OPINION
KEASLER, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Early one August morning in 1996, Allen Brian Velasquez boarded a bus in Houston. Within minutes, police officer Bill Corley also boarded the bus and initiated a conversation with him. Officer Corley asked permission to search the bag on the seat next to Velasquez. Velasquez denied ownership of the bag and did not object. The search revealed cocaine and marihuana. We are asked to decide whether the search was lawful. We conclude that it was.
THE FACTS
The trial judge entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the hearing on Velasquez’s motion to suppress the cocaine and marihuana. He found that “Officer Corley is a credible witness, and the Court accepts as true his testimony regarding his observations of the defendant and his conversations with the defendant.” So we will rely on Officer Corley’s testimony in reviewing the facts.
Corley, a twenty-seven year veteran police officer, was assigned to the narcotics division. He was on duty at the Greyhound Bus Station near downtown Houston when Velasquez attracted his attention. He saw Velasquez getting out of a truck, carrying a black “duffle-type” bag over his shoulder. Corley testified that Velasquez’s actions were consistent with those of drug couriers. He was dropped off across the street from the terminal, rather than immediately in front. After buying his ticket, he sat in a waiting area on the opposite side from his departure gate. ' From the time he walked in the door, he constantly looked around, scanning the terminal lobby. Although he arrived early, Velasquez waited until immediately before departure time to board the bus.
When Velasquez boarded the bus, Cor-ley saw Officer Armando Ordaz and told him his suspicions. The two officers approached the bus driver, and told him that they wanted to board the bus “for a couple of minutes.” The driver said to go ahead and that he wasn’t leaving for a few minutes, anyway.
When the two officers boarded the bus, Velasquez was already seated in an aisle seat toward the middle of the bus. The [678]*678black bag was on the seat next to him. Officer Ordaz took a seat a couple of rows in front of Velasquez. Officer Corley walked on past Velasquez, toward the rear of the bus. Neither officer was in uniform.
Corley turned around and stopped in the aisle immediately behind Velasquez. He squatted down, leaned over and identified himself as a police officer to Velasquez. Neither officer was blocking the aisle to prevent Velasquez’s departure. And Velasquez had no reason to suspect that Or-daz was a police officer.
Corley then asked Velasquez if he could talk to him. Velasquez replied, “Sure.” Corley asked his destination, asked to see his ticket, and asked him for identification. Velasquez complied with each request.
After a few insignificant questions, Officer Corley asked Velasquez if he had any luggage. Velasquez replied that he did not. Corley asked him if the bag next to him was his. Velasquez responded, “No, that’s not my bag.”
Corley reached over to pick up the bag. Velasquez placed his hands across the bag and asked, “What are you doing?”
Corley said, “I’m getting this bag. Is it your bag?”
Velasquez replied, “Uh, no, it’s not.”
Upon looking in the bag, Corley found a ziploc bag containing marihuana. He then placed Velasquez under arrest, summoned Officer Ordaz, handed him the bag, and the three left the bus. The cocaine was found when the bag was thoroughly searched.
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After hearing these facts, the trial judge granted Velasquez’s motion and suppressed all evidence of the marihuana and cocaine. In addition to finding Officer Corley credible, the trial judge found “[t]hat the defendant engaged in a consensual conversation with Officer Corley while on the bus.”
In his conclusions of law, the trial judge found:
1. That the black bag ... was abandoned as a result of police activity.
2. That Officer Corley did not have probable cause to approach the defendant and engage him in conversation or to detain the bus to conduct his investigation.
3. That the defendant was arrested after Officer Corley found marihuana in the black bag.
A panel of the First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling with Justice Nucia dissenting.
ANALYSIS
The trial court speaks of no “probable cause to approach the defendant and engage him in conversation or to detain the bus ...” But the issue of probable cause arises in searches, seizures, and arrests. It does not apply to a police officer’s approaching a citizen to engage in conversation. Nor does the issue of artic-ulable suspicion to detain under Terry v. Ohio 1 apply here. According to the trial court’s findings of fact, this is “a consensual conversation” between Velasquez and Officer Corley. So it is not an arrest or a detention. It is an encounter.
In Hunter v. State2 we said that “[a] police officer is just as free as any other citizen to stop and ask questions of a fellow citizen.” We cited Florida v. Bostick3 as holding that such encounters are consensual “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business.” But that is not what Bostick held. In that case, as in ours, the encounter between the police and the suspect took place on a bus. The [679]*679Supreme Court realized that the “freedom to leave and go about one’s business” test was inappropriate under these facts. Instead, the issue is “whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. [The test] applies to encounters that take place on a city street or in an airport lobby, and it applies equally to encounters on a bus.” 4 We will follow this rule and apply it to the facts at hand.
This case and Bostick are similar. In both cases, officers initiated a conversation with a suspect on a bus without articu-lable suspicion. They asked to inspect his ticket and identification. They were looking for drugs. They asked the suspect’s permission to search his luggage. They searched the luggage and found drugs.
The officers in Bostick advised the suspect that he had the right to refuse consent to search. On the other hand, Officer Corley gave Velasquez no such warning. But this is only one factor in determining whether the encounter constitutes a seizure. In Bostick, two officers, one of whom was obviously armed, questioned the suspect. In contrast, only Officer Corley questioned Velasquez, and there was no evidence as to weapons. We agree with the trial court that under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the conversation between Officer Corley and Velasquez was consensual.
Of course “consensual” is a relative term. We doubt that Velasquez was overjoyed to be questioned by a police officer — especially in light of his bag’s contents. And even an innocent passenger’s pulse might race when a police officer identifies himself and begins asking questions.
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OPINION
KEASLER, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Early one August morning in 1996, Allen Brian Velasquez boarded a bus in Houston. Within minutes, police officer Bill Corley also boarded the bus and initiated a conversation with him. Officer Corley asked permission to search the bag on the seat next to Velasquez. Velasquez denied ownership of the bag and did not object. The search revealed cocaine and marihuana. We are asked to decide whether the search was lawful. We conclude that it was.
THE FACTS
The trial judge entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the hearing on Velasquez’s motion to suppress the cocaine and marihuana. He found that “Officer Corley is a credible witness, and the Court accepts as true his testimony regarding his observations of the defendant and his conversations with the defendant.” So we will rely on Officer Corley’s testimony in reviewing the facts.
Corley, a twenty-seven year veteran police officer, was assigned to the narcotics division. He was on duty at the Greyhound Bus Station near downtown Houston when Velasquez attracted his attention. He saw Velasquez getting out of a truck, carrying a black “duffle-type” bag over his shoulder. Corley testified that Velasquez’s actions were consistent with those of drug couriers. He was dropped off across the street from the terminal, rather than immediately in front. After buying his ticket, he sat in a waiting area on the opposite side from his departure gate. ' From the time he walked in the door, he constantly looked around, scanning the terminal lobby. Although he arrived early, Velasquez waited until immediately before departure time to board the bus.
When Velasquez boarded the bus, Cor-ley saw Officer Armando Ordaz and told him his suspicions. The two officers approached the bus driver, and told him that they wanted to board the bus “for a couple of minutes.” The driver said to go ahead and that he wasn’t leaving for a few minutes, anyway.
When the two officers boarded the bus, Velasquez was already seated in an aisle seat toward the middle of the bus. The [678]*678black bag was on the seat next to him. Officer Ordaz took a seat a couple of rows in front of Velasquez. Officer Corley walked on past Velasquez, toward the rear of the bus. Neither officer was in uniform.
Corley turned around and stopped in the aisle immediately behind Velasquez. He squatted down, leaned over and identified himself as a police officer to Velasquez. Neither officer was blocking the aisle to prevent Velasquez’s departure. And Velasquez had no reason to suspect that Or-daz was a police officer.
Corley then asked Velasquez if he could talk to him. Velasquez replied, “Sure.” Corley asked his destination, asked to see his ticket, and asked him for identification. Velasquez complied with each request.
After a few insignificant questions, Officer Corley asked Velasquez if he had any luggage. Velasquez replied that he did not. Corley asked him if the bag next to him was his. Velasquez responded, “No, that’s not my bag.”
Corley reached over to pick up the bag. Velasquez placed his hands across the bag and asked, “What are you doing?”
Corley said, “I’m getting this bag. Is it your bag?”
Velasquez replied, “Uh, no, it’s not.”
