1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 PETER STROJNIK, SR., Case No. 19-cv-02210-BAS-MSB 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 10 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES v. 11 (ECF No. 17) 1017 CORONADO, INC., 12 Defendant. 13 14 On November 20, 2019, Peter Strojnik, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging 15 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the California Unruh Act, the 16 California Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”) and one count of negligence. (Compl., ECF No. 17 1.) On June 16, 2020, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of 18 standing. (ECF No. 15.) Defendant now moves for Attorney’s Fees or in the Alternative 19 for Sanctions (“Motion”). (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff objects to the Motion (ECF No. 19), 20 and Defendant replies to the objection. (ECF No. 20.) 21 The Court finds this Motion is suitable for determination on the papers submitted 22 and without oral argument. See Civ. LR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court 23 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. (ECF No. 17.) 24 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 25 In the Complaint, Mr. Strojnik alleged he is disabled and “walks with difficulty and 26 pain” requiring “compliant mobility accessible features at places of public 27 accommodation.” (Compl. ¶¶ 2–4.) Plaintiff did not provide greater detail as to the 28 “mobility accessible features” he requires but claims that “[b]y virtue of his disability, [he] 1 requires an ADA compliant lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility, both 2 ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff provided blurry photographs 3 purporting to show barriers that he encountered on Defendant’s website depicting 4 Defendant’s lodging facility. (Compl. ¶¶ 15–16, Addendum A.) Plaintiff did not allege 5 that he personally encountered these barriers, visited the hotel at 1017 Coronado, or called 6 the facility to see if these barriers exist or if alternative options are available for those with 7 Plaintiff’s disabilities. 8 Defendant presents surveillance videos from June 5, 2019, February 10, 2020, and 9 February 11, 2020, ostensibly showing Plaintiff walking around various hotels without the 10 need of a wheelchair. (ECF Nos. 4-2, 17-2.) The Court further notes that in a case 11 involving the same Plaintiff before this Court, Plaintiff attended a hearing on December 12 10, 2019, and was able to enter the courtroom unassisted by a wheelchair and did not appear 13 to have difficulty ambulating. (See Strojnik v. Torrey Pines Club Corp. (“Torrey Pines”), 14 No. 19-cv-00650-BAS-AHG, (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019), ECF No. 56.) In that case, the 15 Court ordered Mr. Strojnik to submit to an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) and 16 set an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Plaintiff should be declared a vexatious 17 litigant, in part, for misrepresenting his disability status in that complaint. (Id.) The IME 18 concluded that Mr. Strojnik “ambulates relatively well with a very slight limp and has an 19 erect posture.” (See Decl. of Philip Stillman (“Stillman Dec.”), Ex. 2 to Mot., ECF No. 17- 20 2.) The parties settled the case before the evidentiary hearing, and the Defendant in that 21 case withdrew the request to have Mr. Strojnik declared a vexatious litigant. (See Torrey 22 Pines, ECF No. 125.) 23 The Defendant in this case moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of standing. 24 (ECF No. 4.) The Court granted the motion, finding Plaintiff never alleged he actually 25 encountered the barriers or contacted the hotel to see if the barriers actually existed. (Order 26 Granting Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 15.) Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiff 27 alleged insufficient facts to show that he was disabled at the time he intended to visit San 28 Diego. (Id. at 6.) And finally, the Court found Mr. Strojnik’s claims in multiple lawsuits 1 throughout the state that he planned to return to all of the various lodging establishments 2 “defie[d] credulity.” (Id.) The Court refused to give Plaintiff leave to amend the 3 Complaint, finding that Mr. Strojnik had been repeatedly informed that his formulaic 4 complaints lacked standing yet he persisted in filing the same boilerplate allegations. (Id. 5 at 7–8.) 