Stout v. Westover

681 P.2d 1008, 106 Idaho 533, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 479
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedMay 18, 1984
Docket14815
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 681 P.2d 1008 (Stout v. Westover) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stout v. Westover, 681 P.2d 1008, 106 Idaho 533, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 479 (Idaho 1984).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

It is alleged as error on appeal that the district court found the evidence sufficient to sustain plaintiff Freda Stout’s claim for adverse possession. The district court apparently based its ruling in part on I.C. *534 § 5-207, “Possession under written claim of title.” Appellants Westover and Westoe, Inc. contend that the evidence does not support adverse possession under § 5-207 because the warranty deed upon which Freda Stout bases her written claim of title does not include a description of all of the property claimed by Mrs. Stout and included in the judgment by the court. Although the warranty deed to Mrs. Stout purports to convey 14.24 acres, the property description actually includes about an acre-and-a-half less. The question thus presented is whether it was error for the district court to rule that Mrs. Stout had established adverse possession under I.C. § 5-207 as to property which was not included in the written instrument upon which the claim of title was founded.

While it is true that the district court quoted both I.C. § 5-207 and § 5-208, the section defining “possession under written claim of title”, the court also made specific findings of fact regarding Mrs. Stout’s payment of taxes on the full 14.24 acres. Payment of taxes is not a requirement under either I.C. § 5-207 or § 5-208. Rather, it is a necessary element for a finding of adverse possession under oral claim of title, pursuant to I.C. § 5-209 and § 5-210. Indeed, the court’s findings of fact would sustain a determination of adverse possession under oral claim of title. Included in such findings were the facts that: Mrs. Stout entered into possession of the property in dispute; she bought cows and has grazed them over all of the claimed property; she has been in continued occupation and possession of the disputed property; she has paid all taxes levied and assessed upon the property (14.24 acres); no one else has paid taxes on that property; she has treated the property as her own and has resisted encroachments by others. The court found that all of these elements were established for a period of well over five years prior to 1977, the time of filing of the complaint.

Appellants urge this Court’s attention to evidence in conflict with the findings just discussed. We recognize that there was a great deal of testimony presented at trial, some of it seeming to conflict with Mrs. Stout’s evidence of possession of the property. But our task is not to retry this case. Where, as here, the findings of the fact-finder are supported by substantial, competent, though conflicting, evidence, they will not be set aside on appeal. Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109, 675 P.2d 824 (1984); Cougar Bay Co. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 597 P.2d 1070 (1979); Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417, 565 P.2d 1374 (1977); I.R. C.P. 52(a). Accordingly, we hold that, based on the specific findings of fact of the district court, it was not error for the court to conclude that Freda Stout established a claim of adverse possession as to all of the property in question.

Appellants also allege error by the district court for failing to grant a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(4). However, the trial court’s determination not to grant a new trial will not be overturned absent manifest abuse of discretion. Luther v. Howland, 101 Idaho 373, 613 P.2d 666 (1980). There has been no such showing in this case.

A final assignment of error is made with respect to the amount of damages found by the district court for the appellants’ trespassory removal of the fence along the property boundary. That determination is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and we decline to set it aside. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Costs to respondents; no attorney fees.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith
976 P.2d 922 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1999)
Bouten Construction Co. v. M & L Land Co.
877 P.2d 928 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1994)
Watson v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.
827 P.2d 656 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1992)
Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards Co.
826 P.2d 1288 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1992)
Abbott v. Nampa School District No. 131
808 P.2d 1289 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1991)
Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens
739 P.2d 400 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1987)
Costello v. Watson
720 P.2d 1033 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1986)
Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc.
718 P.2d 1178 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1986)
Oakley Valley Stone, Inc. v. Alastra
715 P.2d 935 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1985)
Hibbler v. Fisher
712 P.2d 708 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1985)
KRIEGER BY KRIEGER v. Howell
710 P.2d 614 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
681 P.2d 1008, 106 Idaho 533, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stout-v-westover-idaho-1984.