State of New Jersey v. Michael Arena

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: A-2947-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2947-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ARENA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted September 8, 2025 – Decided October 1, 2025

Before Judges Natali and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 23-08-0945.

Kessous Law Group, LLC, attorney for appellant (Jonathan A. Kessous, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Michael Arena appeals from a sentencing order imposing

consecutive sentences after his guilty plea to reckless vehicular homicide,

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in

death, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 and leaving the scene of an accident involving

personal injury, N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(a). Defendant contends the imposition of

consecutive sentences was unconstitutional under principles of double jeopardy,

due process, and fundamental fairness and further contends the trial court abused

its discretion in the sequencing and length of the sentences. After our review of

the record and application of the relevant legal principles, we affirm.

I.

In July 2023, defendant was the driver of an automobile which struck and

killed a fourteen-year-old victim in South River and fled the scene. Defendant

was later identified and apprehended after police reviewed video surveillance

and obtained witness accounts of the incident. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

defendant pled guilty to the offenses indicated above. During the plea hearing,

the court confirmed defendant had reviewed the plea forms with his attorney and

that he understood the sentence the State would recommend, including its

request for the consecutive flat sentence for his guilty plea to leaving the scene

of an accident resulting in death to run first before serving his No Early Release

A-2947-23 2 Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ("NERA"), sentence for the reckless vehicular

homicide.

Defense counsel also confirmed with defendant on the record that

defendant knew he was waiving the right to make "various motions" in order to

enter a guilty plea and that nobody had compelled him to waive these rights.

Defendant then placed a factual basis on the record for the plea, and the judge

accepted his guilty plea. The plea form indicated that that State would "ask that

the defendant serve his flat sentence first" with defendant reserving "the right to

argue at sentencing for a lesser sentence than that which is recommended by the

state" and to ask, "that the NERA sentence run first."

After the plea, but prior to sentencing, defendant asserts the State

submitted a video of defendant operating a vehicle and honking and cursing at

another driver and permitted the State to play the video at the sentencing over

defense counsel's written objection. Defendant also alleges at sentencing, the

State presented other improper evidence including videos of interviews with

witnesses from body worn camera footage and neighborhood impact statements.

After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court

sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment for leaving the scene charge to

A-2947-23 3 be served first, followed by a consecutive five-year sentence, with 85% parole

ineligibility per NERA for the reckless vehicular homicide.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

[POINT] I

APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO A CONCURRENT SENTE[N]CE AS N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 AS WELL AS ANY CONSEC[UT]IVE SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND FUND[A]MENTAL FAIRNESS AS IT RELATES TO THE SPEC[I]FIC FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS MATTER.

[POINT] II

ALTERNATIV[E]LY, THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS IT SENTENCED [DEFENDANT'S] MORE RESTRICTIVE SENTENCE SUBSEQUENT TO THE LESS RESTRICTIVE WHICH WILL RESULT IN SUBSANTIALLY ADDITIONAL TIME TO BE SERVED DUE TO PAROLE RESTRICTION/UNEQUAL COMMUTATION CREDIT.

Specifically, defendant argues although he pled guilty to leaving the scene

of an accident resulting in death and reckless vehicular homicide; that the

manner of leaving the scene was the reckless action, and in the doing so, he

struck the victim fatally. He asserts under these circumstances, both crimes

were premised on the same action for which defendant pled and being sentenced

A-2947-23 4 consecutively for both sentences would run contrary to applicable sentencing

principles and frustrate the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. Defendant posits

that such a sentence "as purportedly required under the [s]tatute is

unconstitutional both federally and [under] the New Jersey Constitution as a

violation of Due Process/Double Jeopardy as well as fundamental fairness

principles [as] two separate punishments for a single act."

II.

The double-jeopardy clauses of the federal and New Jersey Constitutions

provide that no person shall be tried twice for the same criminal offense. U.S.

Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11. The Supreme Court of New Jersey

"has consistently interpreted the State Constitution's double-jeopardy protection

as coextensive with the guarantee of the federal Constitution." State v. Miles,

229 N.J. 83, 92 (2017). "The Double Jeopardy Clause contains three protections

for defendants. It protects against (1) 'a second prosecution for the same offense

after acquittal,' (2) 'a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,'

and (3) 'multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Ibid. (quoting North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). In examining the first two

protections, we review "whether the second prosecution is for the same offense

A-2947-23 5 involved in the first." Id. at 93 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689

(1989)).

In 2017, our Supreme Court adopted the same-elements test as "the sole

double-jeopardy analysis . . . ." Id. at 96. The same-elements test involves a

review of whether the statutes at issue require proof of identical elements. Id.

at 93 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). Thus,

courts evaluating a double jeopardy claim must ask "whether the second

prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first." Id. at 93 (quoting State

v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989)).

Sentencing decisions are reviewed under a deferential standard and may

be overturned only if the sentencing guidelines are violated, findings are

unsupported, or the result shocks the judicial conscience. See State v. Grate,

220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015); State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 169-70 (2006).

In addition, Rule 3:10-2(c) requires the defense of double jeopardy to be

raised before trial. See State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 282 (2002) (explaining the

"plain language of the [r]ule provides that the defense of double jeopardy must

be raised by motion before trial and that the failure to present the defense

constitutes a waiver"). Rule 3:10-2(c) allows for relief from the waiver

provision if defendant can demonstrate good cause. See, e.g., State v. Del Fino,

A-2947-23 6 100 N.J. 154, 161 (1985) (explaining a successful showing of good cause

depends on the circumstances surrounding the delay and the merits of the

underlying assertion).

We first address the requirements of Rule 3:10-2(c) under the factual

setting before us, and conclude defendant waived his double jeopardy claim by

not raising it prior to his plea. As pointed out by the State, defendant had notice

before entering his guilty plea that the pertinent statutes mandated consecutive

sentences and should have raised any double-jeopardy argument before the plea

hearing.

The record shows the State sought to confirm that defendant wished to go

forward with sentencing under the terms of the plea agreement or whether he

wanted to withdraw the plea and go to trial. Thereafter, defendant proceeded

with the sentencing without making any attempt to withdraw his plea despite

having the notice and opportunity to raise the constitutional double jeopardy

issue. Based on these factual circumstances, we conclude defendant has failed

to show good cause for not raising this argument prior to his plea.

Even if we consider defendant's waiver insufficient, we reject his

contention that the consecutive sentencing requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 is

unconstitutional as applied to the factual circumstances herein.

A-2947-23 7 A court's "primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and

carry out the Legislature's intent." In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012); see

also Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, 260 N.J. 410, 419-20 (2025).

The "best indicator of legislative intent is 'the plain language chosen by the

Legislature.'" State v. Perry, 439 N.J. Super. 514, 523 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting

State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)); see also In re Proposed Constr. of

Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, 324 (2024). Therefore, in

interpreting a statute, we first examine the statute's plain language. Fuster v.

Twp. of Chatham, 259 N.J. 533, 547 (2025). Statutes must be given their

"ordinary and common-sense meaning." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014); see also Crisitello v. St. Theresa

Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 219 (2023). "If the language is clear, the court's job is

complete." In re D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014) (citing Kollman, 210 N.J. at

568).

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, defining the offense of knowingly leaving the scene

of an accident resulting in death, specifically states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 [(the merger statute)] or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4, reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or

A-2947-23 8 strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 (emphasis added).]

The statute explicitly provides that convictions for leaving the scene of an

accident resulting in death shall not merge with reckless vehicular homicide and

that sentences for such offenses shall run consecutively. Here, we conclude the

legislative intent is both clear and dispositive under our double jeopardy

principles.

