In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE STEVEN LOERCH, ) No. ED109707 ) Appellant, ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Franklin County vs. ) Cause No. 17AB-CC00071-01 ) CITY OF UNION MISSOURI, ) Honorable Sonya D. Brandt ) Respondent. ) Filed: February 15, 2022
OPINION
Stephen Loerch (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of the
City of Union (“Defendant”) on his petition claiming disability discrimination under the
Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), § 213.010, et seq.1 Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground that Plaintiff does not have a “disability” as that term is defined in the
MHRA. In his sole point on appeal, Plaintiff contends the material facts are genuinely disputed
and Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse and remand.
I. Background
Plaintiff was a long-time employee of Defendant, working as a custodian at the City Hall
building from 1990 to 1992 and again from 2007 until 2015. In the intervening years, Plaintiff
1 All statutory references are to Mo. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp. (2018), unless otherwise noted.
1 worked as a laborer in other city departments. Plaintiff’s responsibilities as the sole City Hall
custodian included indoor and outdoor tasks. According to the written job description, the work
was “mostly in office settings.” It listed the following outdoor tasks as part of the custodian’s
“Principal Duties and Responsibilities”:
● Wash windows, inside and out, twice a month; ● Maintain grounds by mowing lawns, trimming shrubs, and raking leaves; ● Apply fertilizer and/or weed killer to lawn as needed; ● Water lawn and outdoor plants as needed; ● Sweep sidewalk, steps[,] and ramp; ● Pick up any trash; ● Remove snow and ice from sidewalk, steps[,] and ramp immediately after each snowfall.
The written job description also stated:
The work environment characteristics described here are representative of those an employee encounters while performing the essential functions of this job. . . .
While performing the duties of this job, the employee occasionally works in outside weather conditions mostly during daylight hours but occasionally during night-time hours. The employee is frequently exposed to extreme summer heat, extreme winter cold, wet and/or humid conditions and outdoor airborne particles.
Plaintiff’s supervisor testified that the written job description was accurate and estimated
that, while the majority of the custodian’s time was spent working indoors, 25% of the time was
spent working outdoors. Plaintiff disagreed. He testified that, contrary to the written description,
he was not “frequently” exposed to extreme temperatures and estimated he spent only 10% of his
time working outside. Plaintiff and the supervisor agreed that he had discretion to order his
workday, and had at times started his workday as early at 5:00 a.m.
In 2013, Plaintiff was diagnosed with coronary artery disease (“CAD”), but continued
working for Defendant as a custodian without incident. In 2015, Plaintiff underwent a physical in
order to be considered for a laborer position with the parks department. In a letter to Plaintiff’s
supervisor, the doctor who performed the physical stated that Plaintiff “is cleared to remain at his
2 current job and activities” but should “not go to any position where he will be exposed to
extreme heat or cold environment.” The doctor’s “recommendation” was for Plaintiff to
“maintain his current position.”
Plaintiff’s supervisor put him on light duty, restricting him from performing his outdoor
duties. Plaintiff disagreed that his restriction meant he could no longer perform any outdoor
duties. He asserted that he could perform “virtually all” of his outdoor duties without exposure to
extreme temperatures. For instance, he could continue to mow early in the day to avoid exposure
to extreme heat, which he said had been his practice. Plaintiff also asked if another employee
could be assigned to the task of mowing. Plaintiff believed the only duty that potentially would
expose him to extreme conditions was snow and ice removal and asked that another employee be
assigned to that task. In the past, other employees had assisted with snow and ice removal and
performed that and other tasks for Plaintiff when he was absent from work.
Plaintiff’s requested accommodations were denied, and he claims he was told he had to
retire or be terminated. After he retired, he filed the instant lawsuit claiming that he was
terminated or constructively discharged because of his disability in violation of the MHRA.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed facts negate that
Plaintiff has a “disability” as that term is defined in the MHRA. Specifically, Defendant
contended that Plaintiff’s CAD does not substantially limit him from the major life activity of
working and that there was no reasonable accommodation that would have enabled Plaintiff to
work outside in extreme temperatures, which was an essential function of the custodian job. The
trial court granted summary judgment, and this appeal follows.2
2 The current summary judgment was entered after this Court dismissed an appeal from an earlier order granting the summary judgment motion, after determining it was not a final appealable judgment. See Loerch v. City of Union, 601 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020).
