OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals her conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58 — 37—8(2)(a)(i), (b)(ii) (1989). We reverse.
FACTS
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant was issued and executed which authorized police to search for narcotics in the residence of Stan Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The warrant contained provisions which allowed police to enter “day or night,” and to effect the search without notice, i.e., on a “no-knock” basis. The warrant was issued based on information in the officer’s supporting affidavit that a confidential informant had been contacted by Swickey, who told the informant that he, Swickey, had picked up a quantity of methamphetamine and marijuana that was being stored at his home in Leeds. The affidavit in support of the warrant contained preprinted language which stated that the affiant reasonably believed that the property sought could be easily destroyed or hidden or that harm to officers could result from notice. Following this language are two boxes that the affiant can check, and which were checked, to request nighttime and “no-knock” authority. No other factual information supports these requests.
The warrant was executed on a “no-knock” basis on October 7, 1988,1 at approximately 11:30 p.m. When police entered Swickey’s apartment, they found eight people, in addition to Swickey, in the home. Everyone except defendant was in the living room playing cards around a table. Defendant was in the kitchen. After securing the home, the officers had defendant join the other people in the living room, while Swickey was taken into the kitchen and placed under arrest, pursuant to an arrest warrant, and advised of the search warrant. Another individual was arrested when the officers saw drugs nearby, in plain view. The remaining individuals, including defendant, were told they could leave the premises. Defendant did not have her shoes, and asked if she could go to the bedroom to retrieve them. An officer accompanied her to the room, where she took the shoes from a pile of items. [732]*732The officer asked her if she had everything that was hers from that room. Defendant replied that she did.
After defendant left, the officers conducted a search of the home. Narcotics were found throughout the house. A purse was seized from the pile in the bedroom from which defendant had retrieved her shoes. Inside the purse was a small brown vial which contained methamphetamine. Also in the purse were several documents that revealed that the purse belonged to defendant.
Police contacted defendant the next day and advised her that they had a purse that belonged to her. She came down to the station and was arrested. After being advised of her Miranda rights, defendant admitted that the purse and vial of drugs were hers. She told police that she had been “ripping off” drugs from Swickey.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the vial and other contents seized from her purse. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities. The state filed a memorandum opposing defendant’s motion to suppress, and requested a ruling on defendant’s motion. On March 17, 1989, the court issued a written order denying defendant’s motion.
Defendant waived her right to a jury trial, and a bench trial commenced on March 21, 1989. During the trial defendant again renewed her motion to suppress. The basis of her argument was that the search warrant was defective since the supporting affidavit did not support the nighttime or “no-knock” authorization. The state argued that “Mr. Swickey would be the only one to have standing to object to that,” and also argued the merits of the claim. The court denied the renewed motion. Defendant was convicted as charged.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal, all of which challenge the district court’s failure to suppress the items seized from defendant’s purse: 1) Whether there was sufficient factual information in the supporting affidavit to authorize a nighttime search, 2) whether there was sufficient factual information in the supporting affidavit to authorize a “no-knock” search, and 3) whether the search was defective since the warrant was dated subsequent to the search.2
“NO-KNOCK” SEARCH
Defendant argues there was insufficient factual information presented in the supporting affidavit to justify the inclusion of a “no-knock” provision in the search warrant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
[[Image here]]
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.
The affiant in this case requested a warrant to search for narcotics believed located in a residence, by checking a preprinted provision on the affidavit form. A “no-knock” warrant was requested based on the affiant’s statement that such narcotics could be easily destroyed. Defendant argues that this statement alone is insufficient to justify issuance of a “no-knock” warrant. However, reading the affidavit “in a common sense manner and as a whole,” State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432, 405 N.W.2d 608, 610 (1987) (quoting People v. Mardian, 47 Cal.App.3d 16, 35, 121 Cal.Rptr. 269, 281 (1975)), we conclude that the [733]*733magistrate had sufficient basis to issue a “no-knock” warrant.
Although the affidavit is sparse, it is clear that the object of the search was drugs located in a residence. The small amount of drugs ordinarily found in a residential setting can be easily and quickly destroyed with even the briefest notice. Therefore, issuance of a “no-knock” warrant is justified if the affidavit suggests that a small, readily disposable, quantity of drugs in a residence is the object of the search.3 The’magistrate can readily and properly infer that such drugs could be quickly destroyed if notice is given. State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct.App.1987). While a detailed and factually specific affidavit is commendable and may facilitate subsequent review by an appellate court, it is not strictly necessary for the officer to elaborate on the obvious in the affidavit.
NIGHTTIME SEARCH
Defendant also argues that the supporting affidavit lacked sufficient factual information to support a nighttime search. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) provides in pertinent part:
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night.
Previous Utah case law on this issue construed a different code provision which required that a warrant be served in the daytime “unless the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to searched.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-11 (1953). See, e.g., State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848-49 (1972). No Utah cases are drawn to our attention which have addressed the present code provision.
The showing required by the present statute focuses not upon a positive showing that the property is at the place to be searched, but upon whether there are special circumstances which would justify a search at night. The statute does not specify how elaborate or detailed this showing must be, but merely requires that the “affidavits or oral testimony” must support a “reasonable cause” determination that a nighttime search is necessary. The precise quantum of information which would support this determination is not defined in the statute or in Utah case law and, as has been observed elsewhere, it is difficult “to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of a nighttime search.” People v. Kimble, 44 Cal.3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 810, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 155, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 188, 102 L.Ed.2d 157 (1988). Nonetheless, the statute clearly requires a particularized showing either that 1) a search is required in the night because the property is on the verge of being “concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered,” or 2) “for other good reason.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990).
Defendant argues that this particularized showing was not made in this case. We agree. Nothing in the supporting affidavit supported the inclusion of the nighttime service authority other than the preprinted language referred to above and the information received from the confidential informant. Contrary to our view that little more is required to justify a “no-knock” warrant than that the search is for narcotics at a residence, we see nothing inherent in a narcotics search which would necessitate a search at night, even though circumstances can easily be imagined which would suggest the propriety of such a search [734]*734being made at night.4
In interpreting a similar statutory provision which allows a magistrate to authorize a nighttime search upon a showing of “good cause,” one appellate court observed:
(1) A magistrate cannot make a neutral and independent determination of whether authorization of nighttime service is necessary when faced with only concluso-ry and ambiguous allegations in the affidavit; and (2) an affiant’s averment that in his experience (generally) particular types of contraband are easily disposed of does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient showing for the necessity of a nighttime search: a particular and specific reason for nighttime service must be set forth.
People v. Mardian, 47 Cal.App.3d 16, 34, 121 Cal.Rptr. 269, 281 (1975).
In Mardian, the court held that the magistrate had “good cause” to issue a nighttime search warrant based on information provided in the affidavit that the contraband was in the process of being removed from the premises, and that the occupants would be able to remove the remainder of the contraband before a daytime warrant could be served since the occupants would be leaving at 6:00 a.m. Id. 121 Cal.Rptr. at 282. See also Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810, 244 Cal.Rptr. at 155 (magistrate could infer that persons who had recently stolen stereo equipment would attempt to get rid of it quickly, since the theft was tied to a double homicide); State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432, 405 N.W.2d 608 (1987) (affiant’s statement that he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the residence in the afternoon supported an inference that marijuana was being consumed and thus destroyed). See generally Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at Nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951 (1969 & Supp.1990), 1 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure § 166 (13th ed. 1989); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(b) (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.1990).
The affidavit in this case contained no facts from which a magistrate could infer that the contraband was likely to be destroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered during the night. Additionally, we find nothing in the affidavit from which a magistrate could reasonably infer that there was any “other good reason” to justify issuance of a nighttime search warrant.5 We therefore hold that it was error for the [735]*735magistrate to authorize a nighttime search based on the facts in the affidavit presented to him.
STANDING, ABANDONMENT, “GOOD FAITH,” AND SUPPRESSION
The state argues that any inadequacy in the warrant is immaterial since 1) defendant has no standing to challenge the adequacy of the warrant to search Swickey’s apartment since she was only a guest in the apartment; 2) any expectation of privacy she had in the contents of her purse was abandoned when she told the officer she had everything that was hers when she departed Swickey’s bedroom, leaving the purse behind; 3) any technical defects in the warrant were overcome by the officer’s good faith reliance on the warrant in conducting the search; and 4) any failure of the warrant to satisfy merely statutory requirements does not necessitate the suppression of evidence, as would be the case where constitutional requirements are offended.
A. Standing
In her reply brief, defendant claims the state did not raise standing at trial. While we reaffirm that such a failure would be fatal to the state’s position, see State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 885-86 & n. 8 (Utah Ct.App.1990), defendant’s claim is not borne out by the record. As indicated above, the prosecutor specifically argued that “Mr. Swickey would be the only one to have standing to object to [the nighttime and ‘no-knock’ provisions of the warrant].”
Since the contention was adequately raised at trial, we now address the state’s standing argument. The state argues that defendant has no standing to challenge the adequacy of a warrant authorizing the search of a third-party’s home since she was only a party guest in the home. We disagree.
Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law that “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is [“]one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable^’ ”] id. at 143-144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Minnesota v. Olson, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). The state’s position that defendant failed to establish standing based on the nature of her presence in Swickey’s home is arguable, but not compelling.
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded “that Olson’s status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. 110 S.Ct. at 1688. In this case, the evidence did not establish that defendant was an overnight guest in Swickey’s home on the night of the search. There is, however, uncontroverted evidence that defendant had an intimate relationship with Swickey, which may have continued to the time of the incident giving rise to this case, and had stayed overnight in the home on several prior occasions. However, the record lacks facts which would lead to the conclusion that she intended, or might have been invited, to remain overnight on the night of the search.
