SUSAN E. PERCLE NO. 20-CA-244
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
LELOASHIA HARMON TAYLOR AND COURT OF APPEAL JON GEGENHEIMER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON , STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 808-610, DIVISION "A" HONORABLE RAYMOND S. STEIB, JR. , JUDGE PRESIDING = ., ~
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Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Hornberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, Robert A. Chaisson, Stephen J. Windhorst, Hans J. Liljeberg, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
REVERSED SMC FHW SJW HJL JJM
DISSENTS WITH REASONS JGG MEJ RAC COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, SUSAN E. PERCLE Stephen M. Petit, Jr. Brittany D. Rogers Scott L. Sternberg M. Suzanne Montero
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, LELOASHIA HARMON TAYLOR Leloashia Taylor CHEHARDY, C.J.
This is an election suit arising out of the race for a district court judgeship in
the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson.
Factual Background and Procedural History
On July 22, 2020, defendant, Leloashia Harmon Taylor, qualified for the
office of Judge, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Division “M,” by filing a
sworn notice of candidacy. In her notice of candidacy, Ms. Taylor listed her
domicile address as 2414 Avenue Mont Marte, Gretna, Louisiana. Also in her
notice of candidacy, Ms. Taylor certified, among other things, that:
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT:
*** 8) If I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator or representative in congress, that if I claim a homestead exemption or a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, I am registered and vote in the precinct in which that residence is located, unless I reside in a nursing home as defined in La. R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government.
9) If I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, I have filed my federal and state income tax returns, have filed for an extension of time for filing either my federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.
10) I acknowledge that I am subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act if I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator, representative in congress, or member of a committee of a political party and that I do not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.
11) If I am a candidate for a major or district office as defined in La. R.S. 18:1483.1, I have filed each report that I have been required to file by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, if any were previously due …
20-CA-244 1 *** 13) I certify that I am knowledgeable of the laws governing election offenses as provided in Chapter 10 of Title 18 …
14) All of the statements contained herein are true and correct. [Emphasis supplied.]
Ms. Taylor signed and dated the notice of candidacy form before a notary
public and two witnesses on July 22, 2020, certifying under oath that all of the
statements contained therein were true and correct.
Plaintiff, Susan E. Percle, a duly-qualified elector in the Parish of Jefferson,
filed the instant suit seeking to disqualify Leloashia Harmon Taylor as a candidate
for District Court Judge, Division “M,” in the primary election scheduled for
November 3, 2020.1 Pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492, Ms. Percle filed an objection to
Ms. Taylor’s candidacy on the basis that Ms. Taylor failed to qualify for the
primary election in the manner required by La. R.S. 18:463. Specifically, Ms.
Percle challenged the “qualifying” information certified by Ms. Taylor in her
notice of candidacy as true and correct. In particular, Ms. Percle alleged that Ms.
Taylor falsified her notice of candidacy, in violation of LSA-R.S. §
18:463(A)(2)(a)(viii), by certifying on July 22, 2020, that she was registered to
vote in the same precinct where she claimed a homestead exemption that was still
in effect. In fact, Ms. Taylor is registered to vote in Precinct 232B, the precinct in
which 2413 Avenue Mont Marte, Gretna, Louisiana is located and where Ms.
Taylor certified in her notice of candidacy that she is domiciled, while she enjoyed
the benefit of a homestead exemption on a residence located at 2509 Guiffrias
Avenue, Unit 606, Metairie, Louisiana, which is situated in precinct 076.
1 Ms. Percle also named Jon Gegenheimer, only in his capacity as clerk of court for the Parish of Jefferson, as a defendant in order to effect service of process on the candidate’s agent pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1407, as he is the agent for service of all political candidates in the Parish of Jefferson and is the chief elections officer for the Parish of Jefferson.
20-CA-244 2 Ms. Percle further alleged that Ms. Taylor falsified her notice of candidacy,
in violation of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(vi), by certifying that she had filed each
report the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act required her to file. Specifically, Ms.
Percle alleged that insofar as Ms. Taylor registered her campaign website on
March 27, 2020 (which contains the statement that it was “Paid for by The
Committee to elect Leloashia Harmon-Taylor, approved by the candidate”), and
launched a Facebook page announcing her candidacy on April 19, 2020, Ms.
Taylor was required by La. R.S. 18:1491.1, et seq., to file Form 100 (regarding the
designation of principal or subsidiary campaign committees) and Form 200
(Statement of Organization), within ten days of those events, and failed to do so.
Ms. Percle alleged that Ms. Taylor’s certification that she had filed each report
required by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act was false.
Based on these false certifications made by Ms. Taylor in her notice of
candidacy regarding her qualifying information, Ms. Percle averred that Ms.
