State v. Rand

247 N.E.2d 342, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 49 Ohio Op. 2d 127, 1969 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 274
CourtCourt of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division
DecidedMay 13, 1969
DocketNo. 37821
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 247 N.E.2d 342 (State v. Rand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County, Civil Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Rand, 247 N.E.2d 342, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 49 Ohio Op. 2d 127, 1969 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 274 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1969).

Opinion

Steen, J.

The specific issue raised by this motion is whether the defendant is competent to stand trial, if tranquilizing drugs are administered under proper medical direction, which permit the defendant to communicate with his counsel, in an apparently reasonable and rational manner, as to the preparation and conduct of his defense to the pending charge of murder in the first degree.

In 1960, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree with the recommendation of [100]*100mercy. An appeal was timely filed by court-appointed counsel. The judgment of conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals of Franklin County on February 28,1967. Leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on September 27, 1967.

The defendant was committed to the Lima State Hospital prior to trial in 1960. He was also a patient at Lima after conviction, upon transfer from the Ohio Penitentiary on January 27, 1961. He remained at Lima until April 1962. In 1963, he was again transferred to Lima from the Ohio Penitentiary by the State Department of Mental Hygiene and Correction, and he has been at Lima until the present time.

On November 29,1968, a preliminary hearing was held, with the defendant and counsel for the state and defendant being present. A second hearing was held on March 14, 1969, at which time medical testimony was adduced by both parties.

Before discussing the specific issues presented to the court, consideration must be given to the propriety of the detention of the defendant at Lima State Hospital since November 17, 1967, when the Court of Appeals issued its mandate remanding the case to the court for further proceeding.

The defendant was sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary “for life” on June 20, 1960. The defendant is at the present time under the custody of the warden of the penitentiary. Since the penitentiary is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Hygiene and Correction, the warden has the statutory right to transfer prisoners from one institution to another that is under the jurisdiction of the state corrections department. Section 5119.17, Revised Code. However, when the Court of Appeals issued its mandate reversing the Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction, a certificate of reversal should have been issued to the warden of the penitentiary, and the warden, upon receipt of such certificate, should have caused the defendant to be conveyed to the sheriff of this county to await further legal proceedings. Section 2953.13, Revised Code.

If it was felt that the defendant was not sane after the [101]*101Court of Appeals mandate was issued m 1967, proper legal proceedings should have been instituted to have the defendant committed to a mental hospital. This was not done. Therefore, the defendant is being held at the Lima State Hospital without proper judicial commitment.

Turning now to the specific question presented, the court faces an anomalous situation, in that since October 1967, the defendant has asserted, through counsel, that he is competent to stand trial, while the state has taken the opposite view. The question of “insanity” either upon the issue of competence to stand trial, or upon the issue of not being guilty by reason of insanity, is usually a matter raised by the defendant.

Does the state of Ohio have standing to raise the issue as to defendant’s competency to stand trial? This issue,competency to stand trial, must be raised and determined before the issues of the actual trial can be heard and decided. Under Section 2945.37, Revised Code, the question of competency to stand trial can be raised orally by the' defendant in any manner or by the court itself upon its own motion. The question can be raised by the prosecution. See Ormsby v. United States (1921), 273 F. 977, 987. The court in that case ruled that a public officer, charged with enforcing the criminal law, is inherently charged with the duty of invoking laws of this character, not only for the protection of society, but also for the protection-of those accused of crime. In fact, if it appears to the court itself that the question of competency to stand trial should be considered, the court is duty bound to inquire into said issue, People v. Aparicio (1952), 38 Cal. 2d 565, 241 P.2d 221. The issue may be heard and determined even over the objection of defendant’s counsel, State v. Hebert (1937), 186 La. 308, 172 So. 167.

The Ohio statute and court decisions clearly indicate that we are following the common-law rule that if the question of competency to stand trial is raised by the defense, the prosecution, or the court, the matter must be judicially heard and determined before the case may proceed to trial.

We then must consider what is meant by the term [102]*102“competency to stand trial.” The Supreme Court of Ohio states the test in State, ex rel. v. Bushong (1946), 146 Ohio St. 271, 273, as:

“A person being of sufficient mind to understand and appreciate the nature of the charge against him, to comprehend the situation and whether he is mentally capable of furnishing his counsel the facts essential to the presentation of the proper defense.”

This case followed the position taken by that court in State, ex rel. v. Owen (1937), 133 Ohio St. 96, 104. This test was also announced in the landmark case of Dusky v. United States (1962), 362 U. S. 402:

“The test must be whether he (the defendant) has sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”

The responsibility and duty of the court in making a finding as to mental competency of an accused to stand trial is also very clearly set forth in the well-considered opinion in Feguer v. United States (1962), 302 F. 2d 214, which holds that the presence of a mental illness does not mean necessarily one is mentally incompetent to stand trial. The fact that defendant Rand, prior to his trial in 1960, raised the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the fact that since 1963, by the direction of state authorities, the defendant was a patient in Lima State Hospital, do not prohibit a court at this time from determining the defendant’s competency to stand trial.

The tests of responsibility — capacity to know right from wrong, irresistible impulse, etc., have no bearing on the issue presented in this particular proceeding. State v. Murphy (1960), 56 Wash, 2d 761, 355 P. 2d 343, 83 A. L. R. 2d 1061, stated the test of mental unsoundness sufficient to permit a person’s trial as:

Has the defendant capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own condition in reference to such proceedings and to make a rational defense?

It is, therefore, clear that the test of insanity, under [103]*103the Ohio law as stated by Chief Justice Taft’s recent opinion in State v. Staten (1969), 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, does not pertain to the proceedings at hand.

Relevant testimony adduced at the hearing on March 14, 1969, clearly reveals the opinions of both experts as to the specific issue in this case.

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Bluebook (online)
247 N.E.2d 342, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 49 Ohio Op. 2d 127, 1969 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-rand-ohctcomplfrankl-1969.