Stewart v. Southwest Title Loans Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 24, 2022
Docket2:20-cv-01873
StatusUnknown

This text of Stewart v. Southwest Title Loans Incorporated (Stewart v. Southwest Title Loans Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stewart v. Southwest Title Loans Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Rodney Stewart, et al., No. CV-20-01873-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Southwest Title Loans Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Plaintiff Brenda Stewart accuses Defendant Secure Asset Services, PLLC d/b/a 17 Secure Asset Services, LLC (“SAS”) of violating the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 18 by repossessing her 2013 Toyota Corolla. In particular, Arizona law permits secured 19 parties to take possession of collateral without judicial action so long as there is no breach 20 of the peace, A.R.S. § 47-9609(B)(2), and here there was a breach of the peace both because 21 Stewart protested the repossession and because SAS damaged Stewart’s property during 22 the course of the repossession. Stewart served SAS on March 9, 2021, but SAS failed to 23 appear or otherwise respond. The Clerk entered default on April 5, 2021. Stewart now 24 seeks entry of default judgment. 25 After default is entered by the clerk, the court may enter default judgment pursuant 26 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). The court’s “decision whether to enter a default 27 judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 28 Although the court should consider and weigh relevant factors as part of the decision- 1 making process, it “is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” Fair Housing of 2 Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). The following factors may be 3 considered in deciding whether default judgment is appropriate: (1) the possibility of 4 prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 5 (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default 6 is due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel 7 v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering the merits and 8 sufficiency of the complaint, the court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pled factual 9 allegations. See Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 10 The Court has considered the Eitel factors and finds that they favor default 11 judgment. SAS failed to respond to the complaint despite being served. If default 12 judgment is not granted, Stewart “will likely be without other recourse for 13 recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 14 Stewart’s complaint sufficiently states plausible claims to relief. Stewart seeks $1,000 in 15 statutory damages, $735 in actual damages, $8,500 in attorneys’ fees, and $550 in costs. 16 These amounts are reasonable in relation to the allegations in the complaint and the work 17 counsel has performed thus far. Given the sufficiency of the complaint and SAS’s default, 18 “no genuine dispute of material facts would preclude granting [Stewart’s] motion.” Id. 19 There is no evidence that SAS’s default was the result of excusable neglect. And although 20 cases “should be decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 21 1472, the existence of Rule 55(b) “indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not 22 dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (citation omitted). Indeed, it is difficult to 23 reach the merits when the opposing party is absent. Accordingly, 24 IT IS ORDERED that Stewart’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 25) is 25 GRANTED. Default judgment is entered in favor of Stewart and against SAS in the 26 amount of $10,785.00, comprising statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 pursuant 27 to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), compensatory damages of $735.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 28 1|| 1692k(a)(1), reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $9,050.00 in accordance 2|| with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 5 Dated this 24th day of January, 2022. 6 7 Los Ue 10 Upited States Dictri Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Related

Alvera M. Aldabe v. Charles D. Aldabe
616 F.2d 1089 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Gary R. Eitel v. William D. McCool
782 F.2d 1470 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Pepsico, Inc. v. California Security Cans
238 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. California, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Stewart v. Southwest Title Loans Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stewart-v-southwest-title-loans-incorporated-azd-2022.