Stephen B.E. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, M.D. North Carolina
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00591
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STEPHEN B.E., ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) 1:25CV591 ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Commissioner of Social ) Security, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Stephen B.E. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY (“Stephen”), brought this action to obtain review of a final decision of the Stephen filed an application for Commissioner of Social Security disability insurance benefits and a denying his claim for social security period of disability in February of disability insurance benefits and a 2014, alleging a disability onset date period of disability.1 The Court has of November 1, 2006. (Tr. 145-46.) considered the certified The applications were denied initially administrative record, Stephen’s and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 78-81, motion for summary judgment, and 84-87.) After a hearing, ALJ Bowling the briefing from both parties. determined on May 3, 2017 that Because substantial evidence Stephen was not disabled under the supports the determination of the Act. (Tr. 13-61.) The Appeals Council Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), denied a request for review. (Tr. 1-6.) the Court will deny Stephen’s request This Court then remanded the action for remand or the award of benefits, for further proceedings. (Tr. 896-97.) as set forth below. A new hearing was held with a different ALJ (“ALJ Stefanelli”) who also concluded that Stephen was not disabled under the Act, and the

1 Transcript citations refer to the Reference, this matter was referred to the Administrative Transcript of Record filed Undersigned to conduct all proceedings manually with the Commissioner’s in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of 636(c). Docket Entry 14. Appeals Council again denied a conflicting evidence, make credibility request for review. (Tr. 821-73.) determinations, or substitute its Stepehen challenged the new decision judgment for that of the in this Court, which granted the Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 Commissioner’s uncontested motion F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put to remand on April 27, 2022. (Tr. simply: the issue before the Court is 1264-65.) ALJ Stefanelli held a new not whether Stephen is disabled but hearing on December 5, 2023 (Tr. whether the finding that he is not 1204-35) and issued a new decision disabled is supported by substantial on January 17, 2024 (Tr. 1187-95), evidence and based upon a correct again concluding that Stephen was application of the relevant law. Id. not disabled under the Act. The Appeals Council denied a request for III. THE ALJ’S DECISION review on May 7, 2025, making ALJ Stefanelli’s 2024 decision the final The ALJ followed the correct process, decision for purposes of review. (Tr. set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to 1168-74.) Therefore, unless otherwise determine disability. See Albright v. noted, the Court at all times is Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d addressing ALJ Stefanelli’s 2024 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). decision. “The Commissioner uses a five-step II. STANDARD OF REVIEW process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 United States Code “authorizes C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4), judicial review of the Social Security 404.1520(a)(4)). Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits,” see Hines v. Under this process, the Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. Commissioner asks, in 2006), the scope of that review is sequence, whether the specific and narrow, see Smith v. claimant: (1) worked during the Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th alleged period of disability; (2) Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is had a severe impairment; (3) limited to determining if there is had an impairment that met or substantial evidence in the record to equaled the requirements of a support the Commissioner’s decision. listed impairment; (4) could 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. return to her [or his] past Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. relevant work; and (5) if not, 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d could perform any other work 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In in the national economy. reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh 2 Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the onset date of November 1, 2006 claimant at any of several points in through his date last insured of this five-step sequence forecloses a September 30, 2010. (Tr. 1189.) The disability designation and ends the ALJ next found the following severe2 inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the impairments at step two: intercostal fourth step, the burden of production neuralgia and thoracic radiculitis; and and proof is on the claimant. If the post-cholecystectomy pain claimant reaches step five, the burden syndrome.3 (Tr. 1190.) At step three, shifts to the Secretary to produce the ALJ found that Stephen did not evidence that other jobs exist in the have an impairment or combination national economy that the claimant of impairments listed in, or medically can perform considering his age, equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr. education, and work experience.” 1191.) Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted). The ALJ next set forth Stephen’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) The ALJ determined at step one that and determined that he could perform Stephen had not engaged in a reduced range of light work except substantial gainful activity during the he should “never [be] required to relevant period, from his alleged climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds

2 ALJ Stefanelli noted that ALJ Bowling’s symptom. (Tr. 1190, 294.) He has had no 2017 decision found Stephen had severe sedation from medications. (Tr. 1190, migraines with resulting concentration 304.) He has also indicated that his pain limitations. (Tr. 1190; see Tr. 15-16.) But is much improved with medications. (Tr. ALJ Stefanelli found Stephen’s migraines 1190, 303.) did not meet the durational requirement of at least 12 months and that he did not 3 “‘Intercostal Neuralgia’ is ‘pain in the have concentration, persistence, or pace chest wall due to neuralgia of one or more problems. (Tr. 1190.) Stephen does not of the intercostal nerves.’ ‘Neuralgia’ is challenge that specific finding. See ‘[p]ain of a severe, throbbing, or stabbing Grayson v. Co. v. Agadir Int’ l LLC, 856 character in the course or distribution of F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (a party a nerve.’ ‘Intercostal’ is defined as waives an argument by failing to present ‘[b]etween the ribs.’” Ramon M. v. it in his opening brief). However, even if Berryhill, No. CV CBD-18-2025, 2019 Stephen did challenge this finding, it WL 2436938, at *6 n.4 (D. Md. June 10, would fail. As ALJ Stefanelli pointed out 2019) (citing and quoting Stedmans in her 2024 decision, Stephen has not Medical Dictionary, available on reported concentration symptoms to Westlaw at §§ 599340, 599220, and medical providers and he is generally 450160.). A “cholecystectomy” involves noted as alert, oriented, and as having the surgical removal of the gall bladder. normal concentration. (Tr. 1190, 313, See Stedmans, § 169870. “Radiculitis” is 325, 270, 263, 251.) In April 2009, he did a disorder of the spinal nerve roots. Id., § not indicated inability to concentrate as a 748650. 3 necessary to perform work duties; limitation” that assesses the should have no concentrated claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, exposure to hazards, such as heights light, medium, heavy, or very heavy or dangerous equipment; and would work,” as well as “nonexertional be able to change position every 2 limitations (mental, sensory, or skin hours.” (Tr. 1191.) At the fourth step, impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658 the ALJ determined that Stephen was F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). unable to perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 1193.) Last, at step five, the “Social Security Ruling 96-8p ALJ concluded that there were other explains that the RFC assessment jobs in the national economy that must include a narrative discussion Stephen could perform. (Tr. 1194.) describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific IV. DISCUSSION medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence In his appeal, Stephen asserts only (e.g., daily activities, observations).” that “[t]he ALJ failed to properly Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 evaluate [his] complaints of pain.” (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations Docket Entry 12 at 11. The record omitted). An ALJ need not discuss demonstrates otherwise, as set forth every piece of evidence in making an below. RFC determination. See Reid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, A. The RFC Determination. 865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ “must build an accurate and logical The RFC measures the most a bridge from the evidence to [the] claimant can do in a work setting conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner, despite the physical and mental 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017). limitations of his or her impairments “The RFC assessment must first and any related symptoms (e.g., pain). identify the individual’s functional See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see limitations or restrictions and assess also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x his or her work-related abilities on a 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015) function-by-function basis . . . . Only (unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a] [then] may RFC be expressed in terms medical assessment of what an of the exertional levels of work, individual can do in a work setting in sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and spite of the functional limitations and very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL environmental restrictions imposed 374184, at *1. by all of his or her medically determinable impairment(s)”) The Fourth Circuit has held that (internal citation omitted); Hines, “meaningful review is frustrated when 453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes an ALJ goes straight from listing both a “physical exertional or strength evidence to stating a conclusion.” 4 Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, statements about pain, to determine 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id. proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need components: (1) evidence, (2) logical not credit them if they conflict with explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As the objective medical evidence or if noted earlier, the ALJ “must both the underlying impairment could not identify evidence that supports his reasonably be expected to cause the conclusion and ‘build an accurate and symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ logical bridge from [that] evidence to has considered the relevant factors, his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) heard the claimant’s testimony and (alteration in original) (quoting observed his or her demeanor, the Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to Court will defer to the ALJ’s do so constitutes reversible error. See determination regarding those Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 subjective complaints. Shively v. (4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. “analysis is incomplete and precludes 1984). meaningful review,” remand is appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191. Those relevant factors include:

Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the (i) [Plaintiff’s] daily credibility of a claimant’s subjective activities; statements about his condition as part of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v. (ii) The location, duration, Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th frequency, and intensity Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two- of [Plaintiff’s] pain or part test: “First, there must be other symptoms; objective medical evidence showing ‘the existence of a medical (iii) Precipitating and impairment(s) which results from aggravating factors; anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and (iv) The type, dosage, which could reasonably be expected to effectiveness, and side produce the pain or other symptoms effects of any medication alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing [Plaintiff] take[s] or 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), [has] taken to alleviate 404.1529(b)). his pain or other symptoms; If such an impairment exists, the ALJ must then consider, as the second (v) Treatment, other than prong of the test, all available medication, [Plaintiff] evidence, including the claimant’s receive[s] or [has] 5 received for relief of his symptoms . . . .” (Tr. 1192.) Next, the pain or other symptoms; ALJ performed step two of the analysis, concluding that Stephen’s (vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] “statements concerning the intensity, use[s] or [has] used to persistence and limiting effects of relieve his pain or other these symptoms are not entirely symptoms (e.g., lying flat consistent with the medical evidence on [his] back, standing and other evidence in the record for for 15 to 20 minutes the reasons explained in this every hour, sleeping on a decision.” (Tr. 1192.) board, etc.); and The ALJ then gave good reasons for (vii) Other factors concerning partially discounting Stephen’s [Plaintiff’s] functional subjective allegations. First, the ALJ limitations and pointed out that though Stephen at restrictions due to pain times reported pain at medical or other symptoms. appointments and also demonstrated tenderness over his ribs (Tr. 1192, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). 248-49, 270), see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(ii) (ALJ considers Here, the ALJ completed the two- location, duration, frequency, and step Craig analysis. As a preliminary intensity of claimant’s pain in matter, the ALJ summarized evaluating subjective allegations), he Stephen’s subjective complaints. (Tr. otherwise demonstrated mostly 1192.) Specifically, Stephen alleged normal findings of no edema; no that he was disabled because of erythema; no allodynia; no “difficulties sitting, standing, and hyperalgesia; normal strength; walking for long periods during the normal tone; a healthy, well- relevant period. He indicated that he nourished, well developed could lift up to 20 pounds at one time, appearance; intact sensation; normal sit for up to 2 hours, and stand for 2 movement of all extremities; no acute hours at a time. The claimant asserted distress; normal reflexes; and normal that he did not begin going to a pain gait, (Tr. 1192, 1193, 249, 270, 299- clinic until 2008. The claimant 300, 365, 368, 812), see 20 C.F.R. § testified that he had difficulty 404.1529(c)(4) (ALJ considers concentrating.” (Tr. 1192, citation inconsistencies in evidence and the omitted.) extent to which there are conflicts between claimant’s statements and The ALJ then concluded that rest of the evidence in evaluating Stephen’s “medically determinable subjective complaints). Beyond this, impairments could reasonably be repeated examinations during the expected to cause the alleged relevant period showed normal 6 movement of extremities, motor Stephen said steroid injections had strength, muscle bulk and tone, helped his pain “to a certain degree” and/or normal gait. (Tr. 363, 365, with his most recent one giving him 367- 68, 370, 372-73.) three weeks of relief. (Tr. 812.) Stephen also said that Lyrica had been Stephen asserts that this evidence and “very helpful,” Tramadol gave him claims of normal findings have adequate pain relief, and “pain “nothing to do with intercostal medication allows him to function.” neuralgia.” Docket Entry 12 at 16. (Tr. 812.) See 20 C.F.R. § However, normal movement and 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ considers walking are inconsistent with alleged kind of treatment and its effectiveness debilitating pain. Notably, Stephen in assessing allegations). reported that movement, positioning, walking, bending, sitting, and Stephen takes issue with the ALJ standing aggravated his intercostal describing this treatment as neuralgia pain. (Tr. 299, 345, 348, conservative, Docket Entry 12 at 16- 352, 354.) Therefore, contrary to his 17, but in Scharbrough v. Comm’r, argument, Stephen’s ability to move Soc. Sec., No. 23-1830, 2024 WL normally was relevant evidence. 4371618, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 2024), Moreover, the ALJ was required to the Fourth Circuit rejected the very consider objective evidence in same argument. Id. (“[T]he ALJ did evaluating his alleged symptoms. 20 not err by labelling his treatment as C.F.R § 404.1529(c)(2); Craig, 76 conservative.”). See also 20 C.F.R § F.3d at 594. 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ considers medication and other treatment used Second, the ALJ considered Stephen’s to relieve pain/other symptoms in conservative treatment history of evaluating subjective symptoms). steroid injections and pain Accordingly, the ALJ acted medication. (Tr. 1192, 249, 256, 270, reasonably in considering Stephen’s 273, 286, 300, 377.) The ALJ also conservative treatment in finding that pointed out that in 2008, 2009, and the degree of his alleged symptoms 2010, Stephen reported that was not entirely consistent with the medication helped his pain. (Tr. 1192, evidence. (Tr. 1192.) 249, 267, 286, 303, 812.) In February 2009, Stephen said that Lyrica and It was also reasonable for the ALJ to Tramadol had been “very helpful,” consider Stephen’s reported and he was able to partake in “normal improvement at medical activities as well as work because of appointments. (Tr. 1192). Stephen’s the medication.” (Tr. 1192, 286.) reporting that treatment alleviated his Stephen also reported that his pain undermines his extreme medication did not cause any side testimony. For example, Stephen effects. (Tr. 286.) In September 2009, testified that pain affected his ability 7 to concentrate when it was above six work because of medication. (Tr. (Tr. 1220-21), but he told his treating 1192; 286 (2/6/09 (“[H]e is able to doctor that his pain was “4 out of 10” partake in his normal activities as well and Lyrica brought it “down to 1 to 2 as work because of the medication.”); out of 10.” (Tr. 248; see also Tr. 263, 279 (11/14/08 (“able to perform his 286.) Stephen argues that it was activities of daily living”).) The ALJ wrong for the ALJ to consider his also noted that in July 2010, Stephen treatment regimen of injections and reported that he was working full pain medication as conservative time. (Tr. 1192; see Tr. 364, 306; 383.) because intercostal neuralgia is And he estimated 75-85% pain relief difficult to treat and those were his with his current medications. (Tr. only treatment options. Docket Entry 364.) 12 16. But he admitted this conservative approach was effective at Evidence of work during the relevant relieving his symptoms. That is, period is a legitimate factor the ALJ doctors chose to treat his condition may consider when determining the this way, and it worked. Stephen thus consistency of a claimant’s subjective asks this Court to reweigh the claims of disability. See Sigmon v. evidence and find in his favor. Califano, 617 F.2d 41, 42-43 (4th Cir. However, an effective and 1980) (“The general rule is one amply conservative treatment regimen is supported by common sense: the probative evidence that the ALJ must [ALJ] can consider work done by the consider. See 20 C.F.R. claimant after the alleged onset of §404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (ALJ disability as tending to show that the considers kind of treatment and its claimant was not then disabled.”). effectiveness in evaluating subjective Stephen’s reporting at appointments allegations); Gross v. Heckler, 785 that he could perform normal F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (“If a activities and worked is inconsistent symptom can be reasonably with his testimony alleging complete controlled by medication or disability. See 20 C.F.R. § treatment, it is not disabling”). 404.1529(c)(4) (ALJ considers inconsistencies in evidence and extent Third, the ALJ also appropriately to which there are conflicts between considered Stephen’s daily activities claimant’s statements and rest of the in evaluating his alleged symptoms. evidence in evaluating subjective (Tr. 1192.) See 20 C.F.R. § complaints). Based on the foregoing, 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (ALJ considers substantial evidence supports the claimant’s activities in evaluating ALJ’s finding that the degree of subjective allegations). She Stephen’s alleged symptoms was not considered that in February 2009, entirely consistent with the evidence. Stephen reported being able to (Tr. 1192.) partake in normal activities, as well as Fourth, this is not a case where an ALJ 8 disregarded all of a claimant’s consider other evidence in the record, allegations. Instead, the ALJ only “his opinion indicate[d] that the lack partially disregarded Stephen’s of objective medical evidence was his allegations and accounted for his chief, if not definitive, reason for complaints of pain and difficulty with discounting” the plaintiff’s restrictions relating to movement, complaints. Id. at 97. This error was positioning, sitting, standing, and “particularly pronounced” as the walking for long periods by assessing claim involved fibromyalgia—a an RFC for light level work with disease “that does not produce” postural and environmental objective medical evidence, and thus limitations and the ability to change “normal clinical and laboratory positions every two hours. (Tr. 1191- results simply have no relevance to 92, 299, 345, 348, 352, 354, 1215-17, the severity, persistence, or limiting 1220.) And the ALJ further found that effects . . . of the disease.” Id. Stephen could perform the requirements of a range of sedentary Given the nature of the disease, the to light level jobs. (Tr. 1194.) This Fourth Circuit concluded that ALJs tracks with Stephen’s testimony that “may not rely on objective medical he could lift up to 20 pounds and evidence (or the lack thereof)—even sit/stand each for two hours at one as just one of multiple factors—to time. (Tr. 1215-17.) The ALJ was discount a claimant’s subjective required to account for the limitations complaints regarding symptoms of supported by the evidence, not every fibromyalgia or some other disease limitation Stephen alleged. See 20 that does not produce such evidence.” C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). In light of all Id.; see also Shelly C. v. Comm’r of this, the subjective complaints Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 361 analysis is legally correct, well (4th Cir. 2023) (finding depression to supported, and susceptible to judicial be one of those other diseases). As to review. diseases that do produce such objective evidence, the Fourth Circuit Stephen’s reliance on Arakas v. held that ALJs are still prohibited Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d from disregarding a claimant’s 83, 95-97 (4th Cir. 2020) is subjective complaints “solely” misplaced. Docket Entry 12 at 12-13. because they are not substantiated by In that case, the United States Court objective medical evidence. Arakas, of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 983 F.3d at 95 (emphasis added). reversed an ALJ’s decision because he “effectively requir[ed]” that the Here, to the extent Stephen contends claimant provide objective medical that Arakas prohibits the discussion evidence to support her subjective of objective medical evidence at all complaints. See 983 F.3d 83, 96 (4th when it comes to intercostal Cir. 2020). While the ALJ did neuralgia, he is mistaken. While an 9 ALJ should not discount a claimant’s And here, unlike with fibromyalgia, subjective complaints related to normal movement and gait were fibromyalgia based on objective probative of Stephen not being in medical evidence (or a lack thereof), debilitating pain. Consequently, the Arakas itself indicates that an ALJ ALJ here did not run afoul of Arakas. can “substantiat[e] the claimant’s Finally, even assuming arguendo that impairment” with that evidence. the ALJ erred in considering objective Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97-98 (“Objective medical evidence to assess Stephen’s indicators such as normal clinical and subjective symptoms, there is no laboratory results simply have no evidence that Stephen was prejudiced relevance to the severity, persistence, as a result. See, e.g., Howard v. or limiting effects of a claimant’s Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-CV- fibromyalgia, based on the current 00127-FDW, 2023 WL 4111395, at *7 medical understanding of the disease. n.5 (W.D.N.C. June 21, 2023) (“The If considered at all, such evidence— ALJ mentioned objective imaging along with consistent trigger-point findings in her discussion of evidence findings—should be treated as of the record; however, in contrast to evidence substantiating the Claimant’s assertions, the ALJ did not claimant’s impairment.”). indicate in the opinion that it played a ‘chief,’ if any, role in her decision to Additionally, the Fourth Circuit discredit Claimant’s subjective remanded in Arakas on this issue complaints.”). For all of these reasons, because the ALJ’s decision the ALJ’s subjective complaints “indicate[d] that the lack of objective assessment is legally correct, medical evidence was his chief, if not supported by substantial evidence, definitive, reason for discounting and susceptible to judicial review. Arakas’s complaints.” Id. at 97. The same cannot be said here, where the Last, Stephen asserts that his “claim ALJ did not “effectively require[ ]” should be remanded again because objective evidence or offer objective not only did the ALJ apply the medical evidence as the “chief” or incorrect legal standard again when “definitive” reason to discount the evaluating [Stephen’s] pain, but she intensity of Stephen’s subjective also copied, word-for-word, the same complaints. See id. at 96. Instead, the improper reliance on objective ALJ amply demonstrated that she medical evidence that led to a consent relied upon other evidence in the remand during the preceding civil record, including Stephen’s action before this Court, and should improvement upon treatment and lead to remand once again in the activities of daily living (which present case.” See Docket Entry 12 at included working), as justification for 12. However, in her current decision, partially discounting Stephen’s ALJ Stefanelli used the correct legal related symptoms. standard, and provided sound 10 reasons supported by _ substantial evidence for partially discounting Stephen’s subjective complaints. To the extent Stephen addresses ALJ Stefanelli’s prior decision, the argument fails because it was vacated and is not the decision subject to review in this action. See Hancock v. Barnhart, 206 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763- 64 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2002) (on remand, the ALJ’s prior decision has no preclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted de novo). The decision under review now is legally correct, well supported, and susceptible to judicial review. It should be affirmed. V. CONCLUSION After careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is legally correct, supported by substantial evidence, and susceptible to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Stephen’s motion for summary judgment, Docket Entry 11, is DENIED and that the final decision of the Commissioner is upheld.

J as | McFadden Uriited States Magistrate Judge May 13, 2026 Durham, NC