Taylor’s candidacy for district court judge should be disqualified.
A hearing on the matter was held on July 30, 2020. At the hearing, Ms.
Percle called Ms. Taylor and representatives from the Jefferson Parish Registrar of
Voters and the Jefferson Parish Assessor’s office to testify. Philip Trupiano, Chief
Deputy for the Registrar of Voters, testified that Ms. Taylor has been registered to
vote at 2413 Avenue Mont Marte, Gretna, Louisiana (the “Gretna Property”) since
May 14, 2020. Ms. Taylor corroborated his testimony. Ms. Taylor further testified
that she rents the Gretna Property, does not own it, and that she and her husband
and children reside there. Ms. Taylor also testified and submitted evidence that the
Gretna Property is her domicile.
Timothy Porteous, a representative of the Jefferson Parish Assessor’s office,
testified that according to their records, the Taylors have enjoyed a homestead
exemption on a condominium they own located at 2509 Guiffrias Street, Unit 606,
20-CA-244 3 Metairie, Louisiana (the “Metairie Property”), from at least 2008 through July 29,
2020. Mr. Porteous’s testimony was confirmed by the testimony of Ms. Taylor’s
husband, Matthew Taylor, who stated that he revoked the homestead exemption on
the Metairie property on July 29, 2020, seven days after Ms. Taylor had filed her
notice of candidacy. Mr. Porteous further testified that no taxes have been due on
the Metairie Property since 2006 since the homestead exemption was greater than
the taxable assessment on the property. He also stated that in order for a
homestead exemption to exist on a property, the owner (or representative of the
owner) must personally apply for a homestead exemption by verifying that he both
owns and occupies the property. Moreover, if and when the person claiming the
homestead exemption no longer owns and occupies the property, he is bound to
immediately remove the homestead exemption. Mr. Porteous confirmed that a
condo association cannot apply for a homestead exemption for or on behalf of the
individual condominiums owners; each condominium owner must apply. Ms.
Taylor testified that the Metairie Property is currently rented to a third party and
that the Taylors have not occupied the condo for many months.
Ms. Taylor testified that she did not intend to make the false statement on
July 22, 2020, when she certified in her notice of candidacy that she was registered
to vote in the same precinct where she enjoyed a homestead exemption. According
to Ms. Taylor, although she acknowledged that she and her husband had never paid
taxes on the Metairie Property, she was unaware of the homestead exemption at the
time she filed her notice of candidacy and did not personally claim the homestead
exemption on the property she and her husband jointly own. Ms. Taylor contends
that because she did not personally “claim” the homestead exemption, her
certification on the notice of candidacy was not false.
Further, as to her certification in the notice of candidacy that she had filed all
of the forms she was required to file by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, Ms.
20-CA-244 4 Taylor testified that at the time this statement was made it was not false because
she did not understand that the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act required her to
file Form 100 and Form 200 with the Louisiana Board of Ethics. Ms. Taylor
testified that she launched her campaign for district court judge in or about March
or April when she built her website and created her Facebook page. She stated
that, in March or April, she personally spent more than $1,000 on professionally
produced videos and production of campaign materials to promote her candidacy.
Additionally, the record evidence established that Ms. Taylor was soliciting
donations for her campaign during this period, and prior to filing any forms. Ms.
Taylor further testified that while she chose to file her Form 100 and Form 200
with the Louisiana Board of Ethics after being served with Ms. Percle’s objection
to her candidacy and consulting with a lawyer, she maintained her belief that these
were not forms she was required by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act to file.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court allowed the parties to file
post-trial briefs. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment and reasons for
judgment wherein he found that Ms. Taylor did, in fact, falsely certify in her notice
of candidacy that she was registered to vote in the same precinct in which she
claimed her homestead exemption. The trial court further found that “[Ms.
Taylor’s] certification that she filed each report she was required to file by the
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act was incorrect.” Despite these factual findings—
that Ms. Taylor made two false certifications in her notice of candidacy—the trial
court determined that these false certifications were not legally disqualifying.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that under La. R.S. 18:492, Ms. Percle was
required to prove “one or more grounds from the exclusive list” contained within
the statute in order for Ms. Taylor to be disqualified. Ms. Percle’s objection to Ms.
Taylor’s candidacy was based on La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), i.e., that Ms. Taylor
“failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law.”
20-CA-244 5 Despite the trial court’s factual findings that Ms. Taylor made false certifications in
her notice of candidacy, the trial court determined that because the homestead
exemption certification and the filing of Forms 100 and 200 were not expressly
enumerated in La. R.S. 18:492, it could not disqualify Ms. Taylor. Accordingly,
the trial court dismissed Ms. Percle’s petition.2 Ms. Percle now seeks review of
that ruling.
