IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE FILED AT KNOXVILLE October 18, 1999
JUNE SESSION, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * * No. 03C01-9805-CR-00174 Appellee, * * KNOX COUNTY vs. * * Hon. Richard Baumgartner, Judge STEVEN OTIS NICELY, * * (Rape of a Child; Agg. Sexual Battery) Appellant. *
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Tommy K. Hindman Paul G. Summers and Attorney General and Reporter Laura E. Metcalf Attorneys NationsBank Bldg., Suite 700 Todd R. Kelley 550 Main Avenue Assistant Attorney General Knoxville, TN 37901 Criminal Justice Division 425 Fifth Avenue North (ON APPEAL) 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Mark Stephens Knox County Public Defender Randall E. Nichols District Attorney General John Halstead Asst. Public Defender Charm Knight 1209 Euclid Avenue Asst. District Attorney General Knoxville, TN 37921 City-County Building Knoxville, TN 37902 (AT TRIAL)
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes, Judge OPINION
The appellant, Steven Otis Nicely, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County
Criminal Court of one count rape of a child and one count aggravated sexual
battery.
The trial court imposed a twenty-two year sentence for rape of a child and an eleven
year sentence for aggravated sexual battery. The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently. On appeal, the appellant raises four issues for our review: (1) the
sufficiency of the evidence; (2) whether the jury verdict of rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery violate the protections of double jeopardy; (3) whether the
trial court improperly limited the cross-examination of specific prior instances of the
victim’s sexual conduct under Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(ii); and (4) whether the trial
court erred by refusing to charge the jury with range of punishment.
After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 1994, N.B.,1 the victim, the victim’s mother, Wilma Faye
Wynn, and the appellant lived in the Karns community of Knox County. Ms. Wynn
and the appellant began their relationship around 1992. In 1994, they began living
together. N.B. was eleven years old and entering the sixth grade at that time.
Although the thirty-seven year old appellant and the victim’s mother were unmarried,
N.B. viewed the appellant as a “father figure.” In September of 1995, the victim
confided in a friend that she and the appellant had been involved in sexual activity.
In January of 1996, the appellant was charged in a two count indictment with rape of
a child and aggravated sexual battery. 2
1 It is the policy of this court to re fer to child vic tims of sexua l abuse b y their initials. State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W .2d 186, 1 88 n.1 (T enn. Cr im. Ap p. 1989) .
2 The “open dated” indictment charged both offenses occurred between “__ day of June, 1994, an d on diver s and d iverse da tes betw een that d ate and th e __ day o f Septem ber, 199 5.”
2 At trial, she testified, providing no specific dates, that the “touchin’ happened
all the time” in his room, the living room, and the kitchen. She testified that the
appellant had touched her vagina with his penis and his mouth. The victim admitted
that she would go into the appellant’s room because she liked the attention. She
stated that during the incidents of abuse, she remained clothed but the appellant
was unclothed.
The victim recounted that the first sexual encounter occurred when she and
the appellant were watching television in his bedroom. The appellant began rubbing
her back and eventually removed her bra and began rubbing her stomach and
chest. Frightened, the victim left the room. The appellant followed her outside and
told her that if she told they would both be “in trouble.”
Another incident occurred in the living room, when the appellant digitally
penetrated her vagina. She testified that on another occasion he put her hand on
his penis and she masturbated him until he ejaculated. Yet, another offense
occurred in the victim’s brother’s room. The appellant put his hands on her and
asked if she had had sex standing up before. This offense ceased when the victim’s
mother returned home from work.
The victim testified that on or about September 3, 1995, the appellant got out
of the shower and had a towel wrapped around him. The victim had entered his
room to retrieve a towel for herself. The appellant pulled her onto the bed where
they both began touching each other. The appellant then penetrated the victim’s
vagina with his penis. When she complained that it hurt, he stopped. She stated
that she liked the appellant to fondle her; however, the penetration scared and hurt
her.
Later that same day, the appellant took the victim and her brother to the lake.
3 The appellant dropped her brother off at the bank with other children while he and
the victim went riding in the boat. The appellant gave the victim a Valium for a
headache. After entering a cove on the lake, the appellant gave the victim a beer.
That evening, when the appellant and her mother were away at a concert, the victim
drank some liquor, locked herself in the bathroom, and passed out. Her brother
called Debbie, their father’s girlfriend, who took the victim to her trailer in Powell. It
was on this occasion that the victim related to Debbie her sexual encounters with
the appellant. Debbie called the victim’s mother and advised what the victim had
told her.
