State v. Wardlaw

2025 Ohio 2221

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 114376
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wardlaw, 2025-Ohio-2221.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff- Appellee, : No. 114376 v. :

CHARLES WARDLAW, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

_______________________________________

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 26, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-22-675091-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora Bryan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Charles Wardlaw (“Wardlaw”), appeals his

convictions for multiple counts of rape, gross sexual imposition, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and solicitation. His convictions arise from unlawful sexual

conduct involving three minors: T.M., J.G., and K.S., which is alleged to have

occurred intermittently over a period of 20 years. Wardlaw raises the following

assignments of error:

1. The appellant’s conviction cannot be upheld as the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellant’s motion to sever counts.

2. The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the counts relating to KS for preindictment delay.

3. The appellant’s conviction(s) cannot be upheld as it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

4. The trial court erred by permitting the state of Ohio to play JG’s video statement made to CCDCFS.

5. The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the sexually violent predator specifications.

Based upon our review of the record, we affirm Wardlaw’s convictions.

Specifically, we find assignments of error Nos. 1 and 2 lack merit because Wardlaw

failed to demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice due to either the joinder of

these offenses or from the preindictment delay relating to K.S. We further find that

the State met its burden of persuasion in these matters and, therefore, Wardlaw’s

convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court

also did not abuse its discretion in allowing the videotaped interview of J.G. at trial

because the interview was conducted for medical diagnosis and treatment. We

further find that there was sufficient evidence supporting Wardlaw’s classification

as a sexually violent predator. Accordingly, Wardlaw’s five assignments of error are overruled, and we

affirm his convictions.

I. Procedural History, Trial, and Sentencing

A. Procedural History

In March 2023, Wardlaw was indicted on two counts of rape, one count

of gross sexual imposition, and two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor

involving T.M.; two counts of rape, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and one

count of solicitation involving J.G.; and one count of gross sexual imposition

involving K.S. Sexually violent predator specifications pursuant to R.C. 2971.01

were also included in the indictment. Wardlaw pleaded not guilty on all counts.

Relevant to this appeal, Wardlaw timely filed pretrial motions

requesting the trial court to sever the counts of the indictment under Crim.R. 14 and

to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment relating to K.S. due to preindictment delay.

Both motions were argued before the trial court and denied. Wardlaw timely

renewed these motions during trial preserving these issues for appeal.

B. Relevant Trial Evidence

In August 2024, this matter proceeded to trial before a jury. The

evidence at trial consisted of live witness testimony including detailed testimony

from T.M., J.G., and K.S. Several recorded interviews with Wardlaw, J.G., and child-

protection specialist Stephanie Moore (“Moore”) were also admitted and played for

the jury. In general, the State presented its evidence organized by the allegations

made by T.M., J.G., and K.S. and concluded with testimony by law enforcement summarizing their investigations that led to Wardlaw’s indictment. Expert witness

testimony was also introduced regarding the analysis and results of DNA testing

relevant to T.M.

1. T.M.

In January 2019, T.M. was 13 years old and in eighth grade. She

attended school with J.G. T.M and J.G. were best friends. T.M. also lived in the

same apartment complex as Wardlaw, who was J.G.’s stepfather. At this time,

Wardlaw and J.G.’s mother were separated, but J.G. continued to spend time and

stay with Wardlaw at his apartment.

On January 5, 2019, T.M. and J.G. arranged to have a sleepover at

Wardlaw’s apartment. T.M. and J.G. frequently spent the night at each other’s

homes, but this was the first time they spent the night at Wardlaw’s apartment. T.M.

and J.G. arrived at Wardlaw’s apartment in the early evening. They testified that

Wardlaw told them they could have alcohol and marijuana, and they all drank and

smoked together until Wardlaw left for work shortly before midnight.

Wardlaw returned home from work sometime during the middle of the

night. T.M. testified that she and J.G. were still drinking and smoking while T.M.

was flat ironing J.G.’s hair in the bathroom. Wardlaw and the girls then continued

to drink and smoke together.

At some point during the night, T.M. testified that Wardlaw asked the

girls to come into his bedroom and watch a movie. T.M. did not want to go into the

bedroom, but J.G. asked her to because she did not want to go alone. The girls went to the bedroom, and Wardlaw put on a movie for them to watch. J.G. fell asleep.

T.M. tried to wake her, but Wardlaw told her to leave her alone and to come over by

him. Wardlaw then turned off the television and put on music.

Wardlaw started to touch and kiss T.M.’s neck and arms. Wardlaw

started to rub her and tried to take her pants off. T.M. tried to keep her pants on but

eventually gave up fighting him. Wardlaw started to “dry hump” her from behind.

Wardlaw then rolled T.M. over and got on top of her. He started to

dry hump her again. Wardlaw kept asking her if she liked it, and she would nod yes

because she was scared. T.M. testified that Wardlaw had his hand over her mouth

and had another arm holding her down.

T.M. testified that Wardlaw inserted the tip of his penis into her

vagina, but it hurt. She started to make noise due to the pain. He stopped. He did,

however, continue to rub her and “dry hump” her.

T.M. told Wardlaw she needed to go to the bathroom. When she went

to the bathroom, she grabbed her belongings and ran out of the apartment. T.M.

went home and immediately took a shower because she felt disgusting. She also

tried calling and messaging her mother asking her where she was and to come home.

After her shower, T.M. got into her mother’s bed and cried.

