OPINION
HANSON, Justice.
We are asked to extend the holding in State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn.2003), to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or the court to modify [325]*325the sentence where a mandatory conditional release term is not included in the maximum executed sentence described in the defendant’s plea petition but the defendant is on notice of the state’s intention to seek the term before sentencing and fails to object to its inclusion in the sentence. The court of appeals applied Wukawitz to hold that the plea was not intelligently entered and the sentence must be modified. We reverse.
Respondent Johnnie Lee Rhodes was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. lffiffi and subd. 2 (1998). On May 19, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Rhodes pleaded guilty. The written plea petition reflected agreement to a maximum executed sentence of 105 months and made no reference to the mandatory conditional release period required of sex offenders by Minn.Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a) (1998). The conditional release term was not discussed at the plea hearing.
On June 8, 1999, the Presentence Investigation report was issued. Its face sheet included a reference to “Conditional Release: 5 Years” and it concluded with the following “Recommendation”:
It is the recommendation of this Officer that the Court accept the proposed plea negotiation and sentence the defendant to 105 months commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections with jail credit of 270 days. It is further the recommendation of this Officer that the defendant be ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family for their out-of-pocket expenses. As this is a sex offense, he is subject to the provision of a specimen for DNA analysis, registration as a convicted sex offender, and a five year Conditional Release period upon his release from custody.
At the sentencing hearing held on June 17, 1999, the state presented the plea agreement and specifically stated to the court that, “along with a prison sentence, Rhodes would be sentenced to a five-year period of conditional release.” Neither Rhodes nor his counsel objected to this statement and, when later given an opportunity to speak, neither Rhodes nor his counsel made any statement concerning the plea agreement or the conditional release term. When the district court sentenced defendant, the court stated that Rhodes was subject to the 5-year conditional release term and said “so you’ll be on the five-year conditional release after you get out of prison.” The court then asked Rhodes if there were any questions or anything that the court had missed and Rhodes’ counsel answered, “No, your Hon- or.” The judgment roll included the 5-year conditional release term.
Three years later, on August 14, 2002, Rhodes filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or that the conditional release term be reduced to the term of supervised release so that the conditional release term would not cause him to be subject to Department of Corrections’ supervision longer than he would have been under a 105-month sentence. The post-conviction court denied Rhodes’ petition for relief because “[ajlthough the conditional-release term may have been absent in the plea petition itself, it was incorporated into Petitioner’s sentence at the sentencing hearing as required by law.” The court noted that “[tjhere is no requirement that the conditional release term be mentioned prior to sentencing. Rather, the statute specifically requires it to be included in the sentence.” The court concluded that Rhodes was aware of the 5-year conditional release term because it
was specifically outlined in the presen-tence investigation, it was part of the [326]*326prosecutor’s request at sentencing, both Petitioner and his attorney were present when the terra was imposed by the Court, both Petitioner and his attorney were active participants at the hearing and Petitioner and his attorney were afforded the opportunity to object or inquire. All of this took place in open court with the Petitioner present.
In reaching its decision, the postconviction court relied upon an unpublished court of appeals opinion, State v. Norris, No. CX-01-1834, 2002 WL 485292, at *3 (Minn.App. April 2, 2002) (affirming the postcon-viction court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because defendant received notice of the conditional release term at the sentencing hearing and failed to object).
Rhodes appealed to the court of appeals, which held that the postconviction court abused its discretion by not modifying Rhodes’ sentence. The court of appeals concluded that Rhodes “did not intelligently enter his plea because he did not know all the direct consequences of his plea.” Rhodes v. State, No. C7-03-80, 2003 WL 21452143, at *4 (Minn.App. June 24, 2003). The court, mistakenly believing that Rhodes “does not ask to withdraw his guilty plea,” granted Rhodes’ alternative request that the “conditional release be modified so that it is concurrent and coterminous with his supervised release, but so that [Rhodes] would remain incarcerated until the normal supervised release date.” Id. at *2, *4.
