State v. Wyatt
Opinions
OPINION
By the Court,
Wyatt was charged with producing an abortion in violation [732] of NRS 201.120. The abortee testified at the preliminary hearing, but her testimony was not corroborated. For this reason the district court subsequently granted Wyatt’s petition for habeas corpus. The State has appealed from that ruling.
The issue presented to us centers upon the meaning to be given NRS 175.250 (now 175.301) which precludes conviction following a trial unless the testimony of the woman is corroborated by other evidence.1 It is the State’s contention that such corroborative evidence is required only at trial, and need not be offered at a preliminary hearing in order to establish probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The accused counters this contention by noting that this court has thrice ruled that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated at a preliminary hearing even though the statute requiring such corroboration (NRS 175.265, now 175.291) precludes only a “conviction” upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Ex parte Hutchinson, 76 Nev. 478, 357 P.2d 589 (1960); Ex parte Sullivan, 71 Nev. 90, 280 P.2d 965 (1955); In re Oxley and Mulvaney, 38 Nev. 379, 149 P. 992 (1915). Thus, by a parity of reasoning he suggests that we should construe NRS 175.250 in similar fashion. We think that the analogy is sound.
The underlying purpose of a statute requiring corroborative evidence is to prevent false accusations as well as false convictions.2 With this in mind, one accused of producing an abortion should be accorded as much protection at a preliminary hearing as one accused of some other crime on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
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448 P.2d 827 (State v. Wyatt) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.