KAREN R. BAKER, Judge.
liSubTeachUSA challenges the Department of Workforce Services, the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, and the Board of Review, all of which found that LaJuanda Coleman was eligible for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review (Board) affirmed the Appeal Tribunal’s finding that Coleman did not perform services in an instructional capacity for an educational institution in the previous academic term and did not have a reasonable assurance of returning to such work in the next academic term. On appeal, SubTeachUSA alleges that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-509(a) (Supp.2009) is applicable to the facts of this case in that (1) Coleman provided instructional services for an educational institution, and (2) Coleman provided services in one academic year and contracted to provide services in the following year. We disagree with the arguments presented by SubTeachUSA and affirm the | ¡.Board’s decision.
SubTeachUSA is a private employer that hires, trains, and provides substitute teachers and other staff (such as cafeteria, custodial, and clerical workers) to various school districts. James Cole, president of SubTeachUSA, testified that the company had a contract for services with twenty-three school districts in Arkansas, including the Helena-West Helena School District. The contracts were limited to providing services to the school districts during the regular school year and excluded services for summer school. Sub-TeachUSA, therefore, did not provide work for the employees during the summer months. He explained that the employee’s rate of pay was determined by the individual school district and that SubTeachUSA paid the employees thirty-five percent above the amount paid by the school district as compensation.
In August 2006, LaJuanda Coleman, who was previously employed directly by the Helena-West Helena School District, was hired by SubTeachUSA as a substitute teacher. She substitute taught on the Helena-West Helena School campus. Coleman testified that May 24, 2008, was her last day of work for the 2007-2008 school year.1 She testified that her employment contract with SubTeachUSA was for the school year and that she had signed a letter of intent to return to work in August 2008.
Coleman testified that her duties as a substitute teacher were to follow the lesson plan provided by the teacher or, if no lesson plan was made available, to use her skills and | ¡¡experience to provide the students with the learning and instruction they needed. She explained that the services that she performed as a substitute teacher while employed by the school district were exactly the same duties that she performed while employed by SubTeachU-SA. She noted that the only difference was that she received a paycheck from SubTeachUSA rather then the school district.
Concerning SubTeachUSA’s services, Mr. Cole testified that “[w]e consider Sub-Teach USA to be an educational services provider.” He stated, “We consider that our substitute teachers are performing in an instructional capacity for an educational institution, because we send them into classrooms to implement lesson plans.” He explained that SubTeachUSA’s substitute teachers have identical duties to the substitute teachers employed by the school district and that SubTeachUSA maintains the same qualifications for its substitute teachers as required by state law.
The Department of Workforce Services determined that Coleman was currently between terms with her employer, which was not considered to be an educational institution, and determined that Coleman did not have reasonable assurance in the second term to perform services for an educational institution. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Department of Workforce Services’ decision to allow benefits, finding that Coleman worked for SubTeaehUSA, which was not an educational institution; therefore, Coleman did not work as an instructor for an educational institution in an academic year and did not have a reasonable assurance of work for an educational institution during a following academic year. _J/The Board affirmed the award of benefits on the basis that Coleman did not perform services in an instructional capacity for an educational institution in an academic term and did not have a reasonable assurance of performing such services for an educational institution in the next academic term. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review of the Board’s findings of fact is well settled:
We do not conduct a de novo review in appeals from the Board of Review. In appeals of unemployment compensation cases we instead review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board of Review’s findings. The findings of fact made by the Board of Review are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence before it. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Coker v. Director, 99 Ark.App. 455, 456-57, 262 S.W.3d 175, 176 (2007). Additionally, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board of Review. Williams v. Director, 79 Ark.App. 407, 88 S.W.3d 427 (2002).
SubTeaehUSA alleges that Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-10-509(a) is applicable to the facts of this case in that (1) Coleman provided instructional services for an educational institution, and (2) Coleman provided services in one academic year and contracted to provide services in the following year. Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-10-509(a)(l) and (2) (Supp.2009), states that
[w]ith respect to service performed in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution, benefits shall not be paid based on | Rservices for any week of unemployment commencing during the period between two (2) successive academic years or terms, during a similar period between two (2) regular but not successive terms, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract to any individual if:
(1) The individual performs the services in the first of the academic years or terms; and
(2) There is a contract or a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of the academic years or terms.
(Emphasis added.)
SubTeaehUSA alleges that there is no requirement in the plain language of the statute that requires that Coleman be employed by an educational institution. Rather, SubTeaehUSA alleges that the plain language only requires that Coleman perform, services in an educational institution. SubTeaehUSA alleges that to impose the requirement that Coleman be employed by the school would “be effectively to re-write the statute, destroying legislative intent.” We disagree.
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KAREN R. BAKER, Judge.
liSubTeachUSA challenges the Department of Workforce Services, the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, and the Board of Review, all of which found that LaJuanda Coleman was eligible for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review (Board) affirmed the Appeal Tribunal’s finding that Coleman did not perform services in an instructional capacity for an educational institution in the previous academic term and did not have a reasonable assurance of returning to such work in the next academic term. On appeal, SubTeachUSA alleges that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-509(a) (Supp.2009) is applicable to the facts of this case in that (1) Coleman provided instructional services for an educational institution, and (2) Coleman provided services in one academic year and contracted to provide services in the following year. We disagree with the arguments presented by SubTeachUSA and affirm the | ¡.Board’s decision.