A few days later, the victim spoke with the Department of Human Services
(DHS). She told the DHS case worker that the appellant had only penetrated her
once. However, she did tell DHS that he had touched her before. DHS referred the
victim to a psychologist at St. Mary’s Hospital. The victim stated that she was very
unhappy at the time because “[e]verything came out.” The victim remained at the
hospital for nine days. After leaving the hospital, the victim was placed in Peninsula
Lighthouse for further treatment for two months. Next, the victim was placed in
PAASAC where she received continued counseling.
The victim stated that she had never been penetrated before the actions by
the appellant. However, during the time that the appellant was abusing her, she
was digitally penetrated by another boy while they were kissing.
On cross-examination, the victim stated that her mother drank heavily during
the times of these offenses and they were experiencing various conflicts in their
relationship. The victim’s domicile fluctuated back and forth between living with her
father and mother. She admitted telling the psychologist that she had provoked the
appellant by grabbing his genitals and removing the covers from the bed in which he
was lying. She admitted that her story had changed from the time she talked to
4 DHS and her testimony in court.
The victim also told the psychologist that she smoked marijuana and that she
heard voices. However, she denied telling the psychologist of any specific instances
of alcohol or marijuana abuse. She stated that the entire time was very confusing
for her, however, she “did not hallucinate and [was] not mental.”
James Nicely, the appellant’s brother, testified that he talked to the appellant
on two occasions about his sexual involvement with the victim. The appellant told
him that the victim was “comin’ on to him.” On the second occasion, the appellant
asked for his help. The appellant related that the victim had pulled the towel off of
him and climbed on top of him while he was asleep. When he awakened, there was
a wet spot on the sheets. Further, the appellant related that he had performed oral
sex on the victim at the lake.
Also, testifying for the State was Nancy Jackson, an employee of the Blount
Memorial Emotional Health and Recovery Center, where the appellant had
apparently submitted himself for evaluation and/or counseling. Unfortunately, the
testimony of Ms. Jackson is not included in the record.3 An exhibit to her testimony
includes the following interview notations: “she touches/grabs him in an
inappropriate way for [sic] past year. . . states he allowed her to masturbate him. . .
I am really worried that I might be a child molester.”
After resting its case-in-chief, the State elected two offenses pursuant to the
requirements of State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tenn. 1993). For the rape
of N.B., the State elected the offense on or about September 3 which occurred in
3 Volume II of the trial transcript ends with page 172 while volume III begins with page 202, omitting nearly thirty pages of transcript from the record. From the table of contents, we note that this contains a large portion of the State’s proof, i.e., the remainder of the cross examination of James Nicely and the testimony of Nancy Jackson. The obligation of preparing a com plete and adequ ate reco rd for the is sues p resente d on app eal rests u pon the a ppealing party. See Tenn. R. App. P. 2 4(b).
5 the appellant’s bedroom the same day that the appellant, the victim, and her brother
went to the lake. With regard to the aggravated sexual battery, the State elected the
offense which involved masturbation of the appellant; this type of sexual contact
occurring only on the one occasion.
The defense presented the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Davis, a clinical
psychologist employed at St. Mary’s Health System, who treated the victim. From
his report, he testified that the victim and her mother had a “tumultuous” relationship
and she felt abandoned by her father. The victim had reported using Valium,
alcohol, and marijuana and attempts to overdose on drugs. She told the
psychologist that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations in which she heard
people swimming and laughing when she stared outside her window. At one point,
she said that she saw a giant eraser chasing her around her school classroom.
Moreover, she reported seeing “mannequin-like Indians” staring at her.
The victim told the psychologist that she felt close to the appellant because
he took care of her mother. She acknowledged that she had been provocative
toward the appellant and that she enjoyed the attention she received from him. The
psychologist opined that possibly the victim had perceived the relationship as a
means to strain the relationship between the appellant and her mother. Davis
diagnosed the victim with major depression, “severe without psychotic features,”
alcohol and cannabis abuse, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The psychologist
recommended that the victim be placed on medication, in-patient treatment, family
intervention, and chemical dependency treatment. Although the psychologist did not
feel that her hallucinations were valid in the “true psychotic sense,” he felt they were
a product of her imagination and fantasy.
Wilma Wynn, the victim’s mother, testified that her daughter has a history of
lying. Ms. Wynn stated that her daughter expressed much distaste for her new
6 environment in Karns and blamed her mother for her father not being around. She
related that she and the victim’s father were not on good terms because he did not
provide any support for his children. Ms. Wynn testified that her daughter had a
habit of opening the shower door on people, removing covers from the bed while
people were under them, and entering her bedroom. She stated that the appellant
had asked her to lock the bedroom door when she left for work in the mornings.
The appellant also began sleeping in blue jean shorts as opposed to the nude. She
recounted an incident on Valentine’s Day when the appellant had bought her a ruby
ring. The victim became extremely jealous and angry until the appellant also bought
her a ring.
Ms. Wynn stated that the victim has told her on different occasions that the
appellant sexually abused her. Then, on other occasions, the victim denied that the
appellant abused her. Although her daughter was given a pregnancy test upon
admission to the hospital, no test was performed to determine whether the victim
was sexually active.
Tiffany Wallace, a friend of the victim, presently incarcerated at the juvenile
detention center, testified that the victim was a chronic liar. She stated that, prior to
the victim’s admission to Lighthouse, she and the victim were taking Valium,
smoking marijuana, and drinking alcohol on a regular basis.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
First, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence to
sustain a verdict of guilt for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. A jury
conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is cloaked
and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal, a convicted defendant has the
burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient. State v. Tuggle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this
7 court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d
832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate
view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom.
State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113
S.Ct. 1368 (1993). Viewing the evidence under these criteria, it is this court’s
responsibility to affirm the conviction if the proof was sufficient for any rational trier
of fact to have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v.
Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct.
743 (1995); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
First, within his sufficiency arguments, the appellant contends that the victim
is unbelievable because she changed her testimony concerning (1) the number of
times and the places where the abuse occurred; (2) her alcohol and drug use; and
(3) her previous sexual experiences. Thus, the appellant’s challenge is one of
witness credibility. In essence, the appellant requests that this court trespass upon
the jury’s responsibility to evaluate the credibility of the victim, N.B. It is not the duty
of this court to revisit questions of witness credibility on appeal, that function being
within the province of the trier of fact. See generally State v. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d
642, 646 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 718-719 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993). Although inconsistencies or inaccuracies may make the witness a less
credible witness, the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed unless the inaccuracies or
inconsistencies are so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt
of the appellant’s guilt. We decline the appellant’s invitation to overturn his
convictions by making a choice different from that of the jury.
Next, the appellant challenges his conviction for rape of a child. Specifically,
he contends that “the evidence was inconclusive as to whether sexual penetration
even occurred.” He argues that the appellant never mentioned sexual penetration at
8 the hospital, to his father, or to his brother. Moreover, he asserts that penetration
was never proven because no physical examination was performed on the victim.
The State contends that physical evidence is not required for a conviction and the
victim’s testimony of penetration alone was sufficient to support the verdict.
To support a conviction for rape of a child, the State is required to prove an
“unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a
victim, if such victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-522(a) (Supp. 1994). In the instant case, the trial court defined sexual
penetration to the jury as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse,
or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or any object
into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other
person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-501(7) (1991).
This testimony at trial showed the victim, N.B., was twelve years old at the
time of the offense. She testified that the appellant penetrated her vagina with his
penis.4 Therefore, a rational juror could have found that the appellant penetrated
N.B., supporting his conviction for rape of a child. This issue is without merit.
Moreover, we conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to find the
4 An examination of the record reveals the following testimony during the direct exam ination of N .B.: Q: (Prosecutor) Okay. Tell me how that day started. What do you remember about that morning? A: (Victim) Goin’ up--or gettin’ up and I think Steve got out of the shower and had a towel on and was in his room. I went in his room to get a towel. And he pulled me on the bed and started touching me, and I was touching him too. But somehow he pulled me on top of him and my clothes [sic] was off and he put it in. Q: He put what in where? A: He p ut his pen is in my vag ina. ... Q: Okay. And how did you feel about him putting his penis inside you? A: It hurt. I--I--it sca red m e. Q: O kay. T his pa rticula r day-- let’s g o bac k to th at pa rticula r day-- he pu t his p enis inside you that morning? A: Yeah .
9 appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated sexual battery. 5 The
victim testified that the appellant placed her hand on his penis and moved it until he
ejaculated.6 Furthermore, the appellant’s admission at Blount Hospital corroborated
this testimony in that, “he allowed her to masturbate him.“ Accordingly, we find the
evidence presented sufficient proof from which a rational juror could reasonably
infer the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue is without merit.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Second, the appellant asserts that the jury’s verdicts of guilty of rape of a
child and aggravated sexual battery violate the principles of double jeopardy
because both charges arose from a single incident, i.e., “the vaginal penetration and
masturbation occurred at the same time and involved the same victim.” He argues
that his convictions stem from “the continuation of one sexual act from penetration
to ejaculation” and as such violate double jeopardy protections against multiple
punishment for the same offense. See State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378
(Tenn. 1996). The appellant’s recitation of the facts claims, “[o]n the morning in
early September, the vaginal penetration occurred first, the defendant stopped when
5 In order to suppo rt a convic tion for agg ravated sexua l battery, the Sta te is require d to prove “unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim” and that “[t]he victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (Supp . 1994).