3 II. Standard of Review
Review of a summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid–
America Marine Supply Corporation, 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). As the movant,
Defendant bears the initial burden of setting out the uncontroverted material facts and
demonstrating that judgment as a matter of law flows from those material facts. See Blackwell
Motors, Inc. v. Manheim Services Corporation, 529 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
(citing Columbia Mutual Insurance Company v. Heriford, 518 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Mo. App. S.D.
2017)). If that prima facie summary judgment burden is not met, then the analysis ends and the
motion must be denied. See Columbia, 518 S.W.3d at 241. If that initial burden is met, then the
opposing party can overcome summary judgment by demonstrating either that there is a genuine
dispute over the material facts or that the undisputed facts do not establish the right to judgment
as a matter of law. See id. at 241–42. Facts come into the summary judgment record only via the
numbered paragraphs and responses required by Rule 74.04(c).3 Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606
S.W.3d 113, 116 n.5 (Mo. banc 2020) (noting, as other courts have, that the version of Rule
74.04(c) in effect at the time ITT was decided did not contain the same requirement).
We will affirm if the judgment is proper based on any ground raised in the motion and
supported by the accompanying summary judgment record. Clark v. Kinsey, 488 S.W.3d 750,
756 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Summary judgment is seldom appropriate in employment
discrimination cases “because such cases are inherently fact-based[.]” Daugherty v. City of
Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. banc 2007), abrogated on other grounds by §
213.101.4.4
3 Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018).
4 Daugherty and its progeny were abrogated “as they relate to the contributing factor standard and abandonment of the burden-shifting framework.” § 213.101.4.
4 III. Discussion
It is unlawful under the MHRA for an employer to discharge an employee because of that
employee’s disability. § 213.055.1(1)(a). As a threshold element of his MHRA claim, Plaintiff
must prove that his CAD is a “disability” within the meaning of that act. See Medley v. Valentine
Radford Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). In relevant part,
“disability” is defined in the MHRA as “a physical or mental impairment” that “substantially
limits one or more of a person’s major life activities” and that “with or without reasonable
accommodation does not interfere with performing the job.” § 213.010(5). As further defined in
the relevant regulations, the employee must be able to perform the “essential functions” of the
job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(F). In other words, if
despite the substantial limitation the physical impairment otherwise causes, the employee can
perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable accommodation, then he
has a “disability” for purposes of the MHRA.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s CAD is a “physical impairment.” But Defendant
contends the undisputed facts show that (a) Plaintiff’s CAD does not substantially limit a major
life activity and (b) there was no reasonable accommodation that would have enabled Plaintiff to
perform the essential functions of the custodian job. We disagree.
A. Substantial Limitation on Major Life Activities
The first aspect of the threshold inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s CAD substantially limits a
major life activity. One such “major life activity” is the activity of working. See 8 CSR 60-
3.060(1)(C); State ex rel. Sir v. Gateway Taxi Management Company, 400 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2013).5 A substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means the person
5 Only one major life activity need be substantially limited under the MHRA’s definition of “disability.” § 213.010(5). Therefore, we do not address the argument that Plaintiff’s cardiovascular function itself also constitutes
5 is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes.” Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 821-22 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not amount to a substantial
limitation. Id.
Defendant contended in the summary judgment motion that Plaintiff’s restriction from
working outdoors in extreme temperatures does not amount to a substantial limitation on
employment because Plaintiff can still work in many jobs across a broad range of job classes. To
support its right to judgment on this ground, Defendant relied entirely on the fact that since
leaving Defendant’s employ, Plaintiff has found two jobs that require no outdoor work, as a
bagger at a grocery store and a floor technician/night custodian at a hospital. Even though that
fact is undisputed, Plaintiff’s ability to find those two particular jobs does not negate a finding
that Plaintiff is substantially limited in his ability to work. Just as the inability to perform a
particular job does not amount to a substantial limitation, the ability to find a particular job does
not preclude a finding that Plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
See Gallegos v. Swift & Company, 237 F.R.D. 633, 647 (D. Colo. 2006).6 Such evidence may be
probative on this issue, but alone does not establish Defendant’s right to summary judgment. See
id. “The key to summary judgment is the undisputed right to judgment as a matter of law; not
simply the absence of a fact question.” ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 380.
