State v. Schreckendgust

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 28, 1976
• Docket: 13080
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 13080

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN

THE STATE OF M N A A ACTING BY AND OTN THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT O HIGHWAYS F OF THE STATE O MONTANA, F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

CLYDE SCHRECKENDGUST , J R . a /k /a CLYDE SCHRECKENDGUST ,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

A p p e a l from: 9 i s t r i c t Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward D u s s a u l t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant :

Tipp and Hoven, M i s s o u l a , Montana Qouglas S k j e l s e t a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

D a n i e l J. S u l l i v a n and James Beck, Helena, Montana James Beck a r g u e d , Helena, Montana

- - - -

Submitted: A p r i l 20, 1976

Decided : ;! ,' 310 Filed: Hon. M. James S o r t e , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court:

The s t a t e of Montana by and through t h e department

o i highways, brought condemnation proceedings i n t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t , R a v a l l i County, a g a i n s t Clyde Schreckendgust f o r two

p a r c e l s of land. Defendant answered and counterclaimed a s k i n g

f o r damages i n t h e sum of $125,250. A commission h e a r i n g r e s u l t e d

i n an award of $62,356. An a p p e a l by t h e s t a t e of Montana t o

t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e s u l t e d i n a j u r y v e r d i c t of $29,600 and

defendant appealed t o t h i s Court.

Involved i s condemnation of 9.6 a c r e s o u t of a t r a c t of

land o f 24.14 a c r e s r e f e r r e d t o a s p a r c e l 6 , which l i e s n e a r

F l o r e n c e , Montana. The 24.14 a c r e s had been surveyed and p l a t t e d

i n t o l o t s i n 1967 b u t t h e p l a t was never f i l e d . Immediately

a d j a c e n t t o t h e 24.14 a c r e t r a c t was a n o t h e r t r a c t owned by

d e f e n d a n t ' s c o r p o r a t i o n and known a s F o r e s t View E s t a t e s , Unit 1,

which had been p l a t t e d and a l s o f i l e d .

A t t h e south end of t h e 24.14 a c r e p a r c e l t h e r e was a n o t h e r

p a r c e l of land owned by defendant and condemned i n t h i s a c t i o n ,

c o n t a i n i n g 1.6 a c r e s of land r e f e r r e d t o a s p a r c e l 5. The s t a t e ' s

a t t o r n e y s e n t e r e d i n t o a s t i p u l a t i o n w i t h defendant t h a t provided

t h e v a l u e of t h e 1 . 6 a c r e s ( p a r c e l 5) would be computed by

m u l t i p l y i n g p e r a c r e a g e p r i c e determined i n p a r c e l 6 and adding

an increment of $1,000 f o r s i z e .

Defendant a l l e g e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n two r e s p e c t s :

(1) The c o u r t d i d n o t allow d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p r a i s e r s t o

t e s t i f y on v a l u e of t h e condemned l o t s compared t o p l a t t e d sub-

d i v i s i o n property. (2) The court erred in refusing to allow defendant

to introduce a value, on either direct testimony of his appraiser,

or cross-examination of the state's expert, of comparable commer- cial sales of property.

With reference to the first alleged error, the record

discloses defendant called two appraisal witnesses, Charles Fricke

and Roy Rodenberger. Fricke testified that he based his opinion

of value on the basis of building sites and was permitted, over

objection, to state that in his opinion the per acre value of

the land was $10,500.

Defendant's other appraisal witness Roy Rodenberger,

was allowed to testify as to value of the 9.6 acres for the

highest and best use as residential sites and subdivision.

However, the district court would not permit him to use comparable

sales located in an existing subdivision because the property

sought to be condemned was not in an existing subdivision. In

the refusal to allow testimony of comparable sales in an existing subdivision, we note the court did not restrict the witness' testimony on a per acre value of the land. He testified, as he did in a deposition prior to trial, that the highest and best

use of the property was "residential sales or lots" and based

upon that concluded the land's value was $6,867 per acre.

Consequently,appraiser Fricke was permitted to testify as to the land's value for building sites at $10,500 per acre

and appraiser Rodenberger was permitted to testify to the same value of $6,867 per acre for "residential sales or lots" as stated in his deposition prior to trial.

The general rule is that the admission of evidence of comparable sales is within the discretion of the district court

and will not be reversed unless there was manifest abuse of that

discretion. In United States v. 55.22 Acres of Land, Etc., Yakima

Co., Wash., 411 F.2d 432, 434, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

stated the rule thusly:

"It follows that when evidence pertaining to an assertedly comparable sale is tendered, and objection is made thereto, a preliminary question of admissibility is presented. The determination of that question calls for an exercise of a sound discretion by the trial court, and the ruling thereon is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Eden Memorial Park Association, 9 Cir., 350 F.2d 933, 935." ~ ' S L See: United States v. &, 442 F.2d 1325 (1971).

The Illinois Supreme Court, in City of Chicago v. Blanton,

15 I11.2d 198, 154 N.E.2d 242,244,245, considered the exclusion

of an alleged comparable sale by the trial court. In affirming

that court's ruling, it held:

"* * * No general rule can be laid down regarding the degree of similarity which must exist between property sold and that condemned in order to make evidence of such sale proper. Since no two pieces of real estate are exactly alike and since economic influences are constantly changing, the admission of such proof rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will be reversed only where such discretion has been clearly abused."

See: Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 869;

State v. Rowley, 74 Wash.2d 328, 444 P.2d 695; Adams v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga.App. 662, 178 S.E.2d 291; Nystrom v. State, 80 S.D. 58, 119 N.W.2d 123; H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 316, 214 N.E.2d 721; Nonni v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 264, 249 N.E.2d 644. The general rule is that evidence of sales may be intro-

duced as long as they are truly comparable. This Court, in State

Highway Comm'n v. Churchwell, 146 Mont. 52,60, 403 P.2d 751, said: "* * * Concerning t h e admission of evidence, e i t h e r of v a l u e b e f o r e o r a f t e r t h e t a k i n g , t h e problem i s one of c o m p a r a b i l i t y o r s i m i l a r i t y . I n t h i s case a s h e r e i n a f t e r pointed out the f a c t s do n o t make a c a s e f o r s i m i l a r i t y o r com- p a r a b i l i t y . See Vol. 85 A.L.R.2d, pages 130 t o 163 . I '

I n Churchwell t h i s Court acknowledged t h a t p l a t t e d land was

n o t comparable t o raw l a n d :

"The Sprunger p r o p e r t y was an a c r e a g e s a l e a s against the appellants' allegation t h a t t h e i r s was p l a t t e d land."

This follows t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t s a l e s of p l a t t e d l a n d should

n o t be used t o v a l u e l a n d t h a t i s u n p l a t t e d , e s p e c i a l l y i n s i t u a -

t i o n s were t h e r e i s evidence of s a l e s of u n p l a t t e d land i n t h e

area.

I n Waukegan Park D i s t . v . F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of Lake

F o r e s t , 22 I11.2d 238, 174 N.E.2d 824,827, t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme

Court h e l d t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y s t r u c k t h e testimony of t h e

landowner's a p p r a i s e r because he r e f e r r e d t o s a l e s i n s u b d i v i s i o n s

and s a i d :

If* ** There was no e r r o r i n s t r i k i n g t h e t e s t i - mony. The p r o p e r t y involved i n t h e p r e s e n t pro- ceedings i s a c r e a g e p r o p e r t y which i s unsubdivided. The testimony sought t o be i n t r o d u c e d r e l a t e d t o p r o p e r t y which had been subdivided i n t o l o t s . . I t is well established t h a t the l a t t e r is not similar t o unsubdivided o r a c r e p r o p e r t y and t h a t t h e p r i c e of such l o t s i s n o t r e l e v a n t i n f i x i n g t h e v a l u e of p r o p e r t y such a s t h a t i n t h e c a s e s a t bar."

S t a t e Road Commission v. Ferguson, 148 W.Vir.742, 137

S.E.2d 206, 211, involved t h e condemnation of 10.22 a c r e s of

land f o r highway purposes. During t h e t r i a l of the case t h e t r i a l c o u r t p e ~ m i t t e da w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e p r i c e s

of l o t s i n an e x i s t i n g s u b d i v i s i o n . The West V i r g i n i a Supreme

Court h e l d t h i s was e r r o r , n o t i n g :

" ** I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , M r . Canterbury t e s t i - f i e d about a l o t which was s o l d from an e x i s t i n g sub- d i v i s i o n . The p r o p e r t y involved i n th& proceeding i s a t r a c t of land of approximately e l e v e n a c r e s . There i s no s i m i l a r i t y whatever between t h e two. I f t h i s evidence were allowed t h e j u r y would be r e q u i r e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e c o l l a t e r a l i s s u e s , such a s t h e many items of c o s t which n e c e s s a r i l y would be i n c u r r e d t o c o n v e r t t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y i n t o l o t s . T h i s could l e a d o n l y t o c o n f u s i o n and c a u s e t h e j u r y t o engage i n s p e c u l a - t i o n and c o n j e c t u r e .

1I P e r t i n e n t t o t h e i n s t a n t proceeding, many c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t evidence of t h e v a l u e of p l a t t e d o r subdivided land i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o prove t h e v a l u e of a c r e o r u n p l a t t e d p r o p e r t y . Holding such evidence i n a d m i s s i b l e , t h e C o u r t , i n C i t y o i Chicago v. Pridmore, e t a l . , 12 I11.2d 447, 147 N.E.2d 54, commented a s f o l l o w s : ' T h i s c o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t pro- p e r t y which h a s been subdivided i n t o l o t s i s n o t s i m i l a r t o o r s i m i l a r l y c o n d i t i o n e d a s unsubdivided o r a c r e p r o p e r t y . ' See Annotation, 85 A.L.R. 2d 110, a t p . 139, e t s e q . , and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . 11

The Colorado Supreme Court, i n Department of Highways v .

S c h u l h o f f , 167 Col. 72, 445 P.2d 402,407, c o n s i d e r e d t h e admiss-

i b i l i t y of l o t s a l e s i n an eminent domain a c t i o n where t h e pro-

p e r t y sought t o be condemned was n o t subdivided. In t h a t case

t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o admit evidence of such s a l e s . The land-

owner, on c r o s s a p p e a l , urged t h i s a s e r r o r . The Supreme Court

a f f i r m e d t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , h o l d i n g :

" I n p a s s i n g on t h e degree of c o m p a r a b i l i t y of the s a l e s which t h e S c h u l h o f f s attempted t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o evidence t o P a r c e l No. 320, t h e t r i a l c o u r t correctly ruled:

"'* * * t h e Court does n o t c o n s i d e r p l a t t e d sub- d i v i s i o n s , which l i k e l y have s t r e e t s , p o s s i b l y a l l e y s and c u r b s and g u t t e r s , paved s t r e e t s , u t i l i t i e s , g r a d i n g and o t h e r m a t t e r which a r e u s u a l l y i n s u b d i v i s i o n s , comparable t o t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e , and t h e r e f o r e r e f u s e s t o permit testimony a s t o t h e v a l u e of t h e s e l o t s , even though they a r e c a l l e d comparable l o t s .

"I* ** t h e r e a r e s o many elements i n s u b d i v i s i o n s t h a t a r e n ' t i n unimproved p r o p e r t y t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e v a l u a t e o r compare t h e two. '

"The a u t h o r i t i e s support t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g . W quote w i t h approval t h e following language of e t h e c o u r t i n S t a t e Roads Commission v . Wood, 207 Md. 369, 114 A.2d 636, apropos of t h e g e n e r a l r u l e :

"'* * *he v i c e i n comparing subdivided land and unsubdivided land l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e comparison i s between a wholesale and a r e t a i l p r i c e f o r t h e p r i c e of t h e p l a t t e d l o t s i n c l u d e s t h e expense of subdividing and t h e promotional and s a l e s c o s t s of moving t h e individual l o t s . ** *' [ C i t i n g c a s e s ] . " This r u l e was r e a f f i r m e d by t h e Colorado Supreme Court i n

Board of County Com'rs v . V a i l A s s o c i a t e s , L t d . , l 7 1 Co1.381,

Here, t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s t h e r e was testimony a t t h e

t r i a l of comparable s a l e s of undivided p r o p e r t y i n t h e a r e a of

t h e condemned land. The t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h e land i n q u e s t i o n

was n o t subdivided inasmuch a s t h e p l a t had never been f i l e d .

Defendant by n o t f i l i n g t h e s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t , obtained some

advantages i n r e g a r d t o t a x e s on t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e non-dedication

of such land t o t h e p u b l i c .

Lot s a l e s i n an e s t a b l i s h e d s u b d i v i s i o n recognize and t a k e

i n t o account t h e s e f a c t o r s : t h e c o s t of u t i l i t i e s f u r n i s h e d

w i t h t h e l o t s , such a s g a s , e l e c t r i c i t y , w a t e r , sewer and r o a d s ,

e i t h e r paved o r unpaved; ( 2 ) c o s t of land a c q u i s i t i o n , p l a t t i n g

and p r o f i t t o t h e s u b d i v i d e r ; ( 3 ) s e l l i n g expenses such a s com-

missions and a d v e r t i s i n g , and f o r hold-expenses such a s t a x e s ,

and i n t e r e s t c o s t s on t h e unsold land. These costs have - been incurred by the person who has not

not filed the subdivision plat and consequently the land in

question in this case was not comparable to platted lots and

the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

With reference to the alleged second error, a reading of the transcript does not sustain the argument that the defendant was prevented from introducing the evidence on either direct

testimony or on cross-examination of the state's experts concerning

the sale of comparable commercial property. A reading of the transcript indicates the court did not restrict the cross-examina-

tion.

The only objection to any cross-examination was when

defendant attempted to question a witness for the state about

the sale from defendant to Bell McCall Company. The witness

testified he did not know the answer to the question. Defendant

then attempted to premise the question with the answer he wanted

from the witness. An objection was made to this on the ground

that the witness stated that he did not know the purchase price

and the court sustained the objection. It is clear that counsel

cannot put an answer into evidence through the guise of asking another question with the answer as a premise. In any event the question was withdrawn by defendant.

The state made no objection to the cross-examination of the state's second appraisal witness and consequently the court did not restrict the cross-examination of the state's witnesses by defendant. Defendant also alleges the court refused in his direct

examination to allow him to place a dollar value concerning

sales of commercial property. The question here is whether or not

the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling. A t t h e t r i a l Rodenberger was c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d and

t e s t i f i e d , a s he d i d i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h a t

t h e land had a h i g h e s t and b e s t u s e f o r " r e s i d e n t i a l s i t e s

and s u b d i v i s i o n ." Defendant a l s o attempted t o i n t r o d u c e evidence of a s a l e

of . 2 8 a c r e s t o B e l l McCall Company. The c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h i s

s a l e was covered by a s t i p u l a t i o n p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d i n t o by

t h e p a r t i e s and t h e testimony was improper. Defendant made an

offer of proof which was denied by t h e c o u r t , and t h e c o u r t gave

an a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s a l e was f o r commercial

purposes a s Rodenberger had t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e h i g h e s t and b e s t u s e

o f t h e land was f o r r e s i d e n t i a l s i t e s . The w i t n e s s was allowed

t o t e s t i f y t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n t h e land was worth $6,867 p e r a c r e .

The following day t h e w i t n e s s Rodenberger attempted t o

t e s t i f y t h a t he was now of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y had t h e

h i g h e s t and b e s t use f o r r e s i d e n t i a l a n d / o r c o m e r c i a l . The

s t a t e o b j e c t e d on t h e ground t h a t no p r o p e r foundation had been

provided and s u r p r i s e , because of h i s p r e v i o u s d e p o s i t i o n and

testimony. The o b j e c t i o n was s u s t a i n e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .

Defendant made a n o t h e r o f f e r of proof which was denied.

The s t a t e made a motion i n l i m i n e p r i o r t o t r i a l r e -

q u e s t i n g an o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g defendant o r h i s a t t o r n e y o r

w i t n e s s e s from making any r e f e r e n c e t o t h e v a l u e of a t r a c t of

land d e s c r i b e d i n t h e complaint a s p a r c e l 5 , which i n c l u d e d t h e

B e l l McCall Company p r o p e r t y . The motion was n o t r e s i s t e d by

defendant.

Moreover, t h e B e l l McCall Company s a l e involved .28 a c r e s

a s compared w i t h 24.14 a c r e s i n t h e p a r c e l d e s c r i b e d a s p a r c e l 6 i n t h i s case. They a r e not comparable i n s i z e . The s t a t e ' s

witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h e property was not comparable because

i t was p r o j e c t influenced, i t was too small and i t was a s e r v i c e

station sale. There was no e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g .

I n Montana Power Company v. Wolfe, Mont . Y

545 P.2d 674, 33 St.Rep. 172, 174, t h i s Court s a i d :

"* * * Yet it i s well established t h a t appellate review of comparable s a l e evidence admitted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s limited. 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 5 21.31, pp. 21-54 t o 21-59, s t a t e s :

" ' S i m i l a r i t y does not mean i d e n t i c a l , b u t having a resemblance. Obviously, no two p r o p e r t i e s can be e x a c t l y a l i k e , and no g e n e r a l r u l e can be l a i d down regarding t h e degree of s i m i l a r i t y t h a t must e x i s t t o make such evidence admissible. It must n e c e s s a r i l y vary with t h e circumstances of each p a r t i c u l a r case. Whether t h e p r o p e r t i e s a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r t o have some bearing on t h e value under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and t o be of any a i d t o t h e j u r y , must n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t l a r g e l y i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , which w i l l n o t be i n t e r f e r e d with unless abused. The exact l i m i t s , e i t h e r of s i m i l a r i t y o r d i f f e r e n c e , o r of nearness o r remoteness i n p o i n t of time, i s d i f f i - c u l t , i f n o t impossible, t o p r e s c r i b e by any a r b i t r a r y r u l e , but must t o a l a r g e e x t e n t depend on t h e loca- t i o n and t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e property and t h e c i r - cumstance of t h e case. It i s t o be considered with reference t o t h e l i g h t thrown on t h e i s s u e , and n o t a s a mere method of r a i s i n g a l e g a l puzzle. "'

F i n a l l y , t h e v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y i n t h i s case i s not out

of proportion t o t h e i n j u r y t o defendant. This Court has followed

t h e r u l e t h a t i n eminent domain proceedings t h e j u r y v e r d i c t w i l l

n o t be d i s t u r b e d on appeal unless i t i s out of proportion t o t h e

i n j u r y done. S t a t e Highway Commission v. Manry, 143 Mont. 382,

The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed.

D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison. We Concur:

Justices.