Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner

24 T.C. 659, 1955 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 143
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1955
DocketDocket Nos. 42445, 42446
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 24 T.C. 659 (Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 1955 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 143 (tax 1955).

Opinion

OPINION.

Tietjens, Judge:

Where property is sold on the installment plan the seller may return as income from the sale in any taxable year the proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit on the sale bears to the total contract price. Sec. 44, I. R. C. 1939.1 This provision, enacted in the Revenue Act of 1926,2 relieved a seller from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale based on the full amount of anticipated profits when in fact only a small portion of the sales price had been received. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U. S. 496 (1948). It permitted him to distribute the profit on an installment sale over the years during which the purchase money would be actually received, by dividing the payments into parts representing a return of capital and profit. In the case of real property sold on the installment plan where there was a mortgage on the property which the buyer either assumed or took the property subject to, the statutory scheme of returning a portion of each payment as income in the year received did not reach all of the seller’s profit, since the total amount of the selling price was not paid over by the buyer to the seller; that portion of the selling price represented by the mortgage was paid by the buyer directly to the mortgagee. To remedy this, regulations were issued by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury to provide that the amount of the mortgage, to the extent that it did not exceed the seller’s basis in the property sold, was not to be considered a part of the “initial payments” or of the “total contract price.” Treasury Regulations 69, article 44, promulgated August 28, 1926; amended by Treasury Decision 4255, VIII-1 C. B. 165 (1929). The reduction in the total contract price had the effect of increasing the percentage of each installment payment to be returned as income, thereby reaching the entire profit on the sale. The amount by which the mortgage exceeded the seller’s basis in the property was treated as a part of the initial payments and was added to the seller’s basis in computing total contract price. The regulation was upheld in a case involving the sale of mortgaged property where the buyer unequivocally “assumed” the mortgage, as a fair attempt to carry out the intent of Congress. Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U. S. 406 (1933).

The wording of the regulation, insofar as it relates to the question here, is as follows:

Regulations 111:
Sec. 29.44-2. Sale of Real Property Involving Deferred Payments. — * * *
*»***•»
In the sale of mortgaged property the amount of the mortgage, whether the property is merely taken subject to the mortgage or whether the mortgage is assumed by the purchaser, shall be included as a part of the “selling price,” but the amount of the mortgage, to the extent it does not exceed the basis to the vendor of the property sold, shall not be considered as a part of the “initial payments” or of the “total contract price,” as those terms are used in section 44, in sections 29.44^-1 and 29.44-3, and in this section.

The above form of the regulation is the same as that approved by the Supreme Court in Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., supra.

In determining the deficiencies' here involved the respondent followed the procedure described in our Findings of Fact and applied the regulation to the sales made by petitioners, claiming that according to the terms of the agreement of sale a buyer, in effect, assumed the mortgage obligation, or at least that the property was taken subject to the mortgage.

Whether respondent has properly determined the amount of reportable income received by petitioners turns on whether a buyer from petitioners either assumed the mortgage on the property or took the property subject to the mortgage within the meaning of the regulation.

While the regulation first refers broadly to “the sale of mortgaged property,” the language following this broad reference describes the two types of sales of mortgaged property to which the regulation applies: (a) Where a buyer takes property subject to mortgage, or (b) assumes the mortgage. These expressions we take to have the meaning customarily attributed to them in transactions concerned with the transfer of mortgaged property. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1947). Taking property subject to a mortgage means that the buyer pays the seller for the latter’s redemption interest, i. e., the difference between the amount of the mortgage debt and the total amount for which the property is being sold, but the buyer does not assume a personal obligation to pay the mortgage debt. The buyer agrees that as between him and the seller, the latter has no obligation to satisfy the mortgage debt, and that the debt is to be satisfied out of the property. Although he is not obliged to, the buyer will ordinarily make the payments on the mortgage debt in order to protect his interest in the property. Where a buyer assumes a mortgage on property, he pays the seller for the latter’s redemption interest, and in addition promises the seller to pay off the mortgage debt. This promise of the buyer can ordinarily be enforced by the mortgagee. 5 Tiffany, The Law of Seal Property, secs. 1435, 1436 (3d ed. 1939) ; IV American Law of Property, secs. 16.125, 16.127, 16.128-16.132 (1952).

The typical agreement of sale used by petitioners, as set out fully in our Findings of Fact, first specified the purchase price of the property and then provided the manner of payment: A downpayment of $100, monthly payments of $47.40 for 27 months (first period), and then of $33.50 until the purchase price and interest were paid in full (second period). Mention is then made of a deed of trust (mortgage) conveying the property to trustees to secure payment of a promissory note executed by the seller. The agreement states that the installment payments include interest and charges at the same rate and as provided in the promissory note secured by the deed of trust, and the seller is required to apply the installment payments to the loan and to the rest of the purchase price and interest thereon. Provision is then made that the seller shall deliver and the buyer accept conveyance of the property within 5 years (8 and 12 years in some agreements) after the first period installment payments have been made. The option is given to the buyer to determine when in the 5- (sometimes 8- and 12-) year period the conveyance will be made. In some agreements an option is given to the buyer to require conveyance of the property within a period of years after the agreement date. Upon conveyance the buyer is to assume payment of the promissory note secured by the deed of trust. After assumption the buyer’s payments on the purchase price were to be the monthly payments required by the promissory note, but in the event the seller could not obtain a release from its obligation on the promissory note from the lending bank, the seller could withhold conveyance of the property until a release of its liability was obtained, or could make the conveyance at any time sooner.

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Bluebook (online)
24 T.C. 659, 1955 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stonecrest-corp-v-commissioner-tax-1955.