Sullivan & Sons, Inc. v. United States

129 Ct. Cl. 63, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1954 WL 6116
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 13, 1954
DocketCongressional Nos. 17860 and 17861
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 129 Ct. Cl. 63 (Sullivan & Sons, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 63, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1954 WL 6116 (cc 1954).

Opinion

Littleton, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These are Congressional reference cases involving identical parties and claims and were consolidated for proceedings in this court. They were the subject matter of Senate Bill 982 and House of Representatives Bill No. 1598 both of the 81st Congress and were referred to this court by Senate Resolutions 152 and 165 of that Congress with instructions to proceed in accordance with sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28 of the United States Code, 1946 Ed., as amended.1

Said bills provide for the granting of relief to one Thomas F. Harney, Jr., doing business as the Harney Engineering Co., hereinafter referred to as Harney, for alleged losses suffered by him as the plumbing and heating subcontractor under two lump sum contracts between the defendant, acting [66]*66through the Army Quartermaster Corps, and D. A. Sullivan & Sons, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Sullivan, which provided for the construction of building installations including 30 barracks at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, during the fall and winter of 1940-41.

Sullivan, although listed in the petitions as a plaintiff, has entered no appearance in these proceedings nor has any claim been asserted on his behalf.

Harney asks the recovery of $21,088.21. While this amount is made up largely of claims for the performance of alleged extra work, it likewise includes claims for the value of dismantled lumber from Harney’s field office and work shop which was taken and used by soldiers at the camp, and for the return of $441.25 which was charged against him as his share of the liquidated damages assessed against Sullivan for delay in the completion of the contract work.

Sullivan’s contracts contained the standard contract provisions found in all Government construction contracts, which provisions were incorporated by reference with only minor modifications into Harney’s subcontracts. Findings 6 and 7.

The alleged extra work resulted as changes became necessary during the progress of the work. Harney performed this extra work under verbal instructions from Sullivan with the knowledge of defendant’s representatives and although this work was approved and accepted by the defendant’s supervisory engineer no change orders as contemplated by Articles 3 and 4 were ever issued to cover the work. This was so despite efforts by Harney to secure written instructions in advance, and his prompt submission of the costs to Sullivan after the completion of the work necessitated by the changes.

On June 30,1941, Sullivan executed releases on both prime contracts reserving certain items for future claim, among which were the items, with the exception of one, upon which Harney bases his claims here. This one exception was the charge against Harney of $441.25 in liquidated damages.

On September 15, 1941, Sullivan submitted to the War Department a claim for excess labor costs totaling $18,996.51. This claim was referred to the General Accounting Office [67]*67and upon the recommendation of that office Congress enacted a bill providing for payment to Sullivan of $14,481.87 in satisfaction of this claim. Harney’s share of that amount was $4,314.16.

Again on January 9,1942, Sullivan filed additional claims with the War Department. These claims dealt with extra work and included on behalf of Harney a claim for $17,768.74. While those portions of the claims filed by Sullivan on his own behalf were settled, those of Harney were never acted upon nor were they referred to the General Accounting Office. No explanation for this inaction has ever been given. It is those claims which Harney has asserted in these proceedings.

On March 2, 1943, Harney settled with Sullivan receiving for his work under the subcontracts $94,802; under change orders which were issued he received $5,997.15 and as his share of the labor claim settlement referred to above he received $4,314.16.

Unsuccessful in his efforts to secure a satisfactory settlement in the War Department through Sullivan, Harney went to Congress on his own behalf. During the pendency of his claims before Congress, the Secretary of the Army informed the Judiciary Committee of the House that the War Department was “not opposed to further examination and adjustment,” provided payment to Harney did not exceed $17,-767.86. The Secretary went on to point out, however, that the Army’s investigation because of the inadequacy of Har-ney’s cost records failed to develop to what extent, if any, the claims were based on costs incurred in performing extra work. The bill then before the House was amended to provide for payment of $17,767.86. The bill, as amended, passed the House and upon its presentation to the Senate was referred to this court along with a similar bill pending in the Senate.

Harney’s claims have been broken down into 16 separate items and are set-out with the amounts found chargeable to each in our findings 13 through 28. None of these items of claim were covered by change orders or paid.

The defendant has raised several legal defenses, any one of which is sufficient to prevent legal recovery in this court. The first of these is the statute of limitation. Any claim [68]*68which. Harney or Sullivan may have under the contracts as against the Government arose at the very latest on June 30, 1941, when the releases were executed. Since the claims were not referred to the court until July and September of 1949, and the petitions were not filed until February 15, 1950, all claims are barred by the six-year limitation of 28 U. S. C. 2501. This bar likewise applies to the loss of the dismantled lumber even though that claim is not one under the contracts.

The lack of privity of contract between the defendant and Harney bars the claims as well. Harney as a subcontractor has no independent cause of action against the Government and any legal right which he might assert against the Government would have to be made on his behalf by Sullivan. H. Herfurth, Jr., Inc. v. United States, 89 C. Cls. 122, 127. Thus any defense which would be effective against Sullivan would bar Harney as well. Sullivan entered no appearance in these proceedings and even if he did he would be barred at the outset because of his failure to adhere to or to even initiate the relief provisions of the contracts. United States v. Holpuch, 328 U. S. 234, 240; United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 736.

As for the $441.25 in liquidated damages assessed against Harney, that claim is further barred because it was not excepted from the releases as were the other claims. Torres v. United States, 126 C. Cls. 76.

Then too, certain of the claimed items of extra work (findings 21, 22 and 23) arose because of a misunderstanding as to the proper interpretation of' particular specifications. Mr. Harney’s interpretations were overruled by defendant’s supervisory engineer and as a result of changes which then had to be made, Harney’s costs were increased. Sullivan did not appeal those rulings by the supervisory engineer.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
129 Ct. Cl. 63, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1954 WL 6116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-sons-inc-v-united-states-cc-1954.