In addition, we further conclude the two crimes in question require proof

of distinct elements. Reckless vehicular homicide requires recklessness when

causing a death while driving, whereas leaving the scene resulting in death

requires knowingly departing the scene of a fatal accident in violation of

statutory obligations, regardless of cause. The two statutes address different

societal harms—one for causing a death through recklessness in the operation

of a motor vehicle and the other for leaving the scene of the accident, failing to

render aid to the victim or report the accident regardless of whether the driver

A-2947-23 9 was reckless. We conclude the imposition of consecutive sentences under these

circumstances is constitutional and does not violate double jeopardy principles

or due process under the same elements test.

We turn now to defendant's contentions the trial court abused its discretion

by the admission of unrelated, prejudicial evidence at sentencing, the failure to

find certain mitigating factors, and the improper sequencing of sentences. A

review of the record and the trial court's specific findings lead us to conclude

otherwise.

We reiterate that sentencing courts have broad discretion in the evidence

it may consider in invoking a sentence. See N.J.R.E. 101 (a)(3)(C) (permitting

the relaxation of the rules of evidence at sentencing). Here, neither the plea nor

sentencing records contain any indication that the improper evidence as asserted

by defendant was presented at any of these proceedings. The record before us

is also absent of any evidence showing the court considered or relied upon the

challenged evidence since it failed to reference this alleged evidence in its

sentencing findings. Based on these conclusions, the court did not abuse its

discretion.

We further conclude the court's consideration of defendant's motor vehicle

prior offense history was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion. A record

A-2947-23 10 of prior motor vehicle violations are relevant factors in sentencing a defendant

who has committed another significant motor vehicle violation. See State v.

Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 329 (2010) (stating that a court in sentencing a defendant

should consider "the nature and circumstances of the defendant's conduct,

including whether the conduct posed a high risk of danger to the public or caused

physical harm or property damage; the defendant's driving record . . . and the

number, seriousness, and frequency of prior infractions . . . ."). The court's

consideration of defendant's prior record was appropriate.

Concerning defendant's assertion that the court misapplied the

aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, we conclude the

court's oral findings exhibit a thorough consideration of all proposed

aggravating and mitigating factors under the statute, including clear

explanations for rejecting mitigating factors two, seven, eight, and eleven. The

judge properly found only mitigating factor nine applicable and balanced it

against the extensive aggravating factors including prior criminal history,

violations of probation, and repeat offenses. We conclude substantial evidence

exists in the record supporting the court's findings and analysis of the sentencing

factors which clearly demonstrate the sentence imposed on defendant was not

an abuse of discretion.

A-2947-23 11 Finally, we turn to defendant's contention that the court's sequencing of

sentences was error. Defendant specifically contends that the count of reckless

vehicular homicide charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), because it was subject to

NERA, was required to be served prior to the knowingly leaving the scene of an

accident resulting in death charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1.

Our case law provides the following guidance. A court that directs a less

restrictive sentence to be served prior to a more restrictive sentence must make

specific findings on the record to support its sequencing, including the

consequences of such a sequence. See State v. Ellis, 346 N.J. Super. 583, 597

(App. Div. 2002). We have previously concluded consecutive sentences are

statutorily mandated in this instance. We further note:

The goal of consecutive sentences is to incarcerate a defendant for a greater period of time than would result from a concurrent sentence. Here, the sentence imposed [requiring the less restrictive sentence be served prior to the more restrictive sentence] achieves that goal, and it can be argued persuasively that requiring the more restrictive sentence to be served first would not have achieved that goal.

[Id. at 594].

Applying these principles to the sequencing of sentences in the matter

before us, we conclude the judge provided specific, detailed reasons for the

consecutive sentencing sequence—namely, to avoid a sentence which would

A-2947-23 12 have provided defendant a "free crime;" to invoke an appropriate sentence

considering the seriousness of each offense charged; to avoid a sentence which

would be a trivial punishment based on defendant's actions; and to sentence

defendant based on defendant's actions in the same chronology as the conduct

which he pled guilty to committing. We conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion as it provided detailed reasons supporting its sequencing of

sentences which was rationally based and amply supported by the record.

Affirmed.

A-2947-23 13