[Cite as State v. Wells, 2024-Ohio-236.]
COURT OF APPEALS COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Andew J. King, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2023 CA 0021 SHAWN H. WELLS : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 0148
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 24, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
E. MARIE SEIBER KATELYNN R. DAVIS Assistant Coshocton Publilc Defender Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 239 N. Fourth Street 318 Chestnut St. Coshocton, OH 43812 Coshocton, OH 43812 Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 2
Gwin, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Shawn H. Wells [“Wells”] appeals from the May 25,
2023 and the May 31, 2023 Judgment Entries of the Coshocton County Court of Common
Pleas overruling his motion to suppress evidence.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On December 19, 2022, Wells was indicted with one count of Possession
of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A)/ 2925.11(C)(11)(a).
{¶3} On April 17, 2023, Wells filed a motion to suppress. [Docket Entry No. 20].
The state responded on May 15, 2023. [Docket Entry No. 23]. On May 18, 2023 a hearing
was held on the motion to suppress. The following evidence was presented during the
hearing on Wells’ motion to suppress1.
{¶4} On July 18, 2022, at approximately 12:55 a.m., Deputy Jeremy Johnson
was on duty as a road patrol officer for the Coshocton County Sheriff’s Office when he
came upon an unoccupied pickup truck blocking an alleyway in the City of Coshocton.
When looking inside the vehicle, Deputy Johnson spotted a large knife open on the
console. Deputy Johnson first radioed a dispatcher to report the license plate number,
and then checked with neighbors to locate the owner of the truck. Deputy Johnson was
on the scene for a brief period of time when he spotted Wells running toward the truck
carrying a gallon jug of gasoline. Wells resided near the location of his disabled truck.
{¶5} Deputy Johnson's body cam video, State’s Exhibit 1, shows Deputy
Johnson and another deputy allow Wells to move freely in and about the disabled truck
1 The facts are taken in part from the May 25, 2023 Judgment Entry overruling Wells’ motion to
suppress. [Docket Entry No. 31]. Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 3
in search of an item Wells could use as a funnel to pour the gasoline. At one point the
deputies allowed Wells to use a knife to cut into a plastic water bottle. Ultimately, Wells
poured the gasoline through a paper funnel and then started cranking the ignition. After
many unsuccessful attempts, Deputy Johnson finally said, "Shawn, could you just do me
a favor? Step out and give that thing a break for a minute."
{¶6} Deputy Johnson then asks Wells, "You don't have any more weapons on
you? No more knives, guns, anything?" Wells denies having any weapons, and Deputy
Johnson then asks, "Do you mind if I search for weapons and contraband then?" Initially,
Wells responds by saying, "I don't see what the point is." Deputy Johnson asks again,
and Wells replies, "I don't have anything on me. You can search me if you want."
{¶7} Deputy Johnson then conducted a search of Wells’ including his pockets
and observed a tin foil packet, something the deputy believed to be illegal narcotics, in
Wells’ right cargo pocket. As a second deputy, Joseph Corpman, was going to retrieve
gloves, Wells began to flee. Both deputies chased after Wells. Deputy Corpman caught
up to Wells first and tried to restrain him; however, Wells resisted and attempted to get
away. When Deputy Johnson caught up, he shoved both Wells and Deputy Corpman to
the ground. Due to Wells continued resistance, he was tazed in the back of the leg. Wells
was then handcuffed and returned to the scene where the vehicle was located. Wells was
then searched incident to arrest and the tin foil packet was removed from Wells’ pocket.
BCI testing confirmed that the tin foil packet found in Wells’ right pants pocket contained
Fentanyl.
{¶8} By Judgment Entry filed May 25, 2023, the trial judge denied Wells’ motion
to suppress. On May 30, 2023, Wells filed a Motion for additional findings concerning the Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 4
search of Wells’ pockets. [Docket Entry No. 32]. By Judgment Entry filed May 31, 2023,
the trial judge made the additional findings. [Docket Entry No. 33].
