Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court RAYMOND TODD SURFACE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1236 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-01004-LTB-RTG) HOME MORTGAGE ALLIANCE, LLC; (D. Colo.) GUARANTEED RATE, INC.; HALLIDAY, WATKINS & MANN, P.C.; HONORABLE J. ERIC ELLIFF; HONORABLE PAUL D. LOPEZ; HONORABLE DAVID BLACKETT,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Raymond Todd Surface appeals the dismissal of his pro se action challenging
his state foreclosure and eviction proceedings. The district court determined the
action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it sought to overturn the
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 2
state court judgments. 1 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
I
According to the complaint, Mr. Surface financed the purchase of real property
by executing a note and deed of trust in favor of defendant Home Mortgage Alliance,
LLC. His mortgage was serviced by defendant Guaranteed Rate, Inc., which
“attempted to convince and intimidate [him] into [making] additional payments.”
R. at 7. The defendant law firm of Halliday, Watkins & Mann P.C. filed a state
foreclosure action, over which defendant state court judge J. Eric Elliff presided.
Judge Elliff “issued a judgment against [Mr. Surface] in [the state foreclosure action]
and ordered the property to be auctioned.” Id. (capitalization omitted). The property
was then sold by defendant Paul D. Lopez, who is “the Public Trustee and Clerk &
Recorder for the City and County of Denver.” Id. at 6. Mr. Surface was evicted in
state court proceedings presided over by defendant state court judge David Blackett.
Based on these allegations, Mr. Surface brought the underlying federal action,
claiming violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He
averred his home was unlawfully seized and sold without due process, he was
subjected to double jeopardy because he was forced to pay for his home twice, and he
had no opportunity to challenge the validity of the debt or speak to the state court.
He also alleged defendants engaged in extortion and racketeering by foreclosing on
1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 2 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 3
his home. For relief, he sought monetary damages; a declaratory judgment that the
mortgage and deed of trust were unconstitutional and the public trustee was “a
sophisticated [ruse] to circumvent constitutional protections,” id. at 18; and an order
requiring that his home be returned to him.
A magistrate judge directed Mr. Surface to show cause why his action should
not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Mr. Surface responded that, “‘[o]nly when a losing state court litigant calls
on a district court to modify or overturn an injurious state-court judgment should a
claim be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman[.]’” R. at 28 (italics and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2021)). Mr. Surface argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because he did not
seek to appeal or review the state court decisions, but rather, he sought to obtain a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of defendants’ actions and the deed of
trust. The magistrate judge was unpersuaded and recommended that the action be
dismissed under Rooker-Feldman.
Mr. Surface objected, insisting under Behr that Rooker-Feldman applies only
when litigants seek to appeal state court losses in federal court. The district court
overruled the objection and dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction. Mr. Surface appealed.
II
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Bruce v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746
3 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 4
(10th Cir. 2023). Because Mr. Surface proceeds pro se, we afford his materials a
solicitous construction. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007). But we do not advocate on his behalf, and he remains bound to
follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction ‘over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Bruce, 57 F.4th
at 746 (footnote omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine “reflects Congress’s decision to locate
federal appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments exclusively in the Supreme
Court.” Id. But this is a narrow jurisdictional limitation. Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 515 (10th Cir. 2023).
Rooker-Feldman applies where “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the
state court judgment caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (3) the state court rendered
judgment before the plaintiff filed the federal claim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the
district court to review and reject the state court judgment.” Bruce, 57 F.4th at 746.
“Where these factors exist, we lack subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. “The essential
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Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court RAYMOND TODD SURFACE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1236 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-01004-LTB-RTG) HOME MORTGAGE ALLIANCE, LLC; (D. Colo.) GUARANTEED RATE, INC.; HALLIDAY, WATKINS & MANN, P.C.; HONORABLE J. ERIC ELLIFF; HONORABLE PAUL D. LOPEZ; HONORABLE DAVID BLACKETT,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Raymond Todd Surface appeals the dismissal of his pro se action challenging
his state foreclosure and eviction proceedings. The district court determined the
action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it sought to overturn the
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 2
state court judgments. 1 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
I
According to the complaint, Mr. Surface financed the purchase of real property
by executing a note and deed of trust in favor of defendant Home Mortgage Alliance,
LLC. His mortgage was serviced by defendant Guaranteed Rate, Inc., which
“attempted to convince and intimidate [him] into [making] additional payments.”
R. at 7. The defendant law firm of Halliday, Watkins & Mann P.C. filed a state
foreclosure action, over which defendant state court judge J. Eric Elliff presided.
