State v. Galindez

2026 Ohio 832

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 115166
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Galindez, 2026-Ohio-832.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115166 v. :

ANGELO M. GALINDEZ, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-692190

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Megan Helton and Samantha Sohl, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

Angelo Galindez appeals his convictions for several sex offenses

committed against a child less than ten years old, including rape, and several

voyeurism-related offenses committed against separate victims, including a minor.

For the following reasons, we affirm. Galindez sexually abused his daughter beginning when she was eight

years old. The victim described several instances of being raped or touched in a

sexual manner by Galindez in detail. The abuse continued for a couple years, but

the young victim, 11 years old at the time of trial, described several events occurring

in her bedroom and the garage involving both sexual conduct and contact. The

victim stated that Galindez ejaculated during the forced anal, vaginal, and oral

penetration on those occasions, although the victim’s testimony was in childlike

terms. The sexual abuse culminated on the morning of Mother’s Day in 2023 with

Galindez forcing the victim to perform oral sex in her closet. After Galindez

ejaculated in her mouth, the victim spit the semen in a towel on the floor. That towel,

and the DNA evidence identifying Galindez through the preserved seminal fluid, was

a point of contention at trial.

After raping the victim in the closet, Galindez discovered

pornography on the victim’s younger cousin’s phone. Galindez told the victim’s

stepmother about the pornography. The stepmother, who later took legal custody

of the victim, discovered that the victim had used the phone to view the pornography

at Galindez’s direction. The victim then disclosed the abuse to her and other family

members, and authorities were called. The Cuyahoga County Division of Children

and Family Services (“DCFS”) became involved.

The victim spoke with a DCFS sexual-abuse caseworker

(“caseworker”), who conducted a forensic interview. According to the State, the

caseworker explained that “[a] forensic interview is a non-leading interview in order to collect information to determine if a child is abused and/or neglected in their

home, and to make referrals for medical or psychological services.” The types of

referrals include advocacy services, depending on the specific nature or extent of the

abuse. Thus, according to the caseworker, in order to determine the types of

referrals for the child’s support, the caseworker needs to learn what occurred, the

timeframe, and the relationship between the abuser and the victim. During the

caseworker’s assessment, the victim disclosed the abuse that occurred.

In addition to the caseworker, the victim was treated by a sexual

assault nurse examiner (“nurse”). The victim described some of the incidents of oral

sex Galindez forced her to perform, providing details and showing the nurse what

she was forced to do to and with Galindez’s penis. According to the nurse, the victim

disclosed “penetration of vagina, penetration of anus, oral contact, oral in terms of

her mouth to his genitalia, and body areas touched.”

In addition to the sexual abuse of the victim, Galindez secretly

recorded and photographed the stepmother and her daughter in various stages of

undress. The photos were discovered on Galindez’s iPhone 11 and were date-

stamped. Investigators also found self-taken photographs of Galindez on the phone

that bore the same date stamps as the illegally obtained images. Related to that

conduct, police investigators discovered an online purchase of a “hidden camera wi-

fi bluetooth speaker 4K video wireless stereo music player spy hidden cameras,

covert.com nanny cam for office/outside surveillance” from an account linked to

Galindez. The illegal photographs were downloaded with a file path indicating they were generated by the “covert.com nanny cam” purchased through his account. In

addition, it was revealed that Galindez was recorded in a phone call directing

another to erase all information from his iPhone 11.

The jury convicted Galindez, and the trial court sentenced him to a

term of life in prison with the possibility of parole after 15 years on two counts of

anal rape of a child under the age of ten years old; life in prison with the possibility

of parole after ten years on two counts of oral rape of a child under the age of ten;

four years in prison each of four counts of illegal use of a minor or impaired person

in nudity-oriented material or performance; three years in prison each on four

counts of gross sexual imposition; nine months in prison each on five counts of

disseminating matter harmful to juveniles and voyeurism. All counts were ordered

to be served concurrently. Additionally, Galindez was determined to be a Tier III

sex offender/child offender.

