Strom Manuf'g Co. v. Weir Frog Co.

83 F. 170, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2084
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 1, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 83 F. 170 (Strom Manuf'g Co. v. Weir Frog Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strom Manuf'g Co. v. Weir Frog Co., 83 F. 170, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2084 (6th Cir. 1897).

Opinion

SEVERENS, District Judge.

The bill of complaint in this case charges the defendant with infringing certain letters patent issued November 9, 1886, to Charles Alkins, being No. 352,286, for new and useful improvements in the manufacture of rail braces used in the construction of railroad tracks, more especially about switches and curves in the track where the side pressure of the wheels of cars moving on the track is greatest. The rights secured by these letters [171]*171patent were subsequently assigned to the complainant. The bill is in the usual form, and prays not only for an injunction, but for an accounting. The specifications of the patent relate to a rail brace or support “struck up by dies from a blank plate of wrought or malleable iron or steel, in such a maimer as to convert the blank into a suitable base provided with a hollow abutment adapted to engage the side of the rail in order to effectively brace the same.” The objects of the invention, as stated in the specifications, were:

“First. To produce at a reduced cost and in a more convenient way a rail brace possessing in a high degree both strength and durability, and Involving all of the advantages without the disadvantages of the old construction of rail braces.
“Second. To rapidly and economically produce a rail brace possessing all oi the necessary features of strength, durability, and adaptability to Its destined purpose, and at the same time involving the employment of considerably less metal than in the old construction of brace, whereby a saving In material is effected and the cost of production lessened, without weakening or otherwise detracting from the serviceability of the brace.
“Third. To effect a considerable lessening of the time and labor heretofore incident to the manufacture of rail braces, thereby reducing the cost of their maimfafltire. and permitting large orders to be filled rapidly.”

The claims founded on the specifications are 11 in number, the first 5 of which relate to the art or process of manufacturing such braces, the sixth, seventh, and eighth to the blank piece of metal appropriately formed and trimmed on which such rail braces are constructed, and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh to the rail brace itself as formed.

The defendant demurred to so much of the bill as is founded upon claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 of the patent, upon the following grounds:

“(1) That said bill does not contain any matter of equity whereon this court can ground any decree or give to the plaintiff any relief against this defendant on account, of said claims 1, 2, 3, <1, 0, and 10 of said patent.
“(2) That the alleged improvements specified in said claims were not new and patentable at 1ho time of (lie alleged invention thereof, inasmuch as before that time it was the common and general knowledge of ihe public, of which the court will take judicial notice, that the art of striking up metal blanks into hollow articles was old; that the shape of the article produced depended on the form of the dies used; and that it has been held not to be invention to change the form of a die so as to make a new-shaped article under it.
“(3) That cast rail braces of the character and form of the patented one, with solid abutments, being admitted by said bill to bo old before ¡he dale of the alleged invention, it is not shown by said bill that there was any invention in making the abutment; hollow, that being a well aud generally known result of the common practice of the art oí striking up metal into any hollow form,, of which the court will fake judicial notice1, and no special or other means than the public possessed is described in said patent for the accomplishment of this result.”

To so much of the hill as relates to the other claims, the defendant answered, denying that the maíter of the invention was new and useful, and further denying that the patentee was the first inventor thereof. The answer also insisted that, in view of the state of the art at the time of the alleged invention, “the subject of the last-mentioned claims did not involve invention.” Alter the lapse of several months, the complainant set the demurrer down for hearing, and filed a replication to the answer; the defendant at the same time mov[172]*172ing for the dismissal of so much of the bill as was covered by its answer. Ao proofs were offered within the time prescribed by the rules, nor at any time, in support of that portion of the bill which the defendant answered. Upon the hearing of the case in the court below, the demurrer was upheld, upon the ground that no invention was displayed in the supposed improvement set out in the patent. The bill was dismissed, and the complainant has appealed. Ao criticism. is made upon the action of the court in the dismissal of the bill in respect of the claims to which the answer was directed, and the appeal as presented to us by counsel challenges only the decision of the court in sustaining the demurrer, which concerns the first, second, third, sixth, ninth, and tenth claims of the patent.

In support of the appeal it is first contended that the court erred in disposing of the case made by the bill on demurrer. It is claimed that this course was too summary, and that the justice of the case could have been better subserved by awaiting the proof and obtaining the aid'of those conversant with the art in elucidation of the matter of the invention. But it is no longer open to question that where the case as presented is clear, and the court finds no difficulty in understanding the character and scope of the invention from the patent itself when tested by the common knowledge pertaining to it, and thereupon discerns that the patent is not sustainable, the proper and expedient course is to dispose of the case on demurrer, and thus put an end to useless litigation. Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. 745; Richards v. Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 299, 15 Sup. Ct. 831; American Fibre Chamois Co. v. Buckskin Fibre Co., 37 U. S. App. 742, 18 C. C. A. 662, and 72 Fed. 508.

The proper course to be pursued When a question of the propriety of such action is presented was stated by Judge Taft in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of American Fibre Chamois Co. v. Buckskin Fibre Co., 37 U. S. App. 742, 18 C. C. A. 662, and 72 Fed. 508, thus:

“The rule is now well settled that a defendant to a patent infringement bill may raise the question, on demurrer, whether the alleged invention, as disclosed by the specification of the patent, is devoid of patentable novelty or invention. Richards v. Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 299, 15 Sup. Ct. 831; West v. Rae, 33 Fed. 45. It is also well settled that, in considering the question of the validity of a patent on its face, the court may take judicial notice of facts of common and general knowledge tending to show that the device or process patented is old or lacking in invention, and that a court may refresh and strengthen its recollection and impression of what facts were of common and general knowledge at the time of the application for patent by reference to any printed source of general information which is known to the court to be reliable, and to have been published prior to the application for the patent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Trubenizing Process Corp. v. Jacobson
98 F.2d 899 (Second Circuit, 1938)
Minton Mfg. Co. v. Continental Briar Pipe Co.
93 F.2d 271 (Second Circuit, 1937)
Herman Nelson Corp. v. American Blower Corp.
84 F.2d 171 (Sixth Circuit, 1936)
Herman Nelson Corp. v. John J. Nesbitt, Inc.
4 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Michigan, 1933)
Friend v. Burnham & Morrill Co.
55 F.2d 150 (First Circuit, 1932)
Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. Village of Le Roy
17 F.2d 593 (W.D. New York, 1927)
Coffield v. Sunny Line Appliance, Inc.
297 F. 609 (Sixth Circuit, 1924)
Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Ford Motor Co.
278 F. 881 (Sixth Circuit, 1922)
Krell Auto Grand Piano Co. v. Story & Clark Co.
207 F. 946 (Seventh Circuit, 1913)
Towne Steering Wheel Co. v. Lee
199 F. 777 (Ninth Circuit, 1912)
Charles Boldt Co. v. Nivison-Weiskopf Co.
194 F. 871 (Sixth Circuit, 1912)
Thomas v. St. Louis & S. F. R.
149 F. 753 (Sixth Circuit, 1907)
Union Hardware Co. v. Selchow
112 F. 1006 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York, 1901)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
83 F. 170, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2084, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strom-manufg-co-v-weir-frog-co-ca6-1897.