StoneX Group Inc. v. shipman

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 25, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-00613·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------X STONEX GROUP, INC. et al., 23-CV-00613 (JGK) (VF) Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER -against-

HOWARD SHIPMAN,

Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------X VALERIE FIGUEREDO, United States Magistrate Judge. Before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees filed by Plaintiffs StoneX Group Inc. and StoneX Financial Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF No. 151. Plaintiffs request $436,047.57 in attorney’s fees in connection with their successful motion for sanctions. See ECF No. 156 at 10;1 see also ECF Nos. 106, 134, 149. Defendant Howard Shipman objects to the amount requested. See ECF Nos. 154, 155. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED in the amount of $152,812.19. BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, which are set forth in detail in the Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) dated February 5, 2024. See ECF No. 134 at 2-15. As is relevant to the instant motion, on June 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking spoliation sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) against Defendant for his failure to preserve electronically stored information. ECF Nos. 106-07. Plaintiffs contended that Defendant intentionally destroyed electronically stored evidence, despite being under an obligation to preserve that evidence, to cover up his theft of Plaintiffs’

1 The page numbers referenced herein for citations to the electronic docket (“ECF”) are to the original page numbers in those documents. proprietary and confidential computer source code. ECF No. 107. Plaintiffs argued that Defendant’s intentional destruction of evidence constituted spoliation under Rule 37(e), and Plaintiffs sought terminating sanctions in the form of an order striking Shipman’s pleadings and precluding Shipman from putting forth any defense to Plaintiffs’ claims in this matter. Id. at 16- 18, 26-30. Plaintiffs also sought monetary sanctions, in the amount of “all costs and expenses

incurred by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendant’s deliberate acts of spoliation.” Id. at 30-31. Defendant, proceeding pro se, opposed the motion for sanctions on October 19, 2023. ECF Nos. 120-21. On October 26, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief. ECF Nos. 122-23. On January 3, 2024, Defendant submitted a supplemental memorandum in further support of his opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 125. On January 18, 2024, the Court held oral argument on the motion for sanctions. ECF Nos. 124, 130. On January 29, 2024, Defendant filed a supplemental submission. ECF No. 132. On February 5, 2024, I issued the R&R, recommending that the Honorable John G. Koeltl grant Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions and order that Defendant’s cross claims be stricken,

default judgment be entered against Defendant, and Plaintiffs be awarded their attorney’s fees and costs incurred in litigating the motion for sanctions. ECF No. 134. On July 10, 2024, Judge Koeltl adopted the R&R in its entirety and again referred the matter to the undersigned “to formulate an appropriate judgment consistent with” the Court’s Opinion and Order granting the motion for sanctions. ECF No. 149 at 12. On July 24, 2024, the Court ordered briefing on the amount of attorney’s fees and costs Plaintiffs had incurred in bringing the motion for sanctions. ECF No. 150. On September 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their motion for attorney’s fees, seeking an award of $458,357.14. ECF Nos. 151-53. Defendant opposed the motion on October 1, 2024, disputing certain time entries Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted in support of the motion and arguing that Plaintiffs improperly sought $151,153 for time counsel spent on work unrelated to the motion for sanctions. ECF Nos. 154-55. On October 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of their motion for attorney’s fees, voluntarily reducing the amount of the award sought to $436,047.57. ECF Nos. 156-57.

LEGAL STANDARD To calculate an award of attorney’s fees, courts in this Circuit use the “lodestar method.” L.J. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 23-CV-07267 (ER), 2024 WL 3842083, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024). In other words, courts determine the “reasonable hourly rate,” defined as “the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,” and multiply that rate by the number of hours “reasonably expended” in prosecuting an action. See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 114-115, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2007), as amended, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008). To be reasonable, the attorney’s rate must be “in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). In evaluating hours expended, the Court must make “a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.” Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994)). In determining whether hours are excessive, “the critical inquiry is ‘whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.’” Samms v. Abrams, 198 F. Supp. 3d 311, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)). “Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, are to be excluded, . . . and in dealing with such surplusage, the court has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Alicea v. City of N.Y., 272 F. Supp. 3d 603, 608-

09 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The prevailing party bears the burden to produce “contemporaneous time records indicating, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” Scott v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 130, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a plaintiff must present contemporaneous time records that indicate, “for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done” to be awarded attorney’s fees and costs). District courts exercise “considerable discretion” in awarding attorney’s fees. See D.B. ex rel. S.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-7898 (AT) (KHP), 2019 WL 6831506, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

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