But as we read Olson, there is no talis-manic significance, in determining standing, to the length of time a social guest is in the home. Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest has such standing, but nothing in Olson suggests that a social visit of a duration less than overnight would deprive a guest of standing. While an overnight stay may connote a qualitatively greater expectation of privacy than some social visits, given the typical characteristics of overnight stays such as showering, changing clothes, and the use of toilet facilities, the distinction is really more one of degree than of kind. For example, the seclusion extended to a parent who pauses [736]*736to feed or diaper an infant while visiting friends implies a reasonable expectation of privacy, although the visit might be a short one, and certainly less than an overnight stay. Visitors of comparatively short duration may nap, change, use the toilet, or dine without any expectation of interference from the world at large. In this case, defendant felt secure enough in the home to remove her shoes, leave her purse beyond her view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests were playing cards. Eschewing an analysis based on free access and right to exclude others, the Olson Court focused on the social tradition that
hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household.
Id. at 1689.
A standing challenge in the search and seizure context is resolved by a determination of “whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy.” Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). We conclude that defendant’s status as an invited guest in the home vested her with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and she thereby gained sufficient standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant and the resulting search.
B. Abandonment
The state argues that even if defendant might otherwise have standing to challenge the search warrant, she abandoned the purse, and thus abandoned any standing she might otherwise have had to challenge the search which resulted in seizure of her purse. We disagree.
"When individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might have had.” United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 184, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983)). However, “abandonment must be distinguished from a mere disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior to the search, which under the better view does not defeat standing.” United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3, at 548-49 (1978)).
Whether defendant had abandoned her purse, under search and seizure analysis, is primarily a factual question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from “words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.” Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment ordinarily a question for the factfinder to be determined from the facts and circumstances). The burden of proving abandonment falls on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450, 259 Cal.Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be shown by “clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.” Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir.1965). See also United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C.1975); O’Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982). It “is measured from the vantage point” of the defendant, and not the police. Narain v. State, 79 Md.App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n. 4 (1989). “It is only the [defendant’s] state of mind that counts.” Id.
Defendant was allowed to leave the party along with Swickey’s other guests. She was conducted to the bedroom to retrieve her shoes and was given the opportunity to claim any other property belonging to her. When asked by the police officer if anything else belonged to her, she stated that she had retrieved everything in the bedroom that was hers. That repudiation of interest in property located in the bedroom is consistent with a conclusion of abandonment. It is not, however, inconsistent with a conclusion of a mere disclaimer of interest to avoid self-incrimination. The state failed to produce evidence which would de[737]*737velop this issue and perhaps meet its burden of proving abandonment under search and seizure analysis. Accordingly, abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense was not established by the state.6
C. Good Faith
The state further claims the search can be validated by the officer’s good faith reliance on the deficient warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419-20, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring unlawful police conduct,7 does not bar evidence obtained by officers acting in good faith reliance on a defective warrant.8 Id. But the Leon doctrine is not without limitations. When the magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant is not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers. Id. 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. We have determined that there was nothing in the affidavit in this case that would offer [738]*738any basis to the magistrate for a finding of probable cause to allow a nighttime search. It appears from the record that the endorsement of the nighttime authorization was done in impermissible “rubber stamp” fashion. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
The question of the officer’s good faith reliance is subject to de novo determination by this court. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1986). The conduct of the officers executing the search warrant must be objectively reasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3419. Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous statutory directive to present the magistrate with “reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in the night,” Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990), and then claim that their very failure to do so is objectively reasonable conduct on their part. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 n. 20 (objective standard requires reasonable knowledge of the law by police officers); United States v. Freitas, 610 F.Supp. 1560, 1572 (N.D.Cal.1985) (police agency must train officers, who have obligation to ensure that warrant comports with constitutional law), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.1986). In this case, the same officer prepared the affidavit, secured the warrant, and executed the search.9 He had personal knowledge of the affidavit’s contents. This further persuades us that reliance on the warrant cannot be termed “reasonable” and thus the Leon exception does not apply in this case.
D. Appropriate Remedy
Having so concluded, we must now turn our attention to whether the warrant’s issuance in violation of the nighttime search requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, namely the drugs and other items found in defendant’s purse. We recognize that mere ministerial and technical errors in the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate the warrant. See, e.g., State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988) (violation of “knock-and-announce” rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock). Cf. State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) (suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation).
However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy. Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement). But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances).
The historical character of a nighttime search further persuades us that violation of the statute requires suppression. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283-84, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (question of reasonableness of a search must be viewed not only from the particular facts, but also with an eye toward what was considered reasonable at [739]*739the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment). Searches of homes were soundly condemned by the drafters of the Bill of Rights and under English common law.10 See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1968). “Night-time search was the evil in its most obnoxious form.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210, 81 S.Ct. 473, 496, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The propriety of executing a search of an occupied dwelling at night is “sensitively related to the reasonableness” prong of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) (“entry into an occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry executed during the daytime”).
We hold that an unmitigated violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990), as is present in this case, requires suppression of all evidence gained in the search executed pursuant to the defective warrant.11
CONCLUSION
The warrant was unlawful insofar as it authorized a search at night. Defendant has standing to challenge that deficiency by virtue of her status as a guest in the home. The unlawful search cannot be saved on “good faith” or abandonment grounds. It follows that the evidence found in defendant’s purse should have been suppressed. Her conviction is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.