HUSKINS, Justice.
Defendant’s first, second and third assignments of error are based on the contention that the warrantless search of his automobile was illegal. Hence, defendant argues, the fruits of the search were tainted and inadmissible as evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Since the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Thus, evidence unconstitutionally obtained is excluded in both state and federal courts as an essential to due process — not as a rule of evidence but as a matter of constitutional law. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E. 2d 376 (1968). Such was law in North Carolina long before the decision in Mapp. G.S. 15-27 and G.S. 15-27.1 provide, inter alia, that no facts discovered or evidence obtained in the course of any search without a legal search warrant, made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action. These statutes, in accord with constitutional requirements, render incompetent all evidence obtained (1) in the course of a [403]*403search, (2) without a legal search warrant, (3) under conditions requiring a search warrant. State v. Coffey, 255 N.C. 293, 121 S.E. 2d 736 (1961); State v. Stevens, 264 N.C. 737, 142 S.E. 2d 588 (1965).
The Constitution does not prohibit all searches and seizures but only those which are unreasonable. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S.Ct. 1437 (1960). An unreasonable search has been defined as “an examination or inspection without authority of law of one’s premises or person, with a view to the discovery of . . . some evidence of guilt, to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action.” 47 Am. Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 52.
In recognition of the mobility of automobiles, a search of an automobile without a warrant is constitutionally permissible if there is probable cause to make the search. Carroll v. United States, supra; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969). The search of an automobile on probable cause proceeds on a theory entirely different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest. “The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, supra. “Automobiles, because of their mobility, maybe searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office (citations omitted). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have ‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search.” Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 391 U.S. 216, 20 L.Ed. 2d 538, 88 S.Ct. 1472 (1968).
If there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officer may either seize and hold the vehicle before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate, or he may carry out an immediate search without a warrant. “For constitutional purposes we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate [404]*404search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed. 2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970). See Note, Chambers v. Maroney: New Dimensions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 46 Ind. L. J. 257 (1971). Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022, reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 30 L.Ed. 2d 120, 92 S.Ct. 26 (1971).
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts in this case, we hold that Officer Hartley acted on reasonable grounds and with probable cause when he searched defendant’s car on the spot. The officer observed defendant, apparently nude, in a parked car on the parking lot of a business establishment at midnight. Any alert officer under such circumstances would stop and investigate. When this officer stopped, defendant tried to drive away. Then he was seen brushing something out of his lap into the floorboard of the car. Then he appeared to kick something under the seat with his left leg and foot. Such suspicious, furtive conduct would alert any officer to the fact that defendant had something to hide. The totality of these exigent circumstances was sufficient to lead a man of prudence and caution to believe defendant’s car contained contraband of some sort, and Officer Hartley was fully justified in the examination of the car which he made. He would have been remiss in the performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer had he done otherwise. Thus, given probable cause, the search which Officer Hartley made was reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards, and the fruits of the search were properly admitted in evidence. Chambers v. Maroney, supra; State v. Hill, 278 N.C. 365, 180 S.E. 2d 21 (1971); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E. 2d 449 (1971); State v. v. Jordan, 277 N.C. 341, 177 S.E. 2d 289 (1970). These assignments of error are overruled.
The trial court, over defendant’s objection, admitted for jury consideration the following statements made to Officer Hartley: (1) Defendant’s statement that he had shot a woman out off Fisher Road; (2) defendant’s statement that Officer Hartley was a cop and for him to find out for himself the location off Fisher Road where the shooting took place; and (3) defendant’s statement that Officer Hartley should try to find the woman because she may not be dead and Hartley could be a hero. Defendant contends these statements were erroneously admitted because he was an indigent, charged with a capital [405]*405offense, undergoing in-custody interrogation by an officer, and was entitled to counsel during such interrogation under G.S. 7A-451, citing State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E. 2d 561 (1971), as authority for his position. Admission of these incriminating statements constitutes defendant’s fourth assignment of error.
In our view, neither G.S. 7A-451 (1969) nor the decision of this Court in State v. Lynch, supra, have any application to the factual circumstances of this case.
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HUSKINS, Justice.
Defendant’s first, second and third assignments of error are based on the contention that the warrantless search of his automobile was illegal. Hence, defendant argues, the fruits of the search were tainted and inadmissible as evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Since the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961), “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Thus, evidence unconstitutionally obtained is excluded in both state and federal courts as an essential to due process — not as a rule of evidence but as a matter of constitutional law. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E. 2d 376 (1968). Such was law in North Carolina long before the decision in Mapp. G.S. 15-27 and G.S. 15-27.1 provide, inter alia, that no facts discovered or evidence obtained in the course of any search without a legal search warrant, made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action. These statutes, in accord with constitutional requirements, render incompetent all evidence obtained (1) in the course of a [403]*403search, (2) without a legal search warrant, (3) under conditions requiring a search warrant. State v. Coffey, 255 N.C. 293, 121 S.E. 2d 736 (1961); State v. Stevens, 264 N.C. 737, 142 S.E. 2d 588 (1965).
