Stephenson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

43 F.2d 348, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 578, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 86, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3886
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 12, 1930
Docket8661
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 43 F.2d 348 (Stephenson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stephenson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F.2d 348, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 578, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 86, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3886 (8th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

DAVIS, District Judge.

This is a petition to review a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals affirming the action of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in asserting a deficiency of income tax for the year 1921 in the sum of $975.71, and for the year 1922, in the sum of $1,701.84 against appellant.

The appellant claims that he was entitled to certain deductions from income under see *349 tion 214(a) of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 239, 240), providing that in computing income there shall be allowed as deductions:

“(4) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in trade or business;
“(5) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business; * * *
“(7) Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year.” The Board rejected the petition on the following grounds: “(1) that even though petitioner was engaged in business as a banker, the purchase of notes from the bank by petitioner was an individual venture and the loss was not ‘incurred in.trade or business’; (2) there was no evidence petitioner purchased the securities as a transaction entered into for profit; (3) there was no proof of loss; (4) there was .no proof that petitioner sustained a loss because he assumed a moral obligation in purchasing paper from his bank to provide it with liquid capital.”

The appellant, who was in the business of life insurance and money loaning on behalf of insurance companies, was a member of the board of directors of the City National Bank of Lincoln, Neb., in 1919 and 1920, and chairman of the board in 1921. There were sixteen directors and about one hundred and sixty stockholders.' The bank was largely controlled by L. B. Howey and L. J. Dunn) president and vice president, respectively. They owned more than 50 per cent, of the stock. The bank through Howey and Dunn had extended large lines of credit to certain creditors, corporations, and individuals. The extent of its loans was not known to the directors. The larger borrowers were the Hebb Motor Company, the Patriot Motor" Company, the Nebraska Aircraft Corporation, and certain subsidiaries of these companies. The Federal Reserve Bank in the early part of 1920 refused to discount loans such as were being submitted by the City National Bank' and turned back some paper that they had already discounted. The bank found itself in a precarious situation by reason thereof. The directors decided to raise a pool and to take out of the bank certain of these obligations which were thought by the examiners to be perilous. Howey and Dunn, who were largely responsible for the situation, agreed to each supply $150,000 for this purpose, making a total of $300,000, and this was in April, 1921, and they each subsequently, on May 3, 1921, advanced $25,000 additional, making the amount thus raised $350,000; the other directors supplied $398,000, making the total sum of $748,000, of which amount the petitioner contributed $35,000. These sums were not subscribed all at one time, but the pool above mentioned was the net result of their effort. Notes were then taken out of the bank and either cash or notes from the pool substituted in lieu thereof.

The plan was for these directors, acting through a trustee who had possession of the paper, to collect the proceeds of these obligations and to first pay three of the parties whose advances were regarded as preferred and then to prorate the balance in proportion to the contribution of the various director’s to the fund. A comparatively small amount was collected of these notes. Misfortune overtook the makers of the notes, the companies executing them were forced to liquidate, and the total amount collected on these obligations was hardly sufficient to pay the three individuals who had preferred claims. So that the remainder' of the contributors to the fund, of whom the petitioner was one, received nothing on that account.

Subsequent to the raising of this pool of $748,000, and on May 15, 1921, the board of directors of the City National Bank adopted a resolution wherein it was provided that, inasmuch as it was desirable for the bank to have a $1,000,000 in cash to be used in case of emergency, and as members the directors were willing to purchase the notes of the bank in that sum, the officers were authorized to sell such notes to the directors, to the extent of $1,000,000. It was provided that these notes would be sold with recourse on the bank. The notes just mentioned were sold to the directors in exchange largely for their own notes, which paper the bank was able to discount in various places throughout the country and thereby secure cash. This was a separate and distinct transaction from the creation of the pool. The purchasers of these notes had recourse on the bank. There was no liability on the part of the bank in reference to securities taken over by the pool.

The appellant by this transaction lost the entire amount of his contribution to the directors’ pool, and in his tax return for the year 1921 took a deduction of $17,500 and a like sum for the year 1922.

Was this loss deductible under paragraph 4 of section 214(a) of the Revenue Act of 1921 as a loss sustained during the taxable year and incurred in trade or busi *350 ness? The point is made that appellant did not suffer this loss in the course of his business, that of life insurance and money loaning as agent for others. This court in Mastin v. Commissioner, 28 F.(2d) 748, 752, adopted a statement of the law contained in Mente v. Eisner (C. C. A.) 266 F. 161, 162, 11 A. L. R. 496, which is as follows: “We think that the language ‘losses incurred in trade’ are correctly construed by the Treasury Department as meaning in the actual business of the taxpayer, as distinguished from isolated transactions. If it had been intended to permit all losses to be deducted, it would have been easy to say so. Some effect must be given to the words ‘in trade.’ ” So it cannot be successfully contended that the loss in this ease was incurred in the actual business of the taxpayer, because this was an isolated undertaking separate and apart from appellant’s usual and actual business.

Does the situation bring the appellant within the provision of paragraph 5 of the .above statute which provides for a deduction for losses sustained during the taxable year if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit though not connected with trade or business? It seems that the appellant •did not participate in the plan of raising this money for profit. His purpose evidently was as an officer and director of the bank to try to save the institution from failure. He thought that the notes that the directors were buying were good and that they would be paid in due time. The examination that he made of the affairs of the various companies whose notes were purchased caused him to have confidence in their ability to meet outstanding obligations. But it was quite evident that his purpose was not to make a profit out of the transaction, and he would, no doubt, have disclaimed any such an object at the time.

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Bluebook (online)
43 F.2d 348, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 578, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 86, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3886, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stephenson-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1930.