JANINE P. GESKE, J.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Seymour, 177 Wis. 2d 305, 502 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1993), which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse county, Peter G. Pappas, Circuit Judge. A majority of the court of appeals (Dykman, J., dissenting) concluded that sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats., should not be construed differently than sec. 943.20(l)(a).1 Rather, sec. 943.20(l)(b) should be read to include distinct offenses of theft by an employee, and not a mere means of committing a single offense. Consequently, the circuit court erred when it disjunctively instructed the jury on the alternative means of committing theft [686]*686under sec. 943.20(l)(b) without also instructing that the jurors must unanimously agree on the manner in which the statute was violated. The court of appeals ordered that the defendant, Douglas Seymour (Seymour), be given a new trial, at which time the jury would be properly instructed.
The issue in this case is whether the manner in which the jury was instructed by the court infringed upon Seymour's rights to a unanimous verdict and due process of law. Specifically, when a jury is instructed on the alternative means of committing theft under sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats., should there be a second instruction that the jurors unanimously agree on the manner in which the statute was violated? Our examination of the legislative history of sec. 943.20, as well as the holdings in State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985); State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 252 N.W.2d 380 (1977); and Jackson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 1, 284 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1979), leads us to conclude that secs. 943.20(l)(a) and (b) must be construed identically. Each subsection uses words which were intended to describe independent offenses rather than simply delineating methods by which the same offense may be committed. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The facts of this case are as follows. Seymour was employed by Clower Construction and Development, Inc. (Clower Construction) as a carpenter in the fall of 1988. In the spring of 1989, Seymour began his own business, Seymour Enterprizes and Consultants. During that period, Seymour contacted Paul Clower (Clower) and persuaded him to incorporate his construction business, in addition to employing Seymour as an office manager and financial consultant on a part-time basis. As part of this one-year venture, Sey[687]*687mour was to handle the financial aspects of the business. Additionally, Seymour was to bill the services of his consulting company through Clower Construction. At the outset, Clower and Seymour established a $25,000 line of credit and four checking accounts. Seymour then obtained a second $25,000 line of credit for Seymour Enterprizes, which was occasionally used to supplement Clower Construction's cash flow.2
In February, 1990, Seymour and Clower terminated their business relationship following a period of difficulties which began the previous fall.3 In March, 1990, an examination of Clower's books revealed that [688]*688$15,000 had been transferred from the Clower Construction credit line or checking accounts into a Seymour Enterprizes checking account. Bank records indicated that on May 19, 1989, Seymour transferred the $15,000 from the Clower Construction credit line to the Clower Construction main checking account. From there, $10,000 was transferred to a Seymour Enter-prizes checking account, to which Clower did not have access. On May 24, 1989, Seymour issued a check, drawn on the Seymour Enterprizes account, in the amount of $7,000, for deposit into the Clower Construction checking account.
A criminal complaint was issued in May, 1990, charging Seymour with three counts of violating sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats. Each count alleged that Seymour "intentionally used, transferred, and retained possession" of money he held by virtue of his employment as a trustee or bailee.4 (Emphasis added.)
[689]*689During preliminary instructions at the beginning of the trial, the court told the jury that the charge against Seymour was "generically stated as being embezzlement or theft" and described each of the elements of sec. 943.20 as involving the use of another's money without consent.5
At the conclusion of the state's case, Seymour moved to dismiss the information, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had used or transferred money belonging to Clower Construction. The court denied the motion to dismiss following the prosecution's argument that even if Seymour's argument was accepted, he was also charged with having retained possession of Clower Construction's money. [690]*690The state, therefore, believed that the jury could find Seymour guilty under sec. 943.20(l)(b) if it was satisfied that Seymour either "used," "transferred," or "retained possession" of Clower Construction's money. Consequently, the prosecution requested that the pattern jury instruction for theft, Wis. JI — Criminal 1444, be modified to include "transferred" and "retained possession" and to read as follows:
The first element requires that the defendant had possession of the money of another because of his employment.
The second element requires that the defendant intentionally used, transferred, concealed or retained possession of such money without the owner's consent and contrary to the defendant's authority....
The third element requires that the defendant knew that such use, transfer, concealment or retention of the money was without the owner's consent and contrary to the defendant's authority.
The fourth element requires that the defendant used, transferred, concealed, or retained possession of the money with intent to convert it to his own use.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the defendant, by virtue of his employment, had possession of money belonging to another, that the defendant intentionally used, transferred, concealed, or retained possession of such money without the owner's consent, contrary to his authority, and with intent to convert it to his own use, you should find the defendant guilty as to the count under consideration.
(Emphasis added.)6
[692]*692Though Seymour objected, the modified instruction was given to the jury. The state was also allowed in its closing argument to tell the jury that it need not be unanimous as to the manner in which Seymour violated sec. 943.20(l)(b). Seymour was subsequently convicted of two counts of theft by an employee. On appeal, Seymour argued that the circuit court deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict under art. I, secs.
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JANINE P. GESKE, J.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Seymour, 177 Wis. 2d 305, 502 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1993), which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse county, Peter G. Pappas, Circuit Judge. A majority of the court of appeals (Dykman, J., dissenting) concluded that sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats., should not be construed differently than sec. 943.20(l)(a).1 Rather, sec. 943.20(l)(b) should be read to include distinct offenses of theft by an employee, and not a mere means of committing a single offense. Consequently, the circuit court erred when it disjunctively instructed the jury on the alternative means of committing theft [686]*686under sec. 943.20(l)(b) without also instructing that the jurors must unanimously agree on the manner in which the statute was violated. The court of appeals ordered that the defendant, Douglas Seymour (Seymour), be given a new trial, at which time the jury would be properly instructed.
The issue in this case is whether the manner in which the jury was instructed by the court infringed upon Seymour's rights to a unanimous verdict and due process of law. Specifically, when a jury is instructed on the alternative means of committing theft under sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats., should there be a second instruction that the jurors unanimously agree on the manner in which the statute was violated? Our examination of the legislative history of sec. 943.20, as well as the holdings in State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985); State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 252 N.W.2d 380 (1977); and Jackson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 1, 284 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1979), leads us to conclude that secs. 943.20(l)(a) and (b) must be construed identically. Each subsection uses words which were intended to describe independent offenses rather than simply delineating methods by which the same offense may be committed. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The facts of this case are as follows. Seymour was employed by Clower Construction and Development, Inc. (Clower Construction) as a carpenter in the fall of 1988. In the spring of 1989, Seymour began his own business, Seymour Enterprizes and Consultants. During that period, Seymour contacted Paul Clower (Clower) and persuaded him to incorporate his construction business, in addition to employing Seymour as an office manager and financial consultant on a part-time basis. As part of this one-year venture, Sey[687]*687mour was to handle the financial aspects of the business. Additionally, Seymour was to bill the services of his consulting company through Clower Construction. At the outset, Clower and Seymour established a $25,000 line of credit and four checking accounts. Seymour then obtained a second $25,000 line of credit for Seymour Enterprizes, which was occasionally used to supplement Clower Construction's cash flow.2
In February, 1990, Seymour and Clower terminated their business relationship following a period of difficulties which began the previous fall.3 In March, 1990, an examination of Clower's books revealed that [688]*688$15,000 had been transferred from the Clower Construction credit line or checking accounts into a Seymour Enterprizes checking account. Bank records indicated that on May 19, 1989, Seymour transferred the $15,000 from the Clower Construction credit line to the Clower Construction main checking account. From there, $10,000 was transferred to a Seymour Enter-prizes checking account, to which Clower did not have access. On May 24, 1989, Seymour issued a check, drawn on the Seymour Enterprizes account, in the amount of $7,000, for deposit into the Clower Construction checking account.
A criminal complaint was issued in May, 1990, charging Seymour with three counts of violating sec. 943.20(l)(b), Stats. Each count alleged that Seymour "intentionally used, transferred, and retained possession" of money he held by virtue of his employment as a trustee or bailee.4 (Emphasis added.)
[689]*689During preliminary instructions at the beginning of the trial, the court told the jury that the charge against Seymour was "generically stated as being embezzlement or theft" and described each of the elements of sec. 943.20 as involving the use of another's money without consent.5
At the conclusion of the state's case, Seymour moved to dismiss the information, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had used or transferred money belonging to Clower Construction. The court denied the motion to dismiss following the prosecution's argument that even if Seymour's argument was accepted, he was also charged with having retained possession of Clower Construction's money. [690]*690The state, therefore, believed that the jury could find Seymour guilty under sec. 943.20(l)(b) if it was satisfied that Seymour either "used," "transferred," or "retained possession" of Clower Construction's money. Consequently, the prosecution requested that the pattern jury instruction for theft, Wis. JI — Criminal 1444, be modified to include "transferred" and "retained possession" and to read as follows:
The first element requires that the defendant had possession of the money of another because of his employment.
The second element requires that the defendant intentionally used, transferred, concealed or retained possession of such money without the owner's consent and contrary to the defendant's authority....
The third element requires that the defendant knew that such use, transfer, concealment or retention of the money was without the owner's consent and contrary to the defendant's authority.
The fourth element requires that the defendant used, transferred, concealed, or retained possession of the money with intent to convert it to his own use.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the defendant, by virtue of his employment, had possession of money belonging to another, that the defendant intentionally used, transferred, concealed, or retained possession of such money without the owner's consent, contrary to his authority, and with intent to convert it to his own use, you should find the defendant guilty as to the count under consideration.
(Emphasis added.)6
[692]*692Though Seymour objected, the modified instruction was given to the jury. The state was also allowed in its closing argument to tell the jury that it need not be unanimous as to the manner in which Seymour violated sec. 943.20(l)(b). Seymour was subsequently convicted of two counts of theft by an employee. On appeal, Seymour argued that the circuit court deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict under art. I, secs. 5 and 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and his right under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the convictions, remanding for a new trial.7
[693]*693We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court erred at two stages of the trial proceedings. First, the court sua sponte amended the information at the close of trial. The information initially charged Seymour with using, transferring and retaining possession of stolen money. However, during the verdict and jury instructions conference, the court noted that the elements in sec. 943.20(l)(b) were listed in the disjunctive, while the information listed the charges in the conjunctive. The court then said:
I will change the wording on the charges [substituting 'or' for the word 'and'] as far as the Information is concerned to make sure it adheres at this time to the — I am concerned about using the term embezzlement, when the statute clearly defines it as theft.
This change had the effect of making the information duplicitous.8
[694]*694Though the amendment to the information was not prejudicial, since this change did not occur until after each party presented its case to the jury, the circuit court erred a second time when it subsequently instructed the jury in a disjunctive manner without also requiring that the jury unanimously agree on the manner in which the theft statute was violated. As a consequence, Seymour's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was compromised. This right is secured under art. I, secs. 5 and 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution,9 as well as the fourteenth amendment's guarantee that one shall be proved guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
[695]*695Whether a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict is imperiled when a court fails to instruct jurors that they must unanimously agree on the manner in which sec. 943.20(l)(b) has been violated has been answered in a series of Wisconsin cases. In Genova, this court held that sec. 943.20(l)(a), Stats., should be read in the disjunctive and not the conjunctive. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d at 145. This holding was based upon an analysis of the legislative intent surrounding the formation of sec. 943.20, which represented a major revision of the Wisconsin Criminal Code. As of 1955,23 statutes representing the law against misappropriation were coordinated under one section, identified as theft.10 In particular, the Genova court analyzed the [696]*696language of sec. 943.20(l)(a), Stats. Because the grammatical construction of that section differs little from that of sec. 943.20(l)(b), case law such as Genova and the legislative history of the statute provide persuasive guidance.
Both secs. 943.20(l)(a) and (b) should be read in the disjunctive, since each section represents a compilation of various substantive forms of theft. The objective underlying the revisions of the Wisconsin Criminal Code11 was to
clarify, codify and condense the myriad of piecemeal statutes that had developed over the years to avoid technical complexities in pleading and to eliminate the useless distinctions between embezzlement, the various kinds of larceny, and common-law theft.
Genova, 77 Wis. 2d at 146. See also Gordon B. Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin — Part I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 253, 256 (1960-61) (The construction of many statutes dealing with misappropriation led to confusion and an overlap regarding the distinctions among major forms of theft. As a result, the law in this area became more uncertain and less predictable.). Embezzlement represented only one of the forms of misappropriation or theft incorporated into the new statute.
In 1979, the court of appeals held that
[697]*697where there are alternative elements of the offense, and the defendant is charged with these alternative elements, the trial court must do one of the following to avoid [the problem of duplicity]. The court may only submit one of these alternative elements to the jury in the instruction based on the State election of which one they wish to submit to the jury. Alternatively, if more than one is submitted to the jury, the court must instruct the jury that before they may find the defendant guilty, they must unanimously agree on the alternative element they find was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson, 92 Wis. 2d at 11. Again, the focus of the case was sec. 943.20(l)(a). The alternative elements of the offense of theft — taking and carrying away, using, concealing, transferring, and retaining — were submitted to the jury. However, the jury was not instructed that there must be unanimous agreement on the manner in which the statute was violated. As a result, the defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated.12
The Jackson court relied on United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), wherein the court stated:
Like the 'reasonable doubt' standard, which was found to be an indispensable element in all criminal trials . . ., the unanimous jury requirement 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts in issue.'.. . The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining [698]*698whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
Gipson, 553 F.2d at 457-58 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).13
[699]*699Finally, in Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 157, this court relied on Genova for the conclusion that sec. 943.20(l)(a) should be read as five disjunctive acts. "Each of the disjunctive terms describes a separate type of'theft' or property deprivation." Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 168. Therefore, an individual may be separately convicted under sec. 943.20(l)(a) for concealing the movable property of another as well as transferring that property without running the risk of multiplic-itous charging. The Tappa court concluded that such convictions would not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions because sec. 943.20(l)(a) " 'describes a series of acts made criminal thereunder, one or more of which, but not all of which, constituted theft under common law. The statute covers more than "stealing from the owner" as the legislative history clearly shows.'" Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 166 (quoting Genova, 77 Wis. 2d at 145-46).
In Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981), this court examined sec. 943.32(1), Stats. (1977), in order to assess whether the statute defined [700]*700two offenses,14 thereby requiring jury unanimity on the manner in which the statute was violated. Identifying legislative intent as critical in this analysis, the court articulated the following factors as relevant to the determination of that intent: (1) the language of the statute; (2) the legislative history and context of the statute; (3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple punishment for the conduct. Id. at 422.
Though we concluded that one offense was intended under sec. 943.32(1), the same conclusion cannot be drawn in this case. First, secs. 943.20(l)(a) [701]*701and (b) were enacted simultaneously as part of the revision of the Wisconsin Criminal Code. See ch. 696, Wis. Laws of 1955. Both of these sections contain virtually identical language and no statutory instructions to read the terms in sub. (l)(a) differently than the identical terms in sub. (l)(b).
Second, the legislative history does not mandate that the terms in sub. (l)(b) ought to be read differently than those in sub. (l)(a). See Assembly Bill 814,A (ch. 696, Wis. Laws of 1955). Further, using the Manson reasoning as a guide, this court in Tappa concluded that the nature of the proscribed conduct of "transferring" and "concealing" represented significantly different acts:
Concealing only requires the actual hiding of the property, whereas transferring requires the involvement of a third-party and a change in the possession of such property. A transfer involves a separate volitional act. It is not incidental to the concealment. It involves seeking out a third-party and arranging the terms of the transfer.
Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 169 (emphasis added).
A clear distinction between the nature of proscribed acts was impossible to draw in State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983). The issue in Lomagro was whether the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict was violated when he was charged with one count of first-degree sexual assault, but evidence was introduced of six different acts of nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Id. at 586. The following rule was adopted:
When separate criminal offenses of the same type occur during one continuous criminal transaction, the prosecutor may join these acts in a single count [702]*702if they can properly be viewed as one continuous occurrence without violating the protections afforded the defendant by the rule against duplicity.
Id. at 589. Consequently, this court concluded that the acts of sexual assault alleged in the complaint were committed during a short period of time and, as such, were part of one continuous criminal transaction. Id. Unlike acts of sexual assault described in Lomagro, the proscribed conduct under sec. 943.20(l)(b) — using, transferring, concealing or retaining possession of the property of another — can be distinguished according to their individual nature, as well as the time frame in which each may be committed. See Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 169.
Third, the legislative intent has been supported by additional writings of those intimately involved in the design and drafting of the legislation. See Marygold Shire Melli and Frank J. Remington, Thefí; — A Comparative Analysis of the Present Law and the Proposed Criminal Code, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 253, 267 (one of the most frequently suggested reforms in the criminal law is the consolidation of the theft offenses into one section). The jury instructions for sec. 943.20(l)(b) also serve as persuasive authority,15 since two of the members of the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee also served on the Criminal Code Advisory Committee which drafted the legislation. Wis. JI — Criminal 1444 corroborates the conclusion that sec. 943.20(l)(b) is comprised of distinct offenses.
[703]*703Both the legislative history and case law surrounding the drafting and development of sec. 943.20, Stats., require an affirmance of the decision of the court of appeals. Seymour must be given a new trial at which the jury will be properly instructed.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.