B. Essential Functions and Reasonable Accommodation
a “major life activity” under the MHRA, as it does under the federal Amendments Act to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADAAA”) and regulations promulgated thereunder. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2009) (definition of “major life activity” expressly includes “the operation of a major bodily function”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (2012) (“major life activities” include cardiovascular functions). 6 In an MHRA case, our courts are guided by both Missouri law and applicable federal employment discrimination cases to the extent they are “consistent with Missouri law.” Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818.
6 The second aspect of the threshold inquiry is whether, with or without reasonable
accommodation, Plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of his job. See §
213.010(5); see also 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(F). It is undisputed that without an accommodation,
Plaintiff cannot work outdoors in extreme temperatures. Thus, the only questions are (1) whether
performing tasks in extreme temperatures was an essential function of the custodian job and (2)
whether the proposed accommodation of assigning other employees to perform those tasks was
reasonable. In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant claimed the undisputed facts showed
that working in extreme heat and cold was an essential function of the custodian job and that the
proposed accommodation of having another employee perform that function is unreasonable as a
matter of law. We disagree.
1. Essential Function
For purposes of the threshold disability inquiry, the only functions that must be deemed
essential are only those that the impairment substantially interferes with the employee’s ability to
perform. See § 213.010(5). That is, the essential function analysis is necessarily limited to
whether the restricted function--the aspect of the job the employee cannot do--was essential.
Here the only aspect of the job Plaintiff could not do was working outdoors in extreme
temperatures.7 Thus, the proper focus of the analysis asks whether it was essential that he be able
to do so. In other words, even if a particular task was essential, but it was not essential that it be
performed when it was extremely hot or cold, then Plaintiff would have still been able to perform
that essential task. Defendant contends the evidence shows that the outdoor tasks in the written
7 Defendant refers to a disagreement Plaintiff and his supervisor had upon receiving the doctor’s restriction, arguing that it was entitled to rely on the doctor’s opinion, over Plaintiff’s subjective belief, about what he could and could not do and noting that to the extent Plaintiff disagreed with the doctor’s opinion, it was his burden to clarify it. But Plaintiff never suggested that, contrary to the doctor’s opinion, he can actually work outdoors in extreme temperatures; rather, he only pointed out that despite that restriction he could still perform virtually all of his duties in non-extreme weather. This is not a disagreement about the scope of the restrictions, but whether they actually interfere with essential functions.
7 job description are essential to the custodian job and because he cannot perform those tasks “at
all times,” he cannot perform the essential functions of the job. But that argument begs the same
question: is it essential that Plaintiff be able to perform the outdoor tasks at all times, even in
extreme weather?
In general, “essential functions” refer to those “fundamental job duties” of the position.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2012).8 The following factors are relevant when determining whether
the function at issue is “essential”:
(1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before the employer began advertising or interviewing for the position; (3) the amount of time on the job spent performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; and (5) the past or current work experience of employees in similar jobs.
Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 822 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2012)). Each of the above is
“but one factor” to consider when determining if a particular function is essential. See McKinney
v. Mercy Hospital St. Louis, 604 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Mo.App. E.D. 2020); Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d
715, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, what constitutes an essential function “depends on the
totality of the circumstances.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 120
(2d Cir. 2004).
Defendant relied in its summary judgment motion on the written description’s statement
that the custodian job required frequent exposure to extreme heat and cold. It also cited the
written list of outdoor activities set forth earlier in this opinion, though that list does not itself
indicate whether any of those tasks had to be performed in extreme temperatures. Defendant also
cited the supervisor’s testimony that the written job description was accurate and his estimation
that a quarter of Plaintiff’s time was spent outdoors, but that testimony was not specific to how
8 “Essential function” is not defined in the Missouri regulations.