Judge Elliff “issued a judgment against [Mr. Surface] in [the state foreclosure action]
and ordered the property to be auctioned.” Id. (capitalization omitted). The property
was then sold by defendant Paul D. Lopez, who is “the Public Trustee and Clerk &
Recorder for the City and County of Denver.” Id. at 6. Mr. Surface was evicted in
state court proceedings presided over by defendant state court judge David Blackett.
Based on these allegations, Mr. Surface brought the underlying federal action,
claiming violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He
averred his home was unlawfully seized and sold without due process, he was
subjected to double jeopardy because he was forced to pay for his home twice, and he
had no opportunity to challenge the validity of the debt or speak to the state court.
He also alleged defendants engaged in extortion and racketeering by foreclosing on
1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). 2 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 3
his home. For relief, he sought monetary damages; a declaratory judgment that the
mortgage and deed of trust were unconstitutional and the public trustee was “a
sophisticated [ruse] to circumvent constitutional protections,” id. at 18; and an order
requiring that his home be returned to him.
A magistrate judge directed Mr. Surface to show cause why his action should
not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Mr. Surface responded that, “‘[o]nly when a losing state court litigant calls
on a district court to modify or overturn an injurious state-court judgment should a
claim be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman[.]’” R. at 28 (italics and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2021)). Mr. Surface argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because he did not
seek to appeal or review the state court decisions, but rather, he sought to obtain a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of defendants’ actions and the deed of
trust. The magistrate judge was unpersuaded and recommended that the action be
dismissed under Rooker-Feldman.
Mr. Surface objected, insisting under Behr that Rooker-Feldman applies only
when litigants seek to appeal state court losses in federal court. The district court
overruled the objection and dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction. Mr. Surface appealed.
II
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Bruce v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746
3 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 4
(10th Cir. 2023). Because Mr. Surface proceeds pro se, we afford his materials a
solicitous construction. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007). But we do not advocate on his behalf, and he remains bound to
follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction ‘over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Bruce, 57 F.4th
at 746 (footnote omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine “reflects Congress’s decision to locate
federal appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments exclusively in the Supreme
Court.” Id. But this is a narrow jurisdictional limitation. Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 515 (10th Cir. 2023).
Rooker-Feldman applies where “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the
state court judgment caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (3) the state court rendered
judgment before the plaintiff filed the federal claim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the
district court to review and reject the state court judgment.” Bruce, 57 F.4th at 746.
“Where these factors exist, we lack subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. “The essential
point is that barred claims are those complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012)
4 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 5
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, an element of the claim must be
that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment.” Id.
Mr. Surface’s action is barred by Rooker-Feldman. He lost in state court,
where defendants foreclosed on his property and evicted him; his injuries were
caused by the state court judgments that he challenged as unconstitutional; those
judgments were rendered in 2023, before Mr. Surface commenced this action in
2025; and he is asking the district court to review and reject the state court judgments
by seeking the return of his home. These four factors demonstrate this case falls
within the scope of Rooker-Feldman.
Mr. Surface denies that he is challenging the state court judgments, but his
allegations betray his argument. He challenged the foreclosure by alleging the note
was counterfeit and his mortgage servicer did not qualify as a bona fide holder of the
note or the deed of trust. He also accused the state court judge of “tricking him” to
take his property without an opportunity to be heard. R. at 8. And he alleged the
eviction proceedings violated his due process rights because he was evicted after
being “deceptively remov[ed]” from the title of the property. Id. at 12. These
allegations seek review and rejection of the state court judgments, confirming the
action is barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Mr. Surface relies on Behr to dispute this conclusion, but that out-of-circuit
case is distinguishable. It involved a state court child custody judgment the plaintiffs
did not challenge. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213. The plaintiffs sought damages for being
denied access to the courts and adequate legal counsel; they also claimed they
5 Appellate Case: 25-1236 Document: 35 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 6
suffered discrimination and the defendants entered their home under false pretenses
without authorization. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held these claims were not barred by
Rooker-Feldman because they did not seek to review and reject the state court
custody judgment. Id.
Behr is not helpful. Unlike that case, Mr. Surface does challenge the state
court foreclosure and eviction judgments. There is no way to review his claims and
return his home without reevaluating the validity of the note, the deed of trust, the
foreclosure action, and his eviction, all of which he expressly invited the district
court to review and reject. Although Mr. Surface couches his claims in constitutional
terms, arguing that he is asking for a declaratory judgment that defendants’ actions
were unconstitutional, his claims are barred because they all require the conclusion
“that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment,” Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1283.
III
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge