OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MILLER, Judge.
Appellant was found guilty of murder by the trial court, then sentenced by that court to 45 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and complained the trial court erred by admitting testimony of his custodial confession. The court of appeals found the evidence sufficient, but found trial court error in admitting the custodial confession. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of that error and remanded for a new trial. Gipson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991). Although our reasons for reversing the conviction differ from those opined by the court of appeals, this Court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.
We granted the State’s petition on grounds two and three. In ground two the State complains that the court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction on the basis of the inadmissible confession in disregard of the fact that the case at bar was a trial before the court, and in its brief cites Deason v. State, 786 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In ground three the State complains that the court of appeals erred in implicitly holding that a harmless error analysis does not apply.
The portion of the record which the court of appeals relied on to declare the appellant’s confession inadmissible is as follows:
Q. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: While you were taking it [confession], to be fair, of course, you told him [Gibson] it was going to be used against him or could be used against him in this trial?
A. [OFFICER]: Yes.
Q. Likewise, you told him it would be used in his favor?
A. I told him it would be his story he could use in court.
Q. For or against him?
A. I just said it would be his story that he could tell in court.
Q. Wouldn’t that imply that it could be used in his favor?
A. However you choose to use it.
Q. That he could use it on his behalf or the State could use it in their behalf, that’s the impression you wanted to get across to him?
A. I told him it was a story he would be able to tell in court, yes, sir.
Q. That would imply that it could be used in his favor, doesn’t it?
A. I’m saying he could imply that any way he wanted to.
Q. That was your intent, wasn’t it, to get across to him that what he was saying here was his story and that he could use it on his behalf in his trial?
A. Yes, sir, I told him it would be presented to the Grand Jury and also presented in Court, just like he told it.
Q. Either on his behalf or against him?
A. Yes, sir.
The court of appeals reasoned that to warn the accused that his confession might be used for him holds out an inducement for making the confession and is an improper [740]*740warning; therefore, a per se rule of inadmissibility applies if this evidence is uncon-troverted. The court of appeals cited Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 341 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The court of appeals then purported to do a harm analysis of the error, which in its entirety is as follows:
The State contends that if it was error to admit the confession, it was harmless. See Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). The State contends the erroneous admission of this type of confession is subject to the harmless error rule. See Connor v. State, 773 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied a harmless error analysis to the erroneous admission of an induced confession. See Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Both Connor and Sterling are distinguishable. The discussion of the harmless error rule in Connor is dicta. The Sterling facts show, in addition to the inadmissible confession, Sterling made a second admissible confession to another officer and a third oral confession to a fellow inmate. These circumstances distinguish both these cases from the matter before us.
We hold that Dunn applies. We sustain Gipson’s third point of error.
Gipson, 819 S.W.2d 890 at 894. Although the new Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure had been promulgated two months before the opinion in Dunn was issued, Dunn was written with no harm analysis of the error, and reversed on the basis of the inadmissible confession. Dunn, 721 S.W.2d at 327.
In the petition before us, the State complains that the court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction in disregard of the Tact that the case at bar was a trial before the court, and in its brief cites Deason, supra. To better understand the forces at work in the State’s ground for review, we need to go back to Arnold v. State, 161 Tex.Cr. 344, 277 S.W.2d 106 (1955), which shaped Tolbert v. State, 743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), which was the authority relied on in Deason. Arnold says, as does Tolbert and Deason, that:
When a cause is tried before the court and there is nothing to show that the judgment was based upon the inadmissible evidence (such as by findings or conclusions of fact or law) it will be presumed that the trial judge disregarded incompetent evidence admitted at the trial and the judgment will not be reversed on appeal on the ground of the admission of incompetent evidence if sufficient proper evidence was admitted to sustain the judgment.
