1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BROCK STRATTON, ET AL.,
12 Plaintiffs, No. 2:23-cv-00964-TLN-CSK
13 14 v. ORDER OROVILLE CITY ELEMENTARY 15 SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., 16 Defendants.
18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Oroville City Elementary School District 19 and Kimberly Tyler’s (“District Defendants”) Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (ECF No. 20 54.) Plaintiffs Brock Stratton, Nicole Stratton, and C.S., a minor by and through his guardian ad 21 litem, (“Plaintiffs”) filed a notice of non-opposition. (ECF No. 56.) For the reasons set forth 22 below, the Court GRANTS District Defendants’ Motion. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The Court need not recite the factual and procedural history of the instant matter, as it is 3 set forth in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 47.) Relevant here, on March 18, 2025, the Court 4 issued an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in part. (Id.) At the end of the 5 order, the Court stated, “[i]f Plaintiffs opt not to file an amended complaint, the action will 6 proceed only on the claims not dismissed above, and Defendants shall file their answer no later 7 than twenty-one (21) days from Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing an amended complaint.” (Id. at 26.) 8 After the Court issued its order, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, and District 9 Defendants failed to file an Answer within the ordered timeframe. Plaintiffs then requested entry 10 of default as to District Defendants, (ECF No. 49), which the Clerk of Court entered on May 30, 11 2025 (ECF No. 51). On June 12, 2025, District Defendants filed the instant motion to set aside 12 default. (ECF No. 54.) 13 II. STANDARD OF LAW 14 A clerk’s entry of default may be set aside for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “To 15 determine ‘good cause,’ a court must ‘consider three factors: (1) whether [the party seeking to set 16 aside the default] engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether [it] had [no] 17 meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would prejudice’ the other 18 party.” United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 19 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the “good cause” standard is the same that applies to motions to set 20 aside default judgment under Rule 60(b), “the test is more liberally applied in the Rule 55(c) 21 context.” Id. at 1091 n.1 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Brady v. United 22 States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding district court’s discretion is “especially broad” 23 when setting aside entry of default, rather than default judgment). The Court addresses the three 24 “good cause” factors below. 25 III. ANALYSIS 26 District Defendants’ counsel takes full responsibility for missing the deadline to file an 27 answer to the First Amended Complaint and argues there is good cause to set aside the default. 28 (ECF No. 54 at 4.) Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, but requests the Court clarify the 1 scheduling order. (ECF No. 56 at 2.) In light of the non-opposition, the Court only briefly 2 considers the three “good cause” factors below before turning to Plaintiffs’ request for 3 clarification. 4 A. Culpable Conduct 5 “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice of the 6 filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” U.S. v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of 7 Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (quoting TCI Grp. 8 Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, District Defendants’ 9 counsel states she mistakenly failed to calendar the appropriate deadlines and failed to catch the 10 mistake due to personal and family medical issues combined with an impacted schedule of 11 appearances. (ECF No. 54-1 at 5–6.) District Defendants’ counsel argues that while the failure to 12 file an answer was clearly negligent, the failure to file was not intentional nor done to delay or 13 interfere with the judicial process. (Id. at 7.) In light of the non-opposition and finding no reason 14 to conclude otherwise, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of setting aside the default 15 judgment. 16 B. Meritorious Defense 17 “A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must present specific facts that would 18 constitute a defense.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted). “But the burden on a party 19 seeking to vacate a default judgment is not extraordinarily heavy.” Id. All that is necessary to 20 satisfy the “meritorious defense” requirement is to allege sufficient facts that, if true, would 21 constitute a defense: “the question of whether the factual allegation [i]s true” is not to be 22 determined by the court when it decides the motion to set aside the default. Id. Rather, that 23 question “would be the subject of the later litigation.” Id. 24 Here, District Defendants argue the video evidence discounts Plaintiffs’ excessive force 25 claim, and the disability discrimination claims as pled are barred by a Settlement Agreement. (Id. 26 at 8–9.) While the Court refrains from ruling on these defenses at this time, it finds District 27 Defendants have provided sufficient facts which could constitute a defense if proven true. Thus, 28 this factor also weighs in favor of setting aside default judgment. 