8 much time he was required to spend working in extreme weather. As to the consequences of
Plaintiff not performing this function, Defendant focuses on what occurred when Plaintiff was
absent from work in the past and others had to fill in for him, since he was the only City Hall
custodian. On appeal, Defendant claims this arrangement “highlights” the importance of the
“outdoor duties”; in the summary judgment motion, Defendant pointed to evidence that the
arrangement “put a strain on” the parks department and caused them to have “trouble meeting
their duties” and “caused different disruptions” for City Hall when its employees filled in for
Plaintiff. None of these arguments and evidence are focused on the pertinent consequence at
issue here: the impact of Plaintiff's inability to perform only those tasks that had to be completed
when the temperatures were extreme.
While an employer’s judgment and the written job description are certainly relevant
factors in determining what is essential, courts also consider evidence of the employer’s actual
practices. See Shell, 789 F.3d at 718-19 (finding that the amount of time actually spent on
function could reasonably lead a factfinder to discount employer’s judgment or written job
description). Plaintiff responded to the above facts with evidence that despite what the written
job description said, in practice the custodian’s exposure to extreme heat and cold was not
frequent. Plaintiff testified that the written job description statement regarding frequent exposure
to extreme temperatures was inaccurate. Plaintiff estimated that only 10% of the work was
performed outdoors and, thus, he was not even outdoors “frequently,” much less in extreme
temperatures. In fact, as to extreme heat, Plaintiff said he always was able to complete outdoor
jobs early in the day before it got too hot; as Defendant pointed out in reply, his supervisor,
however, recalled seeing him mow the grass during the hottest part of the day. Mowing was
seasonal and occurred at least once a week during that season, but it was disputed how long it
9 took to complete the mowing (Plaintiff said 30 to 45 minutes, and his supervisor said an hour).
Plaintiff agreed that removal of snow and ice might have to be performed in the extreme cold,
but estimated that it only snowed three or four times a year. Again his supervisor’s estimate was
higher, recalling six to eight snow events in 2015, some of which required removing snow or ice
multiple times per event. There was also conflicting evidence regarding how much time it
actually took to remove snow.
Defendant does not disagree that the amount of time spent on the function is relevant to
the essential function analysis. But it cites City of Clayton v. Missouri Commission on Human
Rights, for the proposition that a job function may still be essential even if the overall proportion
of time spent on that function is relatively small. 821 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991). In City
of Clayton, the commission said shoveling was not an essential function of the custodial position
solely based on the fact that the amount of time spent shoveling in a year was “proportionately so
insignificant.” Id. at 529. On review for substantial evidence to support that determination, this
Court found the commission abused its discretion because there was evidence that, regardless of
the amount of time spent on it each year, clearing snow was a “vital priority” to the employer. Id.
Here--under a completely different summary judgment standard--we conclude only that evidence
about the amount of time actually spent in extreme temperatures is material and genuinely in
dispute, precluding a determination at this stage that this function was essential.
Because there are genuine disputes regarding facts material to the essential function
analysis, summary judgment is inappropriate. Even if the facts were undisputed and showed that
working in extreme temperatures was an essential function of his custodian job, Plaintiff
contends he can perform that function with a reasonable accommodation. Thus, we turn to
10 Defendant’s claim in the summary judgment motion that the proposed accommodation is
unreasonable as a matter of law.
2. Reasonable Accommodation
The accommodation Plaintiff sought in this case was having another employee conduct
those tasks that he could not do, which would be limited to those that had to be performed during
extreme weather.9 Accommodations under the MHRA may include “[j]ob restructuring, part-
time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the
provision of readers or interpreters and other similar actions.” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(G)2.B. The
accommodation must be “reasonable,” and “an accommodation that imposes undue financial and
administrative burdens or requires fundamental alterations is not reasonable.” Lomax v.
