MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. O’MALLEY, D.J. (pp. 635-39), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Stephen E. Duffy and Sue Ann Duffy (“the Duffys”), the plaintiffs-appellants, voluntarily dismissed their personal injury lawsuit against the defendant-appellee, [625]*625Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), on the third day of trial. The written dismissal order entered several days later imposed two conditions on the voluntary dismissal: that- the Duffys pay Ford’s litigation costs, including attorney fees, if the case is refiled; and that the rulings from the original action (including most evidentiary rulings and a partial grant of summary judgment) govern the refiled action as the law of the case. When the Duffys refiled their case approximately one year later, the district court dismissed it without prejudice because the Duffys were unable to pay Ford’s costs. The Duffys now appeal. the conditions imposed by the district court in connection with the first dismissal. We hold that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the Duffys themselves— rather than their attorneys — were responsible for the dilatory conduct of the trial. We also hold that it was an abuse of discretion to impose those litigation costs and to apply the law of the original case to the refiled case without giving the Duffys sufficient notice of those conditions and allowing them an opportunity to withdraw their motion to dismiss prior to entering the first dismissal. Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s order of dismissal and the related orders and REMAND for the district court to reconsider its rulings in light of this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Duffys originally filed this products liability suit against Ford in federal court in February 1994, alleging several state-law claims arising out of the death of their son, William Duffy, who was lolled in an accident when his Bronco II collided with another vehicle and rolled over. The district court dismissed the Duffys’ fraud, deception, and misrepresentation claims through a partial grant of summary judgment to Ford, leaving only the Duffys’ negligence and strict liability claims for trial.
After repeated rescheduling, the trial commenced on January 13, 1997. On the third day of trial, the Duffys sought to introduce the expert testimony of two witnesses: Thomas J. Feaheny, a former Ford engineer who was to testify as to the instability of the Bronco’s- design and the vehicle’s propensity to roll over; and Officer Mruk, a Memphis police investigator who was to give an opinion as to whether William Duffy was wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. After a hearing, the district court decided to exclude the testimony of those two witnesses, finding that Feaheny’s testimony did not pass the Daubert test and that Mruk could not give an expert opinion as to seat belt usage, because the Duffys had not listed him as an expert witness in the final pretrial order. In the wake of these rulings, the Duffys moved for voluntary dismissal of their case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Ford did not oppose the motion but stated that it was “not willing ... to forego costs.” J.A. at 327(Tr.). The district court orally granted the motion and agreed with Ford that the Duffys would be responsible for Ford’s costs should they choose to refile. Some discussion ensued between the district court and the Duffys’ counsel regarding-whether those costs would include attorney fees, but the question was not resolved at that time.
On January 24, 1997, the district court issued a written order granting the Duffys’-motion on the condition that the Duffys compensate Ford for its litigation costs should they choose to refile the action and that the rulings made during the original case would apply to a refiled case. Upon Ford’s motion, the district court amended that order to clarify that the litigation “costs” mentioned in the dismissal order included those attorney fees incurred by Ford that could not be recouped in a subsequent action. The district court declined to calculate the total amount of those litigation costs at that time, however, proposing instead to do so if and when the Duffys [626]*626refiled their complaint. The Duffys attempted to appeal that order, but this court held, in an unpublished order, that it was not appealable. See Order, Case No. 97-5764 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997). Specifically, we noted that the district court’s order fell within the scope of the general rule that plaintiffs cannot appeal an order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Furthermore, we added that the appeal would be premature in any case, since the amount of fees payable to the defendant had not yet been specified.
On January 12, 1998, the Duffys, represented by new counsel, recommenced their action against Ford in Tennessee state court. Ford subsequently removed the case, and it was reassigned to the district judge who had presided over the original case. In an order entered on June 11, 1998, the district court assessed Ford’s non-overlapping litigation costs at $98,791.40 and informed the Duffys that they must pay that amount within thirty days or suffer dismissal of their complaint. The district court also ordered that all the rulings from the original action would be the law of the case in the refiled action, except that the Duffys would be permitted to name one additional expert in the refiled action. On June 19,1998, in response to Ford’s motion for reconsideration, the district court adjusted that amount to $126,481.09, finding that the court had erred in its initial calculation. The Duffys timely appealed from those rulings. Ford subsequently moved to dismiss that appeal, arguing again that the Duffys were trying to appeal their own voluntary dismissal and that Sixth Circuit precedent does not permit such appeals. A Sixth Circuit panel denied the motion but asked the parties to address the jurisdictional issues in their appellate briefs. See Order, Case Nos. 98-5950/6112 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 1998).
Facing dismissal of their refiled case due to their inability to pay the required costs, the Duffys filed a motion to stay enforcement of the district court’s order of June 19, 1998, which was denied in an order dated August 3, 1998. On October 14,1998, the district court denied the Duff-ys’ motion for reconsideration of that August 3 order, holding that, because the Duffys had already filed a notice of appeal in the pending case, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion. The Duffys then appealed the October 14 order and the corresponding judgment dismissing their refiled action.
The Duffys now argue that the district court’s orders requiring them to pay Ford’s attorney fees and imposing the law of the case on the refiled action caused them legal prejudice and are therefore immediately appealable under the law of the Sixth Circuit. Furthermore, they claim that the terms and conditions imposed by the district court amounted to an abuse of discretion.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Appealability of the District Court’s Orders
Ford argues that the district court’s orders granting the Duffys’ voluntary-dismissal motion are not immediately ap-pealable, because they are not adverse, involuntary judgments. The Duffys, by contrast, argue that this court has appellate jurisdiction, because the terms and conditions imposed on their voluntary dismissal by the district court caused them legal prejudice.
The general rule is that a plaintiff who requests and is granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) cannot appeal that dismissal, because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment.1 See Scholl [627]*627v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1964); 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2376, at 93 (Supp.1999). Several circuits have recognized an exception to this rule of nonappealability, however, when the plaintiff has suffered “legal prejudice” from the conditions imposed by the district court and has not acquiesced in those conditions. See Belle-Midwest, Inc. v. Missouri Property & Cos. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 56 F.3d 977, 978 (8th Cir.1995); McGregor v. Board of Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1017, 1021 (11th Cir.1992); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822, 108 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed.2d 45 (1987); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129-30 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 1231, 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979); 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2376, at 93. The case law in this circuit suggests that this court would recognize a similar exception. See Management Investors v. United Mine Workers, 610 F.2d 384, 394-95 (6th Cir.1979); Scholl, 327 F.2d at 700.
Nonetheless, the standard for obtaining review of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a fairly stringent one, and the plaintiffs have not met it in this case. In Scholl, this court suggested that the terms and conditions imposed by the district court under Rule 41(a)(2) would be appeal-able only if they were unreasonable. See 327 F.2d at 700. In Management Investors, we stated that an appeal from a voluntary dismissal without prejudice “does not lie to review rulings which do not have the effect of determining the case against plaintiff.” 610 F.2d at 394.. In that case, the district court had declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims, and the plaintiff subsequently dismissed its federal claim voluntarily. Because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the case, this court held that the plaintiff could not appeal the prior ruling dismissing the state-law claims, because that ruling did not prevent the plaintiff from bringing suit again. See id. at 395 (“[Wjhile the dismissal of the state claims precluded their adjudication on the merits in this lawsuit, it did not preclude their adjudication in a state court.”). The court also pointed out that the dismissal had no res judicata effect, even in federal court, because it was without prejudice.2 See id.; see also LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir.1976) (describing legal prejudice as a ruling that “severely eireumscribe[s]” a plaintiffs ability to bring another suit); see also Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir.1997); Belle-Midwest, 56 F.3d at 978.
The Duffys argue that the terms and conditions imposed by the district court are unreasonable and severely circumscribe their ability to bring suit again. With respect to the attorney-fees condition, the Duffys argue that they are unable to pay those fees and are therefore effectively barred from re-filing their suit. The Duffys’ argument is supported by the fact that some courts have hesitated to make categorical statements about what kinds of conditions amount to legal prejudice, stating that it is the effect, rather than the formal language of the dismissal, that determines whether legal prejudice results. See LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603. Ford responds by pointing out that courts have found similar fee conditions not -to constitute legal prejudice: in Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1986), [628]*628the total costs imposed on the plaintiff were $165,774.84, see id. at 554, and in Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.1978), more than two decades ago, the total cost was $44,523.20, see id. at 128. The key question, then, is whether the reasonableness standard for imposing attorney fees under Rule 41(a)(2) is a subjective or objective one — that is, whether the unique circumstances of the individual parties are relevant to the reasonableness of the fees and to the finding of legal prejudice. Although there is no binding precedent on this issue in the Sixth Circuit, this court is extremely reluctant to announce a rule that makes its appellate jurisdiction depend upon the financial wherewithal of the parties. To do so would mean that parties without the means to pay a cost condition could immediately appeal that condition, whereas a wealthier party faced with an identical condition could not; we believe that such a result would be anomalous, and we know of no other area of appellate jurisdiction in which the means of the parties, rather than the nature of the decision, determines appealability. Furthermore, appellate courts are not well positioned to make the predicate factual determination whether a party truly cannot afford to pay costs, which would be required by the rule that the Duffys appear to advocate. Therefore, we conclude that an appealing party must show that a cost condition is objectively unreasonable, without regard to that party’s financial means, in ordér to demonstrate legal prejudice.
