Swift & Co. v. United States

343 U.S. 373, 72 S. Ct. 716, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1008, 96 L. Ed. 1008, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2658
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 5, 1952
Docket282
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 343 U.S. 373 (Swift & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swift & Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 373, 72 S. Ct. 716, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1008, 96 L. Ed. 1008, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2658 (1952).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Minton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 28, 1947, the appellant, Swift and Company, filed a complaint, later amended, before the Interstate Commerce Commission against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and other railroads, alleging that the charges on direct carload shipments of livestock1 from points outside Illinois to its proposed new plant in the Chicago Packingtown area are (1) unreasonable, (2) unduly prejudicial to livestock as a commodity, and (3) unduly prejudicial to Swift as against its competitors, all in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 Swift asked for the establishment of reasonable joint through rates for line-haul carriers serving Chicago and the Chicago Junction Railroad's lessee, the Chicago River and Indiana Railroad, hereafter called Junction,3 such joint rates to [376]*376include delivery of livestock to Swift’s industrial siding at its proposed plant and not to exceed the line-haul rates now in effect at the Union Stock Yards and other points of delivery on line-haul railroads in the area. Swift’s proposed plant, near its present plant, will be located on Junction’s rails and not on those of any line-haul carrier.

After Swift filed its complaint, Junction sought to file a new tariff cancelling the present one as it applies to livestock. The present tariff provides a flat charge for switching carload freight to and from industrial sidings and team tracks; under the new tariff, Junction would not have offered switching services for livestock under any circumstances. Swift and others objected, and the filing was suspended so that the Commission could hear Swift’s complaint and Junction’s request together on a consolidated record.

The Commission dismissed the complaint and refused to cancel the switching tariff as to livestock. Swift & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 274 I. C. C. 557. Swift then sought review of the Commission’s order of dismissal by a statutory three-judge District Court. That court sustained the Commission’s order, and this appeal followed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b). No question is raised as to the Commission’s refusal to cancel the switching tariff.

All livestock shipments by rail to the Chicago area are handled solely by the line-haul carriers; delivery is direct to line-haul terminals at the line-haul rate. Such terminals are the Stock Yards and those unloading pens located on switches directly adjoining a line-haul carrier’s rails. Swift is the one large packer in Chicago that has such a line-haul terminal and can receive all its direct shipments of livestock at line-haul rates. This terminal, the Omaha Packing Plant, a Swift subsidiary situated two and one-half miles northeast of Swift’s present plant and outside the Stock Yards district, is located on the [377]*377rails of the Burlington Railroad, a line-haul carrier. Here Swift receives its direct livestock shipments, about 6,500 carloads annually, which it trucks to its plant in the Stock Yards area.4 The balance of the livestock delivered in Chicago, whether direct or otherwise, is delivered to the Stock Yards, with some minor exceptions, by the line-haul carriers over certain Junction running tracks to the Stock Yards unloading pens. The carriers have trackage rights on these running tracks for which a charge is paid to Junction. On direct shipments to a packer delivered to the Stock Yards, the Yards’ facilities, including a vast system of runways, overpasses and tunnels, are used to drive the livestock from the unloading pens to the packer’s plant. The charges for these facilities are fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture. Junction has never switched or handled any livestock except in an emergency.

The delivery of livestock in the Stock Yards area is to be contrasted with that of “dead freight.” 5 The line-haul carriers make no direct deliveries of dead freight; none of the approximately 500 industries in the area have plants located on line-haul rails and the line-haul carriers do not have trackage rights over the Junction rails which lead to the plants. Consequently, all dead freight is switched by Junction and delivered to the industrial sidings or team tracks alongside of and connecting with Junction’s rails.

Since Junction provides only trackage rights for the livestock shipments to the Stock Yards, the line-haul rates on livestock do not include Junction as a participating carrier. Junction does participate, however, in joint [378]*378rates for dead freight. For any switching operation not covered by line-haul rates in which Junction participates, Junction has a flat switching charge of $28.80 per car.6 This charge would apply to any direct shipments at Swift’s proposed plant in Packingtown which, as we have noted, is not located on any line-haul rails but rather on Junction’s rails.

Trains for the Stock Yards are made up at the break-up yards of the line-haul carriers, located from a few to several miles from the Stock Yards. A train coming in from the west moves to the Ashland Yards of Junction, which are divided into the North and the South Yards. The North Yards are used for the receipt, separation, and distribution of cars of dead freight and empties outbound from the packers and other industries, while the South Yards are used for cars of dead freight inbound. This division is made by three parallel running tracks owned by Junction, numbered 1102, 1103 and 1104, over which the line-haul carriers are permitted to operate in and out of the Stock Yards. Sixty-three percent of the trains to the Stock Yards area are composed exclusively of livestock. The balance are consolidated trains, carrying both livestock and dead freight.

An all-livestock train moves by line-haul carrier, using its own crew and equipment, eastward over Track 1103 to the unloading pens in the Stock Yards and is there spotted for unloading. While the cars are being unloaded, the engine cuts off, passes around to the other end of the train and couples on; when the unloading is completed, the train returns westward over Track 1102 or 1104 through Junction’s Ashland Yards and back to its breakup yards with the empties. This all-livestock train is [379]*379delivered to the Stock Yards in one movement by line-haul carriers for line-haul rates.

A consolidated train moves through the Ashland Yards from the break-up yards to a certain point on Track 1103, just as an all-livestock train. In this consolidated train, the dead-freight cars are hauled just behind the engine and the livestock cars in the rear. At a certain point on Track 1103 the dead-freight cars are cut out and switched into the South Yards upon one of the nine Junction receiving tracks, from which tracks Junction later moves the dead freight to the industrial sidings and team tracks of the packers and other industries located in the area. After the dead freight has been switched to the receiving tracks, the line-haul engine returns to Track 1103 to couple onto the livestock cars and move them to the unloading pens. While the dead freight is being switched to the South Yards, Track 1103, the only means of ingress to the Stock Yards from the west, is blocked by the livestock cars remaining on the track.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Boeta v. Federal Aviation Administration
831 F.3d 636 (Fifth Circuit, 2016)
Covey v. ConAgra, Inc.
763 F. Supp. 479 (D. Colorado, 1991)
Petition of RMG
454 A.2d 776 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1982)
Matter of Valuation Proceedings, Etc.
531 F. Supp. 1191 (Special Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 1982)
Secretary of Defense v. Public Utilities Commission
437 A.2d 1342 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
United States v. Public Utilities Commission
393 A.2d 1092 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1978)
A. Lindberg & Sons, Inc. v. United States
408 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Michigan, 1976)
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. United States
391 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1975)
Alabama Power Company v. United States
316 F. Supp. 337 (District of Columbia, 1970)
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission
174 S.E.2d 304 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1969)
Metropolitan District Commission v. Department of Public Utilities
224 N.E.2d 502 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1967)
Interstate Motor Freight System v. United States
243 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Michigan, 1965)
Hilton Hotels International, Inc. v. Minimum Wage Board
74 P.R. 628 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1953)
Hilton Hotels International, Inc. v. Junta de Salario Mínimo
74 P.R. Dec. 670 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1953)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
343 U.S. 373, 72 S. Ct. 716, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1008, 96 L. Ed. 1008, 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2658, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swift-co-v-united-states-scotus-1952.