Upon looking in the bag, Corley found a ziploc bag containing marihuana. He then placed Velasquez under arrest, summoned Officer Ordaz, handed him the bag, and the three left the bus. The cocaine was found when the bag was thoroughly searched.
THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After hearing these facts, the trial judge granted Velasquez’s motion and suppressed all evidence of the marihuana and cocaine. In addition to finding Officer Corley credible, the trial judge found “[t]hat the defendant engaged in a consensual conversation with Officer Corley while on the bus.”
In his conclusions of law, the trial judge found:
1. That the black bag ... was abandoned as a result of police activity.
2. That Officer Corley did not have probable cause to approach the defendant and engage him in conversation or to detain the bus to conduct his investigation.
3. That the defendant was arrested after Officer Corley found marihuana in the black bag.
A panel of the First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling with Justice Nucia dissenting.
ANALYSIS
The trial court speaks of no “probable cause to approach the defendant and engage him in conversation or to detain the bus ...” But the issue of probable cause arises in searches, seizures, and arrests. It does not apply to a police officer’s approaching a citizen to engage in conversation. Nor does the issue of artic-ulable suspicion to detain under Terry v. Ohio 1 apply here. According to the trial court’s findings of fact, this is “a consensual conversation” between Velasquez and Officer Corley. So it is not an arrest or a detention. It is an encounter.
In Hunter v. State2 we said that “[a] police officer is just as free as any other citizen to stop and ask questions of a fellow citizen.” We cited Florida v. Bostick3 as holding that such encounters are consensual “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business.” But that is not what Bostick held. In that case, as in ours, the encounter between the police and the suspect took place on a bus. The [679]*679Supreme Court realized that the “freedom to leave and go about one’s business” test was inappropriate under these facts. Instead, the issue is “whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. [The test] applies to encounters that take place on a city street or in an airport lobby, and it applies equally to encounters on a bus.” 4 We will follow this rule and apply it to the facts at hand.
This case and Bostick are similar. In both cases, officers initiated a conversation with a suspect on a bus without articu-lable suspicion. They asked to inspect his ticket and identification. They were looking for drugs. They asked the suspect’s permission to search his luggage. They searched the luggage and found drugs.
The officers in Bostick advised the suspect that he had the right to refuse consent to search. On the other hand, Officer Corley gave Velasquez no such warning. But this is only one factor in determining whether the encounter constitutes a seizure. In Bostick, two officers, one of whom was obviously armed, questioned the suspect. In contrast, only Officer Corley questioned Velasquez, and there was no evidence as to weapons. We agree with the trial court that under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the conversation between Officer Corley and Velasquez was consensual.
Of course “consensual” is a relative term. We doubt that Velasquez was overjoyed to be questioned by a police officer — especially in light of his bag’s contents. And even an innocent passenger’s pulse might race when a police officer identifies himself and begins asking questions. He might understandably be uncomfortable saying, “Officer, I don’t want to talk to you. Please leave me alone.” But the Constitution does not guarantee freedom from discomfort. And the test is not whether a timid person would feel free to terminate the interview. Instead, the Supreme Court uses a “reasonable person” standard.
The Court of Appeals apparently says that the consensual encounter between Corley and Velasquez became involuntary at some point. But there was no such finding by the trial court. The Court of Appeals’ finding that the bus door was closed, thus trapping Velasquez on board, was not supported by the trial court’s findings. Indeed, the trial court found that Corley was credible and that his statements were true. Corley said the door was left open. In any event, we find no evidence that the encounter, initially consensual, became coercive.
Having determined that the encounter was consensual, we now examine the search of the bag. In his conclusions of law, the trial judge says that “the black bag ... was abandoned as a result of police activity.” But many legally obtained, admissible items are abandoned as a result of police activity. In McDuff v. State5 we said that a person abandons property if his “decision to abandon it was not the result of police misconduct.”6 There is no evidence of police misconduct here. And Velasquez at least twice denied ownership of the bag and voiced no objection to the search.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Velasquez abandoned the bag. The cocaine and marihuana discovered in the bag were properly admissible against him at trial. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the trial court’s order granting Velasquez’s suppression motion. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MEYERS, J. delivered a dissenting opinion.