PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Marc Yoskowitz, arranged to have his automobile stolen so that he could collect insurance. On March 28, 1985, defendant pleaded guilty in Municipal Court, Livingston, Essex County, to the disorderly-persons offense of filing a false police report. Seven months later the Prosecutor of Union County charged defendant with third-degree arson and third-degree attempted theft by deception. The issue in this appeal is whether a subsequent indictment charging arson and attempted [683]*683theft by deception is barred by double jeopardy, the mandatory joinder rule, or fundamental fairness.
I
' In January 1985, the defendant, then eighteen years old, was having financial trouble and his car was experiencing mechanical difficulties. To get money, defendant devised a plan to defraud his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, by having his 1980 Pontiac Trans Am stolen and then claiming insurance for the loss. In furtherance of the scheme, defendant claims to have met a man named “Andy” at an unnamed bar1 on or about January 17, 1985, and to have paid Andy $100 to “get rid of [his] car.” Defendant described the car to Andy and gave him its license plate number and an extra set of keys. He told Andy he would park the car near the Burger King at the Livingston Mall at about 1:00 p.m. on January 22, 1985.
On that day, defendant drove his car to the Livingston Mall, parked it near the Burger King, locked it, and went shopping. When he returned to the parking lot, his car was missing. Defendant immediately contacted Mall security officers, who assisted him in the futile search for his car. The Livingston Police Department then was called, and defendant reported that his car had been stolen from the mall. The next day he reported the loss to his insurance agent and to Allstate. Although he was aware that the car was a 1980 model, defendant falsely represented to the police and his insurance company that it was a 1982 vehicle. His title papers erroneously indicated that the car was a 1982 model.
Eight days later, on January 30, 1985, at approximately 3:30 a.m., a fire was reported in a deserted area on Village Road in [684]*684Union.2 On arriving at the scene, firefighters found a burning automobile later identified as defendant’s. The car exploded shortly after their arrival, but the fire was soon extinguished. No one was injured by the blaze. A search of the immediate area at the time of the fire yielded a piece of cloth and a sports jacket, each of which smelled of gasoline. The owner of the jacket was never discovered.
The vehicle was examined by fire inspectors from the Union County Bureau of Fire Prevention and an investigator from the Union County Arson Unit. The investigators concluded that the car had been stripped of valuable accessories and, with gasoline as the probable accelerant, set ablaze from within. That same day, Detective Stan Mazur of the Township of Union Police Department was informed that the matter had been referred to the Union County Arson Unit for further investigation. A February 1, 1985, Union County Prosecutor’s Office (Arson Unit) intra-office report described the burned vehicle as having “been stolen at the Livingston Mall some months ago____ [T]he Livingston Police Department is doing a followup investigation on the stolen car aspect along with the Union Police Department.”
On February 6, 1985, defendant called Detective Mazur and learned that his car had been recovered and towed to a local auto-repair shop. Five days later, on February 11,1985, Detective Stehlgens informed Allstate that the car had been found completely burned and that arson was suspected. On February 15,1988, defendant filed with Allstate an “Affidavit of Automobile Total Theft.”
Detective Stehlgens of the Livingston Police Department and Detective Mazur of the Union Police Department investigated the theft of the vehicle. On March 5, 1985, Detective Mazur [685]*685called defendant and requested that he come to the Union Police Station for questioning. On arrival, defendant met with detectives Mazur and Stehlgens. After being informed of his constitutional rights, and after signing a waiver-of-rights form, defendant agreed to make a statement to the two municipal police officers. No county police officer was present at that meeting. Defendant admitted orally and in a signed confession that his car was not stolen but that he had paid someone he knew only as “Andy” $100 to take his car from the Livingston Mall so that he could collect on the insurance policy. Defendant said that he would try to find out Andy’s last name and tell the police. Defendant maintains that he made his written statement in reliance on assurances from the police that he would be charged only with a disorderly-persons offense and not brought into Superior Court.
On March 6, 1985, Detective Stehlgens informed Detective Mazur that he would be signing a complaint against defendant for filing a false police report. Defendant claims that “[t]he Incident Eeport of Union Police with entries 1/30/85-3/6/85 ... indicates the defendant as being the [sic] accused of the crime of arson for insurance N.J.S.A. 2C:17-l(b)(3). Thus both the Union Police and the Livingston Police Officials were aware as early as March 6,1985, of the arson and knew defendant was involved.” This claim by defendant is not supported by the incident report cited, however, because although it contains references to March 6,1985, the report was dated May 31,1985.
On the other hand, defendant refers to an entry in an Allstate diary, apparently made on March 6, 1985, that says “Eec’d call from Det Mazur [sic] of Union * * * he has stmt from insured stating he had someone burn his car for him. Still waiting for name of person who burnt [sic] car so req I did not send denial. Closed file after hearing from Det. will refer to fraud div.” The Allstate diary, in fact, indicates earlier communications between the authorities and Allstate. On February 11, 1985, Detective Stehlgens called to say insured’s car was found in Union “completely burnt — arson Union PD Det Stan Mazur is [686]*686investigating.” And on February 26, 1985, a conversation took place with “Livingston PD” in which it was communicated that the Livingston authority “will gt together w/ Union Det____”
On March 15, 1985, Detective Stehlgens filed a complaint in the Livingston Municipal Court against defendant, charging him with filing a false police report on January 22, 1985, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4(b)(l). On March 28, 1985, defendant appeared without counsel at the Livingston Municipal Court and pleaded guilty to that offense. Before defendant’s plea was accepted, the municipal court advised him of the charges against him, of his right to consult with an attorney, and of the possible penalties he faced. The following colloquy occurred between the municipal court and defendant:
COURT: Anyone promise you anything or threaten you in any way to induce you to enter this plea?
