Stone v. Martin

289 S.E.2d 898, 56 N.C. App. 473, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 2478
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedApril 6, 1982
Docket8010SC1061
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 289 S.E.2d 898 (Stone v. Martin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stone v. Martin, 289 S.E.2d 898, 56 N.C. App. 473, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 2478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

WHICHARD, Judge.

Plaintiffs, shareholders in defendant corporation, filed a complaint against the corporation and the individual defendants, who were officers, directors, and shareholders thereof, alleging numerous improper and unlawful acts and omissions in the operation of the corporation. They sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and, as to the individual defendants, arrest and bail and execution against the person.

Plaintiffs served on defendant fifty-eight interrogatories and fifteen requests for admission. Defendant claimed with respect to each that because the complaint sought punitive damages, which are in the nature of a penalty, to answer would violate his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination under United States Constitution amendments V and XIV and North Carolina Constitution article I, section 23. Plaintiffs moved under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37(a), to compel defendant to comply with discovery. Judge Preston found that three of the interrogatories and three of the requests for admission called for potentially incriminatory answers and denied plaintiffs’ motion with respect thereto. He ordered defendant to answer the remaining interrogatories and requests within thirty days.

Upon defendant’s failure to comply, plaintiffs moved for imposition of Rule 37(b) sanctions. Judge Lee struck defendant’s answer and ordered that he not oppose any claim or allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ complaint. He further ordered judgment by default against defendant, the issue of damages being for jury determination.

Defendant contends the orders compelling him to respond, and imposing sanctions for his failure to do so, infringe upon his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. He *475 does not contend that answering may subject him to criminal punishment; rather, he contends that because plaintiffs seek punitive damages and body execution, he cannot be compelled to submit to discovery. On this record we find no infringement of defendant’s constitutional privilege.

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 37, provides, in part:
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. — A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(2) Motion. — If ... a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33 . . . the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer ....
(b) Failure to comply with order.—
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. —If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under section (a) of this rule . . ., a judge of the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
b. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses

Thus, if the court acted properly in compelling defendant to answer, upon his failure to do so the court had authority to impose sanctions. The court properly ordered defendant to answer if the information sought was discoverable.

*476 Under North Carolina discovery rules, subject only to limitation by court order, any party to a civil action is entitled to all information relevant to the subject matter of that action unless such information is privileged. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1). The right of discovery .must yield, however, to the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. LaFontaine v. Southern Underwriters, 83 N.C. 132, 138 (1880); see also, e.g., Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E. 2d 186 (1964). Thus, courts cannot compel disclosure of information which would tend to incriminate the person from whom it is sought and cannot impose sanctions on one who refuses to disclose privileged information.

In Allred v. Graves, our Supreme Court held that the North Carolina Constitution protects from compulsion, on discovery, to reveal matters which would necessarily tend to subject the disclosing party to verdicts or awards of punitive damages and executions against the person. 261 N.C. at 38, 134 S.E. 2d at 192. The rationale for extending the privilege from information which would subject to criminal punishment to information which, in civil cases, would necessarily tend to subject to punitive damages and body execution, was the penal nature of punitive damages and body execution under North Carolina law. With respect to the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the court adhered to principles espoused by the federal courts.

In civil cases, as well as in matters which may subject to criminal punishment, “the privilege protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities.” Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission, 406 U.S. 472, 478, 32 L.Ed. 2d 234, 240, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 1675 (1972). “[I]t would be to convert a salutory protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential to the ends of justice.” Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 366, 61 L.Ed. 1198, 1200, 37 S.Ct. 621, 622 (1917). Determination of whether the privilege applies must be by the court, not the individual claiming the privilege. “The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself — his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified . . . .” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 (1951).

*477 [T]o vacate an order for examination, ... it must be plainly apparent that the evidence sought must necessarily tend . . . to subject [the party to be examined] to a penalty or forfeiture. . . . [The] plaintiff should not be denied a plain statutory right to examine defendants . . . before trial solely because they claim that any answers they make may subject them to a penalty. This rests the matter upon the ipse dixit of each defendant and not upon the judgment of the court.

Allred, 261 N.C. at 39, 134 S.E. 2d at 192-193 (emphasis in original). Because, “if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee,” the court must review the questions in the setting in which asked and require the witness to answer if “it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken” in asserting the privilege.

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Bluebook (online)
289 S.E.2d 898, 56 N.C. App. 473, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 2478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stone-v-martin-ncctapp-1982.