IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 128,692
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
MELVIN LAVON SHIELDS,
Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1.
K.S.A. 21-2512(a) liberally allows for a petition for DNA testing to be filed "at any time" after conviction.
2.
K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(3) requires a petitioner to allege that previously tested biological material can be subjected to retesting with new DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results.
3.
Courts should liberally construe a pro se petitioner's petition for DNA testing and the allegations therein.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JENNIFER MYERS, judge. Submitted without oral argument April 9, 2026. Opinion filed August 28, 2026. Affirmed.
Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.
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Kayla L. Roehler, deputy district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STEGALL, J.: In 2019, Melvin Shields was convicted of two counts of premeditated murder and sentenced to two life sentences for killings which occurred in 1988. The case had gone cold until DNA testing tied Shields to the killings 15 years later. Despite the DNA test results, prosecutors declined to file charges for another decade because no murder weapon had been recovered. This court considered his direct appeal and affirmed his convictions in State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 817, 511 P.3d 931 (2022).
Before sentencing in 2019, Shields filed a petition for DNA testing pursuant to K.S.A. 21-2512 on certain items which had been previously tested. The district court summarily denied the petition, finding that Shields had not alleged new and more accurate testing techniques could be used. Shields did not appeal that ruling.
Shields filed a second petition for postconviction DNA testing in 2021, which is the subject of this appeal. In that petition he alleges that retesting on certain items should be done using new "touch DNA" methods. He also asks for testing of several other items which were never tested using the touch DNA technique.
The district court summarily denied this second petition after finding that Shields failed to establish that touch DNA techniques would present a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results. Alternatively, the district court found that even if Shields could prove that touch DNA was more accurate, Shields could not show that new testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence showing he was wrongly convicted or sentenced. Importantly, the district court's ruling was made before this
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court's decision in State v. Angelo, 316 Kan. 438, 518 P.3d 27 (2022). Shields appeals. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(4) (right to appeal off-grid convictions to Supreme Court).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1988, two victims, Steve Ray and J.J., were found shot to death in a ditch in Wyandotte County. J.J.'s pantyhose and underwear were torn, exposing her vagina, which was bruised. The next day, J.J.'s car was found abandoned in an alley. Blood samples, cigarette butts, and fingerprints were collected from the car, but the case went cold.
Fourteen years later, a detective ordered DNA testing of the cigarette butts, J.J.'s underwear, and samples from a rape kit collected from J.J. The results showed that Shields was a match to some samples, a possible contributor to others, and that Shields' fingerprints matched those recovered from J.J.'s car.
More specifically, the KBI report showed that a DNA profile matching the known DNA of Shields was found on a cutting from J.J.'s underwear and a cigarette butt from ashtray B of J.J.'s car; a partial DNA profile consistent with the known DNA of Shields was found on a cigarette butt from ashtray A of J.J.'s car and rectal swabs taken from J.J.; a major profile consistent with Shields from a mixed DNA profile was discovered on swabs from the sexual assault kit and another fabric sample taken from J.J.'s underwear; a minor DNA profile consistent with Shields from a mixed DNA profile was found on two other fabric samples from J.J.'s underwear and cigarette butt C; and unknown DNA was found on cigarette butt C, paper towel stains, cigarette butt A, and cigarette butt B. The other victim, Steve Ray, was excluded from being a possible contributor of biological material from the sexual assault kit.
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Despite the DNA evidence, the prosecutor declined to charge Shields without having a murder weapon. Then, in 2016, a different prosecutor decided to pursue the case. The State's case depended on the DNA and fingerprint evidence as well as testimony from J.J.'s cousin, who identified Shields as one of two men he saw in J.J.'s car on the day of the disappearance at a car wash and one of three men he saw in the car on the street the next day.
A jury convicted Shields of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, and the district court sentenced Shields to two consecutive life sentences with no possibility of parole for 15 years. Prior to sentencing in 2019, Shields filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing. In that petition he asked the district court to retest all tangible, physical evidence, including cigarette butts, cryotube rape kit swabs, underwear, and all other physical evidence in this case by an independent lab. The district court denied this petition in June 2020, reasoning that although Shields was a qualified inmate and the State had the items in its possession, Shields had failed to argue that there was previously untested biological evidence or that new DNA testing techniques would provide more accurate or probative results. Shields did not appeal.
Instead, Shields filed a second petition for postconviction DNA testing, which is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, Shields requests retesting of all biological evidence previously tested using new touch DNA techniques as well as testing of several other specific items not previously tested, some of which he specifically alleges were touched—to prove his DNA is not on those items. Shields argued before the district court that United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2015), supported his position that touch DNA is a new and more accurate testing technique.
The district court, without the benefit of this court's guidance in Angelo, 316 Kan.
at 455, held that Shields failed to show that touch DNA was a new technique that would provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results. The district court
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found that Watson was readily distinguishable because that case involved a scenario where previous testing was unable to either identify or exonerate the defendant. In contrast, Shields' known DNA had been identified on several of the items in his case. The court also found that Shields did not explain how touch DNA is a new technique, let alone a more accurate technique, or how it would be beneficial in his case. The district court therefore summarily denied retesting of previously tested items.
Turning to the previously untested items, the district court found that "[e]ven if new testing was done, and if the results came back with no DNA from Shields on these listed items, it still would not produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence." This is because a lack of DNA on these items would have no bearing on Shields' DNA and fingerprints being found elsewhere, including the sexual assault kit, J.J.'s underwear, and swabs from J.J.'s rectum. The district court therefore summarily denied Shields' petition. Shields appeals.
ANALYSIS
Both Shields and the State present their arguments as falling under a single issue.
However, this is an oversimplification of the arguments made in this case. Shields argues that the district court erred by finding that he failed to meet his pleading burden by alleging that new touch DNA techniques exist that would render more accurate results; and that the court erred by determining that additional testing could not produce exculpatory evidence.
The State argues that Shields' current petition should be barred under res judicata because Shields should have raised these issues in his 2019 petition for postconviction DNA testing; or, alternatively that new touch DNA technology is not a new technique and that Shields has not properly argued that there is biological material on any of the items he seeks to have tested for the first time.
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Before addressing these arguments, a review of the relevant statutory language is helpful. See K.S.A. 21-2512(a), (c).
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person in state custody, at any time after conviction for murder in the first degree as defined by K.S.A. 21-3401, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5402, and amendments thereto, or for rape as defined by K.S.A. 21-3502, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5503, and amendments thereto, may petition the court that entered the judgment for forensic DNA testing (deoxyribonucleic acid testing) of any biological material that:
(1) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the conviction;
(2) is in the actual or constructive possession of the state; and
(3) was not previously subjected to DNA testing, or can be subjected to retesting with new DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results.
....
"(c) The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to a petition made under subsection (a) upon a determination that testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim of the petitioner that the petitioner was wrongfully convicted or sentenced." (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 21-2512 (a), (c).
Res Judicata
The State argues that Shields' petition is procedurally barred by res judicata, which applies to issues that have been previously decided on the merits or could have been raised but were not. The State argues that the district court's summary denial of his 2019 petition for postconviction DNA testing and Shields' failure to appeal that ruling create
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the conditions necessary for res judicata to bar his current claims. This court has applied res judicata to K.S.A. 21-2512 petitions. See generally State v. Bailey, 315 Kan. 794, 510 P.3d 1160 (2022); see also State v. Edwards, 318 Kan. 567, 574, 544 P.3d 815 (2024) (extending Bailey to hold that the law of the case doctrine also applies to K.S.A. 21-2512 petitions).
Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in a certain case is an issue of law over which appellate courts exercise unlimited review. State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 481, 437 P.3d 953 (2019). Res judicata prevents relitigation when the following four conditions coincide: "(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity in the quality of persons for or against whom claim is made." Bailey, 315 Kan. at 799. A change in any one of these conditions may render res judicata inapplicable. In re Care & Treatment of Sigler, 310 Kan. 688, 699, 448 P.3d 368 (2019). Stated differently, courts will invoke res judicata to bar a successive suit where the following requirements are met: (1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits. Bailey, 315 Kan. at 799-800.
Shields' 2019 petition sought only retesting of certain biological materials. Shields did not raise arguments regarding the testing of new items or the existence of new technology, as he does in the petition on appeal now. In fact, the basis for the district court's 2019 denial was that Shields hadn't raised the issue of new DNA testing techniques.
K.S.A. 21-2512(a) liberally allows for a petition for DNA testing to be filed "at any time" after conviction. Shields' case is distinguishable from other decisions of this court applying res judicata. For example, in Edwards, the court found that Edwards' petition was barred because "Edwards' 2022 motion for DNA testing under K.S.A. 21- 2512 is identical to his 2018 motion." (Emphasis added.) 318 Kan. at 574. Similarly in
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Bailey, the court found that Bailey's petition raised identical substantive arguments to his previous motions, and that "the district court has twice made the finding that no biological material remains in the possession of the State." 315 Kan. at 802. Shields' situation is materially different from cases dealing with the "relitigation" of the same issue. Because Shields raises new legal arguments alleging new DNA testing technology and because he brings new arguments requesting testing of previously untested items, we find that his 2021 petition is not barred by res judicata.
Retesting of Previously Tested Biological Material
A summary denial occurs when a court's adjudication of a petition is based on the parties' pleadings, the record of the underlying trial, and any legal arguments presented at a nonevidentiary hearing. In such cases appellate review is unlimited because appellate courts are in as good a position as the district court to assess the petition's merits. Angelo, 316 Kan. at 446. The district court summarily denied Shields' 2021 petition. As such, the issue presents a question of law subject to unlimited review.
To state a claim for postconviction DNA testing, a petition must allege facts sufficient to meet the requirements of K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(1)-(3). "Thus, when addressing a petition under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512, the district court first determines whether biological material on the items sought to be tested meet the criteria in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(a)(1)-(3)." 316 Kan. at 452. "[T]his pleading requirement is not rigorous"; however, a petitioner must still allege facts sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements for testing. 316 Kan. at 456. In other words, Shields must allege under K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(3) that previously tested biological material can be subjected to new DNA testing techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results. He has not.
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Shields has not explained how the district court's ruling regarding touch DNA was erroneous. In fact, Shields' appellate brief does not even mention Watson. Shields abandons this argument and merely summarizes the district court's ruling as finding "federal precedent" distinguishable. Instead, he generally claims that touch DNA is a new method which could lead to more accurate results, with no additional support for that conclusion. Shields generally argues that DNA testing in his case was done in the early 2000's and that testimony at trial indicated that "modern" testing uses nearly twice as many "areas" of the DNA for comparison. Shields argues that the trial record establishes that DNA testing done today is generally more accurate than the technique used 20 years ago.
The State argues that touch DNA is not a new testing technique at all, but a reference to a type of technique used to test trace amounts of DNA that remain after someone touches an item—as opposed to blood or another source of DNA.
Shields' arguments do not address the State's position or the district court's finding that Shields has failed to explain at all how touch DNA specifically would render a more accurate result in his case. Shields' references to his trial record reflect the district court's concern that Shields is trying to relitigate his grievances with the original DNA testing— which he challenged at trial—rather than meet the requirements of subsection (a)(3).
Therefore, the district court was correct to conclude that Shields failed to satisfy his burden under K.S.A. 21-2512(a)(3) to adequately plead that new testing techniques could produce more accurate and probative results and to summarily deny Shields' petition with regard to his request for retesting items previously tested.
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Testing of Newly Alleged Untested Biological Material
Shields' second argument is that there are several items related to his case that have not been tested, and he requests that he be allowed to test all of them using the touch DNA technique. As a pro se petitioner, courts should liberally construe Shields' petition for DNA testing and the allegations in it. See 316 Kan. at 457.
The State argues that Shields' petition fails because Shields has failed to identify any biological material in his petition. See State v. Johnson, 320 Kan. 402, 407, 568 P.3d 858 (2025) ("Johnson's petition alleges only the absence of blood in the car, not the presence."); State v. Harris, 318 Kan. 926, 929, 550 P.3d 311 (2024) ("The statute does not contemplate, and certainly does not provide, a spoliation remedy for nonbiological evidence.").
In Angelo this court made clear that:
"[K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(a)] limits the scope of testing to 'any biological material' that is related to the case, in the actual or constructive possession of the State, and which was not previously tested or can be retested with new DNA techniques that are more accurate and probative. (Emphasis added.) Eligible petitioners may request DNA testing of biological material only. The plain language of subsection (a) does not contemplate or provide for testing of other physical evidence to determine whether biological material is present. And K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(a) requires that a petition for postconviction DNA testing allege that biological material satisfying the threshold requirements for testing exists." 316 Kan. at 452-53.
Shields' 2021 petition requests testing of the following:
• A mirror containing a fingerprint that was matched to Shields; • the pants of Steve Ray, which were turned inside out;
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• Steve Ray's wallet and the contents thereof; • Steve Ray's eyeglasses; • plastic license tag cover of J.J.'s car; • the interior of the brown Buick; • albums and album covers found in the trunk of the victim's car; • cassette tapes that were in J.J.'s car "and had been touched"; • insurance papers and paperwork from J.J.'s car that "should not have been scatter[e]d around [the] brown Buick";
• the gun that was pawned; • all clothing worn by victims; • interior of the blue car owned by Steve Ray parked next to the brown Buick; • keys to J.J.'s car; and • hair found on the light bulb holder.
Shields' petition is not perfect, but when liberally construed, he satisfies the "not rigorous" pleading hurdle of K.S.A. 21-2512(a). He asks for testing using touch DNA which, even the State agrees, tests skin cells left behind after something has been touched. He is also alleging, sometimes more explicitly than others, that these listed items were touched. Additionally, the hair is biological material. See 316 Kan. at 457 (holding that under a liberal reading, the petitioner had sufficiently alleged the existence of biological material because his allegations were premised on the existence of biological material amenable to forensic DNA testing and that those items were in possession of the State).
"Under the second step of the pretesting process, the State responds to the petition.
Under our interpretation of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512, the State's response should have identified the biological material it previously secured in connection with the case." 316
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Kan. at 457. However, in Shields' case, the State did not respond and therefore did not dispute at the district court level that it had these items or that they contained biological material.
Shields' case presents a parallel situation to that in Angelo where the district court was not alerted to a dispute regarding the existence of biological material. 316 Kan. at 440 ("Because the parties did not have the benefit of this statutory interpretation, their pleadings did not disclose the existence of a factual dispute concerning the presence of biological material on the victims' clothing, and thus the district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing."). In Angelo, the court determined that because the State did not have the benefit of this court's statutory interpretation, the proper remedy was to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the existence of biological material. 316 Kan. at 458-59 ("Because we conclude in the following section that the district court erred by concluding that testing biological material on the victim's clothing would not produce exculpatory evidence, these circumstances demonstrate the propriety of a remand for further proceedings consistent with our statutory interpretation.").
It is at this point where the unique timeline of Shields' case becomes important.
The district court in Shields' case did not have the benefit of the specific three-step process we described in Angelo at the time it considered and dismissed Shields' petition.
Angelo requires that:
"First, the petition must allege that biological material exists and satisfies the threshold requirements for testing under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(a). Second, once the State has notice of the petition, it must preserve any remaining biological material that it previously 'secured in connection with the case' and identify such biological material in its response. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(b)(2). Finally, once the pleadings have been filed, the parties will either agree or dispute that biological material satisfying the threshold requirements for testing under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(a) exists. If the parties agree such
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biological material exists, then they can proceed to argue whether testing will produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence compelling the district court to order testing under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(c). But if they continue to dispute the existence of such biological material, then they can present evidence to the district court for appropriate fact-finding. In that situation, the petitioner, as the proponent of DNA testing, bears the burden to prove the existence of such biological material. See In re K.E., 294 Kan. 17, 23, 272 P.3d 28 (2012) ('movant generally bears the burden of proof on a motion')." (Emphasis added.) 316 Kan. at 455.
In Shields' case, the district court presumed the existence of biological material and skipped ahead to making a determination that any testing would not be exculpatory. In doing so, the district court did not have the parties "proceed to argue whether testing will produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence compelling the district court to order testing . . ." before summarily dismissing the petition. See 316 Kan. at 455. Instead, the district court in Shields' case found "there is no requirement for a court to . . . hold an evidentiary hearing if the files and records of the case conclusively establish that such testing would not lead to exculpatory evidence."
It is clear that under Angelo, the district court's approach was procedurally incorrect. However, whether a remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine the existence of biological material on these objects in Shields' case is necessary depends on whether this court concludes the district court reversibly erred by determining that the testing of the presumed biological material would not have yielded noncumulative, exculpatory evidence under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512(c). This is the approach that was taken in Angelo, specifically because the parties and court lacked the benefit of our statutory interpretation.
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Angelo demonstrates that the district court's findings are reviewable and the procedural error is not necessarily reversible when "a remand would be futile if the district court nevertheless properly concluded that DNA testing of the presumed biological material . . . could not produce exculpatory evidence." 316 Kan. at 469.
Whether Additional Testing Would Have Produced Noncumulative, Exculpatory Evidence
A district court has a statutory duty under subsection (c) to determine whether testing could produce exculpatory evidence before ordering testing. The district court here determined, pursuant to its duty under the statute, that it would not. In considering the district court's summary denial, "we exercise unlimited review to determine whether DNA testing of the presumed biological material may have yielded noncumulative, exculpatory evidence." 316 Kan. at 459.
"'DNA testing is intended to confirm or dispute the identity of individuals involved in or at the scene of a purported crime.' So DNA evidence may be exculpatory if it tends to establish innocence based on an individual's identity. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Johnson, 299 Kan. 890, 894, 327 P.3d 421 (2014) "A petitioner need not show with certainty that DNA testing of the specified items will produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence. Instead, the possibility of generating such evidence will suffice." Angelo, 316 Kan. at 462; State v. Lackey, 295 Kan. 816, 824, 286 P.3d 859 (2012) (concluding that the language used in K.S.A. 21-2512 shows that the Legislature believed a "fishing expedition" is worth conducting in these cases).
"To be exculpatory evidence, it need not definitively prove the petitioner's innocence but only tend to prove a disputed material fact." State v. Hernandez, 303 Kan. 609, 620, 366 P.3d 200 (2016). It is clear that "'[e]xculpatory' is a relatively low threshold
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to meet; however, evidence must still actually meet that threshold." State v. Holt, 321 Kan. 125, 130, 573 P.3d 665 (2025).
"That . . . potentially exculpatory evidence may be of very little evidentiary value does not matter at this stage. Once DNA results are obtained, the district court will then make 'a "probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do" with the new evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances.'" State v. George, 308 Kan. 62, 68, 418 P.3d 1268 (2018) (quoting Lackey, 295 Kan. at 824).
Stated another way, "[t]he district court does not have discretion at this stage of the proceedings to consider the weight of the exculpatory evidence or its potential effect on the verdict." Angelo, 316 Kan. at 461.
Turning back to Shields, the district court was correct that additional testing of the untested items could not provide any exculpatory evidence as required by K.S.A. 21- 2512(c). The eyewitness testimony of J.J.'s cousin established that there were at least two other people in J.J.'s car. Finding additional DNA that is not Shields' on the listed evidence does nothing to prove or disprove who killed Steve Ray and J.J. There is already evidence in the record there were other people in J.J.'s car. Additional testing excluding Shields from having touched any of the untested items would not affect the current DNA results showing that Shields' DNA was also in J.J.'s car, on her underwear, and on her body via the sexual assault kit and rectal swabs. Stated more directly, Shields' DNA not being on the listed items does not tend to prove a disputed material fact when Shields' DNA was found on J.J. and elsewhere in her car. The DNA testing Shields requests has no possibility of generating exculpatory evidence related to the killings of Steve Ray and J.J. Therefore, any remand for additional proceedings would be futile.
Affirmed.