DEPENDANT: No.
COURT: Do you do so voluntarily?
DEPENDANT: Yes.
COURT: What’s this all about? Why did you report your car stolen if it wasn’t stolen?
DEPENDANT: Well someone did take it but I, I talked to some guy and I gave him some money to take the car. I just, I guess I wanted to collect on the insurance.
COURT: You were going to beat the insurance company? Is that what you did? You were going to report it stolen, have your buddy take it away and then try and collect from your insurance carrier.
DEPENDANT: Well I didn’t know the guy.
COURT: Well so it wasn’t your buddy, you had some stranger take it away.
DEPENDANT: That’s right.
COURT: How much did you pay him?
DEPENDANT: $100.00
COURT: You mean he gets the car for $100.00 and he takes it to a chop shop and gets it all broken so they can use it for parts, you make $6,000.00 and ... they raise the premiums for everyone else.
DEPENDANT: I know I was wrong and I — they dropped the claim.
The trial court sentenced defendant to one year of probation, fined him $150, and ordered him to pay court costs and a $25 penalty to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board.
On July 2, 1985, the police received information from a person named Stewart Kaiser that defendant had admitted that [687]*687he had his car burned. On August 28, 1985, defendant submitted to a polygraph examination at the Union County Prosecutor’s Office. Defendant was told in advance of the questions to be asked and signed a waiver of rights. At the examination’s conclusion, defendant was informed that his responses to the questions “Did you plan to have your car set on fire?” and “Before your car was set on fire, did you definitely know it was about to happen?” (to which he answered “No”) indicated deception on his part. It was also the examiner’s opinion from defendant’s reactions during the test that he knew that gasoline was the accelerant used in the arson. On being told these results, defendant informed the investigator he had made arrangements with Andy to get rid of the car and that when he had asked Andy how this would be accomplished, Andy had said “ ‘Probably bum it.’ ”
On October 80, 1985, a Union County indictment was filed, charging defendant with third-degree arson with the purpose of collecting insurance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C-17-lb(3), and third-degree attempted theft by deception, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4(a).
On December 30, 1985, defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of mandatory joinder, double jeopardy, and the enforcement of a plea agreement. Defendant’s motion was denied.
On January 14, 1986, defendant signed a certification in which he said that when he went to the Union Police Station to speak with Detective Mazur and Detective Stehlgens on March 5, 1985,
Detective Mazur “promised that if I told them about what happened to the car and gave them a statement, that I would be charged with a disorderly persons offense in Municipal Court * * *. They both concurred in that promise. Detective Mazur questioned me, then Detective Stehlgens took a written statement from me. He told me he would be filing a complaint against me in Livingston Municipal Court. The officers told me that if I made the statement the whole thing would be “over.”
[688]*6884. On March 15, 1985, I was charged with filing false police reports * * * I pleaded guilty * * * and I was sentenced. I believed and expected that the entire matter had been disposed of.
On January 31, 1986, defendant’s application for PTI was rejected. On appeal the trial court reversed the decisions of the program director and the Prosecutor and ordered that defendant be admitted to PTI. The Appellate Division summarily reversed the trial court and denied Yoskowitz’s motion for reconsideration. We denied leave to appeal.
On November 18, 1986, defendant entered a retraxit plea of guilty to the charge of attempted theft by deception, but reserved the right to appeal issues pending, including his motion to dismiss the indictment. The State, furthermore, agreed to dismiss the arson count and recommend a non-custodial sentence. Defendant was sentenced to a three-year probationary term with various conditions.
In defendant’s appeal to the Appellate Division, he claimed that the indictment for theft and arson must be dismissed because it violates double jeopardy, the mandatory joinder rule, and principles of fundamental fairness. Defendant also contended that the agreement entered between Detectives Stehlgens and Mazur and defendant before he pleaded guilty to the municipal-court charge must be enforced by dismissal of the indictment and that the Appellate Division erred by summarily reversing the trial court’s order admitting him to PTI.
The Appellate Division reasoned that the facts do
not fit squarely within either a double jeopardy or a mandatory joinder rule analysis, ... [but] that the law enforcement authorities’ failure to handle the municipal charges in one prosecution was contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations which are the underpinnings of both double jeopardy and the mandatory joinder rule. [224 N.J.Super. 375, 381 (1988).]
The court found “the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy” that it felt “constrained to dismiss Yoskowitz’ indictment and to vacate his guilty plea for theft by deception.”
[689]*689We granted the State’s petition for certification, 111 N.J. 608 (1988), but denied defendant’s cross-petition. 111 N.J. 648 (1988).
II
The double-jeopardy clause protects criminal defendants (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 532 (1988) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969)). The instant case involves prosecutions for the same offense following a conviction. In resolving double jeopardy claims, the main difficulty generally is determining “whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first.” See State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 102 (1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 331, 98 L.Ed.2d 358 (1987) (citations omitted) (citing Thomas, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 Iowa L.Rev. 323, 330-35 (1986) (discussing six possible tests for defining “same offense”)).
The traditional test for defining a “same offense” was set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932), in which the Court said the following:
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
[(emphasis added).]
However, in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d 228, 238 (1980), the Supreme Court reexamined the Blockburger test. There the defendant was first convicted of failure to slow his car to avoid an accident. He was then charged with involuntary manslaughter arising from the same incident. After enunciating the Blockburger or [690]*690“elements” test, the Vitale Court also went on to state that “if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d at 238.
The Vitale decision has created controversy among state and federal courts over whether the traditional Blockburger test .has been expanded. A number of jurists have concluded that Vitale did not alter the Blockburger or “elements” test. Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 104 S.Ct. 2916, 82 L.Ed.2d 23, 32 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); State v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948, 951-952, 101 S.Ct. 3094, 3096, 69 L.Ed.2d 961, 963 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Grimes, 573 F.Supp. 1202, 1207 n. 4 (S.D.Ohio 1983); State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132, 1138 (R.I.1986). In their view, an analysis of the actual proofs offered at trial is unnecessary.
We examined the impact of Vitale on the Blockburger test first in State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1983), and then more recently in State v. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. 98. In State v. Dively, we concluded that Vitale did alter the Blockburger test by establishing an additional prong to be met by the defendant seeking to assert a double-jeopardy claim. The defendant in that case had driven his car while intoxicated and caused an accident that resulted in a death. He subsequently pleaded guilty in municipal court to driving while intoxicated, a charge into which reckless driving and failure-to-keep-to-the-right charges had been merged, driving without a license, and driving after license revocation. Id. 92 N.J. at 576-77. A few months after he was sentenced on those charges, defendant was indicted by a grand jury for death by auto. To this charge he also pleaded guilty, but he reserved his right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. In construing Vitale, we concluded that the defendant needed to: (a) meet the elements or Blockburger test; and (b) show that [691]*691the same evidence used to establish the first offense was to be relied on to establish the second offense. Id. 92 N.J. at 581-83. The defendant in Dively, we held, met both prongs of the test. Ibid.
In State v. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. 98, the defendant, while driving with a blood alcohol content of .21%, struck and killed a pedestrian. Id. at 100-01. The issue before the Court was whether defendant’s acquittal by a Law Division jury of death by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-5, should bar a subsequent municipal-court prosecution under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In DeLuca the Appellate Division concluded that although the two charges each required proof of elements not required by the other, and thus passed the Blockburger test, the fact that the State would rely on the same proof in both prosecutions barred the second. Id. 108 N.J. at 101. To this extent, the Appellate Division deviated from Dively’s caveat that “ ‘[i]t is only when both prongs are met that double jeopardy applies.’ ” Id. 108 N.J. at 106 (citing State v. Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 581). Describing Dively’s requirement that both prongs be satisfied as “erroneous,” we concluded that “the more accurate reading of Vitale is that it enhanced the protection afforded a defendant facing a second prosecution on the same facts,” and, therefore, that the second prong is an “alternative” to the first. Id. 108 N.J. at 107. Accord Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions, supra, 71 Iowa L.Rev. at 351-53, and cases cited therein; Comment, State v. DeLuca: Reinterpreting Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 431, 443-46 (1988).
In DeLuca, we thus established that a second prosecution will be barred if either the “elements” test or the “evidence” test is satisfied. We said that
the question in the second prong was whether the evidence actually used to establish guilt in the first prosecution is identical to that that will be used in the second, prosecution. If the same evidence used in the first prosecution is the [692]*692sole evidence in the second, the second is barred. [Ibid, (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]
Because it was unclear whether evidence of defendant’s intoxication was the sole evidence offered by the State to prove recklessness, a necessary element in the death-by-auto case, we reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for review of the proofs of recklessness in the death-by-auto proceeding. Id. 108 N.J. at 111.
In applying the two-prong double-jeopardy analysis of DeLuca we find that defendant fails to satisfy either the “elements” or “evidence” tests. Hence, we conclude that the subsequent indictment does not violate the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
We turn first to an examination of the statutory provisions of the offenses. The elements of the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty in municipal court, filing a false police report, are codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4b(l), which states:
b. Fictitious reports. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he: (1) Reports or causes to be reported to law enforcement authorities an offense or other incident within their concern knowing that it did not occur; (Emphasis added.)
The offense of attempted theft by deception, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4(a), provides that:
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if he purposely:
a. Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind; but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise; (Emphasis added.)
The charge for arson with the purpose of collecting insurance in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-lb(3), states:
b. Arson. A person is guilty of arson, a crime of the third degree, if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his property or another’s:
********
(3) With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property. (Emphasis added.)
[693]*693As noted, the Blockburger or “elements” test (the first prong), looks to “whether each offense requires proof of an additional fact not necessary for the other offense.” DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 106. (Emphasis added). The filing of a false police report is not required for prosecution of theft by deception. Likewise, obtaining the property of another by deception is not required for prosecution of filing a false police report. Similarly arson does not require proof of the filing of a false police report, and the filing of a false report does not require a showing of arson, starting a fire, or causing an explosion. Proof of the filing of a false police report is insufficient in itself to establish the offenses of either theft by deception or arson. The elements of the offenses at issue are not identical or inclusive. Each offense “requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at 303-04, 52 S.Ct. at 181-82, 76 L.Ed.2d at 309. Accordingly, the “elements” prong does not bar the subsequent indictment for arson and theft by deception.
Nor is the subsequent indictment barred by the alternative or “evidence” test (the second prong). DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 107. This test asks us to consider “whether the evidence actually used to establish guilt in the first prosecution is identical to that which will be used in the second prosecution— If the same evidence used in the first prosecution is the sole evidence in the second, the prosecution of the second offense is barred.” Id. 108 N.J. at 105-106 (Emphasis added); accord State v. Morales, 224 N.J.Super. 72, 82 (Law Div.1987). Hence, to satisfy the “evidence” prong defendant must establish that the evidence actually used to establish his guilt for filing a false police report is the same and the sole evidence that would be used to prosecute him for the arson and attempted-theft-by-deception offenses. Accord State v. McGaughy, 505 So.2d 399, 402 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), appeal after remand, 534 So.2d 1134 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (defendant’s conviction for D.U.I. precluded subsequent prosecution for assault because D.U.I. constituted sole evidence of reckless conduct in second prosecution); State v. Lonergan, 16 Conn. [694]*694App. 358, 366-70, 548 A.2d 718, 722-23 (1988) (prosecution for operating car while under influence precluded by earlier manslaughter acquittal because evidence relied on in latter was same and sole evidence to be offered in former), cert. granted, 210 Conn. 812, 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
The evidence used to establish that defendant was guilty of filing a false police report was the filed police report and his admission that it was false because his car was not stolen. This was the only evidence actually before the municipal court when it accepted defendant’s plea of guilty to the charge of filing a false police report. This evidence used in the municipal prosecution clearly would not be the sole evidence presented in the arson and theft charges; such evidence would be insufficient to establish that defendant is guilty of those offenses.
Nor does our conclusion change if we consider defendant’s gratitious statements to the municipal court after he pleaded guilty but before he was sentenced. See the colloquy, supra at 686. No prosecutor would rely on those statements as the sole evidence to establish the third-degree crimes of arson and attempted theft by deception. This is particularly true of a prosecutor who could employ the following additional evidence, none of which was admitted at the municipal court hearing: the fact that defendant’s car was burned eight days after the false report was filed (arson was not mentioned by defendant at the municipal court hearing); the testimony of the investigators and firefighters suggesting arson; defendant’s sworn statement to the police on March 5, 1985, in which he admitted that he had paid someone named “Andy” to take his car so that he could collect insurance, but in which no mention of arson is made; the “Affidavit of Theft” defendant filed with Allstate; the results of the polygraph examinations; and the testimony of Stewart Kaiser regarding defendant’s admission that he had his car burned.
[695]*695Such additional evidence in and of itself is more than sufficient to establish these offenses. Accordingly, it strains credulity to argue the State would rely solely on the evidence admitted at the municipal court to establish defendant’s guilt in filing a false police report to prove arson and attempted theft by deception. Defendant, therefore, is unsuccessful in establishing either the “elements” or “evidence” prongs of the double-jeopardy doctrine with respect to the arson and attempted-theft-by-deception charges. Prosecution of the subsequent indictment, therefore, is not barred under either prong of the DeLuca constitutional-double-jeopardy test.
We reject the dissent’s interpretation of double jeopardy. Indeed, we find the dissent’s contentions to be flawed both as to the facts and the law. As previously set forth, all the offenses — the filing of the false police report, the attempted theft by deception and the arson of the automobile — occurred on different dates and required different proofs. The evidence used to establish the filing of a false police report was neither the same nor the sole evidence that would be used to establish defendant’s guilt on the other charges. Ante at 694.
The dissent misconstrues our holding in DeLuca. The dissent alleges that whenever evidence used in an earlier prosecution is used, in part, to help attain a second prosecution, double jeopardy attaches and the latter prosecution is barred. As the dissent proclaims, “[djouble jeopardy prevents the recycling of the same evidence ... to gain another conviction.” Post at 724. Thus, the dissent diverges from our holding in DeLuca that the evidence must be both the same and sole evidence used in the second prosecution. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J at 107.
To support its tortured interpretation of DeLuca, the dissent quotes from a passage of that opinion, Post at 724, which discusses the comparison of elements. Not surprisingly, this discussion has nothing whatsoever to do with the dissent’s double jeopardy analysis; it is a discussion of the Blockburger or elements test. For reasons stated earlier, infra, at 693, the [696]*696dissent could not and does not argue that the elements prong has been satisfied. Rather, it looks to our discussion in DeLuca of the elements (Blockburger) test to reach a misguided position regarding the evidence test (the second and analytically distinct prong).
Additionally, the dissent’s position that the introduction of evidence of a crime for a purpose other than proving the crime in question may result in double jeopardy problems is not only an expansion of our current law on double jeopardy but also provides “excessive protection” to a defendant. See Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions, supra, 71 Iowa L.Rev. at 381. The following example is cited in that article. A defendant conspires to rob a victim and then rapes and robs her. Evidence of the robbery is introduced in a rape prosecution to rebut the defense of consent. A defendant on trial for rape is obviously not in jeopardy for robbery. Yet, under the dissent’s general evidence rule a subsequent prosecution for robbery would be barred. This approach must be rejected because “Vitale does not suggest that it is necessarily a constitutional violation to offer the same evidence at a second prosecution.” Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 938 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc) (prosecution for hiding fugitive and helping him to avoid detection not barred by earlier prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, even though evidence of these activities was introduced at earlier trial, because such conduct was not a “necessary element” of conspiracy charge), cert. den., 475 U.S. 1025, 106 S.Ct. 1223, 89 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986); cf. United States v. Allen, 539 F.Supp. 296, 310 (C.D.Cal.1982) (question to be considered is whether evidence required to warrant conviction in one prosecution sufficient to support conviction upon the other).
Indeed, as noted, DeLuca explicitly rejects the dissent’s contention that simply because evidence is used or introduced in one prosecution to help prove an element (or offense), subsequent prosecutions in which that same evidence is introduced are barred. In DeLuca we remanded for exactly this reason: we sought a determination of whether evidence besides defen[697]*697dant’s intoxication was relied on to prove recklessness in the death by auto case. 108 N.J. at 111; see State v. Samarel, 231 N.J.Super. 134, 138-39 (App.Div.1989).
This aspect of DeLuca was acknowledged in a recent Appellate Division decision, State v. Travers, 229 N.J.Super. 144, 151 (1988). There it was held that double jeopardy did not require merger of convictions for death by auto and driving while intoxicated. The Travers court, relying on DeLuca, reasoned that in the death-by-auto case the sole evidence of recklessness was not the defendant’s intoxication inasmuch as the State’s case was “predicated on the defendant’s excessive speed or on his intoxication or on a combination of both factors.” Id. at 151.
Likewise, the dissent’s reliance on State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. 327 (1979), a case that concerns the first situation in which double jeopardy acts as a bar, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. at 717, 89 S.Ct. at 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d at 664-65, namely, where a defendant is prosecuted for the same offense after acquittal, is misplaced. In Lynch we held that trial court’s erroneous dismissal of an indictment was “a judgment of acquittal.” Accordingly, we followed the well-established constitutional principle that “if a conviction has been set aside because of insufficient evidence, as distinguished from trial error, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a second trial.” Id. 79 N.J. at 341 (citations omitted).
Our holding that double jeopardy does not bar defendant’s subsequent prosecution for attempted theft by deception and arson is fully supported by our decision in DeLuca. Consider the following paraphrase of the holding in that case:
If the same evidence used in the first prosecution [filing false police report] is the sole evidence in the second [attempted theft by deception and arson], the second [attempted theft by deception and arson] is barred. [108 N.J. at 107 (emphasis added).]
We also reject defendant’s argument that his prosecutions for attempted theft by deception and arson are barred by [698]*698statutory double jeopardy pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:l-10a(3). The statute reads as follows:
When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense
A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts than a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
a. The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 2C:l-9 and subsequent prosecution is for:
^***#*##
(3) The same conduct, unless (a) the offense of which defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil, or (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
This statute is patterned after the Model Penal Code’s double-jeopardy provision, § 1.09. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I, 155-56 (1985); Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, October, 1971, Yol. I, pp. X, 9-10. N.J.S.A. 2C:l-10a(3) is designed to apply in situations where offenses arising from the same course of conduct are not subject to the mandatory joinder rule embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8b. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, at 163; Cannel, TITLE 2C, Comment to N.J.S.A. 2C:l-10a, p. 51. This is such a case. Infra at 729-34.
N.J.S-A. 2C:l-14k states that a disorderly-persons offense is an offense for purposes of statutory double jeopardy. Nonetheless, N.J.S.A. 2C:l-10a(3) does not bar defendant’s prosecution for theft by deception or arson. This section, like the constitutional-double-jeopardy provision, provides a two-pronged protection for the defendant: prosecutions are barred “if they are based on the same conduct and each offense does not require proof of a fact not required by the other or is not [699]*699designed to meet a substantially different harm or evil.”3 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, at 164. Therefore, “[s]ince both factors must exist to permit successive prosecutions, failure to satisfy either requirement will bar successive prosecutions.” Id. (footnote omitted).
The defendant in the instant case has failed to satisfy either prong of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-10a(3). The first prong is a codification of the Bloekburger or “elements” test in that it requires that “each charge demands proof of a fact not required by the other.” Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, 162, 163 n. 32 (citing ALI Proceedings 152 (1956)); accord TITLE 2C, supra, at 51. As shown, the defendant has not prevailed under the Bloekburger test with respect to either charge. Further, statutes proscribing arson, theft by deception, and the filing of a false police report are clearly designed to prevent substantially different evils. See C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 59, 307 (typically where violations of different penal statutes occur, substantially different evils are involved).
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s prosecution for theft by deception and arson did not violate constitutional- or statutory-double-jeopardy principles.
Ill
We conclude, likewise, that defendant’s guilty plea in the Livingston Municipal Court to filing a false police report does not require that the subsequent Union County indictment against him be dismissed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) and Rule 3:15-l(b).
Both Rule 3:15 — 1(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) were enacted in response to State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510 (1975), in which the [700]*700Court enunciated a compulsory-joinder rule. In Gregory, we held that “the preparation of the precise contours and details of the compulsory joinder rule” should be left to “our Criminal Practice Committee for ultimate consideration and promulgation.” 66 N.J. at 522. In the meantime, however, we held that Section 1.07(2) of the Model Penal Code American Law Institute “may be considered in full force and effect in our State.” Ibid.
Prior to its enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(b), the Legislature made two changes to the New Jersey Criminal Law Commission’s tentative draft of N.J.S.A. 2C:1~8(b) that are significant to this case. The term “prosecuting officer” was substituted for the proposed term “law enforcement officer,” and the word “criminal” was deleted before the words “conduct” and “episode” and inserted before the word “offenses.” The tentative draft read that “a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same criminal conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, ... to the appropriate law enforcement officer____” (Emphasis added). See Title 2C, supra, Comment N.J.S. 2C:1-8(b) at 26 (1989); L.1979, c. 178, § 6; A Review of the Legislative History of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 7 Crim.J.Q. 1, 76, § 6 (Summer 1982).
The provision as enacted reads as follows:
N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) provides that:
b. Limitation on separate trials for multiple offenses. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.
(Emphasis added.)
R. 3:15-l(b) provides that:
(b) Mandatory Joinder. Except as provided by R. 3:15-2(b), a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to [701]*701the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.[4]
To invoke the mandatory joinder rule a defendant must satisfy all four of the following criteria: (1) the multiple offenses are criminal; (2) the offenses are based on the same conduct or arose from the same episode; (3) the appropriate prosecuting officer knew of the offenses at the time the first trial commenced; and (4) the offenses were within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court. An examination of the applicable Rule and statute discloses that defendant does not satisfy all of these criteria.
Defendant first contends that all the offenses charged against him are comprehended within the term “multiple criminal offenses” as used in both N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) and Rule 3:15-l(b). We disagree. Defendant has mischaracterized the nature of the offense required in order to activate mandatory joinder.
The explicit language of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) and Rule 3:15-1(b) requires classification of the offense at issue as “criminal” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-4. That statutory provision defines a “crime” as “an offense ... for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 6 months is authorized.” N.J.S.A. 2C:l-4(a). In contrast, an offense is a disorderly-persons offense or petty-disorderly persons offense “if it so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code.” N.J.S.A. 2C:l-4(b). Furthermore, and most importantly for this case, “disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly offenses are petty offenses and are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this State.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
[702]*702We recognize, however, that a defendant convicted of certain petty offenses that are quasi-criminal in nature may be entitled to the same protection as a defendant convicted of a crime. In Dively, supra, 92 N.J. 573, 585, we noted that “[m]otor vehicle offenses have not been considered to be crimes, but only petty offenses.” (citing State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 314 (1978); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 9-10 (1970)). We went on to state: “however, the proceedings involving motor vehicle violations in the municipal courts are quasi-criminal in nature.” Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 585 (citing State v. DiCarlo, 67 N.J. 321, 327 (1975)). Consequently, motor-vehicle offenses were held to be “within the category of offenses subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause.” State v. Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 586; see State v. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 110-11.
Different considerations and legal analysis, however, are involved in motions to dismiss an indictment on mandatory joinder grounds as opposed to relief from double jeopardy. A double-jeopardy analysis involves a consideration of the elements of the charged offenses and the evidence supporting them. Supra at 691-92. The State cannot avoid a constitutional-double-jeopardy problem by claiming that one offense was only a disorderly offense filed by a local police officer. Such considerations, however, are important to a mandatory-joinder issue because the Eule and statute require that charges all be indictable offenses, within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court, and known to the appropriate prosecuting officer. Those prerequisites simply were not established in this case.
The precise parameters of the mandatory-joinder rule are determined by the Legislature. Defendant pleaded guilty in municipal court to filing a false report to the police, a disorderly persons offense, under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4(b)(l). Under the statutory language we do not find this offense a crime. Hence, we find that defendant does not satisfy the first criterion compelling mandatory joinder.
[703]*703Similarly, we find that defendant does not satisfy the jurisdiction and venue requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) and Rule 3:15-l(b). Both the statute and Rule provide that the offenses must be within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court. A municipal court lacks jurisdiction over indictable offenses and offenses that occur outside the municipality. N.J.S.A. 2A:8-20; N.J.S.A. 2A:8-21. Accordingly, neither the Livingston Municipal Court nor the Essex County Prosecutor had jurisdiction or venue over the indictable offenses of arson or attempted theft that occurred in Union County.
We recognize that a Superior Court may assert “jurisdiction over non-indictable offenses when they are lesser included offenses of the indictable.” State v. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111 (citing State v. Saulnier, 63 N.J. 199 (1973)). N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d), which requires merger where one offense is included in another, describes an offense as “included” when
(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than ail the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged * * *;
(2) It consists of an attempt or conspiracy to commit the offense charged * * *; or
(3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest of a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
[(emphasis added).]
In the instant matter, (2) and (3) are inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(d)(l) was described in the 1971 Commentary as providing “that a lesser offense is necessarily included in a charge of the greater offense if the proof necessary to establish the greater offense will of necessity establish every element of the lesser offense.” New Jersey Code, supra, at 42; see, e.g., State v. Queen, 221 N.J.Super. 601, 606-08 (App.Div.), certif. den., 110 N.J. 506 (1988); State v. Jones, 214 N.J.Super. 68, 72-73 (App.Div.1986), certif. den., 107 N.J. 102 (1987). Based on the double-jeopardy analysis above, it is evident that not every element of the false police report offense (ie., the filing of the report) would have been established by the proofs necessary to establish the arson or attempted theft charges. [704]*704Therefore, the filing of a false police report is not a lesser-included offense of arson or theft by deception.
As previously noted the Legislature in enacting 2C:l-8(b) specifically narrowed the persons whose knowledge could be imputed to the State in order to trigger the compulsory-joinder Rule by providing that it was not sufficient that a “law enforcement officer” know of the multiple criminal offenses. In order for the Rule to apply, the “appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial” has to know of the multiple offenses.
Here the “disorderly persons” charge against Yoskowitz was filed by Detective Stehlgens of the Livingston Police Department. It appears that no person including any police officer or municipal prosecutor prosecuted the disorderly-persons offense in the Livingston Municipal Court. Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that a prosecuting officer affiliated with the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General was present at the municipal-court proceeding.5
In sum, defendant was not subject to separate trials “for multiple criminal offenses.” The offenses with which he was charged were not within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court; the local police officer who filed the municipal complaint simply was not the “appropriate prosecuting officer” referred to in the statute and court Rules.
Accordingly, we hold that mandatory joinder pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) does not bar the subsequent prosecutions.
IY
We are unable, however, to determine from this record whether the doctrine of fundamental fairness bars both or either of the subsequent prosecutions. In New Jersey the [705]*705doctrine of fundamental fairness has been an “elusive concept ... [where] exact boundaries are undefinable.” Greenberg, New Jersey’s Fairness and Rightness Doctrine, 15 Rutgers L.J. 927, 928 (1984), (quoting New Jersey State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 209 (1983)). For the most part, it has been employed when the scope of a particular constitutional protection has not been extended to protect a defendant. As one commentator has noted, the fundamental-fairness “cases often follow the same pattern: the court identifies a constitutional issue, discusses it, and then declines to reach it, resting its decision instead on fairness and rightness or an earlier fairness decision.” Greenburg, New Jersey’s Fairness and Rightness Doctrine, supra, 15 Rutgers L.J. at 928. But see State v. Godfrey, 139 N.J.Super. 135 (App.Div.) (indictment could be dismissed on either fundamental-fairness or double-jeopardy grounds), certif. den. 73 N.J. 40 (1976).
The doctrine of fundamental fairness, at least in the context of double-jeopardy and mandatory-joinder cases, is derived from the policy interests underlying those doctrines. The seminal double-jeopardy case decided on the basis of fairness and the reasonable expectations of the defendant is State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531 (1964). In Currie, the defendant was stopped by police officers while driving his car. Id. at 533. When an officer approached, defendant sped away. Ibid. In so doing, defendant struck the officer, struck the police car, and caused a second officer to leap out of injury’s way. Ibid.
Defendant was subsequently apprehended, charged, and convicted in municipal court for reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. Id. at 533-34. Over a year later, defendant was indicted and found guilty by a jury of atrocious assault and battery in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:85-5, whereupon he appealed on double-jeopardy grounds. Id. at 534-35. The trial court’s decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by this Court.
[706]*706Justice Jacobs, writing for the Court, said that the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy “assures that the State with its great resources will not be permitted to harass and oppress the individual by multiple prosecution or punishment of the same offense. The difficulty arises in determining just when we are dealing with the same offense____” Id. at 536. The Court noted “the futility of efforts extended towards the formulation of a single legal test to operate absolutely and inflexibly throughout the field of double jeopardy.” Id. at 539. Justice Jacobs then said that “[i]n applying the prohibition against double jeopardy, the emphasis should be on underlying policies rather than technisms. The primary considerations should be fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of the constitutional and common law goals.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
In certain of its earlier cases, he added, the results reached were on their facts
entirely fair and consistent with reasonable expectations * * *. But they never intended to convey that every magistrate’s determination, no matter how minor the offense charged before him, will necessarily preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution based in whole or in part on the same activity, no matter how aggravated the crime charged.
[Id. at 541.]
Currie went on to emphasize the “relevant practical factors” that “play a vital part in the molding of double jeopardy doctrines.” Id. at 543. These include the speed with which such violations are generally tried, the extent of the evidential presentation and of the legal representation, and the maximum terms and fines allowable and anticipated by the defendant. Ibid. Viewed from the perspective of those factors, the second prosecution was not considered to have involved the “elements of oppression or harassment” or to have violated the reasonable expectations of the defendant. Ibid. Rather, barring the second prosecution would have operated “with gross unfairness to the State.” Ibid.
In State v. Gregory, supra, 66 N.J. 510, the other leading case to address fundamental fairness in the context of a multi[707]*707pie prosecution, an undercover police officer in Newark purchased heroin from defendant and, while doing so, observed other quantities of heroin in defendant’s apartment. Id. at 511. After the sale, defendant’s apartment was raided on the same day and the other heroin was seized. Ibid. Defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted for the single sale of heroin to the officer. Id. at 511-12. After conviction but before sentencing, defendant was indicted for possession and possession with intent to distribute the seized heroin. Id. at 512. Defendant was subsequently convicted for both those charges.
On appeal the defendant raised double-jeopardy and collateral-estoppel arguments. The Appellate Division set aside the “possession” conviction but affirmed the conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Ibid. As in Currie, we examined the genesis of double-jeopardy protection and the difficulties associated with the “same evidence” and the “same transaction” tests. Id. at 513-18.
After concluding that fairness and the reasonable expectations of the defendant demanded that his prosecutions be joined, we said that “[f]or present purposes we need not rest on constitutional grounds for the just result we seek may readily be attained by our exercise of the broad administrative and procedural powers vested in us by our State Constitution.” Id. at 518. We then provided for mandatory joinder, stating that “[cjompulsory joinder ... will not only tend to satisfy the considerations of fairness and reasonable expectations stressed in State v. Currie but will also promote the considerations of ‘justice, economy, and convenience’____” Id. 66 N.J. at 522. (Emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The notions of fairness and reasonable expectations considered in Currie and Gregory have been discussed in later cases. See State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 315-16 (1978) (fundamental fairness required dismissal of speeding charge after defendant’s earlier conviction on same charge was vacated on [708]*708appeal for failure to produce an essential element of proof). In State v. Tsoi, 217 N.J.Super. 290 (1987), the Appellate Division, in applying Currie and Gregory, held that “the elements of harassment and oppression which were the historic object of ... constitutional and common law double jeopardy ...” were not present and allowed the second prosecution. Id. at 297.
We do not question the vitality of the fundamental-fairness doctrine. Rather, we find that an inadequate factual record exists to determine whether it is applicable to this case. We are concerned that under the unique circumstances of this case, defendant may have reasonably expected that the subsequent prosecutions would not be brought. Defendant maintains that Detectives Mazur and Stehlgens led him to believe that if he pleaded guilty to filing a false police report, “the whole thing would be ‘over’ ”. Such an assurance especially if it were made with the acquiescence of the Union County Prosecutor’s Office, might justify defendant’s expectation of finality. Further factual findings, therefore, are required to determine what representations were made to defendant. The court will then be able to determine whether it was reasonable for defendant to rely on such representations in light of the limited disclosures he made to law-enforcement officers.
Although defendant did tell the investigating detectives that he filed the false police report in furtherance of his scheme to defraud his insurance carrier, he failed to make similar disclosures regarding the arson of the car. Therefore, if the trial court finds that such assurances indeed were made to defendant, further inquiry must be made to ascertain whether the detectives, at the time they made such assurances, knew of defendant’s personal involvement in the burning of his car.
Likewise the record is incomplete regarding the extent of the Union County Prosecutor’s knowledge of the activities of Detectives Stehlgens and Mazur and awareness that indictable charges were pending against defendant. In this latter connection the State claims that while arson may have been suspected, [709]*709it was not until Stewart Kaiser’s testimony and defendant’s polygraph in August that it had sufficient evidence to indict defendant for arson. Nonetheless, depending on its knowledge of the detectives’ activities preceding the filing of the complaint in the Livingston Municipal Court, it is not improbable that at the time of the municipal court hearing the Union County Prosecutor’s Office may have had plans to prosecute defendant for the indictable charges.
We have encouraged “cooperation between municipal courts, municipal prosecutors, and county prosecutors.” State v. Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 589. This policy was reinforced and the conflicts between municipal-court and Superior Court jurisdiction eased in State v. DeLuca, where it was held that a Superior Court judge should preside as such over a death by auto case while trying the lesser offenses simultaneously as a municipal court judge. See State v. DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111.
Applying this policy of cooperation to the case at bar, if the Union County Prosecutor’s Office knew or should have known that prosecutions for the related indictable offenses would be instituted in the near future, no complaint should have been filed in the municipal court, or if filed, the hearing should have been suspended until all the charges could be heard together. Since the record is unclear in this regard, we remand to the trial court for a determination of the extent of the Union County Prosecutor’s knowledge of: (a) the probability of future prosecutions for either of the indictable offenses; and (b) the plans of Detectives Mazur and Stehlgens to prosecute defendant in municipal court.
We do not retain jurisdiction. Based on its findings the trial court will decide whether the dictates of the doctrine of fundamental fairness have been transgressed in the instant case.
V
In conclusion, we find that the subsequent indictments were not barred by double jeopardy. Not only was there no identity [710]*710of the elements of the offense, but also the evidence used to establish the “false police report” offenses clearly would not be the identical or sole evidence required to establish the arson and theft by deception offense.
Mandatory joinder, as set out in N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(b) and Rule S:15-l(b), also does not bar the second prosecution. Although arguably the offenses arose from the “same episode” and the prosecutions did not involve “multiple criminal offenses” as required, and the offenses were not within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.
We remand to the trial court to determine whether the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations apply in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.