Issue Presented for Review
The issue presented for this Court’s review is whether La. R.S.
18:492(A)(1)—which provides that a candidate may be disqualified for failing to
“qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law”—includes
disqualification for a false certification made by the candidate in her notice of
candidacy that she is registered to vote at the same address where she claims her
homestead exemption, or a false certification by the candidate in her notice of
candidacy that she has filed all of the required forms with the Board of Ethics, if
any are previously due, that the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act requires her to
file.
Law and Discussion
Applicable Legal Principles
The issue for review before this Court is purely a legal one. Appellate
review of questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally
correct or incorrect. Buford v. Williams, 11-568 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/12), 88
So.3d 540, 545, writ denied, 12-264 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So.3d 630. If a decision is
based on a trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the law, rather than an exercise
of its discretion, it is not entitled to deference. North v. Doucet, 18-437 (La. App.
5 Cir. 8/1/18), 253 So.3d 815, 818, writ denied, 18-1294 (La. 8/3/18), 249 So.3d
2 The judgment was also issued in favor of Jon Gegenheimer, in his official capacity as clerk of court for the Parish of Jefferson.
20-CA-244 6 829 (citing Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135,
1137).
La. Const. Art. V, § 24(A), which sets forth the qualifications for judicial
candidates, provides that a judge of the district court shall have been domiciled in
the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding the election and
shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least eight years. It is
undisputed that Ms. Taylor has been domiciled in Jefferson Parish for more than
one year and will have been admitted to the practice of law for eight years
preceding the election set for November 3, 2020.
In an election contest, because election laws must be interpreted to give the
electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to the
candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate should be disqualified.
Landiak v. Richmond, 05-758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541; Russell v.
Goldsby, 00-2595 (La. 9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1049-51. A court determining
whether the person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof must
liberally construe the laws governing the conduct of elections “so as to promote
rather than defeat candidacy.” Becker v. Dean, 03-2493 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So.2d
864, 869; Russell, 780 So.2d at 1051; Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679, 680 (La.
1991).
The purpose of the notice of candidacy is to provide sufficient information
to show a candidate is qualified to run for the office he seeks. Troclair v. Joseph,
14-675 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So.3d 315, 317, writs not considered, 14-1909
(La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 572 and 14-1920 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 937. Any
doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing
the candidate to run for public office. Becker, 854 So.2d at 869; Russell, 780
So.2d at 1051; Dixon, 587 So.2d at 680.
20-CA-244 7 The “Manner Prescribed by Law” for Candidate Qualification
La. R.S. 18:492 sets forth the exclusive grounds upon which an objection to
a candidate’s qualification can be made. In the instant matter, Ms. Percle bases her
disqualification claim against Ms. Taylor solely on the ground that Ms. Taylor
“failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law.” See
La. R.S. 18:463(A)(1). The “manner prescribed by law” for qualification is the
notice of candidacy and La. R.S. 18:461(A)(1), which provides that a person who
desires to become a candidate in a primary election shall qualify by timely filing
notice of his candidacy, which shall be accompanied … by the qualifying fee and
any additional fee imposed.” The requirements for the notice of candidacy and the
certifications and disclosures the notice must contain are set forth in La. R.S.
18:463, which states, in pertinent part:
A. (1)(a) A notice of candidacy shall be in writing and shall state the candidate’s name, the office he seeks, the address of his domicile, and the parish, ward, and precinct where he is registered to vote …
*** (2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:
(i) That he has read the notice of his candidacy.
(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying. ***
(v) That he acknowledges that he is subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act if he is a candidate for any office other than United States senator, representative in congress, or member of a committee of a political party and that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.
(vi) That, if he is a major or district office candidate as defined in R.S. 18:1483, he has filed each report he has been required to file by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, if any were previously due.
20-CA-244 8 ***
(viii) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress or a candidate who resides in a nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government,3 that if he claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is located.
(ix) That all of the statements contained in it are true and correct.
(b) The certificate shall be executed before a notary public or shall be witnessed by two persons who are registered to vote on the office the candidate seeks. [Emphasis added.]
As noted previously herein, La. R.S.18:463 was amended in 2019 to
include the requirement that a candidate certify in his notice of candidacy that, if
he claims a homestead exemption, his voter registration is located in the same
precinct where the property upon which he claims the exemption is located.
Here, in her notice of candidacy, Ms. Taylor swore that:
6) I have read this Notice of Candidacy …
*** 8) If I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator or representative in congress, that if I claim a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, I am registered and vote in the precinct in which that residence is located, unless I reside in a nursing home as defined in La. R.S. 20:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government.
*** 11) If I am a candidate for a major or district office as defined in La. R.S. 18:1483, I have filed each report that I have been required to file by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, if any were previously due. [Emphasis added.]
*** 3 It is undisputed that Ms. Taylor does not reside in either a nursing home or a veterans’ home. See La. R.S. 18:461(2)(a)(viii).
20-CA-244 9 14) All the statements contained herein are true and correct.
The trial court found, and we agree, that based on the uncontroverted
evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the certifications Ms. Taylor
made in her notice of candidacy with respect to the homestead exemption and the
filing of the reports she was required to file with the Louisiana Ethics Board were
false. However, the trial court made a legal determination that because making
false statements on the notice of candidacy is not one of the seven enumerated
reasons listed in La. R.S. 18:492(A) “for objecting to a candidacy of a person,” the
falsity of Ms. Taylor’s statements were not disqualifying to Ms. Taylor’s
candidacy. We find the trial court’s legal interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492 was
clearly wrong.
La. R.S. 18:492(A) provides for the following specific objections:
(1) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law.
(2) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election within the time prescribed by law.
(3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election.
(4) The defendant is prohibited by law from becoming a candidate for one or more of the offices for which he qualified.
(5) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).
(6) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2).
(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S.
20-CA-244 10 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.
As previously stated, Ms. Percle’s objection to Ms. Taylor’s candidacy
seeking her disqualification is based solely on the first grounds enumerated in La.
R.S. 492(A)(1). That is, that Ms. Taylor failed to qualify in the manner prescribed
by law. The “manner for qualifying” in La. R.S. 18:461 is the filing of an accurate
notice of candidacy, under oath, accompanied by the qualifying fee. According to
the trial judge’s interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492, even though La. R.S. 18:463(A)
requires a candidate to certify by affidavit nine separate requirements in his notice
of candidacy, a candidate is only subject to disqualification for making false
certifications if the false certification he made in his notice of candidacy is with
regard to subjections (5), (6), or (7); i.e., that he does not owe fines, fees or
penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act or the Code of
Governmental Ethics, or that for the previous five years, he filed his federal and
state income tax returns, filed for extensions of time, or was not required to file
such returns. This interpretation of the statute would render meaningless the
remaining language of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(1) and is inaccurate. Therefore, we find
that any information in the notice of candidacy that correlates to subsection (1)
through (7) of La. R.S. 18:463(A), and that requires a candidate’s certification by
affidavit, is substantive and/or material information. Any inaccuracies, mistakes or
false statements made in the notice of candidacy concerning or regarding this
substantive and/or material information are grounds for disqualification under La.
R.S. 18:492(A)(1). This interpretation is what gives effect to La. R.S. 18:461(A).
This Court, in Joseph v. Trosclair, 14-675 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150
So.3d 315, 317, writ not considered, 14-1909 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 572, and
writ not considered, 14-1920 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 937, considered the issue of
whether a candidate may be disqualified pursuant La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) for
20-CA-244 11 “failing to qualify for the principal election in the manner prescribed by law,”
when the notice of candidacy contained information certified by the candidate that
was inaccurate or in error. There, we held that a notice of candidacy must be “free
from errors” and “satisfy the legal requirements of accuracy when it is filed.” Id.
In Trosclair, the candidate qualified for District Court Judge in St. John the Baptist
Parish as a Democrat, but her party affiliation listed on her voter registration was
“None.” Id. at 316. The trial judge disqualified her candidacy due to the
inaccurate statement on her qualifying form, which statement the candidate
certified as true and correct. In affirming the trial court’s ruling, we found that the
error the candidate made concerned “material information that is required by law
to be accurate so that balloting can be properly published” and that “Ms. Joseph’s
failure to properly declare her party affiliation on her notice of candidacy has
disqualified her from candidacy.” Id. at 318-19.
In Trosclair, as in this case, the candidate’s notice of candidacy contained at
least one, if not two, substantive false statements that the candidate certified as true
and correct in her notice of candidacy. Even though the evidence showed that the
candidate attempted to remedy the issues after the suit to disqualify was filed, she
was nevertheless disqualified because the defects could not be remedied after the
fact.
What is at stake here is no less than the integrity of the process of qualifying
for public office. To allow a candidate to include false or inaccurate information
under oath, without allowing the corresponding remedy of disqualification for
making false statements will render the affidavit meaningless. In the case sub
judice, Ms. Taylor does not dispute the trial court’s factual findings that the
statements she made in her notice of candidacy about her homestead
exemption/voter registration and the filing of forms required by the Louisiana
Ethics Board were false. These particular statements were contained in a section
20-CA-244 12 of the notice of candidacy that required Ms. Taylor’s certification under oath that
the statements were true and correct. Ms. Taylor does not contest the trial court’s
finding that she, in fact, falsely certified these statements as true and correct in her
notice of candidacy. Based upon our prior ruling in Trosclair, and having
determined herein that any information contained in a notice of candidacy that
requires the candidate’s certification by affidavit constitutes substantive and/or
material information, and that inaccuracies or falsities made by the candidate
regarding this information are grounds for disqualification under La. R.S.
18:492(A)(1), we find that the false certifications made by Ms. Taylor in her notice
of candidacy disqualify her from candidacy in the primary election for the district
court judge’s race. The trial court committed reversible error in concluding
otherwise. See also, Senegal v. Obafunwa, 99-1449, (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/27/99), 745
So.2d 74, 76; Madden v. Edwards, 436 So.2d 759, 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983),
writ denied sub nom. Madden v. Musmeci, 437 So.2d 287 (La. 1983), and writ
denied, 437 So.2d 287 (La. 1983).
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial judge as a matter of law, and
we hereby find that defendant, Leloashia Harmon Taylor, shall be disqualified for
the office of Judge, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Division “M.”
REVERSED
20-CA-244 13 SUSAN E. PERCLE NO. 20-CA-244
LELOASHIA HARMON TAYLOR AND COURT OF APPEAL JON GEGENHEIMER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE STATE OF LOUISIANA OF LOUISIANA
CHAISSON, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion to reverse the trial
court’s ruling that dismissed the petition to disqualify Ms. Taylor’s candidacy
for Judge of Division “M” of the 24th Judicial District Court. I agree with the
trial court’s detailed reasoning and analysis in reaching its decision to not
disqualify Ms. Taylor as a candidate for the subject office.
Although the majority opinion acknowledges the legal principles that
election laws “must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice
of candidates,” the court must “liberally construe the laws governing the conduct
of elections so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy,” and “doubts as to the
qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing a candidate to
run for public office,” the majority then proceeds to disregard these principles in
favor of an arguably incorrect interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492 that further
disregards its plain language and adds a new judicial rule not supported by that
language.
La. R.S. 18:492(A) states:
20-CA-244 1 An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law. (2) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election within the time prescribed by law. (3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election. (4) The defendant is prohibited by law from becoming a candidate for one or more of the offices for which he qualified. (5) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2). (6) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that he does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of Governmental Ethics as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2). (7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.
(Emphasis added).
The statute uses the mandatory “shall” and thus enumerates the exclusive
grounds upon which a candidate in a primary election may be challenged and
disqualified. Although the Legislature, in subsections (5) thru (7), expressly
provides for disqualification on the grounds of false certifications in the Notice of
Candidacy, those subsections deal with discrete and specific certifications required
by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2). La. R.S. 18:492(A) is silent as to disqualification on the
grounds of inaccuracies or falsities in any of the other certifications required by La.
R.S. 18:463(A)(2). It is presumed that the Legislature was well aware of all of the
20-CA-244 2 certifications required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2) when it adopted La. R.S.
18:492(A).
The two false certifications alleged by Ms. Percle (that the candidate “has
filed each report he has been required to file by the Campaign Finance disclosure
Act, if any were previously due” under La. R.S.18:463(2)(a)(vi), and that the
candidate “claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII,
Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the
precinct in which that residence is located” under La. R.S. 18:463(2)(a)(viii)), do
not appear in La. R.S. 18:492(A) as grounds for disqualification. Cognizant of this
fact, Ms. Percle alleges the ground for disqualification of Ms. Taylor pursuant to
La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), i.e., failure to qualify “in the manner prescribed by law,”
proposing an interpretation of that provision to include errors, inaccuracies or
falsities in a candidate’s Notice of Candidacy that are of a “material” or
“substantive” nature. The trial court declined to adopt such a broad and expansive
interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1).1
In contrast, the majority of this Court, in my opinion, does adopt a broad and
expansive interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1), specifically finding that an
“accurate” Notice of Candidacy is required. The majority further finds that “any
information in the notice of candidacy that requires a candidate’s certification by
affidavit, is substantive and/or material information. And, any inaccuracies,
misstatements or false statements made in the notice of candidacy concerning or
regarding this substantive and/or material information are grounds for
disqualification under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1).” (Emphasis added). It appears that
1 It is also important to note there is no dispute that Ms. Taylor has met the qualifications for judicial candidates set forth in La. Const. art. V, 24(A), namely that Ms. Taylor has been domiciled in the district for one year prior to the election and that she has been admitted to the practice of law for eight years preceding the November 3, 2020 election.
20-CA-244 3 the majority’s test for determining which statements are substantive and/or
material turns upon whether the statement is one that requires the candidate’s
“certification by affidavit.”2
I am also concerned that the majority’s test for determining which
statements are substantive and/or material makes no distinction between statements
that are clearly false statements and those that are legitimately honest mistakes,
giving no consideration to the intent of the candidate. The majority states that Ms.
Taylor has acknowledged that the incorrect statements were “false,” implying to
me that Ms. Taylor intentionally made the misrepresentations. However, Ms.
Taylor testified that she was not aware of the homestead exemption taken on the
Metairie property by her husband and that she did not believe that she had any
reports due pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, clearly an indication
that her misstatements were inadvertent.3 In my opinion, if a judicial rule is to be
created regarding false or inaccurate statements outside of those identified in La.
R.S. 18:492(A), then a distinction should be made between those that are
unintended error and those that are deliberately fraudulent.
Of apparent concern to the majority is that the trial court’s interpretation of
La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) “would render meaningless the language of La. R.S.
18:463(A)(2).” I respectfully disagree. La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2) simply enumerates
a list of declarations to be executed on the notice of candidacy; it does not contain
a penalty provision stating that a candidate shall be disqualified should any of
those enumerated statements later be proven false or inaccurate. La. R.S.
2 I note that in Trosclair v. Becnel, 14-676 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So.3d 324, this Court summarily rejected one of the grounds of disqualification alleged by Ms. Trosclair (i.e., that Judge Becnel failed to “swear an oath” when filing her Notice of Candidacy), by finding that La. R.S. 18:463 does not require a candidate to “swear an oath.” 150 So.3d at 328. 3 Whether such explanations are reasonable and believable would be a determination for trial courts faced with such explanations, but only if the judicial rule established by the majority draws a distinction between unintended error and those that are deliberately fraudulent.
20-CA-244 4 18:492(A)(5)-(7) clearly and explicitly provides which false certifications will
potentially result in disqualification should a candidate be challenged and the false
certification be proven.4
In Trosclair v. Becnel, 14-676 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So.3d 324, this
Court, citing Hamilton v. Royal Int’l Petroleum Corp., 05-846 (La. 2/22/06), 934
So.2d 25, 33, stated: [I]t is not the function of the judicial branch in a civilian legal
system to legislate by inserting penalty provisions into statutes where the
legislature has chosen not to do so.” 150 So.3d at 327-28. In my opinion, the
majority in this case provides the penalty provision that the Legislature chose not
to provide. The Legislature could have easily provided in La. R.S. 18:492 that any
false or inaccurate certification in the Notice of Candidacy would result in
disqualification, yet it chose to expressly provide for disqualification for only three
very specific and limited instances of false certifications, despite knowing that an
additional six certifications are required in the Notice of Candidacy. In my
opinion, providing express grounds for disqualification based upon false
certifications, to the exclusion of others, is deliberate on the part of the Legislature.
An alternative, and reasonable, interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) is
that any prospective candidate that satisfies the requirements of La. R.S. 18:461,
entitled “manner of qualifying,” by filing a timely Notice of Candidacy
accompanied by the qualifying fee and any additional fee imposed will have
qualified in the “manner prescribed by law” pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1). It
is undisputed in this case that Ms. Taylor did file her Notice of Candidacy timely
and paid the required fees.
4 While I acknowledge that a persuasive argument can be made that the law should provide for disqualification of a candidate that makes any false certification in her Notice of Candidacy, I am of the opinion that such a policy determination is best left to the Legislature, not to a judicially created rule not contained within the text of the disqualification statute.
20-CA-244 5 In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) renders
meaningless the language of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5)-(7) regarding false
certifications.5 In La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5)-(7), the Legislature has determined which
false certifications of items set forth in La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2) are grounds for
disqualification. La. R.S. 18:492 simply does not state that any false certification
on the Notice of Candidacy is grounds for disqualification, nor does it state that
any “substantive” or “material” false certifications are grounds for disqualification.
Statutory interpretation is a process the courts engage in when the language
of a statute is susceptible of different meanings. In order to reach the language of
La. R.S. 18:463 so crucial to the majority’s interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492, it had
to reach beyond the text of La. R.S. 18:492 itself. According to longstanding
principles of judicial interpretation, this should only be done when the words of a
statute are ambiguous or susceptible to different meanings. La. C.C. arts. 10, 12.
Though not explicitly stated, the majority’s reasoning relies on a finding that the
phrase “in the manner prescribed by law” of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) is ambiguous
or unclear.
If these words are indeed ambiguous, then the majority’s interpretation may
be considered a reasonable one. However, the alternative interpretation, set forth
by the trial court, is also reasonable. Indeed, for something to be ambiguous
requires it to be susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. If there are
two or more reasonable legal interpretations of La. R.S. 18:492 before us, then the
Court must choose the interpretation that gives the electorate the widest possible
set of candidates and construe the laws so as to promote rather than defeat
candidacy. The majority’s interpretation disqualifies Ms. Taylor, one of only two
5 If any false or inaccurate certification in the Notice of Candidacy is grounds for disqualification, then the language of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5)-(7) is superfluous.
20-CA-244 6 candidates in this race, which means the electorate will have no meaningful choice
of candidate.
By reaching this conclusion, I do not in any way condone or encourage
candidates to be untruthful or careless in their Notice of Candidacy and, as a
result thereof, not face the consequence of possible disqualification. However, it
is the province of the legislature to write the laws and the courts to enforce the
laws as written, and thus, if the legislature desires that the two items pertinent
herein to be grounds for disqualification, then it should specifically say so, like it
did in sections (5), (6), and (7) of La. R.S. 18:492(A).
For the stated reasons, I find that Ms. Percle has failed to prove any ground
for disqualification of Ms. Taylor pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492. I therefore would
affirm the judgment of the trial court and allow Ms. Taylor to remain a candidate
for the office of Judge, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Division “M.”
20-CA-244 7 SUSAN E. PERCLE NO. 20-CA-244
LELOASHIA HARMON TAYLOR AND JON COURT OF APPEAL GEGENHEIMER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA STATE OF LOUISIANA
GRAVOIS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
I respectfully dissent for all of the reasons assigned by Judge Chaisson.
I further want to add that although the majority relies upon Trosclair v.
Joseph, 14-675 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So.3d 315, 317, writ not
considered, 14-1909 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 572, and writ not considered, 14-
1920 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So.3d 937, I find that case both factually and legally
distinguishable. In Trosclair, the candidate qualified for District Court Judge in
St. John the Baptist Parish as a Democrat, but her party affiliation listed on her
voter registration was “None.” Id. at 316. The candidate’s party affiliation was
material information required for balloting to be published by the Secretary of
State, and the error in question, the discrepancy between the party affiliation
listed on her voter registration and on her qualifying documents, could not be
corrected after the fact, and thus served as a basis for disqualifying the candidate.
Here, the alleged false or incorrect information provided by Ms. Taylor is not
material information required for balloting or publication by the Secretary of
State, and therefore, in my opinion, La. R.S. 18:492 does not provide the remedy
of disqualification therefor.
20-CA-244 1 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the
ruling of the trial court that dismissed the petition objecting to the candidacy of
Ms. Taylor.
20-CA-244 2 SUSAN E. PERCLE NO. 20-CA-244
LELOASHIA HARMON TAYLOR AND JON COURT OF APPEAL GEGENHEIMER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA STATE OF LOUISIANA
JOHNSON, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I, respectfully, dissent from the majority opinion in this matter that
Leloashia Harmon-Taylor failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner
prescribed by law as a candidate for Judge, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
Court, Division “M.” In her petition, Susan Percle (“Ms. Percle”) objected to
Ms. Harmon-Taylor’s qualification on the grounds that Ms. Harmon-Taylor
“failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law”
pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1). The trial judge correctly interpreted La. R.S.
18:461, 18:463, and 18:492.
The trial court correctly determined that a person who desires to qualify as
a candidate in the manner prescribed by law, enumerated in La. R.S. 18:461,
shall qualify as a candidate upon timely filing of the notice of candidacy,
accompanied by either a nominating petition or a qualifying fee. Ms. Percle did
not allege that Mrs. Harmon-Taylor failed to timely file her notice of candidacy,
nominating petition, or qualifying fee. Therefore, Ms. Percle did not meet her
burden of proving a ground for an objection to candidacy and her objection to
Mrs. Harmon-Taylor’s candidacy cannot be sustained.
20-CA-244 1 I strongly disagree with the majority’s assertion that the trial court’s
interpretation of La. R.S. 18:492(A)(1) is inaccurate. The legislature listed seven
grounds for an objection to candidacy. A plain reading of the language of the
statute suggests that the list of grounds provided by La. R.S. 18:492 is definitive
and exclusive. The legislature did not add language, such as “including, but not
limited to”, when itemizing the grounds for objection that may disqualify a
potential candidate. Unlike the list of examples included in (a) the definition of
domestic abuse in La. R.S. 46:2132; or (b) the relief granted by a protective
order pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1236(A); or (c) the recreational purposes outlined
in La. R.S. 9:2795, which are prefaced by the phrase “including, but not limited
to”, the list of grounds for an objection specified in La. R.S. 18:492 is
exhaustive, comprehensive, and complete. Legislation is a solemn expression of
legislative will. La. C.C. art. 2. The legislature did not choose to make false
certification of any of the affirmations included in the notice of candidacy
pursuant to La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a) grounds for an objection. Instead, the
legislature only contemplated disqualifying an otherwise qualified candidate in a
few instances. A candidate who timely qualifies, in the manner prescribed by
law, and meets the qualifications of the office may be disqualified when a
candidate falsely certified that: (1) no outstanding fines, fees, or penalties were
owed pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (CDNA); or (2) no
outstanding fines, fees, or penalties were owed pursuant to the Code of
Governmental Ethics; or (3) that the last five years’ state and federal tax returns
were filed timely, if a candidate were required to file, or an extension of time
was requested.
I would also argue that the trial court’s interpretation does not render the
language of La. R.S. 18:461 meaningless. The trial court correctly found that Mrs.
Harmon-Taylor falsely certified that she was registered to vote in the precinct in
20-CA-244 2 which she claimed a homestead exemption as required by La. R.S.
18:463(A)(2)(a)(viii). Mrs. Harmon-Taylor also falsely certified that she filed all
reports required by the CDNA required of her as a district office candidate by La.
R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(v). Mrs. Harmon-Taylor’s notice of candidacy is public
record. An interested party could certainly inform the electorate of the inaccurate
certifications. The electorate, if given a chance, can decide if and how these
offenses will impact her suitability as a candidate.
“[E]lection laws do not “indicate that it was the purpose of the law makers to obstruct with mere technical difficulties, the exercise of the right, which every citizen has, to seek the approval of his political associates, or of the public at large. ‘To the contrary, the whole spirit of the legislation is to encourage the multiplication of worthy candidates for nominations to public office, in order that the body of voters constituting a political party, or constituting the electorate at large, may have the benefit of a choice, and not be compelled to accept candidates chosen by the minority or thrust upon them in some other way.’”
Roe v. Picou, 361 So.2d 874, 878 (La. 1978) citing Langridge v. Dauenhauer, 120
La. 450, 452-53, 45 So. 387, 388 (La. 1908).
Further, the CDNA contemplates violations by any candidate, the treasurer
or chairman of a political committee, or any other person required to file any
reports. See La. R.S. 18:1505.4-1505.6. Through the CDNA, the legislature also
established a supervisory committee, composed of the members of the Board of
Ethics, charged with administering and enforcing the provisions of the act, and
empowered to investigate suspected and alleged violations. La. R.S. 18:1511.1
and18:1511.4. The law, as it stands, assigns the duty of addressing claims of
CDNA violations primarily to the supervisory committee and not to the courts.
Similarly, if the candidate violated the Judicial Code of Conduct, the Supreme
20-CA-244 3 Court, upon recommendation from the Judiciary Commission, is authorized to
discipline the wrongdoer.
Respectfully, in my opinion the majority’s holding in the case sub judice,
and in Trosclair, in which I also filed a dissent, is wrong. When a law is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the
law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in
search of the intent of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9.
The legislature is presumed to have acted with deliberation and to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter. Under longstanding rules of statutory construction, where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. Thus, a statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed fair purpose and intention the legislature had in enacting it. In addition, a general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute controls over a broader, more general statute. It is a fundamental rule that when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character. Id. Also, there is a presumption that those who enact statutory provisions act deliberately and with full knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with knowledge of the effect of their act and a purpose in view.
Capital City Press, L.L.C. v. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Sup'rs, 13-01(La.
App. 1 Cir. 12/30/14); 168 So.3d 727, 737–38, writ denied, 15-209 (La.
4/17/15); 168 So.3d 401. Reading the relevant statutes and code articles together
supports a finding that the legislature did not intend for every error, or even
every substantive error, to disqualify otherwise qualified candidates.
20-CA-244 4 Edwards is also distinguishable from the instant case because Edwards did
not attach his financial statement to his notice of candidacy. Affixing that
statement to the notice was the manner of qualifying prescribed by the law at
that time.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that, although Petitioner proved (and
Mrs. Taylor-Harmon admitted during testimony) that Mrs. Harmon-Taylor
falsely certified on her notice of candidacy that she submitted the forms required
by the CDNA and the home on which her family enjoyed a homestead
exemption was not in the same precinct as the precinct in which she was
registered to vote, the trial court did not commit legal error when it found that
the petitioner did not prove a ground for an objection to Mrs. Taylor-Harmon’s
candidacy. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment, dismiss Ms.
Percle’s objection, and allow Mrs. Harmon-Taylor to run for the office of Judge,
Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Division “M.”
20-CA-244 5 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
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20-CA-244 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HON. RAYMOND S. STEIB, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE) BRITTANY D. ROGERS (APPELLANT) M. SUZANNE MONTERO (APPELLANT) SCOTT L. STERNBERG (APPELLANT) STEPHEN M. PETIT, JR. (APPELLANT) LELOASHIA TAYLOR (APPELLEE) CAREY B. DASTE (APPELLEE)
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