1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION
12 STEPHEN KING, et al., No. 2:26-cv-01408-BFM 13 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 14 TO REMAND EDEN RELOCATION, INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (ECF 8.) For the reasons 18 below, the Motion is denied. 19 I. Background 20 This action arises out of Plaintiff’s agreement with Hawaiian Van Lines 21 to ship his household goods from Oregon to Hawaii. (ECF 1-2 at 6-21 (Compl.).) 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants demanded payment that exceeded what the 23 parties had agreed to, delayed delivery, misled him about the nature of the 24 insurance coverage for the household goods, did not disclose that another 25 company would be responsible for performing the transportation, and damaged 26 the Porsche that had been entrusted to them for delivery. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-17.) 27 Plaintiff sued Eden Relocation, Inc. (dba Hawaiian Van Lines) and Universe 28 1 Systems, Inc. (dba Hawaiian Shipping) in the Los Angeles County Superior 2 Court, raising, among other things, breach of contract and fraud claims. (Compl. 3 at 1.) 4 On February 11, 2026, Defendants removed the matter to this Court, 5 citing both diversity of citizenship and federal question as the basis for federal 6 jurisdiction. (ECF 1 at 2-5.) In that notice of removal, Defendants stated that 7 the Carmack Amendment preempted Plaintiff’s state-law causes of action and 8 gave rise to federal question jurisdiction. (ECF 1 at 3-4.) 9 Plaintiff moved to remand this action, arguing that diversity of citizenship 10 does not provide a basis for removal, and that the only “federal question” was 11 presented by Defendants’ defense and not Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF 8-1 (Mot.); 12 ECF 11 (Reply).) Defendants opposed the Motion, contending that the Carmack 13 Amendment preempts Plaintiff’s state-law claims and that the complaint is 14 accordingly deemed to arise under federal law for jurisdictional purposes. (ECF 15 10 (Opp’n).) The matter is fully briefed and ready for decision. 16 II. Legal Standard 17 In general, “defendants may remove to the appropriate federal district 18 court ‘any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 19 United States have original jurisdiction.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of 20 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). “The propriety 21 of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in 22 federal court.” Id. 23 Federal courts have jurisdiction over two categories of cases: cases that 24 arise under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and cases in which the amount in 25 controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship among the 26 parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The two bases for jurisdiction serve distinct 27 purposes: “Federal-question jurisdiction affords parties a federal forum in which 28 ‘to vindicate federal rights,’ whereas diversity jurisdiction provides ‘a neutral 1 forum’ for parties from different States.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 2 587 U.S. 435, 438 (2019). Here, while Defendants’ notice of removal invokes 3 diversity jurisdiction, their Opposition makes clear that federal jurisdiction in 4 this case turns on federal question jurisdiction, not diversity. (Opp’n at 4.) 5 Regarding federal question jurisdiction, district courts have “original 6 jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 7 of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 8 Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (federal question 9 jurisdiction is “invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action 10 created by federal law”). Federal question jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well- 11 pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only 12 when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly 13 pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A 14 case may not be removed to federal court based on the possibility of a federal 15 defense, even the defense of pre-emption and even if the defense is anticipated 16 in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 393. 17 Under the corollary “artful pleading” doctrine, however, “a well-pleaded 18 state law claim” may “present[] a federal question when a federal statute has 19 completely preempted [a] particular area of law.” Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc, 20 476 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film 21 Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Hansen v. Grp. Health 22 Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 23 522 U.S. 470, 478 (1998)) (“[A] plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to 24 plead necessary federal questions.”). In an area of complete preemption, any 25 claim purportedly based on a preempted state law “is considered, from its 26 inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Wayne v. 27 DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); 28 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 1 24 (1983) (“[I]f a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of 2 action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action 3 necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law”). In short, a “completely preempted claim 4 may be removed to district court under § 1441.” Hall, 476 F.3d at 687. 5 III. Discussion 6 Defendants do not claim that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint contains 7 any federal claim. (ECF 1 at 2; Opp’n at 3-4.)1 The motion, then, turns on 8 whether the Carmack Amendment completely preempts Plaintiff’s state-law 9 causes of action. 10 The Carmack Amendment is a “federal statute that provides the exclusive 11 cause of action for interstate shipping contract claims.” White v. Mayflower 12 Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hall, 476 F.3d at 687- 13 88). It is among the limited number of statutes well-established to “completely 14 preempt” certain well-pleaded state claims involving such contracts. Hall, 476 15 F.3d at 687 (citing Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION
12 STEPHEN KING, et al., No. 2:26-cv-01408-BFM 13 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 14 TO REMAND EDEN RELOCATION, INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (ECF 8.) For the reasons 18 below, the Motion is denied. 19 I. Background 20 This action arises out of Plaintiff’s agreement with Hawaiian Van Lines 21 to ship his household goods from Oregon to Hawaii. (ECF 1-2 at 6-21 (Compl.).) 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants demanded payment that exceeded what the 23 parties had agreed to, delayed delivery, misled him about the nature of the 24 insurance coverage for the household goods, did not disclose that another 25 company would be responsible for performing the transportation, and damaged 26 the Porsche that had been entrusted to them for delivery. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-17.) 27 Plaintiff sued Eden Relocation, Inc. (dba Hawaiian Van Lines) and Universe 28 1 Systems, Inc. (dba Hawaiian Shipping) in the Los Angeles County Superior 2 Court, raising, among other things, breach of contract and fraud claims. (Compl. 3 at 1.) 4 On February 11, 2026, Defendants removed the matter to this Court, 5 citing both diversity of citizenship and federal question as the basis for federal 6 jurisdiction. (ECF 1 at 2-5.) In that notice of removal, Defendants stated that 7 the Carmack Amendment preempted Plaintiff’s state-law causes of action and 8 gave rise to federal question jurisdiction. (ECF 1 at 3-4.) 9 Plaintiff moved to remand this action, arguing that diversity of citizenship 10 does not provide a basis for removal, and that the only “federal question” was 11 presented by Defendants’ defense and not Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF 8-1 (Mot.); 12 ECF 11 (Reply).) Defendants opposed the Motion, contending that the Carmack 13 Amendment preempts Plaintiff’s state-law claims and that the complaint is 14 accordingly deemed to arise under federal law for jurisdictional purposes. (ECF 15 10 (Opp’n).) The matter is fully briefed and ready for decision. 16 II. Legal Standard 17 In general, “defendants may remove to the appropriate federal district 18 court ‘any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 19 United States have original jurisdiction.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of 20 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). “The propriety 21 of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in 22 federal court.” Id. 23 Federal courts have jurisdiction over two categories of cases: cases that 24 arise under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and cases in which the amount in 25 controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship among the 26 parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The two bases for jurisdiction serve distinct 27 purposes: “Federal-question jurisdiction affords parties a federal forum in which 28 ‘to vindicate federal rights,’ whereas diversity jurisdiction provides ‘a neutral 1 forum’ for parties from different States.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 2 587 U.S. 435, 438 (2019). Here, while Defendants’ notice of removal invokes 3 diversity jurisdiction, their Opposition makes clear that federal jurisdiction in 4 this case turns on federal question jurisdiction, not diversity. (Opp’n at 4.) 5 Regarding federal question jurisdiction, district courts have “original 6 jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 7 of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 8 Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (federal question 9 jurisdiction is “invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action 10 created by federal law”). Federal question jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well- 11 pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only 12 when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly 13 pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A 14 case may not be removed to federal court based on the possibility of a federal 15 defense, even the defense of pre-emption and even if the defense is anticipated 16 in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 393. 17 Under the corollary “artful pleading” doctrine, however, “a well-pleaded 18 state law claim” may “present[] a federal question when a federal statute has 19 completely preempted [a] particular area of law.” Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc, 20 476 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film 21 Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Hansen v. Grp. Health 22 Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 23 522 U.S. 470, 478 (1998)) (“[A] plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to 24 plead necessary federal questions.”). In an area of complete preemption, any 25 claim purportedly based on a preempted state law “is considered, from its 26 inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Wayne v. 27 DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); 28 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 1 24 (1983) (“[I]f a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of 2 action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action 3 necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law”). In short, a “completely preempted claim 4 may be removed to district court under § 1441.” Hall, 476 F.3d at 687. 5 III. Discussion 6 Defendants do not claim that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint contains 7 any federal claim. (ECF 1 at 2; Opp’n at 3-4.)1 The motion, then, turns on 8 whether the Carmack Amendment completely preempts Plaintiff’s state-law 9 causes of action. 10 The Carmack Amendment is a “federal statute that provides the exclusive 11 cause of action for interstate shipping contract claims.” White v. Mayflower 12 Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hall, 476 F.3d at 687- 13 88). It is among the limited number of statutes well-established to “completely 14 preempt” certain well-pleaded state claims involving such contracts. Hall, 476 15 F.3d at 687 (citing Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). 16 Specifically, the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state law claims 17 “alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver and damage to property,” so long as the 18 amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. White, 543 F.3d at 584. 19 Here, the Complaint includes state-law causes of action that are 20 completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment. White, 543 F.3d at 584. 21 Claim Six, which alleges property damage to a car transported by Defendants, 22 is most certainly preempted. See Hall, 476 F.3d at 688 (deeming it “well settled” 23 24
25 1 Claim Five cites both a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 14915, and state law. 26 (Compl. ¶¶ 50-56.) Plaintiff argues that that provision does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. (Reply at 3.) Defendants do not rely on Claim Five 27 as a basis for federal question jurisdiction, and given the other bases for federal jurisdiction discussed in this Order, the Court does not need to consider whether 28 that provision alone would give rise to federal question jurisdiction. 1 that the Carmack Amendment “is the exclusive cause of action for interstate- 2 shipping contract claims alleging loss or damage to property”). 3 Beyond that, and contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments (Reply at 4), the 4 Carmack Amendment also preempts contract claims even where the claim is not 5 premised on loss or damage to property. Id. at 688-89. In Hall itself, the contract 6 claim was, like the claim here, premised on allegations that the defendant 7 delayed delivery and demanded charges in excess of the amount originally 8 agreed to before delivering the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 686. The Ninth Circuit 9 concluded that that claim, too, was preempted, noting that “making finer 10 distinctions between types of contract damages would defeat the purpose of the 11 statute, which was to create uniformity out of disparity.” Id. (cleaned up); BNSF 12 Logistics, LLC v. L & N Exp., Inc., No. C 11-5810-PJH, 2012 WL 525526, at *4 13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012) (finding breach of contract claim premised on failure 14 to update contact information and respond to emails preempted by Carmack 15 Amendment); White v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 16 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (claim that defendant improperly billed plaintiff above and 17 beyond the contract price was preempted by Carmack Amendment), aff’d, 543 18 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s claim for “improper 19 billing/overcharging” preempted by Carmack Amendment). 20 Moreover, the Complaint alleges the amount in controversy exceeds 21 $10,000, and Plaintiff does not contend otherwise. Plaintiff himself alleges that 22 the amount in controversy is “over $25,000.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) Moreover, the 23 specific losses alleged in the Complaint clearly surpass the threshold set by the 24 Carmack Amendment; those include the $47,886 Plaintiff paid beyond the 25 $25,296 contract estimate, plus the $1,244.60 in damage to Plaintiff’s Porsche. 26 (Compl. ¶¶ 9-16, 17.) 27 The Court need not decide at this juncture whether each aspect of each 28 claim against each Defendant is completely preempted, because the presence of 1 || a single claim over which there is federal question jurisdiction provides a basis 2 || for this Court to extend supplemental jurisdiction to other closely related 3 || claims—so long as the claims have an amount in controversy that exceeds 4 || $10,000. Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 5 || 2011) (“Because at least one of Smallwood’s claims was preempted by the 6 || Carmack Amendment, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.”). Such 7 || claims exist here, and that is sufficient to decide the present motion. 8 IV. Plaintiff's Request for Fees 9 In his Motion, Plaintiff requests fees and costs under 28 USC § 1447(c) 10 |} and Local Rule 7-8. (Mot. at 4-5.) Section 1447(c) is premised on a successful 11 || motion to remand, and Plaintiffs bid to remand the case was unsuccessful. See 12 |} 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “An order remanding the case may require payment of just 13 |} costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of 14 || the removal.”) 15 V. Conclusion and Order 16 For the reasons above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF 8) is denied. 7 Inuryy 18 |} DATED: March 31, 2026 19 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28