Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Network Appliance, Inc.

591 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105700, 2008 WL 5411691
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Network Appliance, Inc.. Read the opinion of the Court — 710 F. Supp. 2d 925
District Court, N.D. California·Decided December 23, 2008·No. C-07-05488 EDL·Published

Opinion

ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIM TERMS OF THE '720 AND '417 PATENTS

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, United States Magistrate Judge.

On November 24, 2008, the Court held a hearing to construe the disputed terms of United States Patent Numbers 7,318,720 (the “'720 patent”) and 6,868,417 (the “'417 patent”) (collectively, the “NetApp patents”) pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated to construction of the disputed term of United States Patent Number 7,107,385 (the “'385 patent”), as reflected in their November 21, 2008, letter to the Court (docket no. 103). Pursuant to Court order, the parties filed additional briefs following the hearing. Without leave of Court or stipulation, Sun submitted a separate letter brief dated December 3, 2008, concerning the construction of “inode” in the '417 patent (docket no. 109). NetApp objected to the letter as procedurally improper and misstating the record (docket no. 111). The Court hereby grants the motion to strike Sun’s letter brief (docket no. 109) pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d).

The procedural history of this action is summarized in the December 22, 2008 Order, 2008 WL 5384081, construing the Sun patents. Having read the papers and considered the arguments of counsel and the relevant legal authority, the Court hereby rules as follows.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

In construing claims, the court must begin with an examination of the claim language itself. The terms used in the claims are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.2005); see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998) (“The claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.”). This ordinary and customary meaning “is the meaning that the terms would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention .... ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. A patentee is presumed to have intended the ordinary meaning of a claim term in the absence of an express intent to the contrary. York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed.Cir.1996).

Generally speaking, the words in a claim are to be interpreted “in light of the intrinsic evidence of record, including the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324-25 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted); see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2005) (court looks at “the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history”). “Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996).

With regard to the intrinsic evidence, the court’s examination begins, first, with the claim language. See id. Specifically, “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. As part of that context, the court may also consider the other patent claims, both asserted and unasserted. Id. For example, as claim terms are normally used consistently throughout a patent, the usage of a term in *1072 one claim may illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims. Id. The court may also consider differences between claims as a guide to understanding the meaning of particular claim terms. Id.

Second, the claims “must [also] be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. at 1315. When the specification reveals a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. at 1316. Indeed, the specification is to be viewed as the “best source” for understanding a technical term, informed as needed by the prosecution history. Id. at 1315. As the Federal Circuit stated in Phillips, the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” and “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” 415 F.3d at 1321.

Limitations from the specification, however, such as from the preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims absent a clear intention by the patentee to do. Altiris v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“resort to the rest of the specification to define a claim term is only appropriate in limited circumstances”); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 (“The claims must be read in view of the specification, but limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims.”) (citations omitted); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“a patentee need not describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention”).

“[TJhere is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification_ [Attempting to resolve that problem in the context of the particular patent is likely to capture the scope of the actual invention more accurately than either strictly limiting the scope of the claims to the embodiments disclosed in the specification or divorcing the claim language from the specification.” Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 527 F.3d 1300, 1307-08 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Comark Comm’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.Cir.1998)). There is therefore “no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction,” and the court must “read the specification in light of its purposes in order to determine whether the patentee is setting out specific examples of the invention to accomplish those goals, or whether the patentee instead intends for the claims and the embodiments in the specification to be strictly coextensive.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

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Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Network Appliance, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105700, 2008 WL 5411691 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

591 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Network Appliance, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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