State v. Sopher

60 L.R.A. 468, 71 P. 482, 25 Utah 318, 1903 Utah LEXIS 75
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 4, 1903
DocketNo. 1409
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 60 L.R.A. 468 (State v. Sopher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Sopher, 60 L.R.A. 468, 71 P. 482, 25 Utah 318, 1903 Utah LEXIS 75 (Utah 1903).

Opinion

HART, District Judge,

after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

General laws prohibiting the transaction of business on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, are so uniformly upheld by the courts as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State that it is unnecessary to cite or discuss authority in support thereof. It is only upon special statutes, or special exceptions to general so-called Sunday laws, that the constitutionality of such enactments is ser[322]*322iously called in question. 24 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (1 Ed.), p. 530.

In Cooley, Const. Lim. 734, the author says on Sunday laws: “There can no longer be any question, if there ever was, that such laws may be supported as regulations of police.” The dissenting opinion of Judge Field in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 518, which afterwards became the opinion of the court (Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6, 43 Am. Rep. 231; and Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177), and which has been extensively quoted and followed by other courts, clearly and forcibly explains the grounds ujfon which such laws safely rest. At page 520 of his opinion, in defense of a Sunday law, it is said: “In its enactment the Legislature has given the sanction of law to a rule of conduct which the entire civilized world recognizes as essential to the physical and moral well-being of society. Upon no subject is there such a concurrence of opinion, among philosophers, moralists, and statesmen of all nations, as ón the necessity of periodical cessations from labor. One day in seven is the rule, founded in experience and sustained by science. There is no nation, possessing any degree of civilization, where the rule is not observed, either from the sanctions of the law or the sanctions of religion. This fact has not escaped the observation of men of science, and distinguished philosophers have not hesitated to pronounce the rule founded upon a law of our race.” And again: “Labor is in a great degree dependent upon capital, and unless the exercise of the power which capital affords .is restrained those who are obliged to labor will not possess the freedom for rest which they would otherwise exercise. . . . The law steps in to restrain the power of capital. Its object is not to protect those who can rest at their pleasure, but to afford rest to those who need it, and who; from the conditions of society, could not otherwise obtain it. Its aim is to prevent the physical and moral debility which springs from uninterrupted labor, and in this aspect it is a beneficent, and [323]*323merciful law.” The same authority quotes with approval the following from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Specht v. Com., 8 Pa. 312, 49 Am. Dec. 518): “All agree that to the well-being of society periods of rest are absolutely necessary. To be productive of the required advantage, these periods must recur at stated intervals, so- that the mass of which the community is composed may enjoy a respite from labor at the same time. They may be established by common consent, or, as is conceded, the legislative power of the State may, without impropriety, interfere to fix the time of their stated return, and enforce, obedience to the direction. When this happens some one day must be selected, and it has been said the round of the week presents none which, being preferred, might not be regarded as favoring some one of the numerous religious sects into which mankind are divided. In a Christian community, where a very large majority of the people celebrate the first day of the week as their chosen period of rest from labor, it is not surprising that that day should have received the legislative sanction. . . . It is still, essentially, but a civil regulation, made for the government of man as a member of society.”

The necessity for Sunday laws is stated by Mr. T'iede-man as follows: “If the law did not interfere, the feverish intense desire to acquire wealth, so> thoroughly a characteristic of the American nation, would ultimately prevent, not only the wage-earner, but likewise the capitalists and employers themselves, from yielding to the warnings of nature, and obeying the instincts of self-preservation, by resting periodically from labor, even if the mad pursuit of wealth should not warp their judgment and destroy this instinct. Remove the prohibition, and this wholesome sanitary regulation would cease to be observed.” Tied. Lim., 181.

It is true there are some cas.es holding unconstitutional, for various reasons, special Sunday laws directed against some particular vocation, such as barbering; but the decisions upon such statutes are not uniform. Eor instance, Cali[324]*324fornia, while strongly upholding a general law prohibiting the transaction of general business on Sunday (Ex parte Andrews, Ex parte Burke, and Ex parte Koser, supra), has held unconstitutional a law directed against the open barber shop on Sunday. Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 Pac. 803, 32 L. R. A. 664. This case is also followed in City of Tacoma v. Krech (Wash.), 46 Pac. 255, 34 L. R. A. 68, involving the validity of an ordinance of the plaintiff city prohibiting barbering on Sunday “while other laboring people in different characters of employment are allowed to prosecute their work.”

Illinois and Missouri have each held a special law against Sunday barbering to be unconstitutional, there being at the time in Illinois a general law making unlawful “whatever disturbs the peace and good order of society by labor (works of necessity and charity excepted),” and in Missouri a general law broad enough to include barbering, and also a constitutional provision enacting that “where a general law can be made applicable no local or special law shall be enacted.” Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, 32 L. R. A. 659, 52 Am. St. Rep. 365; State v. Granneman, 132 Mo. 326, 33 S. W. 784. It may be noted in this connection that Illinois' has held invalid a statute enacting that no female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours in any one day, or forty-eight hours in any one week (Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 101, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315), in marked contrast to the decision of this court in sustaining an eight-hour law (State v. Holden, 14 Utah 71, 46 Pac. 756, 37 L. R. A. 103; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780). Again, the general Sunday law of Illinois, above referred to, was so construed as to permit other business of a general nature to be transacted on the Sabbath. And so it was forcibly argued in the Eden case that “if the merchant, grocer, the butcher and druggist, and other trades and callings, are allowed to open their place of business and carry [325]*325on their respective vocations during seven days of the week, upon what principle can it be that a person who may be engaged in the business of barbering may not do the same thing?” The case of Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401, cited by appellant, can not be considered as lending much support to this contention, as the law passed upon in that case was so framed as to permit a hotel keeper, • or any one else except a barber, to keep open a bath-room on Sunday. Besides, the act legislated upon two subjects, contrary to the State Constitution.

But special laws directed exclusively against Sunday barbering and other vocations, and other Sunday laws with broader exceptions than in our own statute, have been strongly upheld by the greater number of the States and by the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 L.R.A. 468, 71 P. 482, 25 Utah 318, 1903 Utah LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-sopher-utah-1903.