Arnold, 277 S.W.2d 106 at 107. This was a type of harmless error test, created on the “civil side of the street”, instituted before the promulgation of Rule 81(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 While Arnold was authored pre-81(b)(2), Tolbert and Deason were not, and the standard for evaluating harm in a trial before the court should have changed from the Arnold line of cases to an 81(b)(2) analysis with the advent of that rule. Rule 81(b)(2) speaks to us in very plain terms and does not distinguish between trials before juries and trials before the court. It states:
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OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MILLER, Judge.
Appellant was found guilty of murder by the trial court, then sentenced by that court to 45 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. On appeal, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and complained the trial court erred by admitting testimony of his custodial confession. The court of appeals found the evidence sufficient, but found trial court error in admitting the custodial confession. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of that error and remanded for a new trial. Gipson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991). Although our reasons for reversing the conviction differ from those opined by the court of appeals, this Court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.
We granted the State’s petition on grounds two and three. In ground two the State complains that the court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction on the basis of the inadmissible confession in disregard of the fact that the case at bar was a trial before the court, and in its brief cites Deason v. State, 786 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In ground three the State complains that the court of appeals erred in implicitly holding that a harmless error analysis does not apply.
The portion of the record which the court of appeals relied on to declare the appellant’s confession inadmissible is as follows:
Q. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: While you were taking it [confession], to be fair, of course, you told him [Gibson] it was going to be used against him or could be used against him in this trial?
A. [OFFICER]: Yes.
Q. Likewise, you told him it would be used in his favor?
A. I told him it would be his story he could use in court.
Q. For or against him?
A. I just said it would be his story that he could tell in court.
Q. Wouldn’t that imply that it could be used in his favor?
A. However you choose to use it.
Q. That he could use it on his behalf or the State could use it in their behalf, that’s the impression you wanted to get across to him?
A. I told him it was a story he would be able to tell in court, yes, sir.
Q. That would imply that it could be used in his favor, doesn’t it?
A. I’m saying he could imply that any way he wanted to.
Q. That was your intent, wasn’t it, to get across to him that what he was saying here was his story and that he could use it on his behalf in his trial?
A. Yes, sir, I told him it would be presented to the Grand Jury and also presented in Court, just like he told it.
Q. Either on his behalf or against him?
A. Yes, sir.
The court of appeals reasoned that to warn the accused that his confession might be used for him holds out an inducement for making the confession and is an improper [740]*740warning; therefore, a per se rule of inadmissibility applies if this evidence is uncon-troverted. The court of appeals cited Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 341 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The court of appeals then purported to do a harm analysis of the error, which in its entirety is as follows:
The State contends that if it was error to admit the confession, it was harmless. See Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). The State contends the erroneous admission of this type of confession is subject to the harmless error rule. See Connor v. State, 773 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied a harmless error analysis to the erroneous admission of an induced confession. See Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Both Connor and Sterling are distinguishable. The discussion of the harmless error rule in Connor is dicta. The Sterling facts show, in addition to the inadmissible confession, Sterling made a second admissible confession to another officer and a third oral confession to a fellow inmate. These circumstances distinguish both these cases from the matter before us.
We hold that Dunn applies. We sustain Gipson’s third point of error.
Gipson, 819 S.W.2d 890 at 894. Although the new Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure had been promulgated two months before the opinion in Dunn was issued, Dunn was written with no harm analysis of the error, and reversed on the basis of the inadmissible confession. Dunn, 721 S.W.2d at 327.
In the petition before us, the State complains that the court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction in disregard of the Tact that the case at bar was a trial before the court, and in its brief cites Deason, supra. To better understand the forces at work in the State’s ground for review, we need to go back to Arnold v. State, 161 Tex.Cr. 344, 277 S.W.2d 106 (1955), which shaped Tolbert v. State, 743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), which was the authority relied on in Deason. Arnold says, as does Tolbert and Deason, that:
When a cause is tried before the court and there is nothing to show that the judgment was based upon the inadmissible evidence (such as by findings or conclusions of fact or law) it will be presumed that the trial judge disregarded incompetent evidence admitted at the trial and the judgment will not be reversed on appeal on the ground of the admission of incompetent evidence if sufficient proper evidence was admitted to sustain the judgment.
Arnold, 277 S.W.2d 106 at 107. This was a type of harmless error test, created on the “civil side of the street”, instituted before the promulgation of Rule 81(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 While Arnold was authored pre-81(b)(2), Tolbert and Deason were not, and the standard for evaluating harm in a trial before the court should have changed from the Arnold line of cases to an 81(b)(2) analysis with the advent of that rule. Rule 81(b)(2) speaks to us in very plain terms and does not distinguish between trials before juries and trials before the court. It states:
If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.
While Deason employs an 81(b)(2) analysis after applying the Arnold “presumption test”, there’s no authority to apply such multipronged, conditional testing to an error.
“The confusing majority opinion is, however, understandable when one considers that its authority is Tolbert v. State, which opinion, given the issue that this Court had to resolve, is truly one of this Court’s most incomprehensible, illogical, and nonsensical opinions ever handed down. [Cites omitted]. Perhaps the idea of Tolbert is that if this Court follows Tolbert a sufficient number of times, [741]*741then by sheer number that opinion will become authoritative, rather than simply incomprehensible, illogical, and nonsensical.”
Deason, 786 S.W.2d at 720, Teague, J., concurring. The promulgation of Rule 81(b)(2) implicitly voided the presumption test, and we now expressly do so. The conditional presumption test language in the Amold/Deason line of cases is expressly disavowed. The State’s ground for review that the court of appeals erred in reversing the conviction on the basis of the inadmissible confession in disregard of the fact that the case at bar was a trial before the court is overruled.
The State also complains that the court of appeals erred in implicitly holding that a hármless error analysis does not apply. The State is correct; a harmless error analysis does apply and in that respect we sustain the State’s ground for review. However, we must reverse based on Rule 81(b)(2).
Rule 81(b)(2) is clear. It says that we must reverse when error is found in the proceedings below unless we are able to analyze the error and its effects and determine beyond a reasonable doubt that error made no contribution to the conviction or punishment. In other words, Rule 81(b)(2) mandates reversal unless strong argument is brought to bear which enables the appellate court to make an intelligent determination that the error and all its tangential effects made no contribution to the conviction or punishment.
By its very nature, Rule 81(b)(2) requires a subjective analysis by which the appellate court must calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error on the jury, or as in this case, the judge. Each case must be examined on its own merits by the appellate court, and if the record does not expressly show, as it does in this case, that the error complained of clearly contributed to the conviction, then the error must undergo an in-depth analysis for harm to the defendant.
In doing a harm analysis, the reviewing court should examine the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and its probable collateral implications. Further, the court should consider how much weight a judge or juror would probably place upon the error. In addition, the court must also determine whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
However, in the cause before us, we need not apply the subjective methodology set out in Harris, supra. We do not need to determine whether the error contributed to the conviction because at the pronouncement of guilt, the trial judge specifically states that her judgment was based at least in part on the inadmissible confession. The record reflects the following on page 242 of the trial transcript:
THE COURT: Thank you. Based on the medical evidence, the Defendant’s confession, the Defendant’s actions, based on testimony from the hotel management workers, based on the accomplice testimony and also Mr. White’s testimony, the Court is going to find the Defendant guilty of the offense of murder as now charged in the indictment.
(Emphasis added.) Under Rule 81(b)(2), this Court is constrained to finding the error did contribute to the conviction. Had the trial court not specifically said “Based on ... the Defendant’s confession”, an argument could have been made by the State that the error was harmless, in part because the confession did not admit to the murder, and the information garnered by the confession was repeated in other admissible testimony. However, in this case, the trial judge specifically said her judgment was based on the confession to some degree. Rule 81(b)(2) is unambiguous and says the error can make no contribution to the conviction. The trial judge says plainly that it did. The defendant has been harmed, the conviction tainted. The State’s ground for review is overruled. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
CLINTON, J., agrees with the majority on the merits, but would remand for an 81(b)(2) harm analysis.