T.M.’s mother testified that she had spent the night at her boyfriend’s

apartment. She further testified that when she woke up, she saw the missed calls

and messages from T.M. She went home immediately and found T.M. crying in her

bed. T.M.’s mother asked T.M. what was wrong but did not get an

immediate answer. T.M.’s mother testified that she then called Wardlaw to ask what

had happened and he responded that he did not rape her daughter. T.M. then

reported to her that Wardlaw had forced himself on her.

T.M.’s mother took her to the emergency room where T.M. was

examined, and a rape kit was collected by a sexual assault nurse examiner. The

forensic scientists from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation who conducted

the analysis of the specimens from the rape kit testified that Wardlaw’s DNA was

present on T.M.’s neck, cheek, and on the front and back panels of her underwear.

In his statements to the Euclid Police Department (“EPD”), Wardlaw

provided three separate versions regarding the alleged incident with T.M. In his first

statement, dated January 6, 2019, Wardlaw stated that he did not touch T.M. at all

and she was gone when he woke up in the morning. On January 17, 2019, Wardlaw

called the EPD and amended his statement to say that he woke up to T.M.

masturbating him and he kicked her out of the apartment. On March 7, 2019,

Wardlaw again called the EPD and stated that T.M. slid under the bed sheets and

started grabbing his penis. He told her to stop, or he would tell her mom. T.M. then

went to the other room but did not leave. In February, 2019, T.M. and her mother moved to Baltimore,

Maryland and eventually to Germany where T.M. and her family live to date.

2. J.G.

J.G. is Wardlaw’s stepdaughter. J.G. met Wardlaw when she was two

years old. Wardlaw and J.G.’s mother later married, and J.G. lived with Wardlaw

starting when she was six or seven years old. She testified that Wardlaw was a father

figure to her and that she cared for him. Wardlaw and J.G.’s mother had one child

together, J.G.’s younger brother.

J.G. testified that when she was approximately 12 years old and in the

seventh grade, Wardlaw started doing things that made her uncomfortable. The

first time he made her feel uncomfortable, she and her younger brother were

watching a movie with Wardlaw in his bed. Her brother fell asleep. Wardlaw started

thrusting his penis on her backside. Wardlaw’s clothes were on, but J.G. could feel

his hard penis against her back.

She also testified that Wardlaw frequently offered to pay her and her

brother money or to buy them stuff if they rubbed his feet. Then, after her brother

would leave the room, J.G. stated that Wardlaw would ask her to do other things.

She testified that he asked her numerous times to touch his penis with her hands

until he ejaculated. J.G. would do it because Wardlaw would buy her things or get

her out of trouble with her mother.

J.G. testified that on numerous occasions, Wardlaw would slide his

penis in between her legs while both of them had their pants off. She testified that his penis touched her vagina but did not go inside and Wardlaw would ejaculate.

Again, J.G. testified that she would do these things to get out of trouble or so that

Wardlaw would buy her things.

J.G. further testified that on one occasion when she was 12 and in

seventh grade, Wardlaw put his penis in her mouth until he ejaculated.

J.G. also testified that Wardlaw once put a note under her bedroom

door stating, “If you make daddy come, I’ll give you ten dollars.”

J.G. testified that after Wardlaw moved out, these things stopped for

a while. Sometime later, Wardlaw started asking her to touch his penis with her

hands again. This only happened a few times at Wardlaw’s apartment.

J.G. testified that at the beginning of her freshmen year of high

school, she texted Wardlaw that she was upset that he did these things and she did

not understand why he did them. She said Wardlaw ultimately said he was sorry,

and he had never done that before. After he apologized, there were no more

incidents.

In May 2022, J.G. disclosed to her mother what Wardlaw had been

doing to her. J.G. had previously told two friends about the abuse, and both friends

testified that they told her to tell her mom, but J.G. did not feel comfortable

disclosing the abuse at that time. Later, J.G. told her aunt about the abuse and she

encouraged J.G. to tell her mom. After J.G. told her mother, the two of them went

to the EPD and reported Wardlaw. J.G. testified that she did not previously disclose Wardlaw’s abuse for

many reasons, including that she was scared, did not want to hurt her family, did

not want to take her brother’s father away from him, and did not think her mother

would believe her and because she cared about the defendant and did not want to

get him into trouble.

3. K.S.

K.S. is the biological daughter of Wardlaw. Wardlaw and her mother

were never married, and K.S. never resided with Wardlaw. K.S. did, however,

sporadically visit Wardlaw when she was younger.

In 1999, K.S. was five years old. She was with Wardlaw and his then

girlfriend Chyna. K.S., Wardlaw, and Chyna went to dinner together and then came

back to Wardlaw’s apartment. K.S. was in the living room watching television when

she heard an abnormal noise coming from the bedroom. When she went to the

bedroom to see what it was, K.S. testified that she saw Wardlaw and Chyna engaged

in intercourse with a video camera set up to record. K.S. testified that Wardlaw did

not ask her to leave but K.S. left the room. After this encounter, K.S. testified that

Chyna left the apartment.

Later that evening, K.S. was watching television in Wardlaw’s bed and

fell asleep. She testified that she woke up to find Wardlaw’s hand in her pants

touching her vagina. He stopped when she woke up and acted like nothing

happened. K.S. called her mother and asked her to come pick her up. When they

were in the car, K.S. told her mother what Wardlaw had done. After that, she did

not see Wardlaw again until she was 18 or 19 years old.