1 C. Prejudice 2 Finally, a court may refuse to set aside an entry of default if doing so would prejudice the 3 other party. “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than 4 simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Grp., 244 F.3d at 701. Only tangible harm, such as 5 the loss of evidence, complication of discovery, or the risk of fraud, will support the denial of a 6 motion to set aside the entry of default. Id. A party is not prejudiced simply because it must 7 litigate its claims on the merits. Id. 8 District Defendants argue setting aside default will not prejudice Plaintiffs because it 9 merely returns the parties to the status quo of May 29, 2025, no discovery has been served, no 10 case management order is in place, and the pleadings have only been settled for less than two 11 months. (ECF No. 54-1 at 10.) Plaintiffs do not disagree they will not be prejudiced but note that 12 initial disclosures have been served, and an Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued. 13 (ECF No. 56 at 2.) Again, in light of the non-opposition, the Court finds no reason Plaintiffs will 14 be prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment. Thus, this final factor weighs in favor of 15 setting aside the default judgment. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs are correct that an Initial 16 Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued. (ECF No. 3.) 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS District Defendants’ motion to set aside entry of 18 default. (ECF No. 54.) 19 D. Scheduling Order 20 Plaintiffs request this Court clarify the scheduling order in place and confirm several 21 deadlines calculated pursuant to that order. (ECF No. 56 at 2.) As stated above, the Initial 22 Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued in the instant matter and states that all discovery, with 23 the exception of expert discovery, shall be completed no later than two hundred forty (240) days 24 from the date upon which the last answer may be filed with the Court. (ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BROCK STRATTON, ET AL.,
12 Plaintiffs, No. 2:23-cv-00964-TLN-CSK
13 14 v. ORDER OROVILLE CITY ELEMENTARY 15 SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., 16 Defendants.
18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Oroville City Elementary School District 19 and Kimberly Tyler’s (“District Defendants”) Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (ECF No. 20 54.) Plaintiffs Brock Stratton, Nicole Stratton, and C.S., a minor by and through his guardian ad 21 litem, (“Plaintiffs”) filed a notice of non-opposition. (ECF No. 56.) For the reasons set forth 22 below, the Court GRANTS District Defendants’ Motion. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The Court need not recite the factual and procedural history of the instant matter, as it is 3 set forth in the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 47.) Relevant here, on March 18, 2025, the Court 4 issued an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint in part. (Id.) At the end of the 5 order, the Court stated, “[i]f Plaintiffs opt not to file an amended complaint, the action will 6 proceed only on the claims not dismissed above, and Defendants shall file their answer no later 7 than twenty-one (21) days from Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing an amended complaint.” (Id. at 26.) 8 After the Court issued its order, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, and District 9 Defendants failed to file an Answer within the ordered timeframe. Plaintiffs then requested entry 10 of default as to District Defendants, (ECF No. 49), which the Clerk of Court entered on May 30, 11 2025 (ECF No. 51). On June 12, 2025, District Defendants filed the instant motion to set aside 12 default. (ECF No. 54.) 13 II. STANDARD OF LAW 14 A clerk’s entry of default may be set aside for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “To 15 determine ‘good cause,’ a court must ‘consider three factors: (1) whether [the party seeking to set 16 aside the default] engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether [it] had [no] 17 meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would prejudice’ the other 18 party.” United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 19 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the “good cause” standard is the same that applies to motions to set 20 aside default judgment under Rule 60(b), “the test is more liberally applied in the Rule 55(c) 21 context.” Id. at 1091 n.1 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Brady v. United 22 States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding district court’s discretion is “especially broad” 23 when setting aside entry of default, rather than default judgment). The Court addresses the three 24 “good cause” factors below. 25 III. ANALYSIS 26 District Defendants’ counsel takes full responsibility for missing the deadline to file an 27 answer to the First Amended Complaint and argues there is good cause to set aside the default. 28 (ECF No. 54 at 4.) Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, but requests the Court clarify the 1 scheduling order. (ECF No. 56 at 2.) In light of the non-opposition, the Court only briefly 2 considers the three “good cause” factors below before turning to Plaintiffs’ request for 3 clarification. 