New York Life Insurance v. Edwards

271 U.S. 109, 46 S. Ct. 436, 70 L. Ed. 859, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 611, 1 C.B. 305, 5 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6011, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 172
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 19, 1926
Docket712, 804
StatusPublished
Cited by139 cases

This text of 271 U.S. 109 (New York Life Insurance v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New York Life Insurance v. Edwards, 271 U.S. 109, 46 S. Ct. 436, 70 L. Ed. 859, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 611, 1 C.B. 305, 5 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6011, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 172 (1926).

Opinion

*114 Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Insurance Company brought suit in the District Court at New York to recover of Edwards, Collector, the alleged excessive sum demanded of it ,as income tax for the year 1913, and obtained judgment for a part. 3 Fed. ,(2d) 280. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this exqept as to one item. 8 Fed. (2d) 851. Both parties are here by certiorari, and five questions require consideration. All involve the construction or application of the Revenue Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172.. Section II G (a) imposed an annual tax of one per centum upon the net income of “ every insurance company organized in the United States,” and (b) directed—

■ “Such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross amount of the income of such . . insurance company, received within the year from all sources, (first) all the- ordinary, ¿nd necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance and operation of its business and properties, including rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use. or possession of property; (second) all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for depreciation by use, wear and tear of property, if any; . . , and. in case of insurance companies the net *115 addition, if any, required by law to 'be made within the year to reserve funds and the sums other than dividends paid within the year on policy and annuity contracts: Provided, That . . . life insurance companies shall not include as income in any year such portion of any actual premium received ■ from any individual policyholder as shall have been paid back or credited to such individual policyholder, or treated as an abatement of premium of such individual policyholder, within such year. . .

1. The Company, a New York corporation without capital stock, does business on the mutual, level premium plan and issues both “ .annual dividend ” and “ deferred dividend ” policies. Under this, plan each policyholder pays annually in advance a fixed sum which, when added to like payments by others, probably will create a fund larger than necessary to meet all maturing policies and estimated expenses. At the end of each- year the actual insurance costs and expenses incurred are ascertained. The difference between their sum and the total of advance payments and other income, then Recomes the “ overpayment ” or surplus fund for immediate pro rata distribution among policyholders as dividends or for such future disposition as the contracts provide. An “ annual dividend ” policyholder receives his proportionate part of this fund each year in cash or as a credit upon or abatement of his next premium. “.Deferred dividend ” or, as sometimes called, “ distribution ” policies provide—

“ That no dividend or surplus shall be allowed or paid upon this policy, unless the insured shall survive until completion of its distribution period., and unless this policy shall then be in force. That surplus or profits derived from such policies on the distribution policy plan as shall not be in force at the date of the completion of their respective distribution periods, shall be apportioned among such policies as shall complete the- distribution periods.”

*116 Accordingly, all overpayments by defended dividend policyholders must' await apportionment until the prescribed period ends; and no one of them will receive anything therefrom if his policy lapses or if he dies before that time. The whole of this fund goes to the survivors.

Overpayments by deferred dividend policyholders for 1912 amounted to $8,198,918. The Collector refused to deduct this sum from the total receipts, and demanded the prescribed tax of one per centum thereon. We think he acted properly. Both courts below so held.

The applicable doctrine was much considered in Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523. We there pointed out the probable reason for the permitted non-inclusion in the net income of a life insurance company of such portion of any actual premium received from any individual policyholder as shall have been paid back or credited to such individual policyholder, or treated as an abatement of premium of such individual policyholder, within such year.” Here it is insisted that within the meaning of the quoted provision each deferred dividend policyholder’s overpayment was actually credited to him during the year; but we. cannot accept this theory. The Aggregate of all such payments was held for distribution among policyholders alive at the end of the period. The receipts for the year were not really diminished.

2. The' Company owned many bonds, etc., payable at future dates, purchased at prices above their par values, and to amortize these premiums a fund was set up. It claimed that an addition to this fund should be deducted from • gross receipts. The District Court thought the claim well founded, but the Circuit Court of Appeals took another view. Unless the addition amounted to . a loss “ actually sustained, within the year” no Reduction could be made therefor. Obviously, no actual ascertainable loss had occurred. All of the securities might have been sold thereafter above cost. The result of the venture could not be known until they were either sold or paid off.

*117 3. In 1910 the Company introduced a clause into some policies by which it agreed to waive payment of premiums after 'proof of total and permanent disability. The estimated value on December 31, 1913, of future premiums so waived amounted to $16,629; It claimed this should be added to the reserve fund and deducted from gross income. Insurance companies may deduct “ the net addition, if any, required by law to be made' within the year to reserve funds.”

The pertinent portion of the agreed statement of facts follows—

u In 1910 the plaintiff introduced into some of its contracts of life insurance a clause under which it agreed that upon receipt, before default in the payment of premium, of due proof that the insured had become totally and permanently disabled, the plaintiff would waive payrqent of any premium thereafter falling due. In taking its account at the end of the calendar year 1913, the plaintiff had then received due proof that the insured under a number of these policies were totally and permanently disabled in accordance with the terms of said contracts providing for the waiver Of the payment of future premiums. The value at December 31, 1913, of the future premiums waived on account of total and permanent disability was the sum of $16,629. The value at December 31, 1912, of the future premiums so waived was the sum . of $5,637.
“ In the calculation of the general reserve fund at the end of any calendar year, the Company and the Insurance Department of the State of New York make the computation by deducting from the value of the contractual benefits under, each policy the then value of all future, premiums under the policy.

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Bluebook (online)
271 U.S. 109, 46 S. Ct. 436, 70 L. Ed. 859, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 611, 1 C.B. 305, 5 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6011, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-life-insurance-v-edwards-scotus-1926.