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 243 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). The regulations set
out a list of non-exhaustive factors to be considered when determining whether an
accommodation is reasonable, including the nature and cost of the accommodation and the size
and nature of a business. 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(G)3. But whether a particular proposed
accommodation is reasonable “requires an individual assessment” and “is dependent upon the
facts of each case.” Lomax, 243 S.W.3d at 480-81.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant did not point to facts in the
record showing the proposed accommodation would place an undue financial or administrative
burden on it or require a fundamental alteration of the custodian’s job.10 Instead, Defendant
9 Although Plaintiff also suggested he could avoid the extreme heat altogether by completing tasks earlier in the day, that would still not obviate the need for others to fill in when extreme temperatures could not be avoided. 10 Defendant asserted (in the reply memorandum in support of the motion) that the proposed accommodation was a fundamental alteration to the job and an undue administrative and financial burden, but none of the “facts” underlying these arguments were supported with citations to the summary judgment record. Similarly unsupported is Defendant’s mention on appeal of the limited capacity and resources of a small city government generally, citing to no such facts in the summary judgment record about the City of Union in particular. Finally, to the extent there is any evidence in the summary judgment record relating to the burden of other employees taking on tasks during
11 relied on the proposition that, as a matter of law, assigning other workers to perform tasks for
Plaintiff is unreasonable. We disagree.
First, none of the Missouri cases on which Defendant relies are on point. Reed v. Kansas
City Missouri School District involved the alleged erroneous admission of certain evidence in a
jury trial. 504 S.W.3d 235, 246 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). In discussing the impact that evidence
had on the jury’s verdict, the court first cited all of the evidence that showed no accommodation
would allow the employee to perform her job. Id. at 247. Then it added that the employer’s
failure “to transfer her to . . . or hire additional staff could certainly be perceived as
unreasonable.” Id. Commenting that the jury could have found the proposed accommodation of
hiring more staff unreasonable is hardly the equivalent of holding that such accommodation is
unreasonable as a matter of law for purposes of summary judgment. Moreover, Reed is
distinguishable not only because of its different procedural posture, but also on its facts: there is
no evidence here that Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation included transferring him to another
position, and whether it would require hiring additional employees is disputed.
Umphries v. Jones is equally unavailing to Defendant. There, the employee asked to have
another employee bumped out of his position and into hers, allowing her to be transferred into
the vacancy created by that reassignment. 804 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991). This Court
concluded--on reviewing an agency decision for competent and substantial evidence--that the
record showed the proposed reassignment would have conflicted “with established school board
policy and considerations of seniority in assignments.” Id. We stated that a “[r]easonable
accommodation does not require the employer to reassign an employee or to restructure a job in
a way that would usurp the legitimate rights of other employees.” Id. The proposed
Plaintiff’s absences from work, that is not necessarily indicative of the burden associated with having others perform only those tasks Plaintiff could not perform because of extreme weather.
12 accommodation in this case is significantly narrower than the one Umphries. Here, Plaintiff
asked only that certain tasks be assigned to other employees, and unlike in Umphries, Defendant
put forth no evidence that the “legitimate rights of other employees” would be “usurped” by that
accommodation. See also Folsom v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2019) (cited by Defendant and discussing only reassignment of the employee to
another position, not assigning others to do tasks that employee could not do).
The above cases simply do not support Defendant’s proposition that assigning others to
do the tasks Plaintiff could not do is unreasonable as a matter of law. In fact, such a per se rule
has been rejected by Missouri courts in favor of a case-by-case approach to determining the
reasonableness of accommodations. In Lomax, the employer argued that an undefined leave of
absence is a per se unreasonable accommodation. 243 S.W.3d at 481. This Court did not agree:
“[w]hether any particular proposed accommodation is unreasonable is dependent upon the facts
of each case.” Id. (pointing out that while some employers might deem such an accommodation
unreasonable, there was evidence the employer in that case did not); see also Sherry v. City of
Lee’s Summit, 623 S.W.3d 647, 654-55 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (rejecting argument that a leave
of absence is an unreasonable accommodation as a matter of law and reiterating that
reasonableness of an accommodation is a “question of fact”); see also Wells v. Lester E. Cox
Medical Centers, 379 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012).