The Constitution does not prohibit all searches and seizures but only those which are unreasonable. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S.Ct. 1437 (1960). An unreasonable search has been defined as “an examination or inspection without authority of law of one’s premises or person, with a view to the discovery of . . . some evidence of guilt, to be used in the prosecution of a criminal action.” 47 Am. Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 52.
In recognition of the mobility of automobiles, a search of an automobile without a warrant is constitutionally permissible if there is probable cause to make the search. Carroll v. United States, supra; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969). The search of an automobile on probable cause proceeds on a theory entirely different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest. “The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, supra. “Automobiles, because of their mobility, maybe searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office (citations omitted). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have ‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search.” Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 391 U.S. 216, 20 L.Ed. 2d 538, 88 S.Ct. 1472 (1968).
If there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officer may either seize and hold the vehicle before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate, or he may carry out an immediate search without a warrant. “For constitutional purposes we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate [404]*404search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed. 2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970). See Note, Chambers v. Maroney: New Dimensions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 46 Ind. L. J. 257 (1971). Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022, reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 30 L.Ed. 2d 120, 92 S.Ct. 26 (1971).
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts in this case, we hold that Officer Hartley acted on reasonable grounds and with probable cause when he searched defendant’s car on the spot. The officer observed defendant, apparently nude, in a parked car on the parking lot of a business establishment at midnight. Any alert officer under such circumstances would stop and investigate. When this officer stopped, defendant tried to drive away. Then he was seen brushing something out of his lap into the floorboard of the car. Then he appeared to kick something under the seat with his left leg and foot. Such suspicious, furtive conduct would alert any officer to the fact that defendant had something to hide. The totality of these exigent circumstances was sufficient to lead a man of prudence and caution to believe defendant’s car contained contraband of some sort, and Officer Hartley was fully justified in the examination of the car which he made. He would have been remiss in the performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer had he done otherwise. Thus, given probable cause, the search which Officer Hartley made was reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards, and the fruits of the search were properly admitted in evidence. Chambers v. Maroney, supra; State v. Hill, 278 N.C. 365, 180 S.E. 2d 21 (1971); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E. 2d 449 (1971); State v. v. Jordan, 277 N.C. 341, 177 S.E. 2d 289 (1970). These assignments of error are overruled.
The trial court, over defendant’s objection, admitted for jury consideration the following statements made to Officer Hartley: (1) Defendant’s statement that he had shot a woman out off Fisher Road; (2) defendant’s statement that Officer Hartley was a cop and for him to find out for himself the location off Fisher Road where the shooting took place; and (3) defendant’s statement that Officer Hartley should try to find the woman because she may not be dead and Hartley could be a hero. Defendant contends these statements were erroneously admitted because he was an indigent, charged with a capital [405]*405offense, undergoing in-custody interrogation by an officer, and was entitled to counsel during such interrogation under G.S. 7A-451, citing State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E. 2d 561 (1971), as authority for his position. Admission of these incriminating statements constitutes defendant’s fourth assignment of error.
In our view, neither G.S. 7A-451 (1969) nor the decision of this Court in State v. Lynch, supra, have any application to the factual circumstances of this case. Furthermore, although the officer warned defendant of his constitutional rights and defendant stated he understood them, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964), and in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), have no application to the factual circumstances revealed by this record. Here, an officer on night patrol stopped to investigate the unusual circumstances of an apparently nude man in a parked car on the parking lot of a business establishment at midnight. In consequence of what the officer saw and his discovery of the pistol, he arrested defendant for carrying a concealed weapon, a violation of G.S. 14-269 (1969) and a petty misdemeanor.
At all times pertinent to this case, an indigent charged with a petty misdemeanor was not entitled to the services of counsel at the State’s expense. G.S. 7A-451(1) (1969); State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E. 2d 245 (1968).
At the time Officer Hartley arrested defendant he had no knowledge that Marilyn Best had been murdered. He did not suspect defendant of murder. He had no reason to believe that defendant had committed a capital felony and did not interrogate him with reference to such a crime. Even so, immediately upon informing defendant that he was under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, the officer fully informed him of his constitutional rights and defendant said he understood them. His subsequent police-baiting conduct clearly indicated that he did understand them, that he answered only those questions he wanted to answer, and that he felt no compulsion to answer any of them.
