Mastin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

28 F.2d 748, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 325, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8208, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2445
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 29, 1928
Docket347
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 28 F.2d 748 (Mastin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mastin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 28 F.2d 748, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 325, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8208, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2445 (8th Cir. 1928).

Opinion

28 F.2d 748 (1928)

MASTIN
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

No. 347.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 29, 1928.

Charles M. Howell, of Kansas City, Mo. (Daniel V. Howell, of Kansas City, Mo., James Hagerman, Jr., of Washington, D. C., and Joseph S. Brooks, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for petitioner.

L. W. Scott, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue (Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. M. Charest, General Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C., and Harvey R. Gamble, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.

Before VAN VALKENBURGH and BOOTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLOCK, District Judge.

BOOTH, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition for review of two orders of the Board of Tax Appeals redetermining deficiencies in the income taxes of petitioner. The first order covered the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, and redetermined deficiencies for those years in the amounts of $6,394.60, $13,937.41, and $7,309.46, respectively. The second order covered the year 1922, and redetermined the deficiency in the amount of $3,483.58. The two *749 matters were consolidated before the Board of Tax Appeals for the purpose of hearing. They will be considered together here.

The deficiencies found by the Board of Tax Appeals were based upon the disallowance of certain deductions claimed by the petitioner as losses. The alleged losses consisted (1) of certain payments made by petitioner to his mother and to his aunt for their support during the years mentioned pursuant to the provisions of two written instruments; (2) of an amount paid by petitioner for advertising certain real estate owned by a corporation in which petitioner and others were interested.

The pertinent provisions of the statutes are found in the Revenue Acts of 1918 (40 St. 1057) and 1921 (42 St. 227). They are identical and read as follows:

"Sec. 214. (a) That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:

* * * * * * * * *

"(4) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in trade or business;

"(5) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business."

Article 141, Regulations 45, promulgated by the Treasury Department pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1918, contains the following provision, deemed material.

"Losses. — Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise are fully deductible * * * if (a) incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business, or (b) incurred in any transaction entered into for profit. * * * They must usually be evidenced by closed and completed transactions. * * *"

The facts as found by the Board of Tax Appeals are, in substance, as follows: In 1905 the petitioner, his mother, Elizabeth Simpson Mastin, his aunt Julia Mastin, and his sister Theo Mastin, entered into an agreement of trust. It is set out in the margin, so far as here material.[1] Pursuant to the terms of that agreement a corporation was organized under the name of the Mastin Realty & Mining Company, to which the parties conveyed all of the interests they had in certain properties. Another corporation was also organized for the purpose of holding the stock of the Mastin Realty & Mining Company. This corporation was known as the Mastin Estate; and to it the stock of *750 the Mastin Realty & Mining Company was conveyed. The stock of the holding company was held by the petitioner as trustee in accordance with the trust agreement. The petitioner managed and directed the corporations. He did considerable financing for the purpose of protecting the properties and the equities therein which had been conveyed to the first-named corporation. He arranged a loan of $400,000, which was secured by a bond issue. Only $272,000 of that amount, however, was needed and used by the corporation. A number of the equities were sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of debts against other properties. Up until 1914 there was not enough income accruing to the corporation to meet the expenses. The petitioner's mother and aunt needed funds for their living expenses and maintenance. As a consequence, another contract was entered into in 1914. Meanwhile Theo Mastin had married George Edgar Lovejoy. This second agreement is set out in full in the margin.[2]

*751 During the taxable years here in question, petitioner paid out the following amounts as indicated:

  To his mother and aunt, 1918 ...... $12,346.64
                          1919 ......  11,783.64
                          1920 ......  14,852.24
                          1922 ......  10,567.13
  For advertising some of the
     real estate covered by the
     trust agreement ................   4,245.25

The amounts paid to petitioner's mother and aunt were for their support and were paid pursuant to the agreement of 1914.

Upon the facts thus found, and a finding to be mentioned later, relative to the payment for advertising, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the agreement of 1914 canceled the agreement of 1905. It held further that none of the payments above mentioned made by petitioner were deductible as losses under the statute above cited, and it redetermined the deficiencies of petitioner's income tax for the years in question on the basis of disallowing as losses the payments above mentioned.

No question is raised as to the correctness of the figures, if the legal conclusions of the Board of Tax Appeals are right.

Upon this petition we do not review the facts found by the Board of Tax Appeals, since there was substantial evidence to support them. We review questions of law only. Avery v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A.) 22 F.(2d) 6, 55 A. L. R. 1277; Royal Packing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A.) 22 F.(2d) 536.

The contentions of petitioner are:

First, that the agreement of 1905 was not and could not be canceled by the agreement of 1914, because the former agreement constituted an irrevocable trust and some of the parties interested in the trust, to wit, the lineal heirs of Thomas Mastin and of Theo Mastin, did not join in the agreement of 1914.

*752 Second, that the payments made by petitioner to his mother and aunt, and the one for advertising certain real estate, were all payments by petitioner while acting as trustee under the agreement of 1905 and while also acting under the agreement of 1914, and especially the clause thereof reading as follows: "Whereas said Thomas H. Mastin is willing to undertake the management and control of said shares of stock and properties and has this day agreed, and does hereby agree to undertake the management and control thereof, for the purpose of realizing an income and profit therefrom for the benefit and use of all the parties hereto" — and that the payments were "losses" within the provisions of section 214 (a) (4) and (5) of the act of 1918, above quoted.

We do not find it necessary to a decision of the case at bar to determine the several interesting legal questions arising under petitioner's first contention. We may assume for present purposes that the position of petitioner, that the agreement of 1905 was not canceled by the agreement of 1914, is correct.

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Related

Helvering v. Ward
79 F.2d 381 (Eighth Circuit, 1935)
Stephenson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
43 F.2d 348 (Eighth Circuit, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
28 F.2d 748, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 325, 7 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 8208, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mastin-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1928.