In Baldridge v. Kansas City Public Schools, the employer claimed that providing an
employee with a full-time assistant at work was a per se unreasonable accommodation. 552
S.W.3d 699, 710 n.9 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). The employer in Baldridge relied on Jewell v. Blue
Valley Unified School District, in which a federal district court deemed a request for a full-time
assistant unreasonable, stating that federal courts of appeals “have consistently held that
13 employers are not required to assign existing employees or hire new employees to perform
certain functions or duties” of an employee’s job. 210 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1251 (D. Kan. 2002).11
Although the court in Baldridge did not “have to reach” the reasonableness of the proposed
accommodation,12 id. at 710 n.8, it nevertheless stated that Jewell was non-binding and
distinguishable, noting that “[u]nder Missouri law, whether any particular accommodation is
reasonable or unreasonable is dependent on the facts of the individual case.” Id. at 710 n.9.
Defendant in this case also cites Jewell and other federal cases that refer--in one way or
another--to the principle that under the ADA, employers are not required to accommodate an
employee by assigning others to assist with or perform the essential functions of the employee’s
job. See Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding request for
an assistant to help with employee’s duties unreasonable because an employer “is not obligated
to hire additional employees or reassign existing workers to assist” an employee); Mole v.
Buckhorn Rubber Products, Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding request to hire
additional employee unreasonable because an “employer is not required to hire additional
employees or redistribute essential functions to other employees,” citing Moritz); Minnihan v.
Mediacom Communications Corporation, 779 F.3d 803, 813 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding request that
required other employees to work more hours unreasonable because it would cause other
employees to work harder, longer, or be deprived of opportunities, which is not mandated under
the ADA); Gardea v. JBS USA, LLC, 915 F.3d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding request that
required extensive assistance with common tasks unreasonable, citing that ADA does not
11 Jewell had been cited by the Western District a couple of years earlier in Reed, but only as an example to support its comment that the accommodation of hiring additional staff could be found unreasonable. Reed, 504 S.W.3d at 247. 12 Baldridge involved a claim that removal of the employee’s accommodation--namely, a full-time paraprofessional to assist the employee with numerous tasks at work--created a hostile work environment. 552 S.W.3d at 704-05, 716. In that type of claim, whether the employer’s conduct created such an environment does not depend on whether the removed accommodation was reasonable. Id. at 710-11.
14 mandate other employees to work harder, longer, or be deprived of opportunities); Higgins v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 931 F.3d 664, 671 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding request for time off
unreasonable because it would require other employees to work additional shifts, citing case law
that assigning others to help an employee is not a reasonable accommodation).
To the extent these cases stand for the proposition that assigning others to perform certain
tasks for an employee can never be reasonable as a matter of law under the ADA, they are
inconsistent with the individualized, fact-dependent, case-by-case approach taken by Missouri
courts when determining the reasonableness of an accommodation under the MHRA and are not
applicable here. See Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818 (stating that federal cases consistent with
Missouri law can provide guidance in MHRA cases). As indicated in the parentheticals above,
many of these cases are also distinguishable on their facts because they involved
accommodations that required full-time or extensive assistance, hiring additional employees, or
adding hours and shifts to existing employees’ schedules. As noted earlier, Defendant relied on
no such similar--much less undisputed--evidence here to demonstrate the unreasonableness of
Plaintiff’s requested accommodation.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant failed to demonstrate a right to summary judgment based on undisputed facts
negating that Plaintiff has a disability under the MHRA: (a) it failed to show a right to judgment
stemming from the undisputed facts regarding the substantial limitation Plaintiff’s CAD has on
the major life activity of working; (b) it failed to show that the facts material to the essential
function analysis were undisputed or, stated another way, Plaintiff showed that those facts were
genuinely disputed; and (c) it failed to demonstrate that the requested accommodation here was
15 The point on appeal is granted. The summary judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
_______________________________ Colleen Dolan, J.
Philip M. Hess, P. J., concurs. Angela T. Quigless, J., concurs.