State v. Stafford

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

State v. Stafford

334 S.E.2d 799, 77 N.C. App. 19, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4031

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 1, 1985

Docket848SC1098

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 334 S.E.2d 799 (State v. Stafford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Stafford, 334 S.E.2d 799, 77 N.C. App. 19, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4031 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinions

WEBB, Judge.

The appellant’s only assignment of error is in regard to Dr. Ponzi’s testimony in regard to the rape trauma syndrome. We believe this assignment of error has merit. Dr. Ponzi testified as to the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. He then testified as to the symptoms Tammy Ingram told him on 13 July 1984 that she had. If this testimony was introduced to prove the symptoms which Tammy Ingram had so that the jury could then determine whether she had a rape trauma syndrome it was hearsay testimony. It was offered to prove the truth of what Tammy Ingram told Dr. Ponzi. See G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) for a definition of hearsay. We do not believe this testimony was admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803 provides in part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment — Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

We do not believe this exception is applicable in this case. It is obvious that Tammy Ingram went to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 in preparation for going to court. She did not go for treatment. We do not believe we should hold she went for diagnosis. The commentary says this exception to the hearsay rule is based on the strong motivation for truthfulness when a patient is seeking treatment from a physician. For this reason we believe the diagnosis for which the exception to the hearsay applies should be a diagnosis for the purpose of treating a disease.

[22]*22If the testimony were offered for the purpose of corroborating Tammy Ingram’s testimony it would not be hearsay. Nevertheless a good part of it should have been excluded because Dr. Ponzi’s testimony did not corroborate Tammy Ingram’s testimony. Tammy Ingram testified that between December 1983 and July 1984 her weight went from 125 pounds to between 110 and 115 pounds. She also testified she made lower grades in school. Dr. Ponzi testified that she told him that she had a 15 pound weight loss, that she had been vomiting, that she cried a great deal, was emotionally labile, had a decreased school performance, had nightmares and dreamed about the incident. This testimony went far beyond corroborating the testimony of Tammy Ingram. It was error to admit it. See State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677 (1972). We hold this is an error requiring a new trial.

New trial.

Judge BECTON concurs in the result. Judge MARTIN dissents.

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WEBB, Judge.

The appellant’s only assignment of error is in regard to Dr. Ponzi’s testimony in regard to the rape trauma syndrome. We believe this assignment of error has merit. Dr. Ponzi testified as to the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. He then testified as to the symptoms Tammy Ingram told him on 13 July 1984 that she had. If this testimony was introduced to prove the symptoms which Tammy Ingram had so that the jury could then determine whether she had a rape trauma syndrome it was hearsay testimony. It was offered to prove the truth of what Tammy Ingram told Dr. Ponzi. See G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) for a definition of hearsay. We do not believe this testimony was admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803 provides in part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment — Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

We do not believe this exception is applicable in this case. It is obvious that Tammy Ingram went to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 in preparation for going to court. She did not go for treatment. We do not believe we should hold she went for diagnosis. The commentary says this exception to the hearsay rule is based on the strong motivation for truthfulness when a patient is seeking treatment from a physician. For this reason we believe the diagnosis for which the exception to the hearsay applies should be a diagnosis for the purpose of treating a disease.

[22]*22If the testimony were offered for the purpose of corroborating Tammy Ingram’s testimony it would not be hearsay. Nevertheless a good part of it should have been excluded because Dr. Ponzi’s testimony did not corroborate Tammy Ingram’s testimony. Tammy Ingram testified that between December 1983 and July 1984 her weight went from 125 pounds to between 110 and 115 pounds. She also testified she made lower grades in school. Dr. Ponzi testified that she told him that she had a 15 pound weight loss, that she had been vomiting, that she cried a great deal, was emotionally labile, had a decreased school performance, had nightmares and dreamed about the incident. This testimony went far beyond corroborating the testimony of Tammy Ingram. It was error to admit it. See State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E. 2d 677 (1972). We hold this is an error requiring a new trial.

New trial.

Judge BECTON concurs in the result. Judge MARTIN dissents.

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Bluebook (online)

334 S.E.2d 799, 77 N.C. App. 19, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-stafford-ncctapp-1985.

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