In this timely appeal, Galindez asserts four assignments of error,

which will be reordered for the ease of reading.

In the third assignment of error, Galindez claims his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for relief from the joining

of the separate sexual-assault charges and the voyeurism-related charges.

In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

a defendant must show “that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonable representation,” and “that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Drain, 2022-Ohio-3697, ¶ 36, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

688 (1984). A “reasonable probability” is a probability of a different result sufficient

enough to undermine confidence in the outcome; in other words, the defendant

must demonstrate he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Drain at ¶ 52,

quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004), and Strickland

at 694. As the State notes, the analysis in this case turns on whether the joinder was

appropriate. See State v. Powell, 2019-Ohio-4345, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Ford, 2018-Ohio-5169, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). If it was, it cannot be concluded that his

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable

representation.

Under Crim.R. 8(A), two or more offenses may be charged under one

indictment if the offenses “are of the same or similar character, or are based on the

same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected

together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course

of criminal conduct.” In general, the law favors joinder when “the offenses charged

‘are of the same or similar character.’” State v. Diar, 2008-Ohio-6266, ¶ 94, quoting

State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). Nevertheless, under Crim.R. 14, the

trial court has discretion to grant severance of claims if it appears that the defendant

would be prejudiced by the joinder. Id. at ¶ 95. The defendant bears the burden of

proving prejudice. Id., citing State v. Brinkley, 2005-Ohio-1507, ¶ 29.

The State can refute a claim of prejudice in two ways: demonstrating

that the evidence of each crime is simple and direct, referred to as the “joinder test,” or demonstrating that the evidence of the other crimes would be admissible even if

the counts were severed, referred to as the “other acts” test. Id. at ¶ 96, citing Lott,

at 163. The State in this case focuses on the joinder test. When the evidence is

“simple and direct,” the defendant is not considered to be “prejudiced by joinder

regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of the crimes as other acts under

Evid.R. 404(B).” Powell at ¶ 74, citing Lott at 163.

In this appeal, Galindez solely relies on State v. Kramer-Kelly, 2023-

Ohio-1031 (8th Dist.), which reversed two rape convictions after the panel

concluded that the evidence supporting one of the rape charges was not as strong as

the evidence of the separate rape committed against a separate victim as it was

presented at trial. According to the Kramer-Kelly panel, the trial court abused its

discretion by denying a pretrial motion to sever the trials because in the single trial

concerning both victims, the jury could have applied or “accumulated” evidence

from one of the rapes to support the evidence of the other. Id. at ¶ 70-71.

Importantly, that conclusion was based on reviewing the trial itself, a review the trial

court in Kramer-Kelly could not have conducted at the time the motion for relief

from the joinder was filed. See State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 46, quoting State

v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 59 (1992) (in seeking to reverse the denial of a motion

for relief from joinder, the defendant must in part demonstrate “‘that at the time of

the motion to sever he provided the trial court with sufficient information so that it

could weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant’s right to a

fair trial’” and based on that information, the trial court abused its discretion). As reiterated in Kramer-Kelly, however, evidence is simple and direct

if it satisfies four requirements: “‘if the jury is capable of readily separating the proof

required for each offense, if the evidence is unlikely to confuse jurors, if the evidence

is straightforward, and if there is little danger that the jury would “improperly

consider testimony on one offense as corroborative of the other.”’” Kramer-Kelly at

¶ 85, quoting State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-8702, ¶ 52 (4th Dist.). Thus, Kramer-

Kelly solely focused on the last element: the danger the jury in that case improperly

considered testimony of one rape as corroborative of the other rape. That concern

is not an issue in this case, and therefore, Kramer-Kelly is not controlling.

The evidence in this case as to the charges of sexual abuse and the

voyeurism-related charges was simple and direct, and there was little danger

identified that the jury could improperly consider evidence supporting the

voyeurism-related charges as Galindez’s guilt of the sexual abuse. The evidence was

presented in a victim-specific manner, with no overlap blurring the different crimes.

See, e.g., State v. Morris, 2025-Ohio-3273, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.) (“[A] defendant is not

prejudiced by joinder when each crime can be proven by simple and direct evidence,

such that a jury is likely to be able to segregate the proof required for each offense.”).

The voyeurism-related charges were to be, and were, proven through the police

investigator’s testimony establishing that Galindez purchased a device that captured

the illegal images, which were also found on Galindez’s iPhone 11 with a date stamp

on the same day the self-photographs were taken. This evidence demonstrated his

possession of the phone at the time the images were created or transferred to his device. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-1141 (8th Dist.), and State v. Wardlaw,

2025-Ohio-2221 (8th Dist.). In Miller in particular, the panel concluded that joinder

was not prejudicial, and therefore permissible, because “a trier of fact is believed

capable of segregating the proof on multiple charges when the evidence as to each

of the charges is uncomplicated.” Id. at ¶ 33 and 84. As in Miller, nothing in this

record suggested that the jury could be confused by the straightforward evidence of

different criminal conduct: the rape and other sexual abuse committed against a

child under the age of ten and the voyeurism-related charges committed against

separate victims stemming from surreptitiously obtained video or photographic

recordings.

Although Galindez claims that the State ultimately failed to present

the evidence in “cohesive and simple and direct” manner, he bases that argument

on the fact that the law-enforcement witnesses testified to both sets of crimes during

their appearance at trial. It is unclear how the testimony could be presented

otherwise without the evidence being introduced in a nonlinear fashion by breaking

up the same witness’s testimony, which was a heavily criticized method of

presenting a case as discussed in Kramer-Kelly. Id. at ¶ 88.

Galindez has not demonstrated that a motion for relief from the

joinder would have been successful. His entire argument is based on Kramer-Kelly

with respect to the joinder test, which is distinguishable from the particulars of this

case. Because Galindez could not demonstrate that a motion to sever the trials

would have been successful if filed based on his inability to demonstrate prejudice under Miller, his trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard

of reasonable representation through the failure to file such a motion. The third

assignment of error is overruled.

In the fourth assignment of error, Galindez claims the trial court erred

by admitting the forensic interview conducted by the caseworker despite the

investigatory aspect of the interview and the testimonial nature of the victim’s

statements. He does not challenge the nurse’s testimony. And, despite referring to

the Confrontation Clause, Galindez failed to present any arguments or discussion of

relevant authority in support of the constitutional argument. As a result, our focus

is solely on the hearsay claim arising under Ohio law as it pertains to the

caseworker’s testimony. See App.R. 16(A)(7). On this issue, Galindez “implores”

this panel to review the Euclid Police Department’s role in requesting and observing

the forensic interview and asks for this panel to consider the practice in general from

a policy perspective. He seeks a declaration that the forensic interview should not

be permitted to be used by a law enforcement officer. Galindez nevertheless

concedes that the legal analysis hinges on whether there are any indicia that the

interview was conducted for medical or diagnostic purposes. See State v. Arnold,

2010-Ohio-2742, ¶ 21.

Under Evid.R. 803(4), statements for purposes of medical diagnosis

or treatment, including those to social workers, are an exception to the general rule

prohibiting the introduction of hearsay. In Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court

concluded that statements made to a social worker were admissible at trial for purposes of evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment. In that case, the child victim in a

sexual-assault matter explained to a social worker the defendant raped her. Id. at

¶ 6. Arnold recognized that while social workers have a “dual purpose” and are

tasked with the gathering of information to investigate a crime, they also elicit

information necessary for medical treatment, including any psychological

treatment, for future services. Id. As a result, a victim’s statements describing the

acts of the defendant are necessary for medical diagnosis and are admissible even if

those statements serve a dual purpose that includes investigatory ends. Id. at ¶ 43;

see also State v. Freeman, 2010-Ohio-3714, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.). Courts have repeatedly

held that statements to a social worker are not hearsay and permitted under the

exception of Evid.R. 803 where a social worker interviews the victim as part of an

ongoing attempt to determine the extent of sexual abuse and then refers the child

for the appropriate treatment. See, e.g., id.; State v. Wardlaw, 2025-Ohio-2221,

¶ 46 (8th Dist.).