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Mr. Strojnik is no stranger to having his ADA lawsuits thrown out for lack of 8 standing. On November 16, 2018, the State Bar of Arizona filed a complaint alleging that 9 Mr. Strojnik, then licensed to practice law in the state, had filed thousands of ADA 10 complaints against small businesses in Arizona and then used false statements to pressure 11 the defendants to settle the cases. More than a thousand of these identical cases were 12 consolidated in Arizona Superior Court and all but one were dismissed with prejudice for 13 lack of standing on March 2, 2017. See Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC 14 v. MidFirst Bank, No. CV-16-01989-PHX-NVW, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123795, at **6–8 15 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2018). The Arizona State Bar alleged that Mr. Strojnik had perpetrated 16 a fraud on the court and made a number of misrepresentations to the court in an attempt to 17 avoid sanctions. (See Ex. 1 to Stillman Decl..) Plaintiff consented to disbarment and was 18 disbarred on May 10, 2019. 19 Plaintiff now appears before this Court and many other courts throughout California, 20 not as a lawyer, but as a litigant, making identical allegations (including the typographic 21 errors) about various lodging facilities throughout California. In the Southern District of 22 California alone, Mr. Strojnik has filed 22 identical ADA complaints against various hotels 23 in the Southern District of California.1, 2 24 1 In each of these cases, Plaintiff alleges that he “requires compliant mobility accessible features 25 at places of public accommodation” and that he requires “an ADA compliant lodging facility particularly 26 applicable to his mobility, both ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the hotel rooms and bathrooms are inaccessible to him because they are not wheelchair accessible and 27 their websites fail to identify whether they are wheelchair accessible. 2 See Strojnik v. Pendry San Diego, LLC, No. 19-cv-00305-LAB-AGS; Strojnik v. Host Hotels and 28 1 In an extensive analysis of the cases Mr. Strojnik has filed in California, the district 2 court in Strojnik v. IA Lodging Napa First LLC, No. 19-cv-3983-DMR, 2020 WL 2838814 3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2020), reviewed 114 of these ADA cases in which Mr. Strojnik appeared 4 as a plaintiff. The court concluded that “the vast majority of courts who have reached the 5 issue have granted Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of standing or dismissed Strojnik’s 6 complaints sua sponte on that basis.” Id. at *12; see, e.g., Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles 7 Acquisition, LLC, No. 19-cv-2067, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 213070, at *4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8 14, 2019) (“[H]aving failed to articulate . . . what the specific barriers are, Plaintiff also 9 failed to tie them to his alleged disability as required to show that the violation affects the 10 plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”) (quotations omitted), aff’d 801 Fed. App’x 569 11 (9th Cir. 2020); Strojnik v. Hotel Circle GL Holdings LLC, No. 19-cv-1194, 2019 U.S. 12 Dist. Lexis 202591, at **18–19 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (“Several district courts have 13 dismissed complaints similar to the one before this court filed by plaintiff after finding that 14 he did not properly allege standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in those cases. 15 Plaintiff is therefore well aware of the applicable Ninth Circuit law governing standing to 16 assert an ADA claim[.]”). The court also pointed out that “[a]s early 2017, courts in the 17 Ninth Circuit have repeatedly admonished Strojnik for failing to allege a connection 18 between ADA violations and a plaintiff’s particular disabilities.” IA Lodging Napa First, 19 at *10.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 PETER STROJNIK, SR., Case No. 19-cv-02210-BAS-MSB 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 10 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES v. 11 (ECF No. 17) 1017 CORONADO, INC., 12 Defendant. 13 14 On November 20, 2019, Peter Strojnik, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging 15 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the California Unruh Act, the 16 California Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”) and one count of negligence. (Compl., ECF No. 17 1.) On June 16, 2020, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of 18 standing. (ECF No. 15.) Defendant now moves for Attorney’s Fees or in the Alternative 19 for Sanctions (“Motion”). (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff objects to the Motion (ECF No. 19), 20 and Defendant replies to the objection. (ECF No. 20.) 21 The Court finds this Motion is suitable for determination on the papers submitted 22 and without oral argument. See Civ. LR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court 23 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. (ECF No. 17.) 24 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 25 In the Complaint, Mr. Strojnik alleged he is disabled and “walks with difficulty and 26 pain” requiring “compliant mobility accessible features at places of public 27 accommodation.” (Compl. ¶¶ 2–4.) Plaintiff did not provide greater detail as to the 28 “mobility accessible features” he requires but claims that “[b]y virtue of his disability, [he] 1 requires an ADA compliant lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility, both 2 ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff provided blurry photographs 3 purporting to show barriers that he encountered on Defendant’s website depicting 4 Defendant’s lodging facility. (Compl. ¶¶ 15–16, Addendum A.) Plaintiff did not allege 5 that he personally encountered these barriers, visited the hotel at 1017 Coronado, or called 6 the facility to see if these barriers exist or if alternative options are available for those with 7 Plaintiff’s disabilities. 8 Defendant presents surveillance videos from June 5, 2019, February 10, 2020, and 9 February 11, 2020, ostensibly showing Plaintiff walking around various hotels without the 10 need of a wheelchair. (ECF Nos. 4-2, 17-2.) The Court further notes that in a case 11 involving the same Plaintiff before this Court, Plaintiff attended a hearing on December 12 10, 2019, and was able to enter the courtroom unassisted by a wheelchair and did not appear 13 to have difficulty ambulating. (See Strojnik v. Torrey Pines Club Corp. (“Torrey Pines”), 14 No. 19-cv-00650-BAS-AHG, (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019), ECF No. 56.) In that case, the 15 Court ordered Mr. Strojnik to submit to an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) and 16 set an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Plaintiff should be declared a vexatious 17 litigant, in part, for misrepresenting his disability status in that complaint. (Id.) The IME 18 concluded that Mr. Strojnik “ambulates relatively well with a very slight limp and has an 19 erect posture.” (See Decl. of Philip Stillman (“Stillman Dec.”), Ex. 2 to Mot., ECF No. 17- 20 2.) The parties settled the case before the evidentiary hearing, and the Defendant in that 21 case withdrew the request to have Mr. Strojnik declared a vexatious litigant. (See Torrey 22 Pines, ECF No. 125.) 23 The Defendant in this case moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of standing. 24 (ECF No. 4.) The Court granted the motion, finding Plaintiff never alleged he actually 25 encountered the barriers or contacted the hotel to see if the barriers actually existed. (Order 26 Granting Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 15.) Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiff 27 alleged insufficient facts to show that he was disabled at the time he intended to visit San 28 Diego. (Id. at 6.) And finally, the Court found Mr. Strojnik’s claims in multiple lawsuits 1 throughout the state that he planned to return to all of the various lodging establishments 2 “defie[d] credulity.” (Id.) The Court refused to give Plaintiff leave to amend the 3 Complaint, finding that Mr. Strojnik had been repeatedly informed that his formulaic 4 complaints lacked standing yet he persisted in filing the same boilerplate allegations. (Id. 5 at 7–8.) 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Mr. Strojnik is no stranger to having his ADA lawsuits thrown out for lack of 8 standing. On November 16, 2018, the State Bar of Arizona filed a complaint alleging that 9 Mr. Strojnik, then licensed to practice law in the state, had filed thousands of ADA 10 complaints against small businesses in Arizona and then used false statements to pressure 11 the defendants to settle the cases. More than a thousand of these identical cases were 12 consolidated in Arizona Superior Court and all but one were dismissed with prejudice for 13 lack of standing on March 2, 2017. See Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC 14 v. MidFirst Bank, No. CV-16-01989-PHX-NVW, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123795, at **6–8 15 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2018). The Arizona State Bar alleged that Mr. Strojnik had perpetrated 16 a fraud on the court and made a number of misrepresentations to the court in an attempt to 17 avoid sanctions. (See Ex. 1 to Stillman Decl..) Plaintiff consented to disbarment and was 18 disbarred on May 10, 2019. 19 Plaintiff now appears before this Court and many other courts throughout California, 20 not as a lawyer, but as a litigant, making identical allegations (including the typographic 21 errors) about various lodging facilities throughout California. In the Southern District of 22 California alone, Mr. Strojnik has filed 22 identical ADA complaints against various hotels 23 in the Southern District of California.1, 2 24 1 In each of these cases, Plaintiff alleges that he “requires compliant mobility accessible features 25 at places of public accommodation” and that he requires “an ADA compliant lodging facility particularly 26 applicable to his mobility, both ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the hotel rooms and bathrooms are inaccessible to him because they are not wheelchair accessible and 27 their websites fail to identify whether they are wheelchair accessible. 2 See Strojnik v. Pendry San Diego, LLC, No. 19-cv-00305-LAB-AGS; Strojnik v. Host Hotels and 28 1 In an extensive analysis of the cases Mr. Strojnik has filed in California, the district 2 court in Strojnik v. IA Lodging Napa First LLC, No. 19-cv-3983-DMR, 2020 WL 2838814 3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2020), reviewed 114 of these ADA cases in which Mr. Strojnik appeared 4 as a plaintiff. The court concluded that “the vast majority of courts who have reached the 5 issue have granted Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of standing or dismissed Strojnik’s 6 complaints sua sponte on that basis.” Id. at *12; see, e.g., Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles 7 Acquisition, LLC, No. 19-cv-2067, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 213070, at *4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8 14, 2019) (“[H]aving failed to articulate . . . what the specific barriers are, Plaintiff also 9 failed to tie them to his alleged disability as required to show that the violation affects the 10 plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”) (quotations omitted), aff’d 801 Fed. App’x 569 11 (9th Cir. 2020); Strojnik v. Hotel Circle GL Holdings LLC, No. 19-cv-1194, 2019 U.S. 12 Dist. Lexis 202591, at **18–19 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (“Several district courts have 13 dismissed complaints similar to the one before this court filed by plaintiff after finding that 14 he did not properly allege standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in those cases. 15 Plaintiff is therefore well aware of the applicable Ninth Circuit law governing standing to 16 assert an ADA claim[.]”). The court also pointed out that “[a]s early 2017, courts in the 17 Ninth Circuit have repeatedly admonished Strojnik for failing to allege a connection 18 between ADA violations and a plaintiff’s particular disabilities.” IA Lodging Napa First, 19 at *10. The Court further concluded that “Strojnik has a longstanding practice of failing 20 WQH-KSC; Strojnik v. GHALP Partnership LP, No. 19-cv-01187-LAB-RBB; Strojnik v. CWI 2 La Jolla 21 Hotel LP, No. 19-cv-01381-GPC-MDD; Strojnik v. Prospect Hospitality LP, No. 19-cv-01386-WQH- 22 AGS; Strojnik v. Lizerbram, No. 19-cv-01390-LAB-BLM ; Strojnik v. Bartell Hotels Management Co., No. 19-cv-01391-DMS-MSB.; Strojnik v. RNM Hospitality, No. 19-cv-01455-WQH-WVG; Strojnik v. 23 Marla K Hicks Trust, No. 19-cv-01446-BAS-AHG; Strojnik v. 1315 Orange LLC, No. 19-cv-01991-LAB- JLB; Strojnik v. Barrigon, Inc., No. 19-cv-02147-AJB-RBB; Strojnik v. Cherokee Lodge, No. 19-cv- 24 02148-AJB-AHG; Strojnik v. Village 1017 Coronado, No. 19-cv-02210-BAS-MSB; Strojnik v. INdoc Partners, LLC, No. 19-cv-02211-LAB-BLM; Strojnik v. Kamla Hotels Inc., No. 19-cv-02212-AJB-AHG; 25 Strojnik v. San Diego Farah Partners, LP, No. 20-cv-00358-LAB-BGS; Strojnik v. Souldriver Lessee, 26 Inc., No. 20-cv-00359-JAH-LL; Strojnik v. RBI Investors, L.P., No. 20-cv-00360-BAS-LL; Strojnik v. Lafayette Landlord, LLC, No. 20-cv-00387-GPC-AGS; Strojnik v. Driftwood Capital Partners, LLC, No. 27 20-cv-00384-DMS-MSB; Strojnik v. Pacifica Stratford Three, LLC, No. 20-cv-00868-GPC. The vast majority of these cases have either been immediately settled with no litigation or dismissed for want of 28 1 to allege basic facts about standing such as a connection between a barrier and plaintiff’s 2 disability.” Id. at *11. The Court expressed concern that Strojnik carefully alleged broad 3 non-specific allegations with insufficient details that could neither be confirmed nor 4 discredited. Id. Ultimately the court declared Mr. Strojnik to be a vexatious litigant 5 because of his “frivolous and harassing” litigation tactics. Id. at *13. 6 III. ANALYSIS 7 A. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees 8 Defendant first requests attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §12205. Under this statute, 9 the court may award a party who prevails in a lawsuit filed under the ADA “a reasonable 10 attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” The purpose of awarding fees to 11 a prevailing defendant is “‘to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation.’” CRST 12 Van Expedited, Inc., v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1652 (2016) (quoting Christiansburg 13 Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978)). “The Court, therefore, has interpreted 14 the statute to allow prevailing defendants to recover [only] when the Plaintiff’s ‘claim was 15 frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.’” Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421). 16 Plaintiff argues first that Defendant was not the prevailing party in this case because 17 the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, as Mr. Strojnik 18 well knows, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. 19 v. Aventis Pharma SA, 856 F.3d 696, 709 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissing a case for lack of 20 subject matter jurisdiction is “a significant victory and permanently changes the legal 21 relationship of the parties”). He raised this exact argument in Advocates for Individuals 22 with Disabilities, where the Arizona court pointed out to him that Amphastar allows a 23 Defendant to recover attorney’s fees in similar circumstances. 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24 123795, at *13-14. 25 Next the Court must determine whether this lawsuit was “frivolous, unreasonable or 26 groundless.” “‘Frivolous’ means ‘[l]acking in legal basis or legal merit[.]” Id. at *11 27 (quoting Blacks’ Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed. 2009)). “Bad faith” in bringing the lawsuit 28 1 is not required, but a showing of bad faith could support a finding that the lawsuit was 2 “frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.” Id. 3 Mr. Strojnik has had thousands of cases filed pursuant to the ADA dismissed for 4 lack of standing. He has been repeatedly told that he must articulate: (1) the specific 5 barriers that he encountered; and (2) must tie them to any alleged disability he suffers from. 6 See Pasadena Robles Acquisition, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 213070, at *4 n.1 (“(“[H]aving 7 failed to articulate . . . what the specific barriers are, Plaintiff also failed to tie them to his 8 alleged disability as required to show that the violation affects the plaintiff in a personal 9 and individual way.”) (quotation omitted); IA Lodging Napa First LLC, 2020 WL 2838814, 10 **7–13 (analyzing 114 ADA cases filed by Mr. Strojnik in California and concluding that 11 he should be declared a vexatious litigant for failing to attempt to cure his standing issues). 12 As the Court concluded in IA Lodging Napa First, “[a]s early as 2017, courts in the Ninth 13 Circuit have repeatedly admonished Strojnik for failing to allege a connection between 14 ADA violations and plaintiff’s particular disabilities.” Id. at *10. For example, in Hotel 15 Circle GL Holdings, filed at the same time as this case, the Court concluded that Mr. 16 Strojnik is “well aware of the applicable Ninth Circuit law governing standing to assert an 17 ADA.” Id. at *11. 18 The Court finds the lack of specificity in Mr. Strojnik’s complaints particularly 19 troubling because it allows Mr. Strojnik to avoid alleging the specifics of his disability and 20 how this disability has been affected by the alleged barriers he allegedly encountered. See 21 IA Lodging Napa First, 2020 WL 2838814, at *11 (noting the concern that “Strojnik files 22 bare-bones complaints that do not meet pleading standards in order to pressure ADA 23 defendants into settlement before the Court can reach the merits of his claims”). Mr. 24 Strojnik appears to suggest that he is wheelchair-bound, a fact that clearly is not true. In 25 the case most recently before the Court, the Court ordered an IME to determine whether 26 Mr. Strojnik was truly disabled as he claimed in his lawsuit. The case settled after the IME 27 was conducted but the examiner concluded Mr. Strojnik “ambulates relatively well with a 28 very slight limp and has an erect posture.” (See Ex. 2 to Stillman Decl.) Similarly, at a 1 Court hearing on December 10, 2019 (a month after this lawsuit was filed), the Court 2 observed Plaintiff able to walk into a courtroom unassisted by a wheelchair. At that time 3 Plaintiff did not appear to have difficulty walking. 4 Mr. Strojnik also appears to suggest that he encountered these barriers without ever 5 traveling to the lodging facilities. In other words, he looks at photos online and, without 6 reaching out to the lodging facilities, files a lawsuit claiming that they are not ADA 7 accessible. This is particularly troubling given Mr. Strojnik’s history of filing meritless 8 lawsuits and using misrepresentations to encourage small business defendants into quick 9 settlements. These tactics led Mr. Strojnik to be disbarred by the State of Arizona. He 10 appears to be using similar tactics in California, using himself as a questionable plaintiff. 11 The fact remains that Mr. Strojnik files lawsuits with broad, non-specific allegations 12 that he knows will be dismissed for lack of standing. This conduct is clearly frivolous, 13 unreasonable, and groundless. 14 Mr. Strojnik counters that two lawsuits filed in California were not dismissed for 15 lack of standing based on Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v. Hospitality 16 Properties Trust (“CREEC”), 867 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). (See Strojnik v. 574 Escuela 17 LLC, No. 18-cv-6777, Ex. 1. to Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 19; Strojnik v. GF 18 Carneros Tenant, LLC, No. 19-cv-3583-JSC, Ex. 3 to Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Mot.) But, as 19 the Arizona court in Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities points out, these cases 20 addressed the issue of whether Mr. Strojnik’s allegations that he was deterred from visiting 21 the lodging facilities at issue without actually visiting them established standing. 2018 22 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123795, at **27–28. They do not address Mr. Strojnik’s failure to allege 23 specifically what his disability is and what the barriers are that affect that disability. These 24 shortfalls have been pointed out to Mr. Strojnik on many, many occasions, yet he continues 25 to file boilerplate complaints lacking in substance sufficient to establish standing. 26 In the alternative Defendant requests sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for 27 multiplying the proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously.” Although the Court finds it 28 is likely that Defendant can establish evidence to justify sanctions under this statute, 1 because it has already found that attorney’s fees are justified under § 12205, it does not 2 ||reach this issue. 3 B. Amount of Attorney’s Fees 4 Defendant provides billing records justifying its claim that the lodestar for defending 5 || this claim is $21,995. (Ex. 4 to Stillman Decl.). The Court finds the rate of $500 an hour 6 the prevailing rate for an attorney of Mr. Stillman’s experience in San Diego, and, having 7 ||reviewed the billing records, finds the hours spent defending this action to be reasonable. 8 Plaintiff argues that Defendant fails to establish that Plaintiff’s counsel actually 9 || billed Plaintiff this amount for attorney’s fees and requests discovery as to the terms and 10 || existence of a fee agreement between Defendant and its counsel and any invoices sent by 11 |}counsel to Defendant. (Pl.’s Obj. at 6-7.) However, “the award of attorneys’ fees under 12 rights fee-shifting statutes is not cost-based” and “an award of attorneys’ fees . . . 1s 13 necessarily contingent upon an obligation to pay counsel.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 14 || F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009). “The presence of an attorney-client relationship suffices to 15 || entitle prevailing litigants to receive fee awards.” Jd. Mr. Stillman has appeared as counsel 16 ||for Defendant throughout this litigation, so there is no question that an attorney-client 17 relationship exists between them. Whether or not Defendant is required to pay this amount 18 |}to Mr. Stillman is irrelevant. Therefore, Mr. Strojnik’s objection on this ground is 19 || overruled and his request for discovery is denied. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 22 || Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 17) and awards Defendant $21,995 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff 23 ordered to pay this amount forthwith. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25
26 || DATED: January 12, 2021 Cypilig _| Hohe sk 27 United States Daarict Jalge 28