Strandquist v. Washington State Department of Health and Human Services

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 RANDALL J STRANDQUIST, Case No. 3:23-cv-05071-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. 10 WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT 11 OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES; 12 WENDY LONG, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. ORDER 16 Before the Court is Plaintiff Randall Strandquist’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 209) 17 requesting the Court revisit its order striking Strandquist’s Rule 50(b) motion as untimely 18 (Dkt. 205). First, Strandquist argues that since Rules 6(b)(2) and 50(b) are non-jurisdictional 19 claim-processing rules, there is a forfeiture exception that allows the Court to consider his 20 untimely motion. Dkt. 209 at 3. Second, Strandquist maintains that considering his untimely 21 motion does not affect the policies underlying Rules 6(b)(2) and 50(b). Id. at 3–4. Finally, 22 Strandquist contends that striking his motion hinders judicial efficiency, and asks that the Court 23 24 1 alternatively allow the parties to file dispositive motions prior to trial. Id. at 4–5. For the reasons 2 explained below, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration. 3 Under this District’s Local Civil Rules, “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,”

4 and “[t]he court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error 5 in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been 6 brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1). “[A] motion 7 for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the 8 district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 9 intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH 10 & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A motion for reconsideration is not 11 intended to provide litigants with a second bite at the apple.” Stevens v. Pierce Cnty., No. C22- 12 5862 BHS, 2023 WL 6807204, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16, 2023).

13 Strandquist’s motion fails to meet this high bar. To start, whether the timeliness 14 requirements are non-jurisdictional has no bearing here. Strandquist cites to United States v. 15 Sadler for the proposition that “time constraints arising only from Court-prescribed, albeit 16 congressionally authorized, procedural rules are not jurisdictional.” Dkt. 209 at 3 (quoting U.S. v. 17 Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2007)). He then asserts that since “Rule 50(b)’s . . . filing 18 deadline is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule, it can be waived or forfeited.” Id. 19 (citations omitted). It is true that a non-jurisdictional rule may be waived or forfeited if a party 20 does not timely object. See Weil v. Elliott, 859 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A non- 21 jurisdictional time bar is an affirmative defense that may be forfeited if not timely raised[.]”). 22 But in Sandler, the Ninth Circuit held that because “the government properly raised the

23 untimeliness argument in the instant case . . . we are required to dismiss [Defendant’s] appeal.” 24 480 F.3d at 942. 1 Here, like in Sandler, Defendants properly objected by filing their own motion to deny 2 Strandquist’s Rule 50(b) motion on March 18, 2025—only three days after Strandquist’s motion 3 was filed. See Dkt. 204. Defendants argued that Strandquist’s motion should be denied because

4 he “unequivocally filed [his] Rule 50(b) Motion one day late” and “[u]nder Rule 6(b)(2), the 5 Court cannot extend the deadline for any reason.” Id. at 5. 6 And since Defendants did not forfeit the timeliness requirements, the Court must enforce 7 mandatory deadlines. See Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) 8 (“Although [a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule] is subject to waiver and forfeiture . . . a 9 claim-processing rule is mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party 10 properly raises it.”) (cleaned up). Moreover, even if Defendants had not objected, the Court on 11 its own accord could have struck Strandquist’s untimely motion. See Day v. McDonough, 547 12 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (“[D]istrict courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte”

13 whether a party has complied with a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule.). 14 Strandquist next argues that because the “purpose behind the time constraints in FRCP 15 6(b)(2) and 50(b) are to not upset a jury’s verdict, [and] neither circumstance is present here” the 16 Court should consider his motion. Dkt. 209 at 3. Strandquist further contends that despite the 17 tardiness of his motion, “[i]f it is inevitable that the Court will then grant Plaintiff judgment as a 18 matter of law, then it only makes sense to make that determination prior to trial[.]” Id. at 5. The 19 Court disagrees. 20 Strandquist offers no authority to support how striking his Rule 50(b) motion based on 21 his failure to timely file it constitutes manifest error. See Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc., 571 F.3d at 22 880. Instead, Strandquist maintains that the purpose of the filing deadlines is not undermined by

23 granting him an exception and it would be judicially efficient to do so. Dkt. 209 at 3–5. 24 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and l conservation of judicial resources,” and Strandquist’s arguments fail to show that reconsideration 2 is warranted. Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 Considering the arguments presented in Strandquist’s motion for reconsideration, there is 4 |{no manifest error in the Court’s order striking his Rule 50(b) motion as untimely. The motion for 5 reconsideration (Dkt. 209) is thus DENIED. 6 7 8 Dated this 21st day of April, 2025. ° Sag 10 Tiffan¥M. Cartwright United States District Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24