The Duffys have not made any claim or showing that the costs imposed by the district court are objectively unreasonable: for example, they do not claim that those costs are arbitrary or disproportionate to the effort Ford has expended. Indeed, Ford submitted detailed affidavits itemizing its expenses, which the Duffys do not contest. Rather, they argue that those fees are unreasonable because they result in the Duffys’ inability to bring a second suit. We therefore hold that the district court’s order with respect to costs does not result in legal prejudice to the Duffys.
The Duffys also contend that they were legally prejudiced by the district court’s decision to impose on the refiled action the law of the case from the original action. They argue that the district court’s evidentiary rulings from the original action prevent the Duffys from introducing the evidence necessary to prevail in the refiled action. As Ford points out, however, the Duffys have not pointed to any specific evidence that they need to introduce in order to prevail, nor have they explained what showings they will be unable to make with the considerable evidence they had amassed for the original trial. Furthermore, the district court’s order permitted the Duffys to name one additional expert in the refiled action.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with a situation very similar to this one in Parker v. Freightliner Corp., 940 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.1991). In that case, the district court had granted the plaintiff a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) on the condition that the court’s order barring the plaintiffs use of expert testimony would remain in effect in any subsequent action. The court of appeals determined that this condition did not amount to legal prejudice, because the plaintiff would have been able, under state law, to make out a prima facie case without the use of expert testimony. See id. at 1023-24 & n. 3. In the instant ease, although the Duffys’ counsel described Feaheny as a “critical witness,” J.A. at 400(Tr.), and stated that the exclusion of his testimony was the impetus for requesting a voluntary dismissal, the Duffys have not shown that they would be unable to make out a prima facie case with the evidence they already have or with the addition of one expert witness to replace Feaheny. Indeed, it seems particularly implausible that Feahe-ny could be so central to the Duffys’ case, when, in fact, he admitted that he had not examined the vehicle involved in the accident and that he did not have specific [629]*629knowledge about the engineering of the particular Bronco model that William Duffy was driving when he was killed. Therefore, the Duffys have not shown that the district court’s imposition of the rulings from the original action on the refiled action constituted legal prejudice.
We nonetheless hold that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal of the refiled case. Although the district court’s dismissal of the initial case was not an involuntary, adverse judgment, and therefore was not immediately appeal-able, the dismissal of the refiled case clearly was such a judgment, and the Duffys are allowed to appeal it. See, e.g., Herring v. City of Whitehall, 804 F.2d 464, 466 & n. 2 (8th Cir.1986) (allowing an appeal from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiffs’ refiled suit when the plaintiffs failed to pay the defendants’ attorney fees as required by the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ request for a voluntary dismissal). The Fifth Circuit has suggested that a plaintiff can obtain review of a conditional voluntary dismissal by accepting those conditions, but then refusing to comply with them and suffering a dismissal with prejudice as a result. See Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Richard Carlyon Co., 904 F.2d 298, 301 n. 5 (5th Cir.1990); Yoffe, 580 F.2d at 131 n. 13. That is what the Duffys did in this case. Although the district court technically dismissed the refiled case without prejudice, that dismissal was involuntary and, as the Duffys point out in their brief, operated as a dismissal with prejudice, because the statute of limitations had run on the Duffys’ claims at that point.3 Cf. LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603 (stating that it is the effect, rather than the formal language of the dismissal, that determines whether legal prejudice results). Of course, the dicta of the Fifth Circuit in Yoffe and Mortgage Guaranty are not binding on this court, but the logic of those cases is persuasive. Therefore, we hold that this court can hear the Duffys’ appeal of the dismissal of the refiled case.