In 2008, K.S. and her mother moved to Atlanta, Georgia. In 2012,

K.S. testified that Wardlaw’s then wife, J.G.’s mother, called her to let K.S. know she

had a half-brother. K.S. wanted to have a relationship with him so she traveled to

Cleveland to meet him.

This visit was the first time she saw Wardlaw since the incident.

When questioned as to why she did not disclose Wardlaw’s abuse, she testified that

she was trying to look past it and that she was young and did not really understand

what had happened. She also stated that she wanted to move on, forgive Wardlaw,

and get to know her brother.

After this meeting, she did not keep in touch with Wardlaw. But she

did keep in touch with Wardlaw’s wife so that she could talk with her younger

brother. She further stated that she was friendly with J.G. but did not keep in touch

with her.

In May 2022, K.S. testified that she got a frantic phone call from J.G.’s

mother. When J.G.’s mother told K.S. what Wardlaw had done to J.G., she disclosed

that Wardlaw had done the same thing to her too. Subsequently, K.S. received a

phone call from the EPD and K.S. advised them of what Wardlaw had done to her.. C. Verdict, Sentencing, and Sexually Violent Predator Specifications

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on

all counts. Wardlaw waived his right to a jury trial regarding whether he qualified

as a sexually violent predator. At the subsequent hearing, the parties agreed to adopt

the entire trial testimony and all exhibits from both the State and defense that were

admitted at trial and called no further witnesses. After hearing arguments from

counsel, the trial court classified Wardlaw as a sexually violent predator under

R.C. 2971.01(H)(2)(a), (c), and (f). Wardlaw was sentenced to life in prison with the

first chance of parole after 59 years.

II. Assignment of Error No. 1 – Joinder & Severance

Wardlaw’s first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred

in failing to sever the counts of the indictment due to prejudicial joinder under

Crim.R. 14. Specifically, Wardlaw argues that a separate trial should have been held

regarding each victim. He also contends that the initial joinder of offenses under

Crim.R. 8(A) was inappropriate. We find, however, that the counts were properly

joined in a single indictment under Crim.R. 8(A) because they were of same or

similar character and that Wardlaw failed to demonstrate that he suffered actual

prejudice by the joinder as required by Crim.R. 14. Therefore, this assignment of

error is overruled. A. Standard of Review

“We review the trial court’s decision on joinder for an abuse of

discretion.” State v. Lee, 2017-Ohio-1449, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Dean,

2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 58. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its

judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. “The

defendant ‘“bears the burden of proving prejudice and of proving that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying severance.”’” Lee at ¶ 15, quoting Dean at ¶ 60,

quoting State v Brinkley, 2005-Ohio-1507, ¶ 29.

B. Joinder of Offenses Under Crim.R. 8(A)

Crim.R. 8(A) governs the joinder of offenses in a single indictment.

Crim.R. 8(A) provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal conduct.

If the requirements of Crim.R. 8(A) are satisfied, joining multiple offenses in a single

trial is favored because it conserves judicial resources, lessens the inconvenience to

witnesses, and minimizes the possibility of inconsistent results before different

juries. State v. Anderson, 2017-Ohio-931, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Torres,

66 Ohio St.2d 340 (1981). Further, joinder is to be “liberally permitted.” State v.

Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 58 (1992). Pursuant to Crim.R. 8(A), this court has consistently affirmed the

joinder of multiple offenses arising from unlawful sexual conduct such as rape and

gross sexual imposition involving multiple victims including minors because they

are of the “same or similar character.” See, e.g., State v. Kramer-Kelly,

2023-Ohio-1031, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.) (rape and kidnapping of two unrelated victims on

separate dates); State v. Salti, 2019-Ohio-149, ¶ 52 (8th Dist.) (rape and kidnapping

of eight unrelated victims over a period of two years); State v. Hernandez,

2018-Ohio-738, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (rape, kidnapping and gross sexual imposition of

two minors); State v. Belle, 2019-Ohio-787, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (rape and kidnapping of

three minors over a period 15 years). Accordingly, we find that the initial joinder in

this matter to be proper.

C. Severance Under Crim.R. 14

In turn, Crim.R. 14 provides relief from a prejudicial joinder.

Crim.R. 14 states:

If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder for trial together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide such other relief as justice requires.

Thus, under Crim.R. 14, a defendant may move to sever the charges

against him. “While there is always the possibility of prejudice from joinder of

offenses, once the state has concluded its case, the defendant bears the burden of

demonstrating actual prejudice from the joinder.” State v. Cisternino, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4856, *5 (8th Dist. Oct. 27, 1994), citing State v. Williams, 1 Ohio

App.3d 156, 159 (10th Dist. 1981); State v. Strobel, 51 Ohio App.3d 31, 32-33 (3d

Dist. 1988).

Specifically, the defendant must affirmatively show that his rights

were prejudiced. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at syllabus. The defendant “must show

‘compelling, specific, and actual prejudice from the court’s refusal to grant the

motion to sever.’” State v. Allen, 2010-Ohio-4644, ¶ 57 (5th Dist.), quoting United

States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir. 2005). A defendant seeking severance

must provide the trial court “‘sufficient information so that it can weigh the

considerations favoring joinder against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” State

v. Hand, 2006-Ohio-18, ¶ 166, quoting Torres at 343.

If the defendant successfully establishes prejudice from joinder, then

the burden shifts to the State to rebut the showing of prejudice in one of two ways.

State v. Jackson, 2015-Ohio-4274, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). Specifically, the State may rebut

defendant’s showing of prejudice by satisfying either the “joinder test” or the “other

acts test.” State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-1141, ¶ 80 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Lott, 51

Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). The “joinder test” is satisfied when the evidence

presented at trial is “simple and direct.” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787, at ¶ 24-25 (8th Dist.).

“‘Simple and direct evidence’ means the evidence of each crime is ‘so clearly separate

and distinct as to prevent the jury from considering evidence of one crime as

corroborative as the other.’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Quinones, 2005-Ohio-6576,

¶ 48 (11th Dist.). “Evidence is ‘simple and direct’ if the trier of fact is capable of segregating the proof required for each offense.” Id., citing State v. Gravely,

2010-Ohio-3379, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.).

“‘The purpose of the “joinder test” is to prevent the finder of fact from

confusing the offenses.’” Belle at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Varney, 2008-Ohio-5283,

¶ 19 (4th Dist.). Nonetheless, “a trier of fact is believed capable of segregating the

proof of multiple charges when the evidence as to each of the charges is

uncomplicated.” State v. Lunder, 2014-Ohio-5341, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), citing Torres at

343-344. Thus, “‘Ohio appellate courts routinely find no prejudicial joinder where

the evidence is presented in an orderly fashion as to the separate offenses or victims

without significant overlap or conflation of proof.’” State v. Echols, 2015-Ohio-5138,

¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Lewis, 2010-Ohio-4202, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.).

In turn, the “other acts” test is satisfied when the State shows that the

evidence of the other offenses would have been admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) as

“other acts” if the matters had been tried separately. Lott at 163. For example,

“under Evid.R. 404(B), evidence of other “bad acts” is admissible to establish,

among other things, the defendant’s identity, preparation, or plan. Evidence of

other “bad acts” establishing a defendant’s modus operandi may also be used to

identify the defendant.” Salti, 2019-Ohio-149, at ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). However, “when

the evidence is ‘simple and direct’ an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless

of the nonadmissibility of evidence of the crimes as other acts under Evid.R.

404(B).” Miller at ¶ 20, quoting Lott at 163. Consequently, “[i]f the state can meet the [requirements of] the joinder test, it need not meet the requirements of the

stricter ‘other acts’ test.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122 (1991).

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Failing to Sever the Counts of Wardlaw’s Indictment

In his brief, Wardlaw argues that “the facts and circumstances

surrounding the underlying allegations in the instant matter indicate that [he] could

only receive a fair trial if each incident were tried separately.” More specifically, he

contends that severance is necessary because the crimes are separated in time,

modus operandi, age, and relationship of the victims and the events themselves are

“extremely different.” Wardlaw, however, does not articulate how he was actually

and specifically prejudiced by these “facts.” Wardlaw’s conclusory and speculative

arguments are not sufficient to demonstrate prejudice by joinder. See, e.g., State v.

Porcher, 2011-Ohio-5976, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.) (conclusory allegations of prejudice

insufficient); Gravely, 2010-Ohio-3379, at ¶ 36 (10th Dist.) (speculative arguments

of prejudice insufficient); Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at 344 (speculative arguments of

prejudice insufficient).

Further, even if Wardlaw had demonstrated actual prejudice, the

State has successfully rebutted any prejudice under the joinder test. A thorough

review of the trial transcript in this matter demonstrates that the State presented its

evidence in an orderly fashion that could be easily understood by the jury. The State

first presented the evidence involving T.M., then the evidence involving J.G., and

then followed with the evidence involving K.S. The State concluded its evidence by introducing the interrelated evidence explaining the timing of disclosures by T.M.,

J.G., and K.S. and the investigation conducted by law enforcement after these

disclosures. While we recognize some witness testimony necessarily overlapped due

to the facts of this case, the record does not demonstrate that this overlap was

significant or resulted in such confusion to the jury that it would impair their ability

to properly segregate the proof relating to each victim and the corresponding

charges in this case.

Wardlaw also argues that this court’s decision in State v. Kramer-

Kelly, 2023-Ohio-1031 (8th Dist.), requires us to reverse the trial court’s decision.

We disagree. In Kramer-Kelly, this court reversed the trial court’s denial of

defendant’s motion for severance because the State could not rebut Kramer-Kelly’s

showing of prejudice by either the other acts or joinder test. Id. at ¶ 80, 84, and 90.

Notably, and contrary to Wardlaw’s assertion in his brief, the Kramer-Kelly Court

concluded that the initial joinder of the underlying offenses was proper under

Crim.R. 8(A). Id. at ¶ 69. Additionally, and in contrast to the present matter,

Kramer-Kelly clearly articulated six specific and separate bases for finding prejudice

due to joinder. Id. at ¶ 70-71. The Kramer-Kelly Court agreed that defendant was

prejudiced based upon these arguments. Id. at ¶ 71.

Accordingly, the Kramer-Kelly Court then addressed whether the

State had successfully rebutted the prejudice by either the joinder or other acts test.

Id. at ¶ 72. The court first addressed the other acts test. Id. at ¶ 73. While Kramer-

Kelly involved two separate rapes involving two victims, the facts relating to those rapes were drastically different from the present matter. Kramer-Kelly involved

rapes of two adult women unknown to each other and occurring on separate

occasions. Id. at ¶ 2. Kramer-Kelly’s defense to each incident was different and

included substantial impairment from alcohol and consent. Id. at ¶ 70. Based on

these facts, the Kramer-Kelly Court concluded that evidence from each offense

would not be admissible as “other acts” and, thus, the State did not satisfy the other

acts test. See generally id. at ¶ 73-84.