SubTeachUSA is a private employer that hires, trains, and provides substitute teachers and other staff (such as cafeteria, custodial, and clerical workers) to various school districts. James Cole, president of SubTeachUSA, testified that the company had a contract for services with twenty-three school districts in Arkansas, including the Helena-West Helena School District. The contracts were limited to providing services to the school districts during the regular school year and excluded services for summer school. Sub-TeachUSA, therefore, did not provide work for the employees during the summer months. He explained that the employee’s rate of pay was determined by the individual school district and that SubTeachUSA paid the employees thirty-five percent above the amount paid by the school district as compensation.
In August 2006, LaJuanda Coleman, who was previously employed directly by the Helena-West Helena School District, was hired by SubTeachUSA as a substitute teacher. She substitute taught on the Helena-West Helena School campus. Coleman testified that May 24, 2008, was her last day of work for the 2007-2008 school year.1 She testified that her employment contract with SubTeachUSA was for the school year and that she had signed a letter of intent to return to work in August 2008.
Coleman testified that her duties as a substitute teacher were to follow the lesson plan provided by the teacher or, if no lesson plan was made available, to use her skills and | ¡¡experience to provide the students with the learning and instruction they needed. She explained that the services that she performed as a substitute teacher while employed by the school district were exactly the same duties that she performed while employed by SubTeachU-SA. She noted that the only difference was that she received a paycheck from SubTeachUSA rather then the school district.
Concerning SubTeachUSA’s services, Mr. Cole testified that “[w]e consider Sub-Teach USA to be an educational services provider.” He stated, “We consider that our substitute teachers are performing in an instructional capacity for an educational institution, because we send them into classrooms to implement lesson plans.” He explained that SubTeachUSA’s substitute teachers have identical duties to the substitute teachers employed by the school district and that SubTeachUSA maintains the same qualifications for its substitute teachers as required by state law.
The Department of Workforce Services determined that Coleman was currently between terms with her employer, which was not considered to be an educational institution, and determined that Coleman did not have reasonable assurance in the second term to perform services for an educational institution. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Department of Workforce Services’ decision to allow benefits, finding that Coleman worked for SubTeaehUSA, which was not an educational institution; therefore, Coleman did not work as an instructor for an educational institution in an academic year and did not have a reasonable assurance of work for an educational institution during a following academic year. _J/The Board affirmed the award of benefits on the basis that Coleman did not perform services in an instructional capacity for an educational institution in an academic term and did not have a reasonable assurance of performing such services for an educational institution in the next academic term. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review of the Board’s findings of fact is well settled:
We do not conduct a de novo review in appeals from the Board of Review. In appeals of unemployment compensation cases we instead review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board of Review’s findings. The findings of fact made by the Board of Review are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence before it. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Coker v. Director, 99 Ark.App. 455, 456-57, 262 S.W.3d 175, 176 (2007). Additionally, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board of Review. Williams v. Director, 79 Ark.App. 407, 88 S.W.3d 427 (2002).
SubTeaehUSA alleges that Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-10-509(a) is applicable to the facts of this case in that (1) Coleman provided instructional services for an educational institution, and (2) Coleman provided services in one academic year and contracted to provide services in the following year. Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-10-509(a)(l) and (2) (Supp.2009), states that
[w]ith respect to service performed in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution, benefits shall not be paid based on | Rservices for any week of unemployment commencing during the period between two (2) successive academic years or terms, during a similar period between two (2) regular but not successive terms, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract to any individual if:
(1) The individual performs the services in the first of the academic years or terms; and
(2) There is a contract or a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of the academic years or terms.
(Emphasis added.)
SubTeaehUSA alleges that there is no requirement in the plain language of the statute that requires that Coleman be employed by an educational institution. Rather, SubTeaehUSA alleges that the plain language only requires that Coleman perform, services in an educational institution. SubTeaehUSA alleges that to impose the requirement that Coleman be employed by the school would “be effectively to re-write the statute, destroying legislative intent.” We disagree.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10 — 509(d)(1) states that, with respect to any services described in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, compensation payable on the basis of services in any such capacity shall be denied as specified in subsections (a)-(c) of this section to any individual who performed the services in an educational institution while in the employ of an educational-service agency. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “educational service agency” means a governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing such services to one (1) or more educational institutions. Ark.Code Ann. § 11 — 10— 509(d)(2).
SubTeachUSA claims that it is an educational institution. However, the statutes simply do not contemplate a private company such as SubTeachUSA To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statutes regarding its application to a private company such as SubTeachUSA, we must defer to the agency interpretation. See Seiz Co. v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 2009 Ark. 361, 324 S.W.3d 336 (stating that the interpretation placed on a statute or regulation by an agency or department charged with its administration is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly wrong); see also Teston v. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 361 Ark. 300, 312-13, 206 S.W.3d 796, 805 (2005) (quoting AT & T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 Ark. 188, 196-97, 40 S.W.3d 273, 280 (2001)) (“Raising such constitutional issues before the Commission is significant even when a statute is challenged as unconstitutional on its face, especially because the interpretation given by the agency charged with its execution is highly persuasive.”).
Because there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding, we affirm the Board’s award of benefits. Moreover, because we affirm the Board’s finding that SubTeachUSA is not an educational institution per the language of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-509, we also affirm the Board’s determination that Coleman could not be considered as having a reasonable assurance of work in the next academic term from an educational institution.
Affirmed.
PITTMAN, ROBBINS, and BROWN, JJ., agree. KINARD and MARSHALL, JJ., dissent.