Sylla v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-3525
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 20 2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KOULA SYLLA, No. 25-3525 Agency No. Petitioner, A073-672-614 v. * TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 10, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: COLLINS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.

Koula Sylla (“Sylla”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA’s”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

1. “We review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions because the BIA affirmed the

IJ and cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994).” Cruz v. Bondi, 146

F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748

(9th Cir. 2022)). “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility

determinations, for substantial evidence.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir.

2020) (citing Qiu v. Barr, 944 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2019)). We also “review for

substantial evidence whether [Sylla] would more likely than not be tortured if returned

to [Mauritania].” Cruz, 146 F.4th at 737 (citing Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,

1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010)).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[O]nly the most

extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility

determination.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The agency permissibly

concluded that Sylla made material misrepresentations on various documents

submitted to the immigration authorities. On those documents, Sylla did not disclose

his December 1995 and June 1996 asylum applications that he filed under two

different aliases. Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[W]hen an

-2- asylum applicant has lied to immigration authorities, an [IJ] can find the applicant not

credible, even when the falsehood is not directly related to the basis for the asylum

claim.”). The agency also identified a number of other inconsistent and implausible

aspects of Sylla’s testimony. Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2021)

(explaining that “even minor inconsistencies may have a legitimate impact on a

petitioner’s credibility”); Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 836 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n

IJ may consider . . . the inherent plausibility of a witness’s account.”). For example,

Sylla’s testimony about his departure from Mauritania was inconsistent with

information he provided in connection with his third asylum application. Moreover,

there were various discrepancies in Sylla’s testimony regarding whether he understood

that he was using an alias and whether he or a third-party signed the aliases on his first

two applications. The agency considered Sylla’s explanations for the false

information he submitted and the discrepancies in his testimony. But the agency was

not required to accept Sylla’s explanations, and the record does not compel a contrary

conclusion. See Li, 13 F.4th at 961 (“[T]he Board and IJ [are] not required to accept

[the applicant’s] explanation for [a] discrepancy” where “the record does not compel

a contrary conclusion.”).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Sylla’s

documentary evidence did not rehabilitate his credibility. See Garcia v. Holder, 749

-3- F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that applicant’s documentary evidence was

insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony). Sylla advances various arguments in his

brief regarding the IJ’s rehabilitation finding, none of which articulates how these

documents would have rehabilitated the issues with his credibility. In the absence of

credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence, the agency properly

concluded that Sylla failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of

removal. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020).

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of protection under CAT.

“An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT

protection.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. But the record evidence independent of

Sylla’s testimony “does not meet the high threshold of establishing that it is more

likely than not that [he] will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official.” See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927.

Accordingly, we deny Sylla’s petition.

PETITION DENIED.

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