621 (1947); In re Jennings 187 N.J.Super. 55, 453 A.2d 572 (1981); Hart v. Hart, 705 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Ct.App. 1986); Mallory v. Mallory, 113 Misc.2d 912, 450 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1982); Cohen v. Cohen, 346 So.2d 1047 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1977).
However, other jurisdictions permit a guardian to institute a divorce proceeding on behalf of his incompetent ward. 6 ALR3d 681, § 3[b]. See also, In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal.3d 476, 110 Cal.Rptr. 897, 516 P.2d 289 (1973); Pace v. Pace, 32 Ohio App.3d 47, 513 N.E.2d 1357 (1986); In re Marriage of Gannon, 104 Wash.2d 121, 702 P.2d 465 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 125 Mich.App. 164, 335 N.W.2d 657 (1983); Cohn v. Carlisle, 310 Mass. 126, 37 N.E.2d 260 (1941); Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 5 So.2d 401 (1941).
[226]*226Mindful that an incompetent may maintain a civil action in Pennsylvania only through a guardian, we find the latter view compelling, especially in light of this Commonwealth’s definition of an “incompetent” as a person who, because of infirmities, is unable to manage property or lacks the capacity to make responsible decisions concerning his person. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501; Pa.R.C.P. 2051. It is certainly possible that an “incompetent” may be unable to manage his estate and, yet, be capable of making reasonable choices concerning his personal life. Thus, we should not deny per se an adjudicated “incompetent” the right to proceed with a divorce action.
Rather, an incompetent spouse should be permitted to institute a divorce proceeding through a guardian or guardian ad litem,, provided the incompetent is capable of exercising reasonable judgment as to personal decisions, understands the nature of the action and is able to express unequivocally a desire to dissolve the marriage. Cf. Marriage of Higgason, 110 Cal.Rptr. at 902-903, 516 P.2d at 294-295 (proceeding may be brought on behalf of a spouse under conservatorship through his or her guardian ad litem, provided it is established that the spouse is capable of exercising a judgment, and expressing the wish that the marriage be dissolved on account of irreconcilable differences and has done so); In re Marriage of Kutchins, 136 Ill.App.3d 45, 90 Ill.Dec. 722, 482 N.E.2d 1005 (1985), later appeal 157 Ill.App.3d 384, 110 Ill.Dec. 269, 510 N.E.2d 1300 (1987), appeal denied 117 Ill.2d 544, 115 Ill.Dec. 401, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987). Further, the incompetent must be found “competent” to testify and able to verify statements made in his or her complaint. Commonwealth v. Trudell, 371 Pa.Super. 353, 538 A.2d 53 (1988); In re Rhoads, 70 D. & C.2d 509 (1974).
Upon review of the record, we remand for a clearer determination of whether Mr. Syno is capable of exercising reasonable judgment and expressing his desire to obtain the divorce. We do not believe that the record adequately demonstrates that Mr. Syno meets those requirements as [227]*227Mr. Syno’s testimony6 is insufficient to demonstrate unequivocally his ability to make reasonable decisions and his desire to obtain the divorce, especially when viewed in the light of Dr. Gene F. Harding’s letter to the court.7
[229]*229We turn now to Mrs. Syno’s contention that the the trial court erred in granting a decree in divorce without holding a hearing on the propriety of bifurcation and in failing to issue an opinion analyzing the rationale for bifurcation. We reject this contention under the law of the case.
The doctrine of the “law of the case” provides that where an appellate court has considered and decided a question on appeal, that court will not, in a subsequent appeal of another phase of the same case, reconsider its previous ruling. Roskwitalski v. Reiss, 338 Pa.Super. 85, 487 A.2d 864 (1985), appeal denied 514 Pa. 619, 521 A.2d 933 (1986). In Syno I, the earlier case before this Court we stated:
A court may enter a decree in divorce and dispose of ancillary matters at a later date. The legislature’s clear intent is to permit the entry of a divorce decree while collateral matters remain pending, thus allowing “the parties to quickly begin the task of restructuring their lives[,] ... so that the marriage and each party’s personal life are not held hostage to economic demands. The unexplained delay in this case only serves to thwart the purpose of the Divorce Code (citations omitted).
Syno I, 389 Pa.Super. at 508-09, 567 A.2d at 719. Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a trial court must strictly comply with the mandate of the appellate court. The trial court in the present case properly ordered bifurca[230]*230tion as mandated by this Court in our opinion quashing the appeal at Syno I.
We need not presently address the fourth and fifth issues raised by Mrs. Syno in light of our decision to vacate the divorce decree and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. However, we will comment further to reiterate that an adjudicated incompetent may be “competent” to testify. In those cases where an adjudicated incompetent is a witness, the court must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the incompetent understands his or her duty to tell the truth and whether he or she is able to perceive, remember and communicate the pertinent facts. Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 447 A.2d 234 (1982); Anderson, supra; Trudell, supra. If the court so finds, then the incompetent is “competent” to testify. To that end, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may order the incompetent to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 387 A.2d 46 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 490 A.2d 438 (1985).
In conclusion, we vacate the divorce decree and remand this action with instructions to the lower court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Mr. Syno and to conduct a more thorough hearing on Mr. Syno’s capacity to make reasonable decisions concerning his person, his understanding of the nature of a divorce action and his desire to maintain this action.
Decree vacated and case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
DEL SOLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.