The court of appeals noted that different panels of the court of appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether post-conviction relief is appropriate under these circumstances. Id. at *3 n. 2 (citing Buford v. State, No. C4-01-2137, 2002 WL 31013691 at *3 (Minn.App. Sept.10, 2002) and Norris, 2002 WL 485292, at *2). We granted the state’s petition for further review.
We review a postconviction court’s decision to deny relief under an abuse of discretion standard. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn.2001). Determining what the parties agreed to in a plea bargain is a factual inquiry for the postconviction court to resolve. Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn.1979). But interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements involve issues of law that we review de novo. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is entered. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn.1997). Rather, Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, provides that “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A manifest injustice exists if the plea is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent. Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 688; see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-2.1.(b)(i)(c) (3d ed. 1999) (manifest injustice exists if “the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed.”).
In a series of seven cases, we have considered issues concerning the addition of the conditional release term after the sentence has already been imposed. See Wukawitz,
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OPINION
HANSON, Justice.
We are asked to extend the holding in State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn.2003), to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or the court to modify [325]*325the sentence where a mandatory conditional release term is not included in the maximum executed sentence described in the defendant’s plea petition but the defendant is on notice of the state’s intention to seek the term before sentencing and fails to object to its inclusion in the sentence. The court of appeals applied Wukawitz to hold that the plea was not intelligently entered and the sentence must be modified. We reverse.
Respondent Johnnie Lee Rhodes was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. lffiffi and subd. 2 (1998). On May 19, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Rhodes pleaded guilty. The written plea petition reflected agreement to a maximum executed sentence of 105 months and made no reference to the mandatory conditional release period required of sex offenders by Minn.Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a) (1998). The conditional release term was not discussed at the plea hearing.
On June 8, 1999, the Presentence Investigation report was issued. Its face sheet included a reference to “Conditional Release: 5 Years” and it concluded with the following “Recommendation”:
It is the recommendation of this Officer that the Court accept the proposed plea negotiation and sentence the defendant to 105 months commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections with jail credit of 270 days. It is further the recommendation of this Officer that the defendant be ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family for their out-of-pocket expenses. As this is a sex offense, he is subject to the provision of a specimen for DNA analysis, registration as a convicted sex offender, and a five year Conditional Release period upon his release from custody.
At the sentencing hearing held on June 17, 1999, the state presented the plea agreement and specifically stated to the court that, “along with a prison sentence, Rhodes would be sentenced to a five-year period of conditional release.” Neither Rhodes nor his counsel objected to this statement and, when later given an opportunity to speak, neither Rhodes nor his counsel made any statement concerning the plea agreement or the conditional release term. When the district court sentenced defendant, the court stated that Rhodes was subject to the 5-year conditional release term and said “so you’ll be on the five-year conditional release after you get out of prison.” The court then asked Rhodes if there were any questions or anything that the court had missed and Rhodes’ counsel answered, “No, your Hon- or.” The judgment roll included the 5-year conditional release term.
Three years later, on August 14, 2002, Rhodes filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or that the conditional release term be reduced to the term of supervised release so that the conditional release term would not cause him to be subject to Department of Corrections’ supervision longer than he would have been under a 105-month sentence. The post-conviction court denied Rhodes’ petition for relief because “[ajlthough the conditional-release term may have been absent in the plea petition itself, it was incorporated into Petitioner’s sentence at the sentencing hearing as required by law.” The court noted that “[tjhere is no requirement that the conditional release term be mentioned prior to sentencing. Rather, the statute specifically requires it to be included in the sentence.” The court concluded that Rhodes was aware of the 5-year conditional release term because it
was specifically outlined in the presen-tence investigation, it was part of the [326]*326prosecutor’s request at sentencing, both Petitioner and his attorney were present when the terra was imposed by the Court, both Petitioner and his attorney were active participants at the hearing and Petitioner and his attorney were afforded the opportunity to object or inquire. All of this took place in open court with the Petitioner present.
In reaching its decision, the postconviction court relied upon an unpublished court of appeals opinion, State v. Norris, No. CX-01-1834, 2002 WL 485292, at *3 (Minn.App. April 2, 2002) (affirming the postcon-viction court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because defendant received notice of the conditional release term at the sentencing hearing and failed to object).
Rhodes appealed to the court of appeals, which held that the postconviction court abused its discretion by not modifying Rhodes’ sentence. The court of appeals concluded that Rhodes “did not intelligently enter his plea because he did not know all the direct consequences of his plea.” Rhodes v. State, No. C7-03-80, 2003 WL 21452143, at *4 (Minn.App. June 24, 2003). The court, mistakenly believing that Rhodes “does not ask to withdraw his guilty plea,” granted Rhodes’ alternative request that the “conditional release be modified so that it is concurrent and coterminous with his supervised release, but so that [Rhodes] would remain incarcerated until the normal supervised release date.” Id. at *2, *4.
The court of appeals noted that different panels of the court of appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether post-conviction relief is appropriate under these circumstances. Id. at *3 n. 2 (citing Buford v. State, No. C4-01-2137, 2002 WL 31013691 at *3 (Minn.App. Sept.10, 2002) and Norris, 2002 WL 485292, at *2). We granted the state’s petition for further review.
We review a postconviction court’s decision to deny relief under an abuse of discretion standard. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn.2001). Determining what the parties agreed to in a plea bargain is a factual inquiry for the postconviction court to resolve. Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn.1979). But interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements involve issues of law that we review de novo. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000).
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is entered. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn.1997). Rather, Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, provides that “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” A manifest injustice exists if the plea is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent. Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 688; see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-2.1.(b)(i)(c) (3d ed. 1999) (manifest injustice exists if “the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed.”).
In a series of seven cases, we have considered issues concerning the addition of the conditional release term after the sentence has already been imposed. See Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d at 523-25 (discussing previous cases). In situations where the addition of the conditional release term would result in a sentence that exceeded the maximum executed sentence agreed to in the plea bargain, we have held that the addition of the conditional release term violates the plea agreement. See, e.g., State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 44 [327]*327(Minn.2000). But in each of those cases, the conditional release term was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing or included in the initial sentence. See, e.g., Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d at 529 (“Our holding is limited to those situations where the original sentence did not include conditional release and the imposition of such a term after the fact would violate the plea agreement.”).
The state essentially advances two arguments in support of its contention that the present facts do not produce a manifest injustice and that Rhodes is not entitled to postconviction relief. First, the state argues that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rhodes’ plea was intelligent because Rhodes was aware of the conditional release term. Second, the state argues that because Rhodes did not object to the conditional release term or move to withdraw his guilty plea when the conditional release term was imposed at sentencing, he waived his right to claim that the addition of the conditional release term was a breach of the plea agreement.
Rhodes argues that his decision to plead guilty was not intelligent because he was not informed about the mandatory period of conditional release at the time that he entered his guilty plea. Rhodes argues that the focus in ascertaining the validity of a guilty plea should be on what the defendant knew at the time he decided to plead guilty, not'what he may have subsequently learned from the presritence investigation report or at the sentencing hearing.
We agree with the state that the posteonvietion court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rhodes’ plea was intelligently made. First, at both the time of his plea and of sentencing, Rhodes was on notice that the conditional release term for sex offenders was mandatory and could not be waived by the district court. The statutory requirement of a conditional release term was added in 1992, years before Rhodes entered his plea. Second, we recognized the mandatory nature of conditional release terms in State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn.1998), and State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn.1998). Those decisions were issued on July 9, 1998, 10 months before Rhodes pleaded guilty on May 19, 1999. Third, the postconviction court could infer from Rhodes’ failure to object to the presen-tence investigation’s recommendation, the state’s request at the sentencing hearing and the court’s imposition of the sentence, that Rhodes understood from the beginning that the conditional release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea bargain. This third factor materially differentiates this case from Wukawitz and the precedent on which it relies. It also disproves any claim that Rhodes might make that the state had promised to recommend a sentence that did not include a conditional release term.
We need not reach the state’s alternative argument on waiver. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court’s denial of postconviction relief.
Reversed.