4 A. Culpable Conduct 5 “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice of the 6 filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” U.S. v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of 7 Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (quoting TCI Grp. 8 Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, District Defendants’ 9 counsel states she mistakenly failed to calendar the appropriate deadlines and failed to catch the 10 mistake due to personal and family medical issues combined with an impacted schedule of 11 appearances. (ECF No. 54-1 at 5–6.) District Defendants’ counsel argues that while the failure to 12 file an answer was clearly negligent, the failure to file was not intentional nor done to delay or 13 interfere with the judicial process. (Id. at 7.) In light of the non-opposition and finding no reason 14 to conclude otherwise, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of setting aside the default 15 judgment. 16 B. Meritorious Defense 17 “A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must present specific facts that would 18 constitute a defense.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted). “But the burden on a party 19 seeking to vacate a default judgment is not extraordinarily heavy.” Id. All that is necessary to 20 satisfy the “meritorious defense” requirement is to allege sufficient facts that, if true, would 21 constitute a defense: “the question of whether the factual allegation [i]s true” is not to be 22 determined by the court when it decides the motion to set aside the default. Id. Rather, that 23 question “would be the subject of the later litigation.” Id. 24 Here, District Defendants argue the video evidence discounts Plaintiffs’ excessive force 25 claim, and the disability discrimination claims as pled are barred by a Settlement Agreement. (Id. 26 at 8–9.) While the Court refrains from ruling on these defenses at this time, it finds District 27 Defendants have provided sufficient facts which could constitute a defense if proven true. Thus, 28 this factor also weighs in favor of setting aside default judgment. 1 C. Prejudice 2 Finally, a court may refuse to set aside an entry of default if doing so would prejudice the 3 other party. “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than 4 simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Grp., 244 F.3d at 701. Only tangible harm, such as 5 the loss of evidence, complication of discovery, or the risk of fraud, will support the denial of a 6 motion to set aside the entry of default. Id. A party is not prejudiced simply because it must 7 litigate its claims on the merits. Id. 8 District Defendants argue setting aside default will not prejudice Plaintiffs because it 9 merely returns the parties to the status quo of May 29, 2025, no discovery has been served, no 10 case management order is in place, and the pleadings have only been settled for less than two 11 months. (ECF No. 54-1 at 10.) Plaintiffs do not disagree they will not be prejudiced but note that 12 initial disclosures have been served, and an Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued. 13 (ECF No. 56 at 2.) Again, in light of the non-opposition, the Court finds no reason Plaintiffs will 14 be prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment. Thus, this final factor weighs in favor of 15 setting aside the default judgment. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs are correct that an Initial 16 Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued. (ECF No. 3.) 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS District Defendants’ motion to set aside entry of 18 default. (ECF No. 54.) 19 D. Scheduling Order 20 Plaintiffs request this Court clarify the scheduling order in place and confirm several 21 deadlines calculated pursuant to that order. (ECF No. 56 at 2.) As stated above, the Initial 22 Pretrial Scheduling Order has been issued in the instant matter and states that all discovery, with 23 the exception of expert discovery, shall be completed no later than two hundred forty (240) days 24 from the date upon which the last answer may be filed with the Court. (ECF No. 3 at 2.) Because 25 the Court now grants District Defendants’ motion to set aside the entry of default and allows 26 District Defendants to file a responsive pleading to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, the 27 Court clarifies that all remaining deadlines in the Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order shall be 28 calculated based on the date on which District Defendants’ answer may be filed with the Court. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS District Defendants’ Motion to Set 3 Aside Entry of Default. (ECF No. 54.) District Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to 4 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30) not later than seven (7) days from the 5 electronic filing date of this Order. Should District Defendants not timely file a responsive 6 pleading, Plaintiffs may file a new request for default judgment. Further, as stated above, all 7 remaining deadlines in the Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order shall be calculated based on the date 8 on which District Defendants’ answer may be filed. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Date: August 27, 2025 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28