B. Permissibility of the District Court’s Conditions
The terms and conditions imposed by the district court on the dismissal of the original action resulted in the dismissal of the refiled action. For this reason, we can consider the permissibility of those terms and conditions when we review the appropriateness of the district court’s second dismissal. In conducting that review, we must consider whether the district court’s conditions on the Duffys’ voluntary dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion. See DWG Corp. v. Granada Invs., Inc., 962 F.2d 1201, 1202 (6th Cir.1992). If they did not, then the district court was entitled to dismiss the Duffys’ refiled action, even if that second dismissal operated as a dismissal with prejudice. See Stern v. Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 226 F.2d 409, 409-10 (6th Cir.1955); 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2366, at 316-17. If those conditions were an abuse of discretion, however, then the district court’s orders imposing those conditions, as well as its order dismissing the refiled action due to the Duffys’ failure to meet those conditions, must be reversed.
1. Requiring the Duffys to Pay Ford’s Costs
The Duffys do not contest the district court’s ability to require reimbursement of Ford’s attorney fees and costs, nor [630]*630do they contest the amount of those fees and costs. They argue only that the district court abused its discretion in requiring the Duffys rather than their trial counsel to pay. The Duffys contend that their former counsel, the Thomases, should have to pay Ford’s costs because the Thomases’ incompetence necessitated the voluntary dismissal. We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to consider the Duffys’ responsibility for Ford’s wasted costs in assessing costs against the Duffys rather than their counsel. Furthermore, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in failing prior to the entry of the January 24, 1997, dismissal order to give the Duffys notice of the approximate amount of costs for which they would be responsible upon refiling and to afford them an opportunity to withdraw their motion. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s order of dismissal and its order requiring the Duffys to pay Ford’s costs before refiling, and we remand for reconsideration in light of this holding.
In Herring v. City of Whitehall, 804 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.1986), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to require the plaintiffs to pay attorney fees before they could refile their case without considering whether they were responsible for the defendants’ wasted costs. In that case, the district court had granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a voluntary dismissal due to their counsel’s unpreparedness, on the condition that the plaintiffs’ counsel pay the defendants’ fees and costs if the plaintiffs refiled, but if the plaintiffs retained new counsel — which they did— the plaintiffs would be responsible for the costs. See id. at 466. While noting that there may be some due process concerns associated with assessing costs directly against the attorney rather than the client, see id., and acknowledging that clients are generally held responsible for the acts of their attorneys, who are their “freely selected agent[s],” id. at 467 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)), the court of appeals nonetheless found an abuse of discretion. The court noted that if the attorney was to blame for the neglectful prosecution of the lawsuit, the attorney should bear the sanctions. See id. The court therefore ordered the district court to consider on remand the relative culpability of the attorney and the plaintiffs when determining how the defendants’ costs should be allocated. See id. at 468 & n. 7.4
We find it useful to analogize the instant case to those cases dealing with Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals. The district court’s actions in the instant case, as in the case of an involuntary dismissal with prejudice, have brought about the severe result of depriving the plaintiffs of a day in court to resolve their claims on the merits. See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir.1994). Therefore, while recognizing that the Duffys freely chose their counsel and are consequently responsible for most of the decisions made by that counsel, we nonetheless believe that in this particular case, where the Duffys were not necessarily even aware of the choices faced by their counsel and were given insufficient notice of the possi[631]*631ble consequences of those choices, the Thomases rather than their clients should be required to pay if the Thomases are to blame for Ford’s wasted costs. See id.
There is evidence in this case that the Duffys’ counsel were primarily to blame for the necessity of requesting a voluntary dismissal, and, as discussed above, the Duffys claim that the dismissal of the first action was equivalent to a dismissal with prejudice, because they are unable to pay Ford’s costs. The concern at the heart of Herring and Coleman — that innocent plaintiffs should not be forced lightly to bear the costs created by their incompetent counsel, especially not if the cost ultimately they bear is losing their day in court — is therefore applicable to the Duff-ys’ case. However, we reject the Duffys’ appellate counsel’s suggestion, at oral argument, that the district court has made a specific “finding” that the Duffys’ trial counsel were incompetent. Although the district court did mention the Thomases’ ineptness in one of its orders, due process appears to require that the Thomases have notice and an opportunity to be heard before the district court could require them to pay Ford’s fees. See, e.g., Herring, 804 F.2d at 468.5
We also hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to wait until June of 1998 to determine the costs for which the Duffys would be responsible. At the time that the Duffys moved voluntarily to dismiss the action, they should have been informed of the specific conditions that would be placed on their dismissal and given the opportunity to withdraw the motion if they found those conditions to be too onerous. See Marlow v. Winston & Strawn, 19 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir.1994) (“A court should not label something as a term and condition yet not afford the affected party an opportunity to consider his options before making his decision.”); Lau v. Glendora Unified Sch. Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir.1986); cf. GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 368 (D.C.Cir.1981); Scholl, 327 F.2d at 700 (“There was no requirement that the appellant agree to the entry of this order. It was an alternative available to appellant in lieu of proceeding with the trial.”). Particularly given the size of Ford’s costs, there appears to be a significant likelihood that the Duffys would have withdrawn their motion for-voluntary dismissal, had they been given the relevant information and an opportunity to do so. When faced with the Duffys’ request for a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) and Ford’s request for costs, the district court should have taken steps to determine the approximate costs for which the plaintiffs would be responsible before granting the motion and dismissing the jury. The Duffys then would have been forced to decide whether to accept the conditions and dismiss the case or to withdraw the motion.
We therefore vacate the district court’s orders dismissing the refiled action and requiring the Duffys to pay Ford’s fees, and we remand for the district court to reconsider its rulings. On remand, the district court is directed to assess and [632]*632apportion the obligation to pay Ford’s costs between the Duffys and the Thom-ases according to their respective fault in the first trial. Although the district court’s failure to give the Duffys proper notice was an abuse of discretion, we find that it was reasonable to condition the voluntary dismissal upon the payment of Ford’s costs. We therefore hold that the obligation to pay Ford’s costs has not been extinguished. However, if the Duffys are themselves to blame but are unable to pay all or some of the costs allocated to them, the district court may decide, in its discretion, whether and on what terms the case should go forward. Should the Thomases fail to pay their share of Ford’s costs, the Duffys will be allowed to proceed with their suit notwithstanding the Thomases’ default.
We believe that this result is required by our holding that the district court should have given notice to the Duffys before imposing conditions on their dismissal that they were unable to fulfill. Admittedly, this result would entail some unfairness to Ford. However, faced with the case as it now stands, it seems inevitable that an innocent party will have to suffer, and we believe that it would be worse for the Duffys to lose their day in court, without notice, than for Ford to be required to bear its costs in this litigation. Furthermore, although our holding is limited to the unique circumstances of this case, district courts will be able to avoid the danger of such unfair outcomes in the future by requiring defendants to approximate their costs before granting a voluntary dismissal. Should the district court neglect its responsibility, the defendant— the party with the easiest access to the relevant cost information — will have an incentive to encourage the court to fulfill it. Indeed, in the instant case, Ford could have tried to protect itself by requesting that the district court clarify its terms and conditions when that court orally announced its intention to grant the Duffys’ voluntary dismissal motion.
Finally, we note our disagreement with the dissent’s assertion that Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(d) demonstrates that the district court’s imposition of Ford’s costs and attorney fees on the Duffys was permissible. As a preliminary matter, we do not believe that Rule 41(d), which allows district courts faced with the refiling of a previously dismissed action to “make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper” and to “stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order,” is directly applicable here. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(d). When the Duffys attempted, based on the language of Rule 41(d), to persuade the district court merely to stay the refiled case instead of dismissing it, the district court explicitly stated that it had imposed the payment condition pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), not Rule 41(d). See J.A. at 427-29 (Order Den. PL’s Mot. for Stay & Order Dismissing Compl. Without Prejudice).
Moreover, we do not believe that our holding is inconsistent with Rule 41(d). First, although, as the dissent correctly points out, most courts that have considered the question have concluded that attorney fees may be awarded under Rule 41(d), the matter is far from settled in this circuit or in most others. See, e.g., Edward X. Clinton, Does Rule 4.1(d) Authorize an Award of Attorney’s Fees?, 71 St. John’s L.Rev. 81, 82 & nn. 5-6 (1997) (noting that the federal courts are split on the issue of whether attorney fees may be awarded under Rule 41(d) and citing cases on both sides). Rule 41(d) therefore does not constitute clear authority for the district court’s actions. In addition, a number of courts have expressed reluctance to exercise their discretion to award costs under Rule 41(d) when the result would be to deprive innocent plaintiffs of their day in court due to their inability to pay the defendant’s costs. See Gregory v. Dimock, 286 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir.1961); Zucker v. Katz, 708 F.Supp. 525, 539 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 448-49 (D.Del.1978); see also [633]*633Loubier v. Modern Acoustics, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 17, 22-23 (D.Conn.1998) (noting that, although no showing of bad faith is required before costs may be imposed on the plaintiff under Rule 41(d), the plaintiffs motive in dismissing the prior action may be taken into account); see generally 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2375, at 415-16 (2d ed.1995). Indeed, Rule 41(d) is “intended to serve as a deterrent to forum shopping and vexatious litigation,” of which there was no evidence in this case. Esquivel v. Arau, 913 F.Supp. 1382, 1386 (C.D.Cal.1996) (quoting Simeone v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 971 F.2d 103, 108 (8th Cir.1992)). In any event, a district court’s application of Rule 41(d), like its imposition of terms and conditions pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), is still subject to review by the appellate court for abuse of discretion. See 8 Daniel R. Coquillette et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.70[7] (3d ed.1997). We therefore believe that our decision is in harmony with the understanding of Rule 41(d) expressed in those cases.
2. Imposing All Rulings from the Original Action on the Refiled Action
The Duffys also argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose on the refiled action the law of the case from the original action. They claim that this ruling rendered them unable to prevail in the refiled case, since the ineptness of the Duffys’ original counsel had left significant gaps in their proof.6 Furthermore, they point out that the district court’s ruling undermines the policy behind Rule 41, which is to leave the parties as if the suit had never been brought. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 915 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.1990). Ford, in response, points out that Rule 41 is also intended to protect the defendant from unfairness; in addition, Ford disputes the Duffys’ contention that the district court’s rulings left them unable to prevail in their case. Therefore, Ford urges that the district court’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Under appropriate circumstances, we believe that it would not be an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant a voluntary dismissal on the condition that all rulings from the original action carry over to the refiled action. District courts have broad discretion to attach conditions to voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2). See id. Furthermore, several courts of appeals have upheld conditions on voluntary dismissals similar to the one at issue here. See, e.g., Parker, 940 F.2d at 1025 (upholding the district court’s order that expert testimony excluded in the original action could not be reintroduced in the refiled action); Templeton v. Nedlloyd Lines, 901 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir.1990) (noting with approval the district court’s decision to condition a voluntary dismissal on the plaintiffs agreeing that they would not oppose the use of existing discovery in a subsequent suit). Thus, if necessary for the protection of Ford’s legitimate interests, see, e.g., LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603-05; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2366, at 304, the district court could validly impose the evidentiary rulings from the Duffys’ original action on their refiled action.
We are again troubled, however, by the district court’s failure to give notice to the Duffys that it intended to condition the voluntary dismissal on retaining the law of the case in the refiled action. The record reveals no discussion of that condition on January 15, 1997, when the Duffys requested and the district court orally granted a voluntary dismissal. The first mention of the law-of-the-case condition [634]*634appeared in the district court’s written order granting the voluntary dismissal, on January 24, 1997. In addition, the court did not specify the matters to be governed by the law of the case until an order entered on June 11, 1998, after the Duffys attempted to refile their suit.7 This lack of notice meant that the Duffys did not have a sufficient opportunity to contest the district court’s decision or to withdraw their motion for voluntary dismissal if they did not wish to accept that condition.8 As we stated with respect to the cost condition, we hold that the district court should have given the Duffys notice and an opportunity to withdraw their motion before imposing the law-of-the-case condition. See Marlow, 19 F.3d at 305; Lau, 792 F.2d at 930; GAF Corp., 665 F.2d at 368.
We also note that the district court did not explain its reasons for deciding to apply its rulings from the original action to the refiled action. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to determine whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in attaching this condition to the Duffys’ voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., DWG Corp., 962 F.2d at 1202 (citing Taragan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 838 F.2d 1337, 1339 (D.C.Cir.1988)); LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 605. Ford contends that no additional discovery is necessary for the Duffys to prevail and that there is no legal or factual reason why the district court would be inclined to rule differently on the eviden-tiary issues if the Duffys were given an opportunity to re-visit them. At the same time, the Duffys contend that the district court’s condition prevents them from prevailing in their suit and is not necessary for the protection of the defendant. We believe that the district court is in the better position to determine initially whether there is a basis for reconsidering its evidentiary rulings, whether the Duffys are still capable of prevailing in light of those rulings, and whether retaining the law of the case in the refiled action is necessary for the protection of Ford’s interests.
We therefore find it necessary to vacate the district court’s order applying the law of the original case to the refiled case and direct the district court on remand to reconsider its decision in light of any objections that the Duffys may wish to make. We note, however, that if the district court’s rulings from the original action no longer apply in the refiled action, Ford may be entitled to reimbursement for any additional costs and fees that it will have to expend in the refiled litigation as a result of having to relitigate those rulings, consistent with our discussion in Part II. B.l.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s August 3,1998, dismissal order and its orders of June 11, 1998, and June 19, 1998, requiring the Duffys to pay Ford’s costs and imposing the law of the cáse on the refiled action, and we REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.