State v. Rosenburger

409 P.2d 684, 242 Or. 376, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 597
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 12, 1966
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 409 P.2d 684 (State v. Rosenburger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Rosenburger, 409 P.2d 684, 242 Or. 376, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 597 (Or. 1966).

Opinions

[377]*377PENNY, J.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of receiving and concealing stolen property, and appeals.

The defendant’s claim of error is based upon the trial court’s admission into evidence of oral statements made by defendant to officer Percell, which amounted to a confession. These statements were made after defendant had been charged with the crime and was in custody.

Before permitting the officer to testify, the trial court heard the testimony of the officer out of the presence of the jury and with the defendant and his attorney present. At this time and at no time did the defendant or any witness testify contrary to the facts testified to by the officer.

Officer Percell testified before the trial court as follows:

“I identified myself to him as a police officer, Detective, Auto Theft Detail. I told him I was assigned to this investigation, advised him of his constitutional rights.
ff* * * * *
“I advised Mr. Nosenburger that he need tell me nothing, that he had a right to remain silent, that if he did tell me anything it could be used against him in court. I further told him that he had a right to an attorney and that if he did not have funds to hire an attorney that the State would appoint him an attorney.
if* * * * *
“He indicated to me that he had been in touch with and had retained Mr. Bill Lang [ley] as his attorney but that he hadn’t conferred with Mr. Langley and did not wish to make any statement until such time as he had conferred with him.
[378]*378“Yes, lie was taken to court that day, the first day that I talked to him, and at that time he requested a continuance on the case and indicated to the court that he was represented by counsel but ■that he was undetermined as to what he was going to do.”

The officer had no further conversation with the defendant at this time. Subsequently, and on or about the 25th of November, 1964, the date set for defendant’s preliminary hearing, the officer escorted the defendant to the court room where the defendant advised the presiding judge that he was now without counsel, desired the appointment of counsel, and a continuance of his hearing. The trial court continued the hearing, advised defendant he would appoint counsel, and advised defendant of his right to remain silent. Shortly after this court appearance the officer again talked to the defendant. The state had anticipated a preliminary hearing that morning and there was present at the time Officer Percell talked to defendant one Gary Scott. Percell testified as follows:

“* * * As it developed it was not held that day so one of the subjects in my office requested that he be allowed to talk to John. I went in the courtroom and I told John that Gary Scott was in my office and wished to talk to him and asked him if he would like to talk to him. He said yes, he would talk to him, so I brought him back to our office, auto theft detail, and at this time he and Gary Scott and myself sat down at one of the desks.”

Percell further testified:

“Q Did you at this point have a conversation with Mr. Rosenburger?
“A Yes, I did.
[379]*379“Q Did you ask Mm questions and receive answers?
“A Yes, I did.
“Q * * * Did you use any force or duress •to get the defendant to talk to you?
“A Absolutely not.
# # # &
“Q Prior to your talMng to him on this 25th, did he ask you to, did he tell you, did he ask you to have an attorney before he talked to you?
“A He did the first time that I talked to him but during the interim on that Monday he had talked to Mr. Langley and then the second time that I talked to him on the 25th I believe it was, or Wednesday, he had talked to Mr. Langley but had decided that he was going to ask for State-appointed counsel rather than hire his own.
* * * *
“Q Now, will you tell the Court what your conversation with Mr. Rosenburger was?
“A As I said, we sat down at the desk there and I previously talked to Mr. Scott and Mr. Scott had told me one story of what had transpired so at tMs time in the presence of Mr. Scott and Mr. Rosenburger I detailed to Mr. Rosenburger exactly what Scott had told me and I asked Scott to confirm this. At this time Rosenburger denied the allegations of the story as told by Mr. Scott.
“Q Gro ahead.
“A I talked to him further and after Mr. Scott had talked to him and told him now, tMs is what we did and this is the way it is, then Mr. Rosenburger stated Wes, I was the man that was down there. I was with him. I was the one that sold the clubs.’ And he further indicated to me that he had signed the slip that he gave to Mr. Caplan, that he had used a fictitious name and he said that he had represented that these clubs belonged to a brother and I asked Mm why he had misrepresented [380]*380his name, used an assumed name, and why he had denied being in Caplan’s; and he told me, at that time he made the statement ‘I guess I will have to admit it. I figured the clubs were hot.’ ”

The officer then detailed the statements made by the defendant in relation to the stolen property.

The trial court then made a finding that the statements of the defendant were voluntarily made with full knowledge of his constitutional rights. We agree. See State v. Atherton, 242 Or 621, 410 P2d 208, this day decided on the merits.

The defendant relies upon language contained in Bram v. United States, 168 US 532, 563, 18 S Ct 183, 42 L ed 568, to establish his contention that the statements of the defendant were not voluntary. There is some language therein that gives comfort to the defendant, but an examination of that case discloses that the majority’s opinion is based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of that defendant’s statement so that in fact there was an entrapment. No such circumstances are here present. After being fully advised of his rights, the defendant was given the opportunity to face Scott or not as he saw fit.

The judgment is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Jackson
655 P.2d 592 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
State v. Singleton
602 P.2d 1059 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1979)
State v. Turner
573 P.2d 326 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1978)
State v. Dyke
528 P.2d 1073 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1974)
State v. Freeman
484 P.2d 867 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1971)
State v. Whitewater
445 P.2d 594 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1968)
State v. Earp
440 P.2d 214 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1968)
State v. Allen
434 P.2d 740 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1967)
State v. Rosenburger
409 P.2d 684 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1966)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
409 P.2d 684, 242 Or. 376, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-rosenburger-or-1966.