State v. Rynhart

2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 814, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 124, 2003 WL 22813771

• Court: Court of Appeals of Utah
• Decided: November 28, 2003
• Docket: 20020760-CA
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

DAVIS, Judge:

T1 Tanja Rynhart appeals from a trial court order denying her motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of her vehicle. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

T2 On the morning of January 6, 2002, Officer Robert Burnham of the Brigham City Police Department received a dispatch call requesting investigation of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle. Burnham responded to the call at approximately 8:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the location of the vehicle, Burnham discovered that the vehicle had "traveled over the curb, down an embankment, [and] through two fences," before coming to rest in a "marsh" or "swamp." Burnham also discovered that the tire tracks leading to the vehicle were covered with snow. Because Burnham recalled that "[it had snowed as recently as 8:00" a.m., he determined that the accident had occurred at some point prior to that time.

[ 3 As Burnham approached the vehicle, he saw that it had a license plate, but he did not attempt to identify the owner of the vehicle by using the license plate number. Burnham entered the unlocked vehicle and discovered that there was no one inside. At the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, Burnham testified that his purpose for entering the vehicle was to "try to find out the identity of the owner, the driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at all." However, at the July 22, 2002 hearing on the motion to suppress, Burnham admitted that he performed a "very thorough search" of the vehicle, and testified that he "opened all the doors" and "looked under the seats." He testified that there were "quite a number of items in the vehicle," but admitted that he did not inventory all of the vehicle's contents. Burnham indicated that he was "primarily concerned with" finding and retrieving any "jewelry," "money," or "valuables" that may have been left in the vehicle.

T4 In his search of the vehicle, Burnham found a partially full bottle of vodka in the console between the two front seats, a briefcase on the front passenger seat, and a purse on the floor near the front passenger seat. He searched through the purse and the briefcase to determine their contents. Inside the purse, Burnham found a wallet, which he also searched. In his search of the purse and the wallet, Burnham found Rynmnhart's driver license, $329 in cash, several gift certificates, a small plastic bag containing a "white powdery substance," and "a mirror with some powder on it."

T5 After Burnham completed his investigation, he had the vehicle towed to a wrecking yard for "safe keeping," but did not officially impound the vehicle.¹ He retained the briefcase, the purse, and the items he found in the purse. At some point after he had "cleared from the scene" of the accident, Burnham attempted to contact Rynhart by phone, but was unsuccessful. Later that afternoon, someone from the wrecking yard contacted Burnham by phone to notify him that Rynhart was attempting to retrieve her vehicle. Burnham went to the wrecking yard and met with Rynhart. At that time, Burn-ham asked Rynhart about the small plastic bag containing white powder that he had found in Rynhart's purse. Rynhart admitted to Burnham that the small plastic bag contained cocaine, but told him that it belonged to a friend.

¶ 6 On March 27, 2002, Rynhart was charged with possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public structure, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. At the conclusion of the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, the trial court ruled that there were "reasonable grounds to believe that [Rynbhart] committed the offense[s]" and, accordingly, "requir[ed] that [Rynhart] be held to answer on the charges." Rynhart pleaded not guilty to both charges.

T7 Thereafter, Rynhart filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during Burn-harm's warrantless search of her vehicle. In its ruling on Rynhart's motion, the trial court determined that Rynhart had not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her vehicle. In support of this determination, the trial court made the following findings, which are not challenged on appeal:

The officer inspected the vehicle at 8:80 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 ... that morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle. If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle.

However, the trial court also determined that Burnham's warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency aid doctrine.² See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12," 12, 994 P.2d 1283. In support of this determination the trial court entered the following findings:

The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night. The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was [sic] the driver. Although [Rynhart] makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was lost.

Based upon its conclusion that the emergency aid doctrine was applicable, the trial court denied Rynhart's motion to suppress in an order dated September 3, 2002.

18 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart petitioned this court, pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to permit her appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to suppress. On November 5, 2002, we granted that petition and Rynhart's appeal ensued.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

19 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence.³ The trial court denied the motion based upon its determination that the warrantless search of Ryn-hart's vehicle was justified under the emer-geney aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,¶ 12, 994 P.2d 1283. -

The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.