The Kramer-Kelly Court then concluded that the State also failed to

satisfy the joinder test. Id. at ¶ 85-90. The Kramer-Kelly Court specifically found

“the Kramer-Kelly’s trial was complex, confusing, and inherently inconsistent.” Id.

at ¶ 86. Further, the Kramer-Kelly Court found that the State presented its evidence

in a nonlinear fashion providing “no roadmap to the jury separating the testimony”

regarding witnesses, the witnesses would not be the same in both matters, and the

DNA evidence in the matter was overly complicated. Id. at ¶ 87-89.

As set forth above, the State’s presentation in this matter satisfied the

simple and direct test and Wardlaw did not provide us with any arguments that

would lead us to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in failing to sever the counts against Wardlaw. This assignment of error

is overruled.

III. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Preindictment Delay

In his second assignment of error, Wardlaw argues that his right to

due process was violated by the trial court’s failure to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment for gross sexual imposition relating to K.S. due to preindictment delay.

The incident involving K.S. and Wardlaw occurred sometime between 1999 and

2001 when she was five or six years old. K.S. did not report the incident to the police

until 2022. Wardlaw alleges that this delay caused him to suffer actual prejudice

because he no longer has access to his employment records, housing records, and

cell phone records and due to the unavailability of a witness known as Chyna. Based

upon the record before us, however, we find that Wardlaw failed to demonstrate

actual prejudice from the delay and, specifically, the exculpatory value of this lost

evidence. Therefore, we overrule this assignment of error.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss

on the grounds of preindictment delay for an abuse of discretion. Miller, 2021-Ohio-

1878, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 33. An abuse

of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way,

in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson, 2021-

Ohio-3304, at ¶ 35. Further, “‘[c]ourts reviewing a decision on a motion to dismiss

for pre-indictment delay accord deference to the lower court’s findings of fact but

engage in a de novo review of the lower court’s application of those facts to the law.’”

Miller at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Henley, 2006-Ohio-2728, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.); see also

State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling

on a motion to dismiss for preindictment delay, we apply a de novo standard of review to issues of law but afford great deference to the trial court’s findings of

fact.”).

B. Preindictment Delay Under Ohio Law

Preindictment delay generally refers to the time between the

commission of a crime by a defendant and the filing of formal charges by the

prosecution against the defendant for that crime. The United States Supreme Court

has “determined that a defendant is protected against any prejudice that may result

from the time delay between the alleged incident and indictment by the statute of

limitations.” State v. Anderson, 2022-Ohio-1313, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Cruz, 2019-Ohio-768, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322

(1971). Indeed, it is the statute of limitations for a crime that provides the “‘primary

guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.’” State v. Wade,

2008-Ohio-4574, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting Henley at ¶ 5, citing United States v.

Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977).

However, preindictment delay may still violate a defendant’s due

process rights despite the State’s initiation of prosecution within the statutorily

defined period when the delay causes actual prejudice to the defendant and is

unjustifiable. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588, at ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones,

2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 12; see also State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150, paragraph two of

the syllabus (1984). Consequently, the Ohio Supreme Court has “firmly established

a burden-shifting framework for analyzing a due process claim based on

preindictment delay.” Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 13. Under this framework, “[o]nce a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice, the burden shifts to the

state to produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay.” Id., citing State v.

Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 (1998); State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 99.

The burden is on the defendant to prove preindictment delay violated

their due process rights. State v. Bourn, 2022-Ohio-4321, ¶ 18. Courts have

routinely noted that this burden is “nearly insurmountable.” (Cleaned up.) Id.

Moreover, “prejudice is not presumed solely due to a lengthy delay.” State v.

Copeland, 2008-Ohio-234, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). “The possibility that memories will fade,

witnesses will become inaccessible, or evidence will be lost is not sufficient to

establish actual prejudice.” Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 21, quoting Adams at 105.

“Those are the real possibilities of prejudice inherent in any extended delay and the

statutes of limitations sufficiently protect against them.” Id., citing Marion at 326.

Further, “speculative claims of prejudice or vague assertions of

prejudice are insufficient to meet a defendant’s burden.” Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588

(8th Dist.), at ¶ 44, citing Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 27. Rather, actual prejudice

exists when “the missing evidence or unavailable testimony would have minimized

or eliminated the impact of the state’s evidence and bolstered the defense.” Bourn

at ¶ 18, citing Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, at ¶ 28, citing Luck at 157-158. As the Ohio

Supreme Court recognized in Bourn, “the use of the word ‘would’ in the Jones

decision is significant. It is not enough for a defendant to show that the missing

evidence or unavailable testimony ‘could’ or ‘may’ help the defendant. Instead, the

defendant must show that the evidence or testimony would help the defendant.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 17. “‘[A] defendant must show, by concrete proof,

the exculpatory value of any alleged missing evidence.’” Wade, 2008-Ohio-4574, at

¶ 48 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Robinson, 2008-Ohio-3498, ¶ 121 (6th Dist.), citing

State v. Gulley, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6091, *8 (12th Dist. Dec. 20, 1999), citing

United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 964 (C.A.7 1989). In conclusion, it is clear

under established precedent that the “‘defendant must show how the lost witnesses

and physical evidence would have proven the defendant’s asserted defense.’” Id. at

¶ 48, quoting Robinson at ¶ 121.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Wardlaw’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 Due to Preindictment Delay

Wardlaw contends that he has suffered actual prejudice on several

grounds: (1) employment records are no longer available; (2) apartment lease

records and surveillance video are no longer available; (3) cell phone records are no

longer available; and (4) his inability to locate a lost witness known as Chyna. He

fails, however, to articulate the exculpatory value of this lost evidence or, in other

words, how this evidence would prove his defense against the allegations raised by

K.S. Rather, Wardlaw only asserts that this evidence may have helped him

investigate and build an alibi defense.