{¶9} A change of plea hearing was held on June 20, 2023. Wells appeared with
counsel and agreed to enter a plea of no contest to the single count found within the
indictment, Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a felony of the fifth degree. The
judge accepted the plea of no contest and found Wells guilty. Sentence was deferred
pending a pre-sentence investigation report.
{¶10} On August 8, 2023, Wells and counsel appeared for sentencing. Wells was
sentenced to Community Control Sanctions for a period of three years. Wells was advised
that if he violated the terms and conditions of community sanctions, he shall be sentenced
to a definite term of incarceration up to six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve
months in a state penal institution. Wells was ordered to pay the Public Defender fee, a
monthly supervision fee, and the costs of prosecution. Bond was released.
Assignments of Error
{¶11} Wells raises two Assignments of Error,
{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT WAS UNLAWFULLY ORDERED TO EXIT HIS
VEHICLE.
{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH EXCEEDED THE CONSENT
GIVEN AND THE LIMITS OF A TERRY SEARCH.”
I. & II.
{¶14} In his First Assignment of Error, Wells argues that the trial judge erred in
denying his Motion to Suppress because Wells was unlawfully ordered to exit his vehicle . Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 5
In his Second Assignment of Error, Wells contends the scope of the search by Deputy
Johnson of Wells’ pockets exceeded the consent given by Wells and the limits of a Terry
pat-down frisk.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶15} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d
71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness
credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988;
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing
court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists
to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio
App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,
675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as
true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the
applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio
App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial
court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra.
Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that
Wells voluntarily consented to the search of his pockets. Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 6
{¶16} Contact between police officers and the public can be characterized in three
different ways. State v. Richardson, 5th Dist. No. 2004CA00205, 2005-Ohio-554 at ¶ 23-
27. The first is contact initiated by a police officer for purposes of investigation. “[M]erely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place [,]” seeking to ask
questions for voluntary, uncoerced responses, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1990). The United State Supreme
Court “[has] held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.”
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); see also
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). “[E]ven when
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual's identification; and request
consent to search his or her luggage.” Bostick, supra, at 434-435, 111 S.Ct. 2382
(citations omitted). The person approached, however, need not answer any question put
to him, and may continue on his way. Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 497-98.
Moreover, he may not be detained even momentarily for his refusal to listen or answer.”
501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389.
{¶17} The second type of contact is generally referred to as “a Terry stop” and is
predicated upon reasonable suspicion. Richardson, supra; Flowers, 909 F.2d at 147; See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968). This temporary detention,
although a seizure, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under the Terry doctrine,
“certain seizures are justifiable ... if there is articulable suspicion that a person has
committed or is about to commit a crime” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct.
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229(1983). In holding that the police officer's actions were reasonable Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 7
under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist provided the following discussion of the
holding in Terry:
In Terry this Court recognized that a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest. The Fourth Amendment does not
require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary
for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime
to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it
may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.
A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,
may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612(1972).
{¶18} The Fourth Amendment requires that officers have had a “reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety” before frisking. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968). Specifically, “[t]he officer ... must be able to articulate something
more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Whether that standard is met must be
determined “‘from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,”’ without
reference to “the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” United States v. Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 8
Hill ,131 F.3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997), (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996)).
{¶19} The third type of contact arises when an officer has “probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and the person stopped committed it.” Richardson,
supra; Flowers, 909 F.2d at 147. A warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid if: “[a]t the
moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it, whether at that
moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the * * * [individual] had committed or was committing an offense.” State v. Heston,
29 Ohio St.2d 152, 155-156, 280 N.E.2d 376(1972), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142(1964). “The principal components of a determination of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to
the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or
to probable cause.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134
L.Ed.2d 911(1996). A police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in
deciding whether probable cause exists. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz (1975), 422 U.S.
891, 897, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623(1975).
{¶20} In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389(1991),
the United States Supreme Court reiterated that,
[A] consensual encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n.