State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct. App.1996).

ANALYSIS

$10 Rynhart argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion based upon its determination that the warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,1 12, 994 P.2d 1283.

(11 "The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Brown, 858 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted). "The burden of establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 204 (Utah 1995). "One such exception to the warrant requirement recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is exigent cireumstances. The emergency aid doctrine, sometimes referred to as the medical emer-geney doctrine, is a variant of the exigent cireumstances doctrine." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at 119-10, 994 P.2d 1283 (citations omitted).

112 In Davidson, we explained that

"[the [emergency aid doctrine] will support a warrantless search of a person or personal effects when [a] person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious condition and the purpose of the search is to discover evidence of identification and other information that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance, and the rationale is that the need to protect life or avoid serious injury to another is paramount to the rights of privacy...." Several courts have also applied the emergency aid doctrine when a person is missing and feared to be injured or dead.

Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 ALR. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993)). We adopted the emergency aid doctrine in Davidson, see id. at 1 13, and provided the following test for its application:

[A] warrantless search is lawful under the emergency aid doctrine if the following requirements are met:

(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life.

(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.

(8) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched and the emergency.

Id. at 112 (quotations and citation omitted). Under this test, "[wlhether an emergency exists is fact intensive and the [S)tate has the burden to prove that the exigencies of the situation make the course imperative." Id. at 110 (quotations and citation omitted). "This court has observed that application of the emergency aid doctrine should be strictly cireumseribed ... because of the significant departure [it] takes from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by requiring neither a warrant nor probable cause as prerequisites to a search." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,-117, 51 P.3d 55 (quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).

T 13 To satisfy the first prong of the emer-geney aid doctrine, the State must show that Burnham had "an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exist[ed]" and that he believed there was "an immediate need for [his] assistance for the protection of life." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at 112, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations and citation omitted). Our review of the record and the trial court's ruling reveals that several of the trial court's findings relating to the first prong are clearly erroneous.

14 The trial court determined that the first prong was satisfied based upon several findings. The trial court's findings that "[the accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night," and that the driver was "absen[t]" are supported by evidence in the record. Although these findings certainly weigh in favor of satisfying the first prong, in this case they are not sufficient, without more, to satisfy the first prong. The trial court's other findings that "[t)he driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented" and that "the officer had a duty ... to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was lost" are speculative and unsupported by evidence in the record. There is no evidence in the record indicating that facts gathered by Burnham at the scene of the accident were objectively indicative of injury to possible victims of the accident which would require him to "preserve life," or of any passengers of the vehicle being "lost," "disoriented," or "in distress."⁴ Accordingly, we conclude that these unsupported findings are clearly erroneous.

115 Because the aforesaid findings are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the first prong of the emergency aid doctrine was satisfied. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that the emergency aid doctrine was applicable in this case.

116 Moreover, when "strictly circumscribed," the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, does not apply to the facts of this case. Comer, 2002 UT App 219 at ¶ 17, 51 P.3d 55 (quotations and citations omitted). First, because Burnham did not find anyone in the vehicle in an "unconscious or semiconscious condition," the doctrine would be applicable only if "a person [was] missing and feared to be injured or dead." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at 110, 994 P2d 1288 (quotations and citations omitted). In that situation, "there must be some reliable and specific indication of the probability that a person is suffering from a serious physical injury before application of the [emergency aid] doctrine is justified." Comer, 2002 UT App 219 at T20, 51 P.3d 55. There is no evidence in the record indicating that Burn-ham ever observed anything at the scene of the accident that was a "reliable and specific indication of the probability that a person [was] suffering from a serious physical injury." Id. Without these indications, not only was Burnham not justified in searching the purse or wallet under the emergency aid doctrine, he had no reason to believe that anything that may be found in the purse or wallet would provide these indications, or that the owner of the purse or wallet was even in the vehicle when it left the roadway. Second, under the rationale of the emergency aid doctrine, a warrantless search is allowed if "the purpose of the search is to discover evidence of identification and other information that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance, . protect[ing] life[,] or avoid[ing] serious injury to another." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at 110, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations and citation omitted). Although Burnham did discover Rynhart's driver license during his warrantless search of her purse and wallet, there is no evidence in the record indicating that he searched these items for this purpose. Other than his phone calls to Rynhart, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that he took any action after completing his search of these items that could be construed as an attempt to provide "appropriate medical assistance, . protect life[,] or avoid serious injury to another." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Consequently, the trial court's application of the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, to the facts of this case was improper.

117 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the emergency aid doctrine was applicable in this case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of her vehicle.

CONCLUSION

1118 We conclude that several of the trial court's findings relating to the first prong of the emergency aid doctrine are clearly erroneous. Because these findings are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the first prong was satisfied and that the emergency aid doctrine was applicable in this case. Moreover, we conclude that the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrant-less search of her vehicle.

19 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge.

1 . Burnham neither attempted to obtain a warrant nor conduct an inventory search.

2 . Although the trial court refers to this doctrine as "ihe community caretaker function" in its ruling, it applies the elements of the emergency aid doctrine set forth in Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,% 12, 994 P.2d 1283, to determine whether Burnham's warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified.

3 . Although this is the sole issue raised by Ryn-hart, the State suggests that we should, without the benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the trial court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only does the record offer scant support for that proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet and the contents thereof. In State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, we cited numerous cases addressing the issue of a motor vehicle occupant's expectation of privacy in personal belongings left in the vehicle.

See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companion's car); People v. Manke, 181 Ill. 374, 130 Ill.Dec. 192, 537 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1989) (concluding that a car passenger whose closed brown paper bag was found in car's trunk, and was searched by police, had standing to challenge search); Ar nold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 313, 437 $.E.2d 235, 237 (1993) (holding that a car passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his closed plastic shopping bag found on the floor of the car).

Other jurisdictions have also held that car passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their coats or jackets found in cars. See People v. Armendarez, 188 Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d 893, 900 (1991) (finding that car passenger had "standing to object to the search of his personal effects in the car, namely, his coat," where his coat was found on front seat of vehicle); State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111, 112-13 (1993) (holding that car passenger had legitimate expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled on the back seat of car).

Finally, other jurisdictions have found that car passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their purses left in cars. See United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the owner of a shoulder bag, located on the front seat of his girlfriend's car, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (Oth Cir.1993) (holding that car passenger who left her purse in her boyfriend's car "had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Indeed, a purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest expectations of privacy."); State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1235-37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that car passenger whose purse was found on floor behind driver's seat and searched had standing because "a purse is clearly a container in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy").

Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256 at 9-11, 76 P.3d 178.

In his dissent, our colleague admits that these cases clearly support the proposition that vehicle occupants may possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in their personal belongings left in a vehicle. However, he asserts that we have "mistakenly" focused our attention on these cases and the proposition they stand for in reaching our conclusion that Rynhart did not abandon her expectation of privacy in her vehicle or its contents. He misapprehends our reliance upon these cases and the proposition they stand for. We do not rely upon these cases as the sole support for our ultimate conclusion on abandonment; rather, we rely upon these cases for the proposition that our colleague admits they stand for-that Rynhart, as a vehicle occupant, may have possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of her vehicle.

We then determine that (1) Rynhart clearly had "a subjective expectation of privacy" not just in her vehicle, but also in its contents; and (2) as the trial court's unchallenged findings on abandonment establish, that this "expectation was objectively reasonable." Id. at 17 (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, Rynhart did have a legitimate expectation of privacy both in her vehicle and in its contents. See id.

Finally, again based upon the trial court's unchallenged findings on abandonment, we conclude that Rynhart never "voluntarily relinquish[ed] a reasonable expectation of privacy" and, accordingly, that she did not abandon her expectation of privacy in her vehicle or in its contents. Id. at 114 (quotations and citation omitted).

In an era when our citizens' expectations of privacy are not only being eroded, but affirmatively attacked, we, t0o, are puzzled by the herculean effort of our esteemed colleague to obtain a result that not only is unsupported by the authorities he relies upon, unsupported by the facts, and contrary to the express ruling of the trial court, but also further erodes what is left of legitimate expectations of privacy.

4 . Indeed, the accident occurred on a major street within 1000 feet of a public structure.