While we recognize Wardlaw’s difficulty in providing an “alibi” to

K.S.’s allegations where the timeframe for the offense cannot be narrowed to a

specific day and time, we conclude that Wardlaw has not met his burden in

establishing actual prejudice due to the preindictment delay in this matter. As to his employment records, Wardlaw has not asserted that he was at work during the time

of the offense or exactly how his employment records would benefit him.

Regarding apartment records, it is also unclear what the exculpatory

value is of where Wardlaw lived at the time of the alleged offense, nor does he

attempt to establish actual prejudice from the unavailability of these records.

Similarly, Wardlaw does not show how his past telephone records would have

proven his defense to K.S.’s allegations.

As to the lost witness, Chyna, K.S. testified that Chyna was not present

during the incident with Wardlaw. Moreover, during arguments before the trial

court as well as at oral argument, counsel for Wardlaw conceded that they had no

idea what Chyna would say if she were available, and she may in fact be more helpful

to the State. On these facts, we cannot conclude that Wardlaw suffered any actual

prejudice due to her absence.

Because we find Wardlaw’s arguments to be purely speculative and

do not constitute actual prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

failing to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment due to preindictment delay regarding

K.S. This assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Assignment of Error No. 3 — Manifest Weight

Wardlaw’s third assignment of error claims that his convictions are

not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Wardlaw attacks his

convictions on three bases: lack of credible evidence, lack of corroborating evidence, and inconsistent witness statements. Based on the record, we find that each of

Wardlaw’s arguments lack merit. This assignment of error is overruled as well.

“A manifest weight challenge questions whether the State has met its

burden of persuasion.” State v. Harris, 2020-Ohio-1497, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997). “[W]eight of the evidence

addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief. In other words, a reviewing court

asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s.” State v.

Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386-387. A manifest weight

challenge raises factual issues and our review is as follows:

“‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”

Harris at ¶ 28, quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). “The use of the word ‘manifest’ in the standard of review

‘means that we can only reverse the trier of fact if its decision is very plainly or

obviously contrary to the evidence.’” Id., quoting State v. Hernandez, 2018-Ohio-

5031, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). B. Wardlaw’s Convictions Are Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Law

1. Inconsistent Witness Statements

The record demonstrates instances where T.S. and J.G. made

inconsistent statements regarding the facts and circumstances relevant to their

allegations of abuse by Wardlaw. Nonetheless, “inconsistencies or contradictions in

a witness’s testimony do not entitle a defendant to a reversal of trial.” State v.

Rentas, 2024-Ohio-732, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Moreover, “‘a defendant is not entitled to

reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because certain aspects of a witness’

testimony are inconsistent or contradictory.’” State v. Solomon, 2021-Ohio-940,

¶ 62 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Flores-Santiago, 2020-Ohio-1274, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.).

“‘While [a factfinder] may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount

them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction

against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.’” State v. Mann, 2011-

Ohio-5286, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Nivens, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2245,

*7 (10th Dist. Mar. 28, 1996).

In Rentas, this court referenced the Tenth District’s opinion in State

v. R.I.H., 2019-Ohio-2189 (10th Dist.), to conclude that inconsistent witness

statements do not amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Rentas at ¶ 16.

Specifically, the Rentas Court noted that “portions of a victim’s trial testimony that

were inconsistent with prior statements to police did not amount to a finding of a

manifest miscarriage of justice where the jury was aware of such inconsistency and was able to consider this when weighing the credibility of the testimony.” Rentas at

¶ 16, citing R.I.H. at ¶ 41.

Similar to R.I.H., the jury in this case was made aware of the

inconsistent prior statements regarding the incidents involving Wardlaw. Both J.G.

and T.M. testified at length regarding Wardlaw’s abuse, and the jury also viewed

Wardlaw’s conflicting police interviews. The jury was in the best position to weigh

the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony, and we do not find that they lost their way

in finding T.M. and J.G. to be credible witnesses.

2. Lack of Corroborating Evidence

Wardlaw’s objections resting on the lack of corroborating evidence

also lack merit. Specifically, it is well established in this court that “a rape conviction

obtained without corroborative evidence does not necessarily render the conviction

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Peterson, 2024-Ohio-2903,

¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Wilk, 2022-Ohio-1840, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.). Stated

otherwise, “[a] victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction; there is

no requirement that a rape victim’s testimony be corroborated.” Id., citing State v.

McSwain, 2017-Ohio-8489, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Blakenship, 2001 Ohio

App. LEXIS 5520, *11 (8th Dist. Dec. 13, 2001). As previously stated, K.S., J.G., and

T.M. each provided detailed testimony regarding Wardlaw’s abuse and their

testimony alone is sufficient to support his convictions. 3. Lack of Credible Evidence

Reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Notably, T.M., J.G., and K.S. provided

detailed testimony regarding the abuse. Wardlaw’s inconsistent statements to law

enforcement regarding the incident with T.M. were introduced at trial as well as

testimony indicating that Wardlaw’s DNA was present on T.M.’s cheek, neck, and

underwear. Close friends and family of J.G. also testified regarding her disclosure

of Wardlaw’s abuse to them. The record in this case simply does not present us with

facts demonstrating that this is an exceptional case where the evidence weighs

heavily against conviction.

In conclusion, this court has often “recognized that sexual assault

victims’ reactions vary and a victim’s normal behavior following a crime and delayed

disclosure does not mean that a reasonable trier of fact lost its way in finding

defendant guilty.” State v. O’Boyle, 2024-Ohio-5480, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing Harris

2020-Ohio-1497, at ¶ 53. Based upon all the foregoing, we overrule Wardlaw’s third

assignment of error.

V. Assignment of Error No. 4 — Hearsay

Wardlaw’s fourth assignment of error argues that the trial court erred

admitting into evidence the video interview of child-protection specialist Stephanie

Moore with J.G. Wardlaw contends that the interview took place for investigative

purposes rather than medical diagnosis and treatment and, therefore, does not fall within a recognized exception to the general inadmissibility of hearsay. We

disagree. Based upon established precedent in this district, we conclude that the

trial court properly admitted the interview because the primary purpose of the

interview was for Moore to evaluate J.G. for medical diagnosis and treatment. This

assignment of error is overruled.

“‘“It is well established that, pursuant to Evid.R. 104, the introduction

of evidence at trial falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.”’” State v.

Jeffries, 2018-Ohio-5039, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting Caruso v. Leneghan, 2014-Ohio-

1824, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 239 (1990).

Further, “‘[a] trial court possesses broad discretion regarding the admission of

evidence, including the discretion to determine whether evidence constitutes

hearsay and whether it is admissible hearsay.’” State v. Rosa, 2019-Ohio-4888, ¶ 29

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Grooms, 2018-Ohio-1093, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Graves, 2009-Ohio-1133, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). It is also well established that “we review

the admission or exclusion of evidence by the trial court for an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs

when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter

over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson, 2021-Ohio-3304, at ¶ 35.

B. Hearsay

Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Under Evid.R. 802, hearsay is

not admissible unless the offered statement falls into a recognized exception to that

rule. Evid.R. 803 sets forth several exceptions to the rule against hearsay.

Applicable here is Evid.R. 803(4), which provides an exception for statements made

for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment and states:

Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character or the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.

Indeed, “statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and

treatment are a clearly defined, long-standing exception to the rules of hearsay.”

Rosa at ¶ 30. Additionally, in considering cases of sexual assault and rape, “‘“courts

have consistently found that a description of the encounter and identification of the

perpetrator are within the scope of statements for medical treatment and

diagnosis.”’” State v. Fears, 2017-Ohio-6978, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), quoting Echols, 2015-

Ohio-5138, at ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), quoting In re D.L., 2005-Ohio-2320, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Stahl, 2005-Ohio-1137, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.). Further, “[i]n sexual assault

cases involving young victims, there is often testimony from a child advocacy social

worker. And courts have acknowledged the ‘dual role’ medical diagnosis/treatment

and investigation/gathering of evidence — of social workers who interview a child

who may be the victim of sexual abuse.” Id. at ¶ 37. “Social workers are oftentimes

in the best position to help determine the proper treatment for the minor, which treatment includes determining which home was free of sexual abuse.” Id., citing

State v. Durham, 2005-Ohio-202, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.).

“However, not every statement made by a declarant in aid of

treatment is admissible” under Evid.R. 803(4). Rosa, 2019-Ohio-488,8 at ¶ 30.

“‘The exception is limited to those statements made by the patient which are

reasonably pertinent to an accurate diagnosis and should not be a conduit through

which matters of no medical significance would be admitted.’” Id., quoting Staff

Note to Evid.R.803(4); Echols at ¶ 28. Specifically, “[t]o the extent a victim’s

statement to a social worker is for investigative or prosecutorial purposes, the

statement will not fall within the hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(4).” Fears at

¶ 38. “The fact that the information initially gathered by the social workers was

subsequently used by the state in its prosecution, however, does not change the fact

that these statements were not made for investigative or prosecutorial purposes.”

Id., citing State v. Muttart, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 62.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting J.G.’s Video Interview With Moore.

Wardlaw argues that the interview Moore conducted with J.G. was

inadmissible at trial because it fell outside the exception to hearsay outlined by

Evid.R. 803(4). Specifically, Wardlaw contends that the primary purpose of the

interview was for investigative purposes and not for medical diagnosis and

treatment. However, Moore repeatedly testified that the purpose of these interviews

is to assess the safety of the child and to make referrals for any necessary medical and psychological/mental-health needs. Further, when asked if the purpose of her

interview changes when the interview is requested by law enforcement, Moore

replied “absolutely not.”

Moore testified that she is a child-protection specialist with the Child

Advocacy Center and her job includes interviewing children who may be the subject

of abuse. Moore also testified that it is common for law enforcement to request that

the Child Advocacy Center conduct these interviews to minimize the times that a

victim must tell someone about the abuse as this can be traumatizing to them.

Moore also noted that this is also the reason why the interviews are recorded.

Further, Moore begins her interview with J.G. by informing her that

Moore’s job is to make sure she is healthy and safe and that she has everything she

needs to be healthy and safe. Moore further notes that the interview is being

recorded so that J.G. does not have to continue to report the abuse, i.e., tell her story

multiple times. The balance of the interview is confined to J.G. describing

Wardlaw’s abuse.

Therefore, based upon our review of Moore’s trial testimony as well

as her interview with J.G., we conclude that the primary purpose of the interview

was for medical diagnosis and treatment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the interview at trial and this assignment of error is

overruled. VI. Assignment of Error No. 5 — Sexually Violent Predator Specification

Wardlaw’s final assignment of error challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his classification as a sexual violent predator under

R.C. 2971.01(H). This assignment is without merit.

“The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether,

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Goudlock, 2010-Ohio-3600, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus. In a sufficiency

inquiry, on review, “courts are to assess not whether the state's evidence is to be

believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a

conviction.” State v. Starks, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d at 387.

B. R.C. 2971.01(H) – Sexually Violent Predator Specification

R.C. 2971.01(H)(1) defines a “sexually violent predator” as a “person

who, on or after January 1, 1997, commits a sexually violent offense and is likely to

engage in the future in one or more sexually violent offenses.” Under this provision,

Ohio courts have concluded that there are three elements or “factors” that “must

exist before a defendant may be labeled as a sexually violent predator: (1) the offense

occurred on or after January 1, 1997; (2) the defendant commits a sexually violent offense; and (3) it is likely that the defendant will engage in at least one more

sexually violent offense in the future.” Belle, 2019-Ohio-787, at ¶ 34 (8th Dist.).

Further, “the key inquiry for finding a defendant to be a sexually violent predator is

whether the person is likely to engage in sexually violent offenses in the future.” Id.

“Because of the punitive aspects of the specification, for a sexually violent predator

specification to apply to an offender, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that R.C. 2971.01(H) applies to the offender.” Goudlock at ¶ 30, citing State v.

Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 532 (2000).

R.C. 2971.01(H)(2) sets forth the factors to be considered when

determining whether a defendant is a sexually violent predator:

(a) The person has been convicted two or more times, in separate criminal actions of a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense. For purposes of this division, convictions that result from or are connected with the same act or result from offenses committed at the same time are one conviction, and a conviction set aside pursuant to law is not a conviction.

(b) The person has a documented history from childhood, into the juvenile developmental years, that exhibits sexually deviant behavior.

(c) Available information or evidence suggests that the person chronically commits offenses with a sexual motivation.

(d) The person has committed one or more offenses in which the person has tortured or engaged in ritualistic acts with one or more victims.

(e) The person has committed one or more offenses in which one or more victims were physically harmed to the degree that the particular victim’s life was in jeopardy.

(f) Any other relevant evidence. There is no requirement that all these factors must be satisfied to find

a person to be a sexually violent predator. State v. Sopko, 2009-Ohio-140, ¶ 48 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4188, *14 (8th Dist. Sept. 20,

2001). Rather, “‘[t]he statute specially notes that any of the factors may be

considered as evidence that an individual is likely to engage in one or more sexually

violent offenses.’” Id., quoting Williams at id. Additionally, “[a]t a bench trial, there

is a presumption that the judge will have considered only relevant, material and

competent evidence in reaching a verdict, unless the record affirmatively

demonstrates otherwise.” State v. Bugg, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1839, *16 (8th Dist.

Apr. 7, 2000), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 (1987).

C. There Was Sufficient Evidence for the Trial Court to Find Wardlaw Qualified as a Sexually Violent Predator

There is no dispute that the first two requirements of R.C. 2971.01(H)

are satisfied. Wardlaw’s offenses all occurred after January 1, 1997, and he

committed a sexually violent offense. Thus, the only issue before this court is

whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Wardlaw was

likely to commit a sexually violent offense in the future.

The trial court found that Wardlaw was likely to commit a sexually

violent offense in the future under R.C. 2971.01(H)(2)(a), 2971.01(H)(2)(c), and

2971.01(H)(2)(f). Wardlaw asserts that the trial court could not find him likely to

commit a sexually violent offense in the future under R.C. 2971.01(H)(2)(a) because

he had no sexually oriented convictions prior to the prosecution of this matter, and the fact that this case involved multiple convictions arising from unlawful sexual

conduct could not satisfy this provision. However, this court has repeatedly rejected

this argument and Wardlaw provides no reason for us to deviate from this

established precedent. See State v. Bates, 2024-Ohio-2909, ¶ 65-66 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Hartman, 2018-Ohio-2641, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.); State v. Kelley, 2024-

Ohio-157, ¶ 81 (8th Dist.) (“‘R.C. 2971.01(H) allows an offender to be classified and

sentenced as a sexually violent predator based on the convictions of the underlying

offense contained in the indictment.’”), quoting Williams, at ¶ 72, quoting State v.

Boynton, 2010-Ohio-4670, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.).

Further, viewing the evidence admitted at trial in a light most

favorable to the State, we find that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to

determine that Wardlaw was a sexually violent predator under any one of these three

subsections. Specifically, the evidence shows that Wardlaw committed multiple

sexually motivated offenses over a period of 20 years and involved three minors.

These minors included his biological daughter and a stepdaughter for whom he had

been a father figure since she was a small child. Wardlaw also raped a minor who

was a close friend of his stepdaughter while she was arguably under his custody and

control during a sleepover at his apartment. Each of these minors provided detailed

testimony at trial regarding the sexual abuse they suffered at the hands of Wardlaw.

There was also DNA evidence introduced at trial that confirmed the existence of

Wardlaw’s DNA on the front and back panels of T.M.’s underwear. On this evidence,

as well as the additional evidence offered at trial, we find that the trial court had more than sufficient evidence to determine that Wardlaw was a sexually violent

predator under R.C. 2971.01(H). This assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR