Succession of Larmore

518 So. 2d 1085, 1987 WL 34807
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 13, 1987
DocketCA 86 1135
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 518 So. 2d 1085 (Succession of Larmore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Succession of Larmore, 518 So. 2d 1085, 1987 WL 34807 (La. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

518 So.2d 1085 (1987)

In re SUCCESSION OF Eva Donivan LARMORE.

No. CA 86 1135.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

November 13, 1987.

*1086 E.B. Dittmer, III, Bogalusa, for plaintiff-appellant Betty McMillian.

John N. Gallaspy, Bogalusa, for defendant-appellee.

Before LOTTINGER, EDWARDS and ALFORD, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Betty McMillan, appeals from the trial court's decision to omit from the tableau of distribution a claim for services she allegedly rendered to the decedent.

FACTS

Eva Donivan Larmore died December 10, 1984. On Dec. 5, 1985 appellant, Mrs. McMillan, submitted to the co-executors of the succession on an unsworn claim for the value of services she claims to have rendered to decedent. On February 18, 1986, the co-executors filed a tableau of distribution. Appellant opposed the tableau of distribution because it did not include her claim. Appellant sought to introduce parol evidence to prove her claim. The appellee objected arguing La.R.S. 13:3721,[1] which cites La.Code Civ.P. art. 3245[2], prohibits *1087 admission of parol evidence unless a sworn, formal proof of claim is submitted to the succession representative(s) within a year of the decedent's death.

TRIAL COURT

The trial court sustained the objection to the admission of parol evidence, denied appellant's claim for services, and approved the proposed tableau of distribution.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Appellant assigns the following errors:

1. The trial court erred in holding that, because appellant's proof of claim was not verified, parol evidence was inadmissible to prove appellant's claim; and

2. The trial court erred in disallowing appellant's opposition to the tableau of distribution which omitted her claim for the value of services rendered to the decedent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Appellant argues the requirement the claim be sworn is a mere formality, substantial compliance should suffice because the primary concern of the statute is timely notice (however made) so as to protect the succession from stale and unfounded claims, and the succession representative owes a fiduciary duty to the legatees, heirs, and creditors.

La.R.S. 13:3721 permits the admission of parol evidence to prove a claim against the decedent in only four instances, one of which is that within one year of decedent's death, "(t)he claimant has submitted to the succession representative a formal proof of his claim against the succession, as provided in article 3245 of the Code of Civil Procedure." The latter requires a "formal written proof of the claim, sworn to by the claimant."[3] La.R.S. 13:3721 further provides, "[t]he provisions of this section cannot be waived impliedly through the failure of a litigant to object to the admission of evidence which is inadmissible thereunder."

Appellant argues the primary concern of La.R.S. 13:3721 is the one-year requirement because it applies to all four methods of presenting a claim, whereas only one of the methods requires verification. We disagree. As appellant herself argues, the purpose of the statute is to prevent "stale and unfounded (emphasis added) claims from being filed against the succession...." Succession of Otts, 400 So.2d 1175 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981).

In Successions of Marcotte, 449 So. 2d 732 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), a case also involving an unsworn claim, the court disallowed the parol evidence. In its reasoning, the court stated, "[i]n order to preserve the purpose of La.R.S. 13:3721, the statute must be strictly construed." Appellant attempts to distinguish that case by contending the claim was barred not because of one deficiency, namely that it was unsworn, but because of several deficiencies, i.e., there was no succession representative nor was the succession under an administration. Appellant argues the basis for the decision was "the procedure employed failed to insure adequate notice." We again disagree. Timely notice is only one requirement. The Marcotte court was quite clear when it stated the statute must be strictly construed and accordingly cited each statutory requirement not met. In addition, the court noted there was no administration, which precluded claimant from asserting he had chosen the "informal" method of presenting his claim allowed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 3241.[4]

Next, appellant argues "substantial compliance" with La.R.S. 13:3721 should *1088 suffice. Olinkraft, Inc. v. Gerard, 364 So.2d 639 (La.App. 2d Cir.1978); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938); State Department of Highways v. Claitor, 289 So. 2d 527 (La.App. 1st Cir.1973); Village of Folsom v. Alford, 204 So.2d 100 (La.App. 1st Cir.1967); Banta v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 200 So.2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir.1967); and Succession of Porche, 288 So.2d 27 (La.1973).

These cases are all inapposite to the case sub judice. Olinkraft dealt with a breach of contract. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., Village of Folsom v. Alford, State Department of Highways v. Claitor, and Banta v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, all dealt with substantial compliance with statutory dedication of roads and not with the statute governing presentation of claims against a succession.

In Succession of Porche the testator failed to sign below the attestation clause as required by La.R.S. 9:2442(3). The court held the attestation clause is designed merely to evidence compliance with formalities and the will "substantially complied with statutory formalities." Appellant urges La.R.S. 13:3721 should be interpreted likewise. Its intent, she contends, is to provide timely notice of a claim to the executor, and it is immaterial whether the claim is verified. This court disagrees.

Succession of Porche, is not applicable for several reasons. It involved the prospect of voiding an entire will because the testator did not sign below the attestation clause, but signed above the attestation clause with the witnesses and notary public signing below the clause.

After all, the purpose of the attestation clause is primarily to evidence, at the time the will was executed, that the statutory formalities (Requirements 1 and 2) had been satisfied. When, in fact, the instrument as a whole shows that these formalities have been satisfied, we see no reason why technical variations in the attestation clause-which is designed merely to evidence compliance with the formalities-should defeat the dispositive portions of an otherwise valid will. Id. at 29. (Emphasis by Supreme Court).

In the case sub judice, the requirement the proof of claim be sworn is not a mere formality. Rather, it reflects the very purpose of the statute, i.e., to protect the succession from "stale and unfounded" claims the decedent could have refuted if he were alive. Succession of Otts.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

This assignment was not briefed, and is thus considered abandoned. Rule 2-12.4, Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal.

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Bluebook (online)
518 So. 2d 1085, 1987 WL 34807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-larmore-lactapp-1987.