Suozzo v. Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 11, 2022
Docket7:22-cv-01071
StatusUnknown

This text of Suozzo v. Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. (Suozzo v. Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Suozzo v. Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSEPH SUOZZO, Plaintiff, ORDER TO AMEND

-against- No. 22-CV-1071 (PMH) BECK CHEVROLET CO., INC.; RUSSELL S.

GELLER Defendants.

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge: Joseph Suozzo (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se action invoking the Court’s federal question subject-matter jurisdiction. He sues Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. (“Beck Chevrolet”) and its President and owner, Russell S. Geller (“Geller and together, “Defendants”), alleging that they violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1, “Compl.” at 2).1 Plaintiff, who has paid the filing fees to bring this action, seeks damages and injunctive relief. The Court, considering Plaintiff’s Complaint with the liberality required of pro se pleadings, construes the Complaint as asserting claims of false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), as well as claims under state law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the fees to bring a federal civil action, if it determines that the action is frivolous, see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000), fails to state a claim, Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994), or that the Court lacks subject-matter

1 Citations to the Complaint correspond to the pagination generated by ECF. jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following: On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff brought his 1973 Buick Centurion convertible to Beck Chevrolet for minor repairs; Plaintiff gave one of Beck Chevrolet’s supervisors (“Dennis”) a written list of the repairs requested. (Compl. at 8). Dennis told Plaintiff that the repairs should be done in two or three days. (Id.). “Notwithstanding [Plaintiff’s] constant follow-up visits with Dennis to find out the status,” however, the repairs have not been completed, and Plaintiff’s vehicle remains in the possession of Beck Chevrolet.2 (Id. at 8-9). Because Plaintiff became “exasperated by the endless delays,” on January 19, 2022, Plaintiff hand-delivered a letter to Geller, Beck Chevrolet’s President and owner. (Id. at 8). After

Geller read the letter and had a short discussion with Plaintiff, “during which [Geller] got angrier . . . and even surly,” Geller told Plaintiff that he “was trespassing on private property[,] order[ed] [Plaintiff] to immediately leave the premises[,] [and informed Plaintiff] that he would advise his staff never to allow [Plaintiff] onto the dealership again. . . .” (Id.). Geller refused to discuss the subject of Plaintiff’s letter and threatened to have Plaintiff arrested if Plaintiff ever visited Beck Chevrolet again. (Id.). One week later, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Bob Brunner, a Beck Chevrolet service manager, who told him to come and retrieve his vehicle. Plaintiff asked Brunner if the repairs had been completed; Brunner told him that he had been instructed “‘not to touch that car again.’” (Id.). Plaintiff visited Beck Chevrolet the next day, and asked Dennis “if he would at least

install the new set of tires [Plaintiff] had sent to him and do an inspection. . . .” (Id.). Dennis and Plaintiff then went to Brunner’s office, and Dennis asked Brunner if he could grant Plaintiff’s request; Brunner again stated that he “‘was instructed not to touch that car again.’” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts claims of false advertising, deceptive practices, and tortious interference with contract. With respect to Plaintiff’s claims of false advertising, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants falsely advertise that they treat customers “‘like family[,] . . . put[] the customer first[,] . . . [and that] taking care of customers is what [they] do best.” (Id. at 9). Plaintiff is restoring his

2 Plaintiff alleges that “Dennis comes across as completely believable no matter how often he breaks his promise. [Plaintiff] had no reason to doubt his sincerity[,] so [he] continued to leave the car with the hope that one day the repairs actually would be completed.” (Compl. at 8). vehicle in order to sell it at auction; Defendants’ failure to repair the vehicle has delayed its sale. Plaintiff seeks damages as well as “specific performance of all repairs contracted for.” (Id. at 10). DISCUSSION Under the Lanham Act: [a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce . . . any . . . false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Davis v. AVVO, Inc.
345 F. Supp. 3d 534 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Suozzo v. Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/suozzo-v-beck-chevrolet-co-inc-nysd-2022.