Stubbins v. Chase Home Finance LLC (In Re Robinson)

403 B.R. 497, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3967, 2008 WL 5869074
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 26, 2008
DocketBankruptcy No. 07-52148. Adversary No. 07-02289
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 403 B.R. 497 (Stubbins v. Chase Home Finance LLC (In Re Robinson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stubbins v. Chase Home Finance LLC (In Re Robinson), 403 B.R. 497, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3967, 2008 WL 5869074 (Ohio 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C. KATHRYN PRESTON, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff/Trustee’s (“Trustee”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24), the Brief in Opposition thereto by Defendant Chase Home Finance, LLC (Doc. ¿6), and the Trustee’s Reply (Doc. 30) filed in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. The Court having considered the record and the arguments of the parties, makes the following findings and conclusions.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and the standing General Order of Reference entered in this District. This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (K). Venue is properly before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

I. Standard of Review for Motions for Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7056, provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of “informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In the instant case, the parties agree that the material facts are not in dispute, and the only issues are those of law. In such a case, it is well settled that the court may enter summary judgment against either party, whether or not they were the moving party. See Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 246 Fed.Appx. 953, 960 (6th Cir.2007) (“[T]he commentators generally agree that where there is no genuine issue of fact, the court may enter summary judgment for either party, whether or not such party has made a motion therefor.”) (quoting Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 734 F.2d 1402, 1408 (10th Cir.1984) rev’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 237, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985)).

II. Findings of Fact

The facts upon which this matter may be decided are without dispute and may be summarized as follows: Jeffery M. Robinson and Laura L. Robinson (“Debtors”) filed a voluntary Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 27, 2007. The Trustee is the duly appointed Chapter 7 trustee of the Debt *500 ors’ bankruptcy estate. The Debtors own certain real property located at 222 Logan St., Crooksville, Ohio 43731 (the “Property”), which constitutes property of their bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541. On or about January 10, 2003, the Debtors both executed an open-end mortgage (“Mortgage”) granting to Yerke Mortgage Company a lien on the Property. The Mortgage was recorded in the Perry County, Ohio Recorder’s Office on January 31, 2003 in Official Records Volume 290, Page 2472. Trustee and Defendant agree that a true and accurate copy of the Mortgage is attached to the Trustee’s Complaint as an exhibit. Defendant is the current holder of the Mortgage.

The Debtors initialed each page and signed the Mortgage, and it appears that they acknowledged the signing of the Mortgage before a notary public. The original document contains a proper certificate of acknowledgment, the signature of the notary public, and a raised notary seal stating the words “notarial seal” and “State of Ohio.” However, it does not contain a printed, typewritten or stamped name of the notary who signed the Mortgage, nor does it contain the expiration date of the notary’s appointment. Additionally, the notary’s seal is not visible on the image of the Mortgage recorded in the public records.

The Trustee asserts that the certificate of acknowledgment is defective in that it fails to provide the name of the notary public in other than signature form and fails to state the expiration date of the notary’s appointment. He further asserts that the Mortgage is fatally defective because the raised seal is not visible on the image of the Mortgage available in the public records, and the seal does not include the name of the notary as required by the Ohio Revised Code. Therefore, he argues, as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 544, the execution and perfection of the mortgage is invalid against the Trustee and he is entitled to avoid the Mortgage. Conversely, Defendant asserts that the Mortgage is valid under Ohio law despite the shortcomings of the certificate of acknowledgment and the public records.

III. Conclusions of Law

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he Trustee shall have, as of commencement of the case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debt- or ... that is voidable by a bona fide purchaser of real property ... from the debtor-”11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). Courts have uniformly interpreted § 544 to allow the Trustee to “enjoy[] the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, without regard to any actual knowledge of the Trustee.” First Southern Bank v. Stamphill (In re Stanphill), 312 B.R. 691, 694 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2004) (citations omitted).

The Ohio Revised Code provides, in pertinent part as follows:

(A) A deed, mortgage, land contract ... or lease of any interest in real property ... shall be signed by the grantor, mortgagor, vendor or lessor.... The signing shall be acknowledged by the grantor, mortgagor, vendor, or lessor, ...

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
403 B.R. 497, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3967, 2008 WL 5869074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stubbins-v-chase-home-finance-llc-in-re-robinson-ohsb-2008.