16, 20 L. Ed.2d 889. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 9
particular individual, they may generally ask the individual questions,
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 310-311, 83 L.Ed.2d
165, ask to examine identification, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104
S.Ct. 1758, 1762-1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247, and request consent to search
luggage, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75
L.Ed.2d 229, provided they do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required.
501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389. The courts in Ohio have taken a
similar approach:
Because the vehicle was parked, appellant was not subjected to a
seizure per se as happens when a motorist is stopped in transit by a police
officer. Numerous Ohio courts ... have held that a police approach and
encounter with a stationary vehicle is consensual in nature, thereby making
the Fourth Amendment inapplicable. See, e.g., State v. Welz (Dec. 9, 1994),
Lake App. No. 93-L-137, unreported; Cuyahoga Falls v. Sandstrom (June
21, 1995), Summit App. No. 17000, unreported; State v. Kiggans (Nov. 20,
1995), Stark App. No. 1995CA00157, unreported; State v. Osborne (Dec.
13, 1995), Montgomery App. No. CA 15151, unreported.
State v. Lott, 11th Dist. No. 96-A-0011, 1997 WL 799426(Dec. 26, 1997) at *5.
{¶21} In the case at bar, the deputies did not stop Wells or his vehicle. As the trial
judge found, the deputies were simply rendering aid to a disabled vehicle blocking a public
alleyway. Wells was not compelled to remain at the scene by the officers; rather, his car
was blocking the public alleyway and he needed to move it. After putting gasoline in the Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 10
tank and several unsuccessful attempts to start the engine, the circumstances warranted
a different approach. Deputy Johnson simply asked Wells to step out so the situation
could be assessed. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a police officer's statement
“Hey, come here a minute,” while nominally couched in the form of a demand, is actually
a request that a citizen is free to regard or to disregard. State v. Smith, 45 Ohio St.3d 255,
258–259, 544 N.E.2d 239, 242(1989), reversed sub nom. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541,
110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464(1990)2; State v. Crossen, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 2010-
COA-027, 2011-Ohio-2509, ¶13. Accordingly, Deputy Johnson’s approach and encounter
with a stationary vehicle was consensual in nature, thereby making the Fourth
Amendment inapplicable.
{¶22} Upon review, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the
events in the case sub judice constituted a consensual encounter such that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct.
1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497(1980).
{¶23} Wells next contends that the search of his pockets was not authorized by
his consent to be searched.
{¶24} It is well-established a defendant waives his or her Fourth Amendment
protection by consenting to a warrantless search. State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203,
208, 495 N.E.2d 922 (1986), citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 1256,
90 L.Ed. 1453(1946), Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36
2 The United States Supreme Court held that an incident search may not precede an arrest and
serve as part of its justification. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990). The Court further found that the defendant did not abandon the paper bag when he threw it on his car and turned to face the officer. Id. at 543, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L.Ed.2d 464. Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 11
L.Ed.2d 854(1973), State v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 23 Ohio St.3d 141, 491 N.E.2d
1129(1986).
{¶25} In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of consent searches in police investigations, noting that “a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence” to
apprehend a criminal. 412 U.S. at 227-228, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. See, State v.
Fry, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 03CA26, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 18. The United States Supreme
Court further noted: “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that
people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates
the consensual nature of the response.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S.Ct.
1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205, 122 S.Ct.
2105, 2113, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002). Moreover, a voluntary consent need not amount to
a waiver; consent can be voluntary without being an “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 235,
93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58
S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 495 N.E.2d
922 (1986); State v. McConnell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00048, 2002-Ohio-5300, 2002
WL 31270071, ¶ 8. Rather, the proper test is whether the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates that the consent was voluntary. Id. “Voluntary consent, determined under
the totality of the circumstances, may validate an otherwise illegal detention and search.”
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 241, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997).