6 Q: (P rose cuto r) Ok ay. W ere th ere e ver tim es w hen he wo uld ge t you to touc h him ? A: (Victim) Hum, once, and I put my hand on his penis. Q: O kay. A nd w hen you pu t your h and on his penis , how did tha t hap pen ? Did he ask you to? Did he tell you to? How did that happen? A: Just k ind of put m y hand on it and started mov ing it. Q: W ho did that? Did he-- A: Yeah. Q: H e or yo u--I’m sorr y. A: He did. Q: Him or you? A: He did. Q: Okay. He put his hand where? A: No . I put m y hand on him --he put m y hand on him . Q: H e put your h and on him ? A: Yeah. Q: Okay. And by on him do you mean his penis? A: Yeah. Q: Okay. And once he got you to put your hand on his penis, what did he make you do with your hand? A: Masturbate--
10 the victim said it hurt, and she completed the sexual act by masturbating the
defendant. We find no proof in the record to support this factual contention.
Indeed, the record reflects that the battery conviction (masturbation) and the rape
conviction were unrelated and occurred on different dates thus constituting two
separate and distinct crimes. 7 For this reason, we find no further analysis of the
double jeopardy issue necessary. This issue is wholly without merit.
III. RAPE SHIELD LAW
Next, the appellant asserts that he was denied his right to a fair trial because
the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of the victim regarding specific
instances of her prior sexual conduct under Tenn. R. Evid. 412. The appellant
argues that the victim’s sexual experiences from persons other than the appellant
“included heavy petting, masturbation, and digital penetration.” Thus, he contends it
was imperative that he be permitted to show that the victim’s “knowledge of sexual
matters” was obtained from persons other than the accused. See Tenn. R. Evid.
7 The record contains no evidence as to the date the sexual contact by masturbation occ urre d. Th e tes timo ny of th e sex ual ba ttery inv olving ma sturb ation was who lly unre lated in tim e to the rape which occurred “on the morning of the day in early September, 1995" that the three went to the lake. As previously noted, the State elected offenses and the trial court charged the jury (1) as to th e rape c harge, For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, . . ., the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential elements:
(1) That the defendant had unlawful, sexual penetration of the alleged victim, or the alleged victim had unlawful sexual pen etrat ion of the d efen dan t in the bedr oom of the resid enc e in Knox County, Tennessee, occupied by the Defendant . . . and [the victim] on the morning of the day in early September, 1995, that the Defendant . . ., [the victim], and her younger brother went to the lake . ...
and (2) as to the aggr avate d sex ual ba ttery,
For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, . . . , the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential elements:
(1) That the defendant had unlawful sexual contact with the alleged victim , . . ., specifically being the day the a lleged victim , . . . , masturbated the Defendant . . . until he ejaculated in the bedroom of the residence in Knox County, Tennessee, occupied by the De fendan t . . . and [the victim ]. ...
11 412(c)(4)(ii). In sum, he contends that the victim’s sexual experiences with persons
other than himself would have established that (1) the victim was not sexually naive;
(2) she was sexually curious and aggressive toward the appellant; and (3) she
obtained knowledge independently from the appellant to falsify the allegations
against him.
Before evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior may be
admitted at trial, the accused must file a written motion ten days prior to trial,
accompanied by an offer of proof describing the specific evidence and the purpose
for introducing it. Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d)(1). After notice has been given, the trial
court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury and the public to
determine whether the evidence is admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d)(2). The trial
court must decide (1) whether the evidence is relevant to the issue of knowledge of
sexual matters and (2) the probative value must outweigh the unfair prejudice to the
victim. Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d)(4). “[T]he evidence shall be admissible in the
proceeding to the extent an order made by the court specifies the evidence which
may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined
or cross-examined.“ Tenn. R. Evid. 412(d)(4).
In a pre-trial motion hearing, the appellant requested that he be permitted
to cross-examine the victim at trial concerning specific statements she made to case
workers in a Department of Human Services report. The DHS report attributed
statements to the minor victim which she allegedly made during their investigation of
sexual abuse. The report indicated the following statements: (1) the victim related,
“[w]hen asked for specifics of this incident . . . [victim] said that he [appellant] looked
like everyone else, referring to his privates,” and (2) when asked if she had been
sexually active with a boyfriend, “[s]he stated that she had not had sex but admitted
that there had been heavy petting involving digital penetration with boys fourteen
years old.” (Emphasis added).
12 At the hearing, the minor victim denied making the statement to DHS that she
had been involved in digital penetration with boys. She admitted that on one
occasion she had been digitally penetrated by a friend after they had kissed. Other
than the DHS report, the appellant offered no other direct proof pertaining to the
victim’s alleged prior sexual experiences.
On cross-examination at the hearing, N.B. related that she knew about sex
“through school and her friends.” She testified that she had a sex education class in
the fifth grade which occurred prior to any of the offenses involving the appellant.
She stated that the appellant began molesting her prior to the one incident with her
fourteen year old friend. Moreover, the appellant’s digital penetration occurred
before the occurrence with the friend. She further stated that she had never seen
another man’s genitalia before she saw the appellant’s.
In ruling on the motion, the trial court observed:
The issue in this case is, you know, whether or not there was-- there was sexual penetration of this twelve year old child by Mr. Nicely. The basis of that testimony or the basis of that charge is the testimony of [victim]. Their only way to rebut that is to claim that she for whatever reason is either lying or mistaken or is dreaming this up. Of course, I think--well- -and the only way that they can do that is to attack the credibility. What I’ve tried to do is fashion the purpose of the rule, and that is not to drag out somebody’s sexual history. In my judgment this young girl doesn’t have a sexual history other than that she’s engaged, . . ., in some petting with a teenage boy that involved . . .digital penetration. . . . But the only opportunity they have to question her credibility is to show that this is not the exclusive sexual contact that this girl has, that she would have another basis of knowledge of what sexual contact is. . . . I’m going to allow Mr. Hindman [appellant’s trial counsel] to ask this question--write it down-- ”Have you”--referring to [victim]-- ”Have you engaged in”--or “Have other individuals, other men, engaged in digital penetration with you?” And establish whether it’s prior to or after [appellant] had done that and on how many occasions. That will be the entire scope of the examination with regard to that.
13 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the
accused in a criminal prosecution to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986). “[T]he
main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in the original). See also State v. Melvin Edward Henning, No.
02C01-9703-CC-00126 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Oct. 24, 1997). “[T]he
Confrontation Clause only guarantees ‘an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense counsel might wish.’” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999 (1987) (citation omitted). The propriety, scope,
manner and control of testimony and other evidence, including the scope of cross-
examination, remains within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Barnard, 899 S.W.2d
617, 624 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1994) (citations
omitted); Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a). We conclude that the trial court achieved the
purpose of the rape shield rule in maintaining “a balance between the paramount
interests of the accused in a fair trial and the important interests of the sexual
assault victim in avoiding an unnecessary, degrading, and embarrassing invasion of
sexual privacy.” Advisory Commission Comments, Tenn. R. Evid. 412. Finding no
abuse of discretion, this issue is without merit.
IV. RANGE OF PUNISHMENT INSTRUCTION
Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct
the jury with the range of punishment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
201(b)(1) (1997) (repealed 1998) for the charged offenses. Although in State v.
Cook, 816 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tenn. 1991), our supreme court held that this provision
granted the defendant a statutory right to have the jury informed of the applicable
punishment for the pertinent charges prior to determining guilt or innocence, this
14 statutory right is not absolute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(1) (1997)(repealed
1998) provides in pertinent part:
In all contested criminal cases, except for capital crimes which are governed by the procedures contained in §§ 39-13-204 and 39-13- 205, upon the motion of either party, filed with the court prior to the selection of the jury, the court shall charge the possible penalties for the offense charged and all lesser included offenses. (Emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, the appellant concedes that he only requested the
“Truth in Sentencing” instruction following his closing argument. As argued by the
State, the appellant never filed a motion requesting the court to instruct the jury on
the range of punishment for the offenses of rape of a child and aggravated sexual
battery. Therefore, the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury regarding
range of punishment. See State v. Joanna Gail Rosa, No. 03C01-9707-CR-00261
(Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Jan. 6, 1999); State v. Marcus A. Velez, No. 01C01-
9611-CC-00488 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 30, 1998), perm. to appeal
denied, (Tenn. Jan. 4, 1999). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of conviction for rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery are affirmed.
____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
15 _______________________________________ JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge