MASON, Justice.
William A. Wright appeals from judgment and sentence pronounced approximately 20 months after he was placed on probation following a plea of guilty. The appeal presents the question of the authority of trial courts in criminal proceedings to defer imposition of sentence and place a defendant convicted by verdict or guilty plea on probation.
October 5, 1968, a county attorney’s information was filed charging Wright with the crime of adultery contrary to section 702.1, The Code. October 17 Wright, represented by counsel, appeared for arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. February 6, 1969, defendant again appeared with counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Upon inquiry of defendant, his counsel and the prosecuting attorney the court was told defendant’s plea was a negotiated plea. The court then advised defendant of the possible maximum penalty upon conviction of the crime and, for the purpose of making the constitutionally required determination that defendant’s guilty plea was truly voluntary, the court interrogated defendant in accordance with the guidelines set forth in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547-552 (Iowa 1969). The guilty plea was accepted and time for pronouncing sentence was set for 4 p. m. the same day.
However, instead of sentencing defendant at that time, the trial judge “determined that a fuller investigation * * * [was] required in order to determine the proper sentence herein and that execution of judgment or sentence should be withheld and probation granted to defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 247.20.”
He then ordered the “time of sentence herein” be continued until March 1, 1970, and that “pending sentence herein” defendant be placed on probation.
April 5, 1969, the court ordered defendant to pay $65 each week for the benefit of his wife and minor children as a condition of his probation.
August 4, 1969, the court changed the date of sentencing from March 1, 1970 to August 15, 1969, since defendant failed to make the support payments. This language appears in the court’s order: “[T]ime of sentence was continued to March 1, 1970 with Defendant paroled * * *, pending sentence.”
Neither defendant nor his lawyer appeared on August 15, 1969, for the purpose of sentencing and the court on August 16 authorized the issuance of a warrant for defendant’s arrest.
October 7, 1970, defendant appeared with his attorney before the same trial judge who had paroled him. After being advised [75]*75upon inquiry that there was no lawful reason why judgment should not be imposed upon the defendant at that time, the court then sentenced Wright “to be confined in the State Penitentiary for a term of not more than three years.”
I. In his one assignment of error defendant contends the court erred in “pronouncing judgment against * * * [defendant] on October 7, 1970, after first sentencing him on February 6, 1969, pursuant to the provisions of section 247.20 * * *, for the reason that said sentencing and procedures utilized by the court violated the provisions of chapter 789 * * * [The Code].”
Section 247.20, The Code, provides in part:
“Probation by court. The trial court before which any person has been convicted of any crime, * * * may by record entry at time of or after sentence is pronounced but before imprisonment, suspend the sentence and grant probation to said person during good behavior. The said court shall have authority by record entry to withhold execution of any judgment or sentence for such time as shall be reasonably necessary for an investigation with respect to suspension of sentence and probation. * *
Section 789.2, The Code, provides in part:
“Judgment of conviction — time for. Upon a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction must be rendered, the court must fix a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least three days after the verdict is rendered, if the court remains in session so long * * *; but in no case can it be pronounced in less than six hours after the verdict is rendered, unless defendant consent thereto.”
Defendant argues that section 247.20 only authorizes the trial court to withhold execution of the sentence for a period of time reasonably necessary for a presentence investigation or an investigation concerning the suspension of a sentence already pronounced; this section does not permit the court to place a defendant on probation, without having first sentenced him, and then authorize “an investigation with respect to suspension of sentence and probation.” He asserts the court thus violated section 247.20.
Defendant also maintains the court violated section 789.2 set out, supra. He argues although the' order of February 6, 1969, purported to set the time of sentencing and judgment for March 1, 1970, this was not done because it was superseded by the court in granting defendant probation and later setting the terms and conditions thereof.
Defendant insists the court failed to ask him whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not have been pronounced against him on February 6, 1969, when he was placed on probation as is required by section 789.6, The Code. This section provides a defendant with the right of allocution. Its purpose is to elicit facts which would constitute reason for withholding sentence. State v. Mehuys, 172 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1969).
Defendant’s contentions that the court violated the provisions of chapter 789 are tenuous in view of the facts. What the court did in fact was to delay the imposition of any sentence and place defendant on probation pending sentence. Since sections 789.2 and 789.6 pertain only to the procedures to be followed in pronotmeing judgment or sentence, the trial court need not have complied with these provisions when it ordered that defendant be placed on probation February 6, 1969. That order did not constitute a pronouncement of judgment and sentence. As aptly noted by the State, placing one on probation is not in any way a declaration of a sentence or judgment. Defendant was not sentenced for the crime to which he had plead guilty until October 7, 1970.
[76]*76Defendant’s argument that he was in effect sentenced and judgment was pronounced against him when the court entered its order of February 6, 1969, and re-sentenced October 7, 1970, for the crime of adultery is without merit.
The granting of probation is not the imposition of sentence nor its equivalent. Gehl v. People, 161 Colo. 535, 423 P.2d 332, 334; In re Williams’ Petition, 145 Mont. 45, 399 P.2d 732, 736-739; Commonwealth ex rel. Paige v. Smith, 130 Pa.Super. 536, 198 A. 812, 813-815; Connor v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 150 S.E.2d 478, 480; State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 152 W.Va. 500, 165 S.E.2d 90, 94. Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 31 L.Ed.2d 484.
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MASON, Justice.
William A. Wright appeals from judgment and sentence pronounced approximately 20 months after he was placed on probation following a plea of guilty. The appeal presents the question of the authority of trial courts in criminal proceedings to defer imposition of sentence and place a defendant convicted by verdict or guilty plea on probation.
October 5, 1968, a county attorney’s information was filed charging Wright with the crime of adultery contrary to section 702.1, The Code. October 17 Wright, represented by counsel, appeared for arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. February 6, 1969, defendant again appeared with counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Upon inquiry of defendant, his counsel and the prosecuting attorney the court was told defendant’s plea was a negotiated plea. The court then advised defendant of the possible maximum penalty upon conviction of the crime and, for the purpose of making the constitutionally required determination that defendant’s guilty plea was truly voluntary, the court interrogated defendant in accordance with the guidelines set forth in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547-552 (Iowa 1969). The guilty plea was accepted and time for pronouncing sentence was set for 4 p. m. the same day.
However, instead of sentencing defendant at that time, the trial judge “determined that a fuller investigation * * * [was] required in order to determine the proper sentence herein and that execution of judgment or sentence should be withheld and probation granted to defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 247.20.”
He then ordered the “time of sentence herein” be continued until March 1, 1970, and that “pending sentence herein” defendant be placed on probation.
April 5, 1969, the court ordered defendant to pay $65 each week for the benefit of his wife and minor children as a condition of his probation.
August 4, 1969, the court changed the date of sentencing from March 1, 1970 to August 15, 1969, since defendant failed to make the support payments. This language appears in the court’s order: “[T]ime of sentence was continued to March 1, 1970 with Defendant paroled * * *, pending sentence.”
Neither defendant nor his lawyer appeared on August 15, 1969, for the purpose of sentencing and the court on August 16 authorized the issuance of a warrant for defendant’s arrest.
October 7, 1970, defendant appeared with his attorney before the same trial judge who had paroled him. After being advised [75]*75upon inquiry that there was no lawful reason why judgment should not be imposed upon the defendant at that time, the court then sentenced Wright “to be confined in the State Penitentiary for a term of not more than three years.”
I. In his one assignment of error defendant contends the court erred in “pronouncing judgment against * * * [defendant] on October 7, 1970, after first sentencing him on February 6, 1969, pursuant to the provisions of section 247.20 * * *, for the reason that said sentencing and procedures utilized by the court violated the provisions of chapter 789 * * * [The Code].”
Section 247.20, The Code, provides in part:
“Probation by court. The trial court before which any person has been convicted of any crime, * * * may by record entry at time of or after sentence is pronounced but before imprisonment, suspend the sentence and grant probation to said person during good behavior. The said court shall have authority by record entry to withhold execution of any judgment or sentence for such time as shall be reasonably necessary for an investigation with respect to suspension of sentence and probation. * *
Section 789.2, The Code, provides in part:
“Judgment of conviction — time for. Upon a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction must be rendered, the court must fix a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least three days after the verdict is rendered, if the court remains in session so long * * *; but in no case can it be pronounced in less than six hours after the verdict is rendered, unless defendant consent thereto.”
Defendant argues that section 247.20 only authorizes the trial court to withhold execution of the sentence for a period of time reasonably necessary for a presentence investigation or an investigation concerning the suspension of a sentence already pronounced; this section does not permit the court to place a defendant on probation, without having first sentenced him, and then authorize “an investigation with respect to suspension of sentence and probation.” He asserts the court thus violated section 247.20.
Defendant also maintains the court violated section 789.2 set out, supra. He argues although the' order of February 6, 1969, purported to set the time of sentencing and judgment for March 1, 1970, this was not done because it was superseded by the court in granting defendant probation and later setting the terms and conditions thereof.
Defendant insists the court failed to ask him whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not have been pronounced against him on February 6, 1969, when he was placed on probation as is required by section 789.6, The Code. This section provides a defendant with the right of allocution. Its purpose is to elicit facts which would constitute reason for withholding sentence. State v. Mehuys, 172 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1969).
Defendant’s contentions that the court violated the provisions of chapter 789 are tenuous in view of the facts. What the court did in fact was to delay the imposition of any sentence and place defendant on probation pending sentence. Since sections 789.2 and 789.6 pertain only to the procedures to be followed in pronotmeing judgment or sentence, the trial court need not have complied with these provisions when it ordered that defendant be placed on probation February 6, 1969. That order did not constitute a pronouncement of judgment and sentence. As aptly noted by the State, placing one on probation is not in any way a declaration of a sentence or judgment. Defendant was not sentenced for the crime to which he had plead guilty until October 7, 1970.
[76]*76Defendant’s argument that he was in effect sentenced and judgment was pronounced against him when the court entered its order of February 6, 1969, and re-sentenced October 7, 1970, for the crime of adultery is without merit.
The granting of probation is not the imposition of sentence nor its equivalent. Gehl v. People, 161 Colo. 535, 423 P.2d 332, 334; In re Williams’ Petition, 145 Mont. 45, 399 P.2d 732, 736-739; Commonwealth ex rel. Paige v. Smith, 130 Pa.Super. 536, 198 A. 812, 813-815; Connor v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 455, 150 S.E.2d 478, 480; State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 152 W.Va. 500, 165 S.E.2d 90, 94. Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 31 L.Ed.2d 484. Although it has been said there is a basic difference between “probation” and “parole” in that probation relates to judicial action taken before the prison door is closed, whereas parole relates to executive or administrative action taken after the door has been closed on a convict, State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 351, 154 S.E.2d 476, 479, both follow conviction and imposition of sentence, Cole v. Holliday, 171 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 1969), unless otherwise explicitly authorized by statute.
II. The right to defer imposition of a sentence in a criminal case is not inherent but is regulated by statute and can only be exercised in accordance with the terms of the statute. As tending to support this principle see Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 1296, 232 N.W. 798, 799 and State v. Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 1049-1050, 14 N.W.2d 676, 678.
This appears to be the general rule. Pete v. State, 379 P.2d 625 (Alaska 1963) (power to suspend sentences is not inherent in the judicial branch of government, but that power exists only when conferred upon the judiciary by the legislature) ; Peterson v. Flood, 84 Ariz. 256, 326 P.2d 845 (the power of a court to suspend sentence is not an inherent power but exists solely by virtue of statute and may be exercised only in accordance therewith); State v. Van Meter, 7 Ariz.App. 422, 440 P.2d 58, 64 (in accord with earlier statement); Fayad v. Superior Court, 153 Cal.App.2d 79, 313 P.2d 669 (authority of court to suspend imposition or execution of sentence in a criminal case and to place defendant on probation is wholly statutory, and statute furnishes and limits measure of authority which the court may exercise) ; State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. In & For County of Clark, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (trial courts do not have inherent power to suspend imposition or execution of sentence and can order such suspension only as authorized by statute and such statutory power must be strictly construed) ; and State ex rel. Woodhouse v. Dore, 69 Wash.2d 64, 416 P.2d 670 (power of court to defer imposition of sentence in criminal case, as with the power to suspend sentence, must come expressly from the legislature).
Federal courts have been expressly authorized to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place a defendant on probation by the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C.A. section 3651 which provides in part:
“Suspension of sentence and probation. Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
«⅜ * * »
States having probation acts in addition to those listed in Shepard’s Acts and Cases by Popular Names as disclosed by our research include, Florida (Statutes Annotated, vol. 24, chapter 948, section 948.01 (3)); Minnesota (Statutes Annotated, chap[77]*77ter 609, section 609.135); Mississippi (Code Annotated, section 4004—23); New Jersey (Statutes Annotated, Title 2A, chapter 168, section 1) ; Ohio (3 Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, Titles 19-29); Utah (8 Utah Code Annotated, 77-35-17), which brings the total to 27.
III. The problem is whether section 247.20 set out, supra, explicitly authorizes the procedure adopted by the court in the case before us.
As indicated in division I, supra, defendant maintains this statute does not authorize a trial court in a criminal proceedings to defer imposition of sentence and place a defendant convicted by plea or verdict of guilty on probation.
The State does not dispute the principle of law that the authority to suspend sentences and grant probation is purely statutory, the court having no inherent power to do so. It contends, however, that such authority was granted in section 247.20 as it first appeared in The Code, 1966. As originally enacted what is now section 247.-20 provided, “The court * * * shall have the power to suspend the execution of the sentence * * This section was repealed by the Sixtieth General Assembly, chapter 159, section 1, and the 1966 statute was enacted as a substitute. The word “execution” was dropped by the revised statute. This section appears unchanged in The Code, 1971.
The State points to this portion of the revised statute as pertinent to the problem:
“ * * * the trial court * * * may by record entry at time of or after sentence is pronounced * * * suspend the sentence and grant probation * * * during good behavior.” (Emphasis in State’s argument.)
The State concedes in written brief and argument that section 247.20 has been consistently applied to situations involving the power of the court to suspend execution of sentences and frankly admits that research discloses no case where this section has been used to uphold the power of the court to suspend imposition of sentences. It maintains, however, that the statute as now written is inclusive of both situations.
The underlying contention of the State’s argument is that the language “at the time of or after sentence is pronounced” clearly defines two points in time. One point in time is defined as after sentence is pronounced. The other, at time of sentence, can logically refer only to a point before sentence is pronounced, that is, before imposition. It insists that had the legislature wanted to provide only for power to suspend execution they would have left that part of the statute as it read in previous codes.
We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. In our opinion section 247.20 refers only to a suspended sentence and has no application to a deferred sentence. The two are not the same. A suspended sentence is one actually imposed but the execution thereof is thereafter suspended while a deferred sentence is never imposed unless defendant violates the condition of his probation.
In Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 268, 64 S.Ct. 113, 116, 88 L.Ed. 41, 43, this statement appears:
“The ten year legislative history of the Probation Act strongly suggests that Congress intended to draw a sharp distinction between the power to suspend execution of a sentence and the alternative power to defer its imposition.”
In the case under consideration judgment was not pronounced against defendant until October 7, 1970. Before that time there was no sentence to be suspended. Thus, the factual situation presented by the February 6, 1969, procedure involves deferring imposition of sentence and is not authorized by section 247.20.
The State’s argument that the statute defines two points in time is without [78]*78merit. We construe the words “at time of” as meaning “simultaneously with” rather than “prior to.” As support for our construction of the quoted words see Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp. (S.D.N.Y.), 104 F.Supp. 957, 960, where the district court was interpreting a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
IV. There is thus left for consideration the consequence of the trial court’s failure to comply with section 247.20, The Code.
Defendant urges that since the trial court suspended the pronouncement of sentence without statutory authority, it was without jurisdiction to revoke the unauthorized order and impose sentence October 7, 1970. People v. Penn, 302 Ill. 488, 135 N.E. 92; Warner v. State, 194 Ind. 426, 143 N.E. 288; Ex Parte Brown (Mo.App.), 297 S.W. 445; Collins v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 117, 217 P. 896, cited by defendant in support of his contention, involve the indefinite postponement of sentence. The cited cases do not aid defendant since in the case under consideration imposition of sentence was not deferred indefinitely but to a day certain, March 1, 1970.
The State refers the court to State v. Stevens, 47 Iowa 276, 278 and State v. Ray, 50 Iowa 520, 521, wherein sentence was not immediately pronounced following a verdict or plea of guilty.
In Stevens defendant entered a plea of guilty on the last da}'- of the term and requested that the cause be continued, which request was granted. Because the record did not show any objection to the continuance the court presumed that six hours did not intervene between the filing of the plea and the final adjournment of the term; therefore, under the terms of the statute the trial court did not err in failing to pronounce judgment at the term at which the plea was filed. With regard to the lapse of 17 months before sentence was pronounced, the court observed:
“Whether a term of court was held after that at which the plea of guilty was filed and before the term in which judgment was pronounced does not appear from the record. In the absence of a showing that such term was held we will presume that judgment was entered at the next term after the plea and continuance.”
In Ray defendant was convicted during the January term of 1877. However, the court did not render judgment upon the verdict until the August term of the same year. The court stated: “ * * * It is insisted that the court could not render judgment after the term, but our attention is called to no statute or decision which supports the position. We discover no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.”
We do not consider the cited cases helpful to a solution of the problem.
There can be no doubt that a court has judicial power to defer the pronouncement of judgment for the purpose of hearing and determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of judgment or for such reasonable time as may be necessary to complete an investigation of the accused’s record, his family life and other facts bearing upon his likelihood of reformation in order to determine a just and appropriate sentence. Such procedure does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to later impose a valid sentence where a definite time has been fixed for imposition of sentence. Otherwise, it is not within the power of the court to defer the pronouncement of sentence after conviction in the absence of statutory authority.
The order of February 6, 1969, was void insofar as it attempted to place defendant on probation without the imposition of sentence.
However, where pronouncement of sentence has been suspended for a fixed time, as here, the case remains on the court docket until disposed of by final judgment. Jurisdiction of the district court continued over the case and defendant until disposed of by imposition of a valid sentence.
[79]*79Defendant’s contention considered in this division is without merit.
V. We wish to emphasize that the conclusion the trial court was without judicial power to defer imposition of sentence and place defendant, who had been convicted by a plea of guilty, on probation, is based on absence of statutory authority which can only come from the legislature. We call the attention of the legislature to the number of jurisdictions, both state and federal, which have enacted statutes granting trial courts such judicial power.
The case is therefore
Affirmed.
All Justices concur except McCORMICK, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ., who concur specially.