{¶26} It is important to keep in mind, however, that an individual may limit the
scope of his consent to search, and he may revoke that consent entirely. See, e.g., United Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 12
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242; Painter v.
Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 1999). Of course, an item properly seized prior to
the withdrawal of consent is not subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Riggins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C0306262, 2004-Ohio-4247, 2004 WL 1800714.
{¶27} The prevailing rule among Ohio courts is that consent to a search may be
limited in time, duration, area, and intensity or may be revoked at any time, even after the
search has begun. See Lakewood v. Smith, 1 Ohio St.2d 128, 130, 205 N.E.2d 388
(1965); State v. Crawford, 151 Ohio App.3d 784, 2003-Ohio-902, 786 N.E.2d 83 (2nd
Dist.); State v. Mack, 118 Ohio App.3d 516, 519, 693 N.E.2d 821 (6th Dist. 1997); State
v. Rojas, 92 Ohio App.3d 336, 635 N.E.2d 66 (8th Dist. 1993); State v. Arrington, 96 Ohio
App.3d 375, 645 N.E.2d 96 (12th Dist. 1994).
{¶28} The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the
Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness-what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803–04, 114 L.Ed.2d
297 (1991), citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111
L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326-
1327, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.); id., at 514, 103 S.Ct. at 1332
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). The scope of a search is defined by its expressed purpose
or by the nature of the object being sought. See Jimeno, citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); see, also, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S.Ct. at 2457, 159 L.Ed.2d
292(2004). Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 13
{¶29} The Second District Court of Appeals held that when a suspect consents to
a pat down for weapons, and the officer retrieves and opens an object that is not a
weapon, the officer has exceeded the consent of the search. State v. Crawford, 2nd Dist.
No. 19316, 151 Ohio App.3d 784, 2003-Ohio-902, 786 N.E.2d 83. See, State v. Snow,
5th Dist. Knox No. 20CA00021, 2021-Ohio-3644, ¶37. In Crawford, the officer asked the
defendant if he can perform a quick pat down for weapons. Id. The defendant consents.
Id. The officer found a piece of paper folded into a triangle and wrapped in a tissue. Id.
Upon opening the paper the officer noted it was full of cocaine. Id. The Second District
Court of Appeals held that once the officer retrieved the tissue and noted that it did not
contain a weapon and that the officer could bend the paper, the officer was not permitted
to open the paper. Id.
{¶30} In State v. Arrington, the officer asked to search the defendant’s purse for
weapons. Arrington at 376. See, State v. Snow, 5th Dist. Knox No. 20CA00021, 2021-
Ohio-3644, ¶39. The defendant consented to a search for weapons in the purse. Id. The
officer found a cigarette case inside the purse, opened it and found crack cocaine. Id. The
Twelfth District Court of Appeals held the defendant consented to a search of her purse
for weapons, but a further search of the cigarette case inside her purse clearly exceeded
the scope of the defendant’s consent. Id. at 378.
{¶31} At the suppression hearing, there was testimony that Deputy Johnson
asked Wells for permission to search his person for “weapons or contraband.” T. at 19;
State’s Exhibit 1. We find that the trial court did not err in finding that the consent to search Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0021 14
was voluntary, uncoerced and valid, and included the search of Wells’ pockets. At the
point Deputy Johnson observed the tin foil package, Wells fled and resisted the deputies.3
{¶32} We are unpersuaded that Wells acted under coercion or merely submitted
to a claim of lawful authority. We are further unpersuaded that the search of Wells’
pockets exceeded the scope of Wells’ consent. Based on the totality of the circumstances
presented, we conclude that Wells gave clear, open-ended permission to Deputy Johnson
to search his person, including his pockets, for weapons or contraband.
{¶33} The trial judge did not err in denying the Motion to Suppress.
{¶34} Wells’ First and Second Assignments of Error are overruled.
{¶35} The judgment of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, J.,
Delaney, P.J., and
King, J., concur
3 The trial judge made no finding with respect to a search incident to arrest.