It is important to note that “the fact that the information initially

gathered by the social workers was subsequently used by the [S]tate in its

prosecution, however, does not change the fact that these statements were not made

for investigative or prosecutorial purposes.” State v. Fears, 2017-Ohio-6978, ¶ 38

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Muttart, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 62. Further, when asked at

trial whether any referrals occurred following the interview, the caseworker testified

to providing the family with the name of a psychologist at the Cleveland Rape Crisis

Center for future treatment. Tr. 854. Although she was not sure whether therapy occurred, the treatment was, at the least, recommended based on the forensic

interview. In light of that and the vast authority permitting the introduction of the

forensic interview, authority not addressed by Galindez, the fourth assignment of

error is overruled.

And finally, in the first and second assignments of error, Galindez

claims his convictions for sexually abusing and raping the victim and his convictions

for the voyeurism-related charges are against the weight of the evidence.

When evaluating a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, appellate courts “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” and the conviction must be

reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Reversing a conviction based upon

the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983).

With respect to the rapes and sexual abuse committed against the

victim, Galindez claims that the jury lost its way because the jury could not consider

the DNA evidence on the towel that inculpated Galindez in raping the victim in the

closet on Mother’s Day. The DNA evidence was excluded because, according to the

trial court, the State added all the analysts, who tested the DNA material, after Galindez filed a belated motion in limine to exclude the report three days into the

trial. Galindez based that motion on the Confrontation Clause and Arizona v. Smith,

602 U.S. 779 (2024). Smith, generally speaking, held that a Confrontation Clause

violation exists if the maker of a scientific conclusion relies on the truth of another

analysist’s statement and that other analysist does not testify in the trial. Id. The

validity of the evidentiary ruling is not an issue in this appeal.

In addition to the lack of DNA evidence, Galindez claims that the

stepmother had a reason to fabricate her testimony because she later sought legal

custody of the victim. And finally, he claims that the jury lost its way in convicting

him of voyeurism-related charges because other people had access to Galindez’s

iPhone 11 and lived in the house.

At the onset of this analysis, it is important to note the broad brush

with which Galindez presents his argument. For example, the excluded DNA

evidence in this case is only relevant to one of the four rape counts, the oral rape in

the victim’s closet on Mother’s Day in 2023. Despite this, Galindez claims that the

lack of DNA evidence to all charges demonstrates that the jury lost its way. The lack

of DNA evidence for rapes committed, especially in cases in which a child under the

age of ten discloses systemic abuse, does not render a conviction as being against

the weight of the evidence. And even without the DNA evidence with respect to the

one incident of rape, the victim’s testimony as to that event is not inherently

incredible. Further, although Galindez has identified a possible motive for the

stepmother to fabricate her trial testimony based on her seeking custody of the

victim after the fact, that argument is purely speculative and ignores the

overwhelming evidence of his guilt introduced through the victim’s detailed and

specific testimony implicating Galindez, who has not demonstrated that the victim’s

testimony is unreliable in any way. The jury did not lose its way or create a manifest

miscarriage of justice in convicting Galindez of the rape and other sexual abuse of

the victim.

And finally, as it pertains to the voyeurism-related charges, the State

systematically presented evidence that the photos or recordings on Galindez’s

iPhone 11 were downloaded or created on the phone the same day that Galindez

had possession of the phone. The self-photograph images demonstrated his

possession of the phone. When that is coupled with the evidence demonstrating

that Galindez bought the camera generating the illegal images on his phone and

Galindez’s plea to another to have that information deleted before it could be

recovered by authorities, we cannot conclude the jury lost its way in convicting him

of the voyeurism-related offenses against the other two victims.

The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

The convictions are affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR