PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-1819
STEPHANIE JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of A.J.; STEPHANIE JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of T.S.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:19−cv−00244−MOC−DSC)
Argued: September 23, 2021 Decided: December 20, 2021
Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson and Judge Quattlebaum joined.
ARGUED: Andrew Kiernan Cuddy, CUDDY LAW FIRM PLLC, Auburn, New York, for Appellants. Christopher Zemp Campbell, Kristopher Lee Caudle, CAMPBELL SHATLEY, PLLC, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Melissa Woods, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Stephanie Johnson is the mother of two students, A.J. and T.S., who
formerly attended a public school operated by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board
of Education (CMS, or the school district) in North Carolina. Johnson filed administrative
complaints with the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, claiming that the
school district had violated her daughters’ rights under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Johnson sought several remedies in the
administrative process, including (1) special education services, and (2) the “backward-
looking” remedy of “compensatory education” to compensate for the alleged prior
deficiencies in her daughters’ education.
After failing to obtain relief from the administrative agency, Johnson filed a civil
action in federal district court and later withdrew her daughters from the CMS system.
Observing that Johnson’s complaint did not contain a request for compensatory education,
the district court dismissed the case as moot because the children no longer were enrolled
in a school operated by CMS. Johnson appealed from the district court’s judgment.
Upon our review, we agree with the district court and hold that Johnson’s
withdrawal of the children from the CMS system rendered moot her request for prospective
relief. Moreover, because district court proceedings under the IDEA are original civil
actions, we hold that Johnson’s failure to specify in her complaint that she was seeking
compensatory education for her children, or to include allegations from which a request for
compensatory education reasonably could be inferred, precludes her present assertion of a
2 live controversy in the district court. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint as moot.
I.
The IDEA “establishes a substantive right to a ‘free appropriate public education’
[FAPE] for certain children with disabilities” in exchange for a state receiving federal funds
to provide such education. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 993
(2017). This statutory right to a FAPE ensures “meaningful access to education based on
[the student’s] individual needs,” and includes “both instruction tailored to meet a child’s
unique needs and sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from that
instruction.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748-49, 753-54 (2017) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to the substantive right to a FAPE, the
IDEA grants certain procedural rights to parents 1 of a child with a disability, including
obtaining an independent educational evaluation of their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b).
A parent may request that her child be evaluated to determine whether the student
qualifies as a “child with a disability” within the meaning of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401(3), 1414(a)(1)(B). After receiving such a request, the state or local educational
1 The IDEA defines a “parent” to include guardians as well as other persons who are “legally responsible for the child’s welfare.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23). For simplicity, we refer throughout this opinion to “parents.” 3 agency 2 typically must conduct an initial evaluation within 60 days. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A),
(C)(i), (D)(i)(1).
Once a student is deemed eligible, a team consisting of the student’s parent,
teachers, and other school officials (IEP team) convenes to develop an “individualized
education program,” or IEP, for the child. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3),
1414(b)(4), (d). The IEP ensures that eligible students receive a FAPE, and sets forth the
student’s current academic skills, her annual goals, and the “special education and related
services” 3 to which she is entitled. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748-49 (citation omitted). Failure to
identify and evaluate a child suspected of having a disability constitutes a procedural
violation of the IDEA that is actionable if the violation affected the child’s substantive
rights. T.B., Jr. v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 2018).
To challenge a school’s failure to evaluate a child or to provide a FAPE, a parent in
North Carolina may file a formal complaint with the North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings (the state agency) and receive a “due process hearing” before an
2 Under the IDEA, a “local educational agency” is “a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State . . . . ” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A). CMS qualifies as a local educational agency, and therefore is charged with fulfilling the state’s obligations under the IDEA for students in CMS’s jurisdiction. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a), 1414. 3 “Special education” is “specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” whereas “related services” are “the support services required to assist a child to benefit from that instruction.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26), (29)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Related services” might include, for example, speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological services, or physical or occupational therapy. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). 4 administrative law judge (ALJ). 20 U.S.C. § 1415; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.6(a), (f).
A parent may appeal the decision of the ALJ to a Review Officer appointed by the State
Board of Education. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.9(a). If unsuccessful in this
administrative process, the parent may file a civil action in state or federal court “with
respect to the complaint presented” under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Federal district courts are authorized to award a broad range of remedies and to
“grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate” when a school has denied a student
a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Available relief includes the discretionary remedy
of compensatory education, which is intended to remedy an “educational deficit” caused
by a school’s prior failure to provide a FAPE to a disabled student. G v. Fort Bragg
Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir. 2003). Such relief can be ordered
prospectively to compensate for a prior deficiency in the provision of services. Id. at 308-
09. Compensatory education includes provision of educational services necessary to
compensate for the education that a child should have received. 4 See D.F. v. Collingswood
Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing compensatory
education as “those educational services that a special needs student ought to have received
4 Under certain circumstances, parents may be entitled to reimbursement for out-of- pocket expenses they paid as a result of a school district’s failure to provide a FAPE. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (reimbursement for private school tuition); M.S. v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 325 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining the conditions under which reimbursement is available). Although Johnson sought reimbursement in the administrative proceedings, on appeal she does not claim that she is entitled to reimbursement as a remedy. We therefore limit our analysis to the question whether Johnson adequately pleaded a request for compensatory education in her federal complaint. 5 during the period of time that FAPE was not provided” (citation omitted)); Reid ex rel.
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that
compensatory education may include “special programs to make up for prior
deficiencies”).
II.
With this background in mind, we turn to the facts underlying the present case. The
older of Johnson’s two children, A.J., was in fifth grade during the 2017-18 school year.
A.J. previously had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and certain other
disabilities, and had received special education and related services pursuant to an IEP.
In May 2018, A.J.’s IEP team, including Johnson, convened a meeting and decided
to reduce the amount of services offered to A.J. during the following school year, a decision
with which Johnson disagreed (the May 2018 IEP). In August 2018, Johnson requested
independent educational evaluations for A.J., and, shortly thereafter, filed a “petition for a
contested case hearing” before the state agency. Among other allegations, Johnson
asserted that the district had denied A.J. a FAPE by failing to articulate appropriate speech
goals, failing to provide for adequate speech services in the May 2018 IEP, and failing to
respond to Johnson’s request for independent evaluations. Johnson also challenged the
adequacy of the education A.J. had received under earlier IEPs. As relief, Johnson sought
a new IEP for A.J., funding for an independent psychological evaluation, and “[a]ny other
remedy that the [ALJ] deem[ed] appropriate to remedy CMS’s denial” of a FAPE.
6 A few months after the administrative petition was filed, the IEP team held a new
IEP meeting for A.J., which Johnson attended. The team agreed to continue providing
special education services for A.J. and to conduct new evaluations. Johnson agreed to the
new evaluations, and a new IEP was adopted, effective November 7, 2018 (the November
2018 IEP).
The administrative proceedings continued, and the ALJ granted summary judgment
to the school district on A.J.’s petition, concluding that Johnson had not supported her
claims with sufficient evidence. The ALJ also held that the implementation of the
November 2018 IEP “altered the legal relationship between [the parties] and there is no
current legal controversy which has the capability of repeating while evading review.” The
ALJ thus held that A.J.’s claims were moot. 5 On appeal, the State Hearing Review Officer
affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Johnson’s case involving her younger daughter, T.S., followed a different course.
Despite having been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and other
conditions, T.S. has not been identified as a “child with a disability” under the IDEA.
However, during the 2017-18 school year when T.S. was in third grade, the school district
provided her with a “Section 504 plan” (the 504 plan) under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 6 The 504 plan required that T.S. be placed in “small-group settings for
5 The ALJ also held that A.J.’s claims arising before August 2017, as well as the claim requesting independent educational evaluations, were time-barred. 6 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
7 tests,” be given preferential seating assignments, and be provided with extra study
materials.
Johnson asserts that, in March 2018, she verbally requested that school officials
evaluate T.S. for eligibility for special education services. About two months later,
Johnson restated this request in writing. On the same day that the school district received
Johnson’s written request, school officials scheduled a meeting, which Johnson did not
attend. The school officials determined that T.S. was performing adequately under her 504
plan and did not require special education services. In August 2018, Johnson requested
independent educational evaluations for T.S., which the school did not provide. Less than
two weeks later, Johnson filed a petition before the state agency alleging that the district
had denied T.S. a FAPE, as mandated by the IDEA. Among other remedies, Johnson
sought “[c]ompensatory education,” including individual instruction in certain subjects.
As in A.J.’s case, school officials convened a meeting for T.S. in November 2018,
which Johnson attended. The officials determined that T.S. should be formally evaluated
to determine her eligibility for special education services. Nearly a month later, Johnson
returned the necessary form consenting to the evaluations, but she failed to provide certain
other documentation required to conduct an evaluation of T.S.
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . ” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Act requires that public schools provide reasonable accommodations to students with disabilities, but does not establish the right to “individually tailored educational services” as mandated by the IDEA. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749-50, 756. The Rehabilitation Act also contains its own definition of “disability,” which is broader than that used in the IDEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9), (20); CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2014). 8 In the administrative proceedings, the ALJ granted the school district’s motion for
summary judgment on the claims related to T.S. The ALJ concluded that Johnson had not
proffered sufficient evidence to support her claims and that, regardless, the parties had
agreed to evaluate T.S. Accordingly, as in A.J.’s case, the ALJ held that the parties had
“voluntarily altered the legal relationship between them,” that there was no remaining
controversy, and that all the claims were moot. The State Hearing Review Officer affirmed
the decision of the ALJ in part, but reversed and remanded the case to the ALJ to consider
whether the school district erroneously had failed to identify T.S. as a child with a disability
and had failed to create an appropriate IEP.
Johnson later filed separate federal complaints in the district court regarding each
child, which complaints the court consolidated. 7 Johnson alleged under the IDEA that the
school district had denied both children a FAPE. With respect to A.J., Johnson primarily
challenged the adequacy of the May 2018 IEP and earlier IEPs, particularly the provisions
of the May 2018 IEP relating to speech services and the school district’s failure to comply
with her request for independent educational evaluations. Regarding T.S., Johnson
similarly raised a challenge about the need for independent educational evaluations. In
both complaints, Johnson sought to “annul” the administrative decisions, to obtain a
remand to the ALJ for an evidentiary hearing, and to receive other “just and proper” relief.
7 Although Johnson filed separate complaints in the district court for A.J. and T.S., we refer to the two documents in the singular, as both complaints sought the same relief from the district court. 9 While the district court proceedings were pending, Johnson withdrew both children
from the school district and enrolled them in a public school in a different North Carolina
school district. CMS thereafter filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, which the district court granted. The court reasoned that because Johnson had
not sought compensatory relief from CMS, the children’s enrollment in a different school
district rendered moot their claims against CMS.
III.
On appeal, Johnson contends that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint
as moot. She argues that although her children no longer are enrolled in the CMS system,
she still is entitled to relief in the form of compensatory education based on CMS’s
previous failure to provide the children their substantive right to a FAPE. Johnson
concedes that she did not explicitly request compensatory education in her federal
complaint, but nevertheless asserts that she preserved her right to seek compensatory
education by seeking a remand to the state agency. In Johnson’s view, her request for
compensatory education before the agency, but not in the district court, was sufficient to
establish federal subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. We disagree with
Johnson’s position.
A.
“The doctrine of mootness constitutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal
court jurisdiction, which extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Porter v. Clarke,
852 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration
10 omitted). Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions and from deciding
issues that will not affect the rights of the parties to the case. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S.
165, 172 (2013). Thus, federal courts lack jurisdiction when “the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Leaders of a
Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330, 336 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citation
omitted). If a change in the law or facts “makes it impossible for a court to grant effective
relief to a prevailing party,” the case is moot and must be dismissed. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Airgas, Inc., 885 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2018).
As an initial matter, we observe that Johnson does not dispute that her request for
prospective relief from CMS is moot. When a plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive
relief, a case is moot “once the threat of the act sought to be enjoined dissipates.” Brown
v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Me. Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 321 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) (“In a suit seeking
only injunctive relief, . . . once the act sought to be enjoined occurs, the suit must be
dismissed as moot.”). Here, the district court could not order CMS to provide A.J. or T.S.
with future evaluations or services, because the students no longer attend CMS schools.
Any order granting relief for future evaluations or services would have to be directed to
the children’s current school district, which is not a defendant in this case. We therefore
agree with the district court’s conclusion that all Johnson’s claims for prospective relief
against CMS are moot.
We next consider whether a claim for compensatory education is rendered moot
because a student has left the defendant school district. As stated above, compensatory
11 education is an equitable remedy addressing a school district’s past failure to provide a
FAPE that encompasses a broad array of potential remedies. See G, 343 F.3d at 308;
Brown, 442 F.3d at 596-98; Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. E.M.D.H., 960 F.3d 1073, 1085
(8th Cir. 2020). A claim for compensatory education “begins to accrue when [the
student’s] IEP is so inappropriate that the child is receiving no real educational benefit.”
Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 321 F.3d at 18.
Based on the “backward-looking” character of compensatory education, we agree
with several of our sister circuits, which have held that a claim for compensatory education
is not rendered moot simply because the student has left the defendant school district. 8
Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 908 F.3d 162, 171-72 (6th Cir. 2018); D.F., 694 F.3d at 498;
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., 258 F.3d 769, 774-75 (8th Cir. 2001); cf. Garcia v. Bd.
of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 520 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
“even if a student is ineligible going forward under IDEA, seeking backward-looking relief
to make up for past deprivations” renders a claim live); Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 321
F.3d at 18 (“The presence of an actionable claim for compensatory education will insulate
an IDEA case against a mootness challenge even after the child’s eligibility for special
education services ends.”); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 890
(9th Cir. 1995) (same). We agree with this view, which holds a school district accountable
when its school’s failure to comply with the IDEA has caused a student to withdraw from
that school and to enroll in another school district.
In an unpublished opinion, Z.G. v. Pamlico Cnty. Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 744 F. 8
App’x 769, 778 n.15 (4th Cir. 2018), a panel of this Court reached the same conclusion. 12 No parent should be compelled to keep her child in a school that continually has
violated the child’s IDEA rights in order to safeguard a future claim for compensatory
education. Cf. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 (authorizing tuition reimbursement, because a
contrary rule would force parents to acquiesce to an inappropriate public placement or
forgo reimbursement). Such a result plainly would be at odds with the IDEA’s purpose of
providing equal educational opportunities to students with disabilities. Id. We thus agree
with the Third Circuit’s reasoning that “a school district no longer responsible for educating
a child must still be held responsible for its past transgressions,” to avoid “creat[ing] an
enormous loophole” in the IDEA and weakening the law’s protections. D.F., 694 F.3d at
497-98. For these reasons, we hold that a claim for compensatory education is not rendered
moot simply because a student has departed from the defendant school district.
B.
We are left with the question, however, whether Johnson’s federal complaint was
sufficiently broad to include a request for compensatory education. Initially, we observe
that Johnson did not specifically seek any form of compensatory education in her federal
complaint. Johnson argues, however, that her complaint is not rendered moot by the
absence of such a request. Instead, she maintains that her claim for compensatory
education in the state administrative proceedings, combined with her request in her federal
complaint that her case be remanded to the state agency, are sufficient to preserve a live
controversy in the district court. We disagree.
Our conclusion is compelled by fundamental principles regarding the nature of
IDEA actions and federal pleading requirements. The major flaw in Johnson’s position is
13 her reliance on a request made solely in the state administrative proceedings 9 to establish
subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. An action filed in federal district court under
the IDEA, however, is an original civil action, not an appeal from a state administrative
agency. Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 382, 387 (4th Cir. 2000);
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). District courts “conduct a modified de novo review,
giving due weight to the underlying administrative proceedings,” but are empowered to
receive and consider evidence outside the administrative record. R.F. v. Cecil Cnty. Pub.
Schs., 919 F.3d 237, 244 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). As we explained in our decision in Kirkpatrick,
a district court does not simply affirm, reverse, or vacate the decision of the state administrative agency. Instead, it offers its own independent de novo review and conclusion. If the district court fashions a different remedy, that remedy is imposed by the district court itself as an enforceable order.
216 F.3d at 384.
Federal pleading standards are applicable to claims filed under the IDEA in federal
court. The plaintiff is the “master of [her] complaint and determines [which] claims to
bring.” Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 728 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation,
internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Thus, in the present case, it was
Johnson’s choice as plaintiff whether to seek compensatory education as a remedy in
9 The parties dispute whether Johnson properly requested compensatory education for A.J. in the administrative proceedings. However, we need not resolve this dispute, because we conclude that Johnson abandoned any claim for compensatory education in the district court by failing to raise it in her federal complaint. 14 federal court, and whether to abandon any claims made before the state agency that she no
longer wished to pursue. See Brown, 442 F.3d at 598.
Johnson was obligated to alert the district court to the relief she was seeking that
could be awarded under the IDEA. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, a plaintiff’s
failure to request compensatory education in her federal complaint “deprive[s] the district
court of an opportunity to exercise [its] discretion” to order such relief. Id. We will not
require a district court to intuit what relief a plaintiff seeks, particularly when, as here, the
plaintiff has been represented by counsel throughout the administrative and district court
proceedings. 10 We therefore hold that a plaintiff ordinarily must include in her federal
complaint a request for compensatory education to avoid dismissal for mootness when the
student no longer is enrolled in the defendant school system. See id.; Moseley v. Bd. of
Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 483 F.3d 689, 694 (10th Cir. 2007); cf. Lillbask ex rel.
Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (IDEA case
was moot when federal complaint was “bereft of any prayer for compensatory education
relief” and “fail[ed] to make any mention whatsoever of [the student’s] need for
compensatory education”); Lauren C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 363, 373
n.7 (5th Cir. 2018) (claims for denial of FAPE and identification obligations moot when
plaintiff sought compensatory education before the agency but “did not renew those
requests in her federal lawsuit”).
10 We also note that Johnson never sought to amend her federal complaint to add a claim for compensatory education. 15 Although we are sympathetic to Johnson’s desire to obtain a quality education for
her children, we cannot read into her complaint a remedy that she never sought from the
district court. While Johnson claimed that A.J. was “unable to make appropriate progress”
in the prior school year, and that T.S. was “not achieving on grade level in English and
Math,” we cannot infer from these and other similarly general statements that Johnson was
asking the district court to award the “exceptional” relief of compensatory education, rather
than the provision of a FAPE as guaranteed by the IDEA. See Brown, 442 F.3d at 597-98
(explaining that compensatory education is an “exceptional” remedy within the “range of
equitable remedies” that the district court may order (citations omitted)); see also Reid, 401
F.3d at 523 (remedies available under the IDEA include “prospective correction of a
deficient IEP”). Instead, “[t]he tenor of the entire complaint” is for prospective relief.
Moseley, 483 F.3d at 694. Accordingly, based on our review of the facts alleged by
Johnson, we hold that a request for compensatory education “cannot be inferred from the
language of [her] complaint.” Brown, 442 F.3d at 598.
Our conclusion is not altered by Johnson’s contention that she preserved her claim
for compensatory education by requesting in her federal complaint a remand to the state
agency. In rejecting this position, we return to the federalism principles underlying our
decision in Kirkpatrick. There, we reiterated the long-established rule that lower federal
courts “cannot directly supervise and supplant state administrative action.” 216 F.3d at
387.
The limited, original jurisdiction of federal district courts in IDEA cases does not
extend to appellate review of state administrative IDEA complaints. See id. at 386
16 (explaining that our system of federalism does not permit “cross-system appeals from state
courts to federal courts”). As discussed above, district courts cannot “affirm, reverse, or
vacate the decision of the state administrative agency.” Id. at 384. And, while we did not
explicitly address the issue of remand in Kirkpatrick, we cited approvingly the Third
Circuit’s observation that “[r]ather than affirming, reversing or remanding an agency
decision, [district] courts are required to decide upon an educational placement which
conforms to their understanding of the aims and terms of the [IDEA].” Id. at 387 (quoting
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 451 (3d Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added).
We agree with the Third Circuit in this regard and hold that, based on the principles
expressed in Kirkpatrick, district courts cannot “remand” an IDEA case to a state agency. 11
We therefore return to the question presented in this case, namely, whether a state
administrative agency’s ability to order compensatory education, based on a claim made
exclusively to the state agency, can establish a live controversy in federal court. The
answer to this question is no. The existence of a live controversy in the federal forum is
predicated on the contents of the federal complaint, not on previous requests made
11 Following our decision in Kirkpatrick, we occasionally have directed district courts to remand an IDEA case to a state agency. See, e.g., JH v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 326 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2003); J.P. v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., Va., 516 F.3d 254, 262 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). In those cases, however, we were not presented with the question before us here, namely, whether our decision in Kirkpatrick permits us to order such a remand. Moreover, our decision in Kirkpatrick governs our present analysis because Kirkpatrick is our earlier-decided precedent. McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004).
17 exclusively to the state agency over which lower federal courts do not exercise appellate
jurisdiction. 12
IV.
For these reasons, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claims are moot. 13 We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED
12 We similarly reject Johnson’s suggestion at oral argument that remand is the only proper remedy because the ALJ erred in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Again, this argument treats the district court’s jurisdiction as appellate in nature. And, as discussed above, the district court was empowered to receive additional evidence at the request of either party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (C). 13 Because we hold that the students’ withdrawal from CMS rendered moot their claims for prospective relief, we do not address the district court’s alternative conclusion that the parties voluntarily altered their legal relationship in November 2018 by adopting a new IEP for A.J. and by agreeing to evaluations for T.S. 18