Brown, J.
When sec. 72.01 (3) (b), Stats., was enacted by ch. 44, Laws of 1903, it was already law in New York and had been construed by the courts of that state. “It is a settled rule in the construction of statutes, that where a statute has received a judicial construction in another state, and is then adopted, it is taken with the construction which has been so given to it.” Draper v. Emerson (1867), 22 Wis. 147, 150; Estate of Bullen (1910), 143 Wis. 512, 520, 128 N. W. 109. The prior New York decisions dealt with cases of life insurance.
“. . . the uniform tenor of all adjudications in this state in which the question has been determined is to the effect that, where a policy has been made payable to a named individual, [259]*259the proceeds are not subject to the transfer tax of the state of New York [cases cited], but that where a policy is made payable to the decedent’s estate, or to his executors, administrators, and assigns without qualification, the proceeds form a part of the estate and are subject to the imposition of a transfer tax.” Matter of Haedrich (1929), 134 Misc. 741, 743, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395, 399.
Of course, the transfer of interest is the same, whether the insurer makes payment to the executor or to some other named person. Why is it that such a transfer was held taxable in one instance and exempt in the other? The explanation given by Matter of Voorhees (1922), 200 App. Div. 259, 263, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168, 171, is that when the proceeds of the policy come to the estate or its representative they are distributed to heirs in accordance with the laws of inheritance and the taxes imposed on inheritance come into operation; while if they are paid by the insurer to some other named beneficiary they do not come into the estate at all and are not affected by the laws, including tax laws, to which inheritances are subject.
The explanation given by Matter of Haedrich, supra, is different. In exempting from tax life insurance payable to a corporate trustee for the benefit of the assured’s wife and daughter, the court pointed out that, historically, insurance benefits payable to the dependents of the assured are charged with a public interest which has excluded them from taxation and the legislature must clearly express an intention to reverse this policy before the court will believe it so intended. The court said (134 Misc. 747, 236 N. Y. Supp. 402) :
“On this theory it must follow that, in any case, the primary test of taxability of proceeds will be whether they are dedicated to the use of individuals toward whom the insured owed some especial duty, and if this requirement be satisfied the courts will, so far as possible, give effect to the dictates of this fundamental public policy and will not seek to draw nice distinctions as to the extent of the assured’s moral or [260]*260legal obligations to those ultimately benefited nor as to the conduit through which such benefit is to pass.
“The foregoing is not intended to convey the impression that it is beyond the power of the legislature to effect a change in the law so as to make taxable the proceeds of insurance policies payable to specified beneficiaries. It is, however, the opinion of this court that in view of the long-established public policy connected with such matters, no presumption exists that the legislature intends to disturb this well-settled law and policy, and any change in enactment must be quite clear and explicit to be construed as effecting such a result.”
The first New York adjudications dealt only with life insurance cases but the reasons given applied as exactly to annuities as they did to life insurance and, when a question concerning the taxability of an annuity arose in that state, it was decided in conformity with the life insurance decisions. Thus, in Matter of Wilson (1931), 143 Misc. 742, 744, 257 N. Y. Supp. 230, 233, relying on Matter of Haedrich, supra, the court said:
“In so far as this legislative policy of nontaxation of insurance moneys has been applied in this state, there has been no distinction made between the outright payment of the proceeds to a designated beneficiary at the death of the insured, and an annuity or trust income to a designated person which has come into existence at that time. The general policy of exemption applies with equal force to a joint annuity, as here, created in the lifetime of both parties which may be affected by the death of one. In each case the right of the specific beneficiary or life tenant or survivor to receive the amount arises out of the contract of insurance. It is not deemed to be property passing as part of the estate, nor is it to be considered as a taxable interest or transfer taking effect in possession or enjoyment upon death, within the meaning of the tax law. The pertinent rule of statutory construction is that if there be ‘a doubt upon the question, it should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer as represented by the executors and against the taxing power.’ Matter of McMullen, 199 App. Div. 393, 399, 192 N. Y. Supp. 49, 53, [261]*261affirmed 236 N. Y. 518, 142 N. E. 266, citing In re Fayerweather, 143 N. Y. 114, 119, 38 N. E. 278. Certainty as to the rights of the widow, rather than doubt, exists in the present case. In the absence of any specific statutory requirement for an assessment, her interest should be exempted from taxation.”
We understand that the New York statute has since been amended, affecting the results of more recent cases.
Coming now to Wisconsin, respondent argues that this state imported New York’s interpretation of its statute only in so far as it applied to the proceeds of life insurance policies, since only those adjudications existed when our legislature adopted the New York statute. We cannot agree to this. In our view, by the enactment of the statute Wisconsin took over the principles upon which the New York courts had rested their interpretation of it and, just as those principles which were stated in life insurance matters were decisive when annuity cases arose in New York, so they are decisive whenever appropriate in Wisconsin even though it is not life insurance which is in question.
The Bullen Case, supra, dealt in part with life insurance, but included also matters concerning the situs of the taxable estate and the contemplation of death as a motive for the transfer of interest. In deciding the latter questions, which are not involved now, we cited the precedents of the New York courts in construing the New York Inheritance Tax Law and said they were brought here with the statute; but in determining the taxability of the proceeds of the life insurance policy payable to the widow we made no reference to any New York decision, merely reciting in a short paragraph, 143 Wis. at page 523, the policy was payable to Mrs. Bullen with no right in Mr. Bullen to change the beneficiary, and Mrs. Bullen had not relinquished her rights in it. Therefore, we said, the policy remained Mrs. Bullen’s property and was not a part of Mr. Bullen’s estate, and was not taxable. For [262]*262all that appears or can now be ascertained, the decision on this point may have rested on our original view of the law, uninfluenced by any prior New York interpretation of a like statute. Whether our Bullen
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Brown, J.
When sec. 72.01 (3) (b), Stats., was enacted by ch. 44, Laws of 1903, it was already law in New York and had been construed by the courts of that state. “It is a settled rule in the construction of statutes, that where a statute has received a judicial construction in another state, and is then adopted, it is taken with the construction which has been so given to it.” Draper v. Emerson (1867), 22 Wis. 147, 150; Estate of Bullen (1910), 143 Wis. 512, 520, 128 N. W. 109. The prior New York decisions dealt with cases of life insurance.
“. . . the uniform tenor of all adjudications in this state in which the question has been determined is to the effect that, where a policy has been made payable to a named individual, [259]*259the proceeds are not subject to the transfer tax of the state of New York [cases cited], but that where a policy is made payable to the decedent’s estate, or to his executors, administrators, and assigns without qualification, the proceeds form a part of the estate and are subject to the imposition of a transfer tax.” Matter of Haedrich (1929), 134 Misc. 741, 743, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395, 399.
Of course, the transfer of interest is the same, whether the insurer makes payment to the executor or to some other named person. Why is it that such a transfer was held taxable in one instance and exempt in the other? The explanation given by Matter of Voorhees (1922), 200 App. Div. 259, 263, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168, 171, is that when the proceeds of the policy come to the estate or its representative they are distributed to heirs in accordance with the laws of inheritance and the taxes imposed on inheritance come into operation; while if they are paid by the insurer to some other named beneficiary they do not come into the estate at all and are not affected by the laws, including tax laws, to which inheritances are subject.
The explanation given by Matter of Haedrich, supra, is different. In exempting from tax life insurance payable to a corporate trustee for the benefit of the assured’s wife and daughter, the court pointed out that, historically, insurance benefits payable to the dependents of the assured are charged with a public interest which has excluded them from taxation and the legislature must clearly express an intention to reverse this policy before the court will believe it so intended. The court said (134 Misc. 747, 236 N. Y. Supp. 402) :
“On this theory it must follow that, in any case, the primary test of taxability of proceeds will be whether they are dedicated to the use of individuals toward whom the insured owed some especial duty, and if this requirement be satisfied the courts will, so far as possible, give effect to the dictates of this fundamental public policy and will not seek to draw nice distinctions as to the extent of the assured’s moral or [260]*260legal obligations to those ultimately benefited nor as to the conduit through which such benefit is to pass.
“The foregoing is not intended to convey the impression that it is beyond the power of the legislature to effect a change in the law so as to make taxable the proceeds of insurance policies payable to specified beneficiaries. It is, however, the opinion of this court that in view of the long-established public policy connected with such matters, no presumption exists that the legislature intends to disturb this well-settled law and policy, and any change in enactment must be quite clear and explicit to be construed as effecting such a result.”
The first New York adjudications dealt only with life insurance cases but the reasons given applied as exactly to annuities as they did to life insurance and, when a question concerning the taxability of an annuity arose in that state, it was decided in conformity with the life insurance decisions. Thus, in Matter of Wilson (1931), 143 Misc. 742, 744, 257 N. Y. Supp. 230, 233, relying on Matter of Haedrich, supra, the court said:
“In so far as this legislative policy of nontaxation of insurance moneys has been applied in this state, there has been no distinction made between the outright payment of the proceeds to a designated beneficiary at the death of the insured, and an annuity or trust income to a designated person which has come into existence at that time. The general policy of exemption applies with equal force to a joint annuity, as here, created in the lifetime of both parties which may be affected by the death of one. In each case the right of the specific beneficiary or life tenant or survivor to receive the amount arises out of the contract of insurance. It is not deemed to be property passing as part of the estate, nor is it to be considered as a taxable interest or transfer taking effect in possession or enjoyment upon death, within the meaning of the tax law. The pertinent rule of statutory construction is that if there be ‘a doubt upon the question, it should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer as represented by the executors and against the taxing power.’ Matter of McMullen, 199 App. Div. 393, 399, 192 N. Y. Supp. 49, 53, [261]*261affirmed 236 N. Y. 518, 142 N. E. 266, citing In re Fayerweather, 143 N. Y. 114, 119, 38 N. E. 278. Certainty as to the rights of the widow, rather than doubt, exists in the present case. In the absence of any specific statutory requirement for an assessment, her interest should be exempted from taxation.”
We understand that the New York statute has since been amended, affecting the results of more recent cases.
Coming now to Wisconsin, respondent argues that this state imported New York’s interpretation of its statute only in so far as it applied to the proceeds of life insurance policies, since only those adjudications existed when our legislature adopted the New York statute. We cannot agree to this. In our view, by the enactment of the statute Wisconsin took over the principles upon which the New York courts had rested their interpretation of it and, just as those principles which were stated in life insurance matters were decisive when annuity cases arose in New York, so they are decisive whenever appropriate in Wisconsin even though it is not life insurance which is in question.
The Bullen Case, supra, dealt in part with life insurance, but included also matters concerning the situs of the taxable estate and the contemplation of death as a motive for the transfer of interest. In deciding the latter questions, which are not involved now, we cited the precedents of the New York courts in construing the New York Inheritance Tax Law and said they were brought here with the statute; but in determining the taxability of the proceeds of the life insurance policy payable to the widow we made no reference to any New York decision, merely reciting in a short paragraph, 143 Wis. at page 523, the policy was payable to Mrs. Bullen with no right in Mr. Bullen to change the beneficiary, and Mrs. Bullen had not relinquished her rights in it. Therefore, we said, the policy remained Mrs. Bullen’s property and was not a part of Mr. Bullen’s estate, and was not taxable. For [262]*262all that appears or can now be ascertained, the decision on this point may have rested on our original view of the law, uninfluenced by any prior New York interpretation of a like statute. Whether our Bullen decision, in the part concerning the life insurance feature, was an unexpressed recognition of prior New York decisions or whether it was the result of independent consideration is not material now. At present we have payments due Mrs. Sweet by reason of her husband’s retirement agreement. The federal retirement system prescribes the beneficiary and the employee cannot change it. This beneficiary has not relinquished her rights. The payments come direct to her. We consider that the same conditions prevail that produced the decision in the Bullen Case, supra, and by reason of the result there the proceeds of the retirement agreement are not taxable under sec. 72.01 (3) (b), Stats.
After the decision in the Bullen Case, supra, holding that life insurance proceeds were not taxable to Bullen’s widow, the legislature enacted ch. 253, Laws of 1915, which expressly provided that “insurance payable upon the death of any person . . . shall be deemed a part of his estate for the purpose of the tax, and shall be taxable to the person or persons entitled thereto.” Though amended in certain respects this act, now known as sec. 72.01 (7), Stats., forms the basis of the present taxation of insurance benefits. Thus there is now a clear and express declaration by the Wisconsin legislature that insurance, payable on the death of the assured, shall be taxed, whether payable to the estate or to another beneficiary. A fundamental rule of tax law is “that a tax cannot be imposed without clear and express language for that purpose, and where ambiguity and doubt exist it must be resolved in favor of the person upon whom it is sought to impose the tax.” Wadhams Oil Co. v. State (1933), 210 Wis. 448, 459, 245 N. W. 646, 246 N. W. 687. Respondent does not contend that retirement benefits like those in question [263]*263constitute life insurance. Indeed, it submits much authority to the contrary, in which we concur. Accordingly, we cannot construe the term “insurance payable upon the death of any person,” as used in sec. 72.01 (7), as language which expressly and without doubt or ambiguity shows a legislative intent to subject these benefits to taxation. Being taxable neither under sec. 72.01 (3) (b) by virtue of the decision in Estate of Bullen, supra, nor as insurance under sec. 72.01 (7), it follows that the order taxing them must be reversed.
By the Court. — -That portion of the order dealing with the annuity due under the federal civil service retirement system is reversed. Cause remanded with directions to exclude the annuity from the taxable estate.