The conversation between Officer Hartley and defendant was not an in-custody interrogation of a murder suspect. While awaiting the wrecker which would take defendant’s automobile [406]*406to the sheriff’s office, Hartley “broke down” the pistol which defendant had concealed when the officer approached. When he observed that three of its nine chambers were empty, he asked defendant where he had been and what he had been shooting at. Considering the misdemeanor charge against defendant and his unusual attire for midnight travel, this offhand inquiry was not illogical. Defendant’s casual and astonishing reply was, “I just shot a woman.” When the officer asked who and where the victim was, defendant replied that he did not know her name and that it was out on Fisher Road. The officer’s attempt to get more definite information was unsuccessful. Defendant told him he was a cop and for him to find out.
After that comment from defendant, Officer Hartley devoted his attention to filling out a storage report to have defendant’s automobile stored; and while thus engaged, defendant volunteered the information that the woman might not be dead and that Hartley could be a hero if he found her.
At this disclosure it is rather apparent that Officer Hartley did not know whether he had on his hands a lunatic, a drug addict, a police baiter, a practical joker, or a felon. Obviously, the officer could not ignore the possibility that somewhere near Fisher Road the life of a wounded woman might depend on receiving immediate aid. He did what any officer and any other person of good will would have done when he tried to learn the woman’s identity and where she could be found. To suggest that such inquiries must await a determination of indigency and appointment of counsel is unrealistic.
To such inquiries by the officer, however, defendant, in obscene language, referred to the officer as a pig and refused any further information. At one time he said, “What if I told you her name began with the letter A ? What if I told you her name began with a B ?” After those" baiting questions from defendant Officer Hartley ceased his efforts to ascertain the woman’s whereabouts. He went back to defendant’s car where he found a hatchet on the floor of the back seat and a lady’s necklace watch, which defendant said belonged to his wife, on the floor of the front seat. He also found three or four wet, folded dollar bills which he gave to defendant with an admonition against leaving money in the car.
[407]*407About this time the wrecker arrived and defendant inquired whether Hartley was going to charge him with murder. Hartley told him he was under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon and he would not be arrested for murder until they found a body. Defendant said “that would be good, he could spend a lot of time in the penitentiary with some good cons and learn himself a trade like bank robbery or something of that nature.” Hartley then asked defendant why he shot the woman and was informed, in vulgar language, that she would not consent to have intercourse with him.
En route to the jail defendant again told the officer that he should try to find the woman. Then he added, “Oh, hell, I know she’s dead because I shot her five times.” At the police station, Hartley told defendant to tell Sergeant Norton what he had told him about shooting a woman and defendant said, “I didn’t shoot a woman, I shot a man.”
The foregoing recital is a resume of the evidence which the judge heard on voir dire in the absence of the jury. Before the jury, with reference to his conversation with defendant, Hartley was permitted to say only that defendant told him he had shot a woman off Fisher Road; that Hartley was a cop and it was for him to find out where; and that he should try to find the woman because she might not be dead and he would be a hero.
This narration of the questions put to defendant in the deserted parking lot depicts a situation entirely foreign to “in-custody interrogation” discussed and condemned in Escobedo and Miranda. It was no incommunicado interrogation of an individual in a police dominated atmosphere. After having volunteered the information that the woman he had shot might not be dead, he refused to give any additional information. His contention now that his conviction should be set aside because he was indigent and unrepresented by counsel must fall on deaf ears. Neither the law nor common sense permits or requires such a farcical result. Cf. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P. 2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); commented upon in K. Graham, “What is ‘Custodial Interrogation?’ ” 14 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 59, 118 (1966).
An officer does not question a misdemeanant at the risk of jeopardizing the prosecution of some felony he did not know [408]*408had been committed. Under the circumstances revealed by this record, we hold that the officer’s questions were entirely proper and in nowise violated defendant’s rights, either constitutional or statutory, and it was not error to admit for consideration by the jury the three statements which form the basis of defendant’s fourth assignment of error. The first statement (that he had shot a woman) was a surprising and unexpected answer to a proper question. The second statement (that Hartley was a cop and it was for him to locate the victim) was badgering language and does not amount to a confession. The third statement (that the woman might'not be dead and Hartley could be a hero) was volunteered and its admission into evidence is not barred under any theory of the law. State v. Stepney, 280 N.C. 306, 185 S.E. 2d 844 (1972). Defendant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Other assignments relating to motion for nonsuit and for directed verdict are formal requiring no discussion. For the reasons stated the